SANTA  CRUZ 


Gift  of 
Henry  J.  McFarland 


>•  ' 

u 

i- 


THE   WILSON 

ADMINISTRATION    AND 

THE    GREAT    WAR 


•j 

ERNEST  W.  YOUNG,, LL.M. 

\    I  «••  -^ 

Author  of  "Comments  on  the  Interchurch  Report  on  the 
Steel  Strike  of  igign 


BOSTON 

RICHARD  G.  BADGER 

THE  GORHAM   PRESS 


COPYRIGHT,  1922,  BY  RICHARD  G.  BADGER 


All  Rights  Reserved 


Made  in  the  United  States  of  America 
The  Gorham  Press,  Boston,  U.S.A. 


POINT  OF  VIEW 

The  following  pages  attempt  to  treat  of  Functioning — 
Governmental  Functioning  at  a  time  of  peculiar  crisis  in 
the  nation's  career.  They  do  not  assume  to  be  a  history  of 
the  Great  War.  They  undertake,  rather,  to  select  a  few 
of  the  greater  matters  which  engaged  the  attention  of  the 
Wilson  Administration  in  that  notable  period,  those  that 
came  nearest  the  hearth,  the  heart-center  of  the  great  Re- 
public; those  that  the  history  of  the  future  will  necessarily 
select  as  the  chief  center  of  the  impulses  of  the  nation's 
throbs  for  humanity. 

As  these  touch  upon  matters  of  history,  perhaps  of 
statecraft,  it  is  proper  to  add  that  it  is  not  only  war-time 
orders  of  the  President  of  the  mightiest  republic  of  re- 
corded time,  or  the  thrilling  utterance  of  eloquent  lips;  not 
the  laws  of  Congress  or  the  decrees  of  a  great  and  orderly 
Senate;  nor  yet  the  surge  and  urge  of  irresistible  armies — 
not  these  alone  constitute  history.  They  are  a  part.  No 
less  a  part  thereof  are  the  din  and  uproar  and  tumult  in  the 
busy  places  of  trade  or  where  crowds  gather  to  hear  their 
spokesmen — or  the  spokesmen  of  their  opponents;  the 
shout  and  noise  and  clash  of  opposing  social  and  economic 
forces;  the  ringing  of  bells,  the  blasts  of  whistles,  the  toot 
of  horns,  the  "confusion  worse  confounded"  in  the  celebra- 
tion of  victory  or  the  signing  of  an  armistice,  yet  order  in 
it  all — these  constitute  an  essential  part  of  history. 

But  chief  of  all  and  center  of  all  is  that  place  where  the 
child  is  taught  its  mother's  tongue  and  lisps  its  early 
prayers;  where  father  and  son,  mother  and  daughter  are  ac- 
customed to  meet  on  common  ground ;  where  tears  are  shed 
and  griefs  are  shared,  where  fond  love  first  finds  its  joys; 

iii 


iv  Point  of  View 

where  the  infirm  ease  their  pains  and  the  strong  learn  to 
bear  the  burdens  of  the  weak;  where  God  is  revered,  and 
the  nation's  unassailable  foundations  are  based — the  fire- 
side. It  is  here  that  the  historian  who  would  seek  the  start- 
ing point,  the  very  center  and  the  whole  circumference  of 
the  fabric  of  the  nation's  greatness,  must  search;  omitting 
which,  he  fails  of  truth.  Bolshevism,  anarchism,  destruc- 
tion of  all  kinds  can  never  disturb  the  nation's  balance,  until 
they  first  shake  these  sure  foundations.  But  once  these 
finest  elements  are  lost  out  of  the  nation's  life,  once  the 
nation's  women  are  nationalized,  turned  into  cattle,  then 
these  foundations  are  shaken,  the  nation  loses  its  morale, 
and  the  Republic  of  the  fathers  is  at  an  end. 

If  the  course  of  the  Wilson  Administration  at  any  time 
caused  depression  because  admitting  the  dernier  forces  to 
a  partial  temporary  control,  it  passed  with  the  breaking  of 
the  new  day.  The  night  of  gloom  is  gone,  let  it  be  hoped 
forever. 

The  author  felt  that  when  Mr.  Bryan  swung  the  Balti- 
more convention  to  Woodrow  Wilson,  after  his  chief  com- 
petitor had  a  majority  of  the  convention,  he  performed  one 
of  the  most  notable  acts  of  our  entire  political  history  and 
for  the  public  good.  With  an  open  mind,  he  was  favorably 
inclined  toward  Mr.  Wilson  when  he  entered  upon  his  first 
term  in  the  presidency,  and  resented  Theodore  Roosevelt's 
first  broadsides  against  the  President  after  the  European 
conflagration  started.  Yet,  in  common  with  millions  of 
others,  was  compelled  to  admit  the  correctness  of  Mr. 
Roosevelt's  position. 

In  the  matter  of  labor  his  sympathies  always  have  been, 
and  now  are,  ardently  with  the  real  working  man  as  dis- 
tinguished from  the  professional  agitator-man.  Brought 
up  on  a  hill  farm  in  an  eastern  state,  where,  at  the  age  of 
sixteen,  and  not  yet  grown,  he  cut  the  grain  in  the  hilly 
fields  by  swinging  the  cradle  with  strong  men,  he  knows 
from  personal  experience  the  hardest  of  manual  labor.  If 


Point  of  View  v 

the  following  pages  reveal  the  fact  that  he  has  no  more 
sympathy  with  autocracy  in  labor  circles  than  in  industrial 
capitalism,  the  presidency,  or  Prussia,  that  is  a  necessary 
incident  to  this  study.  He  has  no  sympathy  with  a  so-called 
laboring  man,  who,  merely  because  he  is  in  an  organized 
group,  will  smite  an  honest  laboring  man  merely  because 
he  happens  to  be  outside  of  that  group,  as  the  great  majority 
are.  "A  man's  a  man  for  a1  that.11  His  brand  of  democ- 
racy is  as  broad  and  deep  as  humanity  itself.  He  regards 
America  as  the  great  hope  of  the  world's  democracy,  be- 
cause she  is  free  and  her  people  unshackled. 

THE  AUTHOR. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I    COMING  STORM  AND  PREPARATION 9 

II    THE  FOOD  ADMINISTRATION       ......  28 

III  THE  FUEL  ADMINISTRATION 41 

IV  LABOR  AND  WAGES 51 

V    SHIPBUILDING 66 

VI    GOVERNMENT  RAILROADING 83 

VII     SECRETARY  BAKER  AND  MR.  CREEL  IN  WAR    .     .  107 

VIII     THE  POST-OFFICE  DEPARTMENT 140 

IX    THE  PRESS  AND  PUBLIC  OPINION 154 

X    LIQUOR  AND  VICE 169 

XI     RUSSIA  AND  BOLSHEVISM 188 

XII     DISLOYALTY 221 

XIII  LOOKING  TOWARD  PEACE 234 

XIV  THE  WORLD'S  PEACE  CONGRESS 261 

XV    THE  TREATY  OF  PARIS 300 

XVI    THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS     .......  325 

XVII     THE  ADMINISTRATION  AND  POLITICS      ....  346 

XVIII    WILSON  AND  WILSONISM 365 

XIX     PROFITEERING 387 

XX    RECONSTRUCTION 398 

XXI     INSURANCE  AND  COMPENSATION 420 

XXII    THE  SPIRIT  OF  AMERICA 429 

CONCLUSIONS 450 

INDEX 457 

vii 


THE  WILSON  ADMINISTRATION 
AND  THE  GREAT  WAR 


THE  WILSON 

ADMINISTRATION  AND 

THE  GREAT  WAR 

CHAPTER  I 

COMING  STORM  AND  PREPARATION 

The  low,  long  roll  of  thunder  was  heard  along  the  east- 
ern horizon  on  a  morning  of  that  fateful  last  week  in  July, 
1914.  The  sound  of  it  stretched  across  the  sea  and 
reached  America  and  circled  the  globe.  No  cloud  was  in 
sight;  no  cause  apparent.  Yet  the  first  peal  grew  into  a  ter- 
rific roar,  the  whole  heaven  was  darkened,  and  the  world 
was  caught  in  an  awful  storm.  Thick  darkness  was  round 
about. 

The  diplomatic  battle,  with  Sir  Edward  Grey  as  the 
center  of  all  the  parleys  having  for  their  end  the  peace  of 
the  world,  was  ended  within  ten  days.  England  held  aloof, 
warning  France  that  for  her  to  advance  toward  Germany 
beyond  the  line  of  diplomatic  prudence  would  endanger 
her  support.  The  first  week  in  August  saw  military  force 
arrayed  against  military  force.  The  usual  poise  of  the 
world  was  upset  by  the  fierceness  and  ruthlessness  of  the 
onslaught,  and  little  Belgium  was  first  made  to  feel  the 
heavy  blow  of  the  cruel  ravager;  and  her  endurance  for 
the  first  ten  days  of  self-effacement,  together  with  Eng- 
land's ready  navy  saved  to  the  world  that  civilization  which 
was  the  product  of  twenty  centuries  of  human  effort.  For 
it  enabled  France  to  gather  her  forces  and  England  to 

9 


io      The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

assemble  her  resources  and  to  get  her  bearings  in  the  new 
relationships. 

America  was  in  a  maze.  To  her  the  situation  was 
stupefying.  The  Thing  seemed  unreal.  It  was  like  a  tale 
from  cloudland — impossible.  The  American  was  confused, 
baffled.  He  knew  that  there  was  disordered  movement  in 
the  world;  that  the  world  was  out  of  joint.  He  witnessed 
a  combat  of  giants  on  an  unheard-of  scale.  The  world  was 
beginning  to  sway  and  reel  like  a  drunken  man.  Events 
were  not  taking  place  in  their  usual  course.  History  seemed 
to  have  come  to  an  end;  and  history  seemed  to  be  begin- 
ning anew.  Had  mankind  gone  mad?  Was  civilization's 
very  foundation  to  be  destroyed?  Was  all  that  had  been 
built  upon  the  teachings  of  the  Christ  to  be  discarded?  Was 
civilization  itself  sagging? 

These  were  the  questions  that  ran  through  the  mind  of 
America  from  day  to  day  and  from  week  to  week. 

Then  came  the  quick  and  mighty  forging  forward 
toward  Paris,  once  Belgium  was  prostrate.  It  seemed  that 
nothing  would  stop  the  onward  sweep,  and  that  the  French 
capital  must  be  reached  within  a  few  weeks  and  surrender 
to  the  sword.  But  the  marvel  of  it  was  that  within  a  few 
miles  of  the  city  the  tide  was  stemmed.  And  at  this  time, 
but  a  few  weeks  after  the  titanic  struggle  began,  the  dis- 
tinctively American  citizen  was  glad  that  the  tide  had  been 
turned  back  and  that  Paris  was  saved.  For  already,  with 
incomplete  knowledge,  there  was  a  growing  feeling  that 
Germany  was  in  the  wrong,  that  the  outrage  on  Belgium 
would  not  bear  the  scrutiny  of  modern  civilization,  and  that 
the  German  government  proposed  to  use  every  means 
within  its  power,  fair  or  foul,  civilized  or  savage,  to  ac- 
complish its  purpose. 

And  treachery  and  propaganda  were  at  work  in  Amer- 
ica, but  by  the  Central  Powers  only.  Cunningly  devised,  it 
was  so  insidiously  operated  as  to  mislead  thoroughgoing 
Americans.  Its  purpose  was  to  win  America  to  the  Ger- 


Coming  Storm  and  Preparation  1 1 

man  cause;  or,  failing  in  that,  so  to  confuse  judgment  and 
blur  vision  by  falsehood  and  innuendo  as  to  weaken  any 
attempt  to  align  American  sentiment  with  the  Allies.  In 
fact,  this  had  begun  years  before,  when,  by  some  means, 
even  American  textbooks  used  in  the  schools  were  prepared 
in  such  form  as  to  laud  Germany  and  things  German. 
Thousands  of  American  students  attending  German  uni- 
versities imbibed  of  the  materialistic  and  hideous  doctrines 
which  Germany,  through  her  universities,  had  been  foisting 
upon  the  world;  and  at  the  ripe  moment  many  of  them  stood 
by  Germany,  eminent  Americans,  teaching  public  law  in 
great  seats  of  American  learning,  aiding  in  the  literary 
propaganda  prepared  in  Germany  for  American  consump- 
tion. 

The  extent  of  this  treacherous  propaganda  was  not  fully 
known  to  the  American  public  until  the  United  States  en- 
tered the  war,  and  in  its  fullest  extent  will  probably  never 
be  revealed.  It  was  open  and  notorious  in  large  population 
centers,  but  was  by  no  means  confined  to  the  cities.  North 
Dakota,  an  almost  solidly  agricultural  section,  was  sedu- 
lously cultivated  through  the  pro-German  leaders  of  the 
Nonpartisan  League;  others  soon  became  well  known. 

Openly  where  it  seemed  best,  elsewhere  clandestinely, 
Germany  zealously  backed  up  these  efforts.  If  it  was  not 
an  attempt  to  frighten  America  with  a  vision  of  Japan 
reaching  out  for  the  Philippines,  Hawaii,  and  even  Cali- 
fornia, then  it  was  a  setting  forth  of  how  England  was 
seeking  to  catch  unwary  America  in  an  effort  to  break  down 
her  commerce,  or  to  push  the  Irish  question  to  the  front. 

This  persistent  propaganda  had  a  distinct  anti-Ally  in- 
fluence, both  immediately  and  for  the  future.  By  dividing 
American  sentiment,  it  served  well  its  purpose  at  the  begin- 
ning of  hostilities  in  Europe,  as  well  as  when  America 
should  have  entered  the  armed  conflict,  when  the  first  steps 
toward  peace  were  contemplated,  and  while  the  Peace  Con- 
gress was  in  session,  as  well  as  in  the  execution  of  the  Treaty. 


12       The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

On  the  other  hand,  it  was  a  potent  force  helpful  to  the 
cause  of  the  Allies,  in  that  it  caused  the  organizing  of  the 
American  forces  everywhere  as  they  had  not  been  previously 
organized.  And  these,  fortifying  the  American  public  with 
the  facts  in  the  case,  cleared  the  way  for  a  fairer  understand- 
ing of  the  conflict  in  Europe  and  strengthened  Allied  senti- 
ment in  America. 

For  each  time  the  Allies  undertook  to  state  the  justice 
of  their  cause,  there  immediately  came  into  existence  a 
stream  of  literature  and  of  pronouncements  from  certain 
pulpits  that  told  how  false  was  every  statement  thus  made. 
On  September  7,  1914,  the  German  kaiser  himself  pro- 
tested to  President  Wilson  against  the  conduct  of  the  enemy 
in  using  dumdum  bullets.  The  sole  purpose  was  to  blur  the 
vision,  at  a  time  when  the  American  public  was  not  aware 
of  the  dastardly  attempts  of  the  German  Government, 
aided  by  the  pro-Germans  in  the  United  States,  to  put  forth 
any  false  statements  that  might  tend  to  show  the  Germans 
right,  the  Allies  wrong. 

And  this  influence  reached  Administration  circles  where 
it  seemingly  had  more  influence  than  upon  the  general  pub- 
lic. Not  only  did  it  influence  individual  congressmen  so 
that  they  were  at  all  times  pro-German,  but  it  influenced 
Congress  as  a  whole. 

The  chief  prop  of  this  official  propaganda  in  America 
was  the  German-American  Alliance,  whose  wishes  found 
expression  in  resolutions  in  the  House  offered  by  their  chief 
spokesmen,  Vollmer  and  Bartholdt.  The  Alliance  at  Minne- 
apolis telegraphed  a  member  of  the  House :  uln  the  name 
of  Christian  humanity  and  the  spirit  of  neutrality  we  beg 
your  support  of  Bartholdt's  bill  to  stop  munitions  of  war 
from  America  reaching  Europe."  It  was  not  that  they 
cared  one  iota  about  Christian  humanity  or  the  spirit  of 
neutrality  or  the  stopping  of  munitions  from  reaching 
Europe;  what  did  concern  these  pro-German  organizations 
was  that  Germany,  barred  by  the  effective  naval  operations 


Coming  Storm  and  Preparation  13 

of  Great  Britain,  was  unable  to  receive  these  munitions. 
Germany  made  no  objections  to  any  neutral  country,  her- 
self included,  shipping  munitions  of  war  in  the  Boer  War. 

About  this  time  a  great  neutrality  meeting  was  an- 
nounced for  Philadelphia  by  the  newly  formed  American 
Neutrality  League,  and  its  secretary  invited  Dr.  Rhine- 
lander,  Bishop  of  Pennsylvania,  to  be  one  of  its  vice-presi- 
dents. But  the  good  bishop  saw  through  this  neutrality 
scheme,  and  declared  that  from  information  which  had 
then  lately  reached  him  it  appeared  that  this  agitation  was 
chiefly  "not  really  in  the  interest  of  neutrality,  but  in  hos- 
tility to  the  Allied  nations,  and  with  the  hope  of  helping 
Germany  and  Austria  in  their  campaign."  And  further 
stated :  "As  an  American  citizen  pledged  to  uphold  Ameri- 
can ideals,  I  am  altogether  against  Germany  and  Austria 
in  this  war,  on  the  ground  that  they  are  threatening,  and 
would  destroy,  as  far  as  they  have  opportunity,  those  politi- 
cal and  personal  liberties  and  rights  which  we  Americans 
have  made  the  foundation  of  our  government." 

Here  was  the  reply  of  a  real  American  who  saw  through 
all  the  jugglery  of  pro-Germanism.  And,  of  course,  in  the 
opinion  of  the  secretary  of  the  League,  this  letter  showing 
real  Americanism  placed  the  Bishop  of  Pennsylvania  as  a 
partisan  and  made  him  ineligible  as  a  vice-president  of  a 
neutrality  meeting.  But  eminent  men  were  present,  and  to 
get  them  into  such  meetings  was  always  a  large  part  of  the 
plan.  Governor  Brumbaugh  presided,  while  congressmen 
made  bitter  anti-British  speeches,  and  resolutions  were 
adopted  which  were  zealously  anti-Ally  and  vigorously  pro- 
German;  and  the  enormous  throng  unable  to  gain  entrance 
to  the  meeting  turned  itself  into  a  overflow  meeting  which 
manifested  its  neutrality  by  singing  "Die  Wacht  am  Rheim" 
and  "Deutschland  Ueber  Alles."  The  influence  of  such 
meetings  entered  very  emphatically  into  Administration 
circles  in  Washington. 

Yet,  the  Administration  presumably  had  at  hand  inti- 


14      The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

mate  knowledge  of  all  the  transactions  of  a  foreign  nation 
a  belligerent,  in  the  country.  But  it  was  never  explained  tc 
the  American  people  why  the  Administration  did  not  kno\\ 
what  the  German  Imperial  Government  was  doing  by  wa> 
of  violation  of  the  requirements  of  international  law;  or, 
knowing,  why  it  did  not  put  a  stop  to  this  underhanded, 
insidious  campaign  to  drag  America  into  the  side  that  was 
wrong,  and  which  men  of  the  perspicacity  of  Bishop  Rhine- 
lander  and  others,  who  at  this  time  were  proclaiming  the 
inhumanity  and  heartlessness  of  the  German  Government 
and  the  justice  and  righteousness  of  the  Allied  cause,  could 
see  so  clearly. 

The  war  in  Europe  had  scarcely  more  than  begun  when 
the  German-American  Alliance,  through  its  president,  Dr. 
J.  C.  Hexamer,  requested  President  Wilson  to  ask  Japan 
to  keep  her  hands  off  in  the  East  at  the  time  she  demanded 
of  Germany  withdrawal  of  armed  ships  from  that  quarter. 
Immediately  thereafter,  on  August  18,  1914,  President  Wil- 
son delivered  one  of  his  notable  war  addresses  to  the 
American  people.  Coming  at  that  time,  it  was  regarded  as 
the  Administration's  reply.  Among  other  things,  he  said: 

The  effect  of  the  war  upon  the  United  States  will  depend  upon 
what  American  citizens  say  and  do.  Every  man  who  really  loves 
America  will  act  and  speak  in  the  true  spirit  of  neutrality,  which  is 
the  spirit  of  impartiality  and  fairness  and  friendliness  to  all  con- 
cerned. 

******* 

I  venture,  therefore,  my  fellow-countrymen,  to  speak  a  solemn 
word  of  warning  to  you  against  that  deepest,  most  subtle,  most  essen- 
tial breach  of  neutrality  which  may  spring  out  of  partisanship,  out 
of  passionately  taking  sides.  The  United  States  must  be  neutral  in 
fact  as  well  as  in  name  during  these  days  that  are  to  try  men's  souls. 
We  must  be  impartial  in  thought  as  well  as  in  action,  must  put  a 
curb  upon  our  sentiments  as  well  as  upon  every  transaction  that  might 
be  construed  as  a  preference  of  one  party  to  the  struggle  before 
another. 

My  thought  is  of  America.    I  am  speaking,  I  feel  sure,  the  earnest 


Coming  Storm  and  Preparation  15 

wish  and  purpose  of  every  thoughtful  American  that  this  great  coun- 
try of  ours,  which  is,  of  course,  the  first  in  our  thoughts  and  in  our 
hearts,  should  show  herself  in  this  time  of  peculiar  trial  a  nation  fit 
beyond  others  to  exhibit  the  fine  poise  of  undisturbed  judgment,  the 
dignity  of  self-control,  the  efficiency  of  dispassionate  action ;  a  nation 
that  neither  sits  in  judgment  upon  others  nor  is  disturbed  in  her  own 
counsels  and  which  keeps  herself  fit  and  free  to  do  what  is  honest 
and  disinterested  and  truly  serviceable  for  the  peace  of  the  world. 

As  this  address,  in  some  respects  of  the  finest,  came  after 
the  ravishment  of  Belgium,  the  President  was  most  se- 
verely criticised  for  asking  red-blooded  Americans  to  be 
"neutral  in  thought,"  as  his  address  was  understood  to  mean, 
after  the  brutality  shown  toward  little  Belgium;  and  to 
maintain  the  "fine  poise  of  undisturbed  judgment"  and  to 
remain  "dispassionate"  after  the  blood-thirsty  methods  of 
brute  force  exhibited  toward  innocent  women  and  children 
of  a  prostrate  people.  One  of  the  picture-posters  after- 
ward used  very  effectively  by  the  Administration  in  seeking 
enlistments,  showing  a  stalwart  young  American,  when  he 
heard  the  tale  of  brutality,  throwing  off  his  coat  to  settle 
with  the  offender,  accompanied  by  the  injunction:  "Tell  it 
to  the  marines,"  was  a  very  clear  expression  of  the  feelings 
of  the  real  American.  He  was  not  dispassionate  or  neutral 
in  the  face  of  outraged  conscience. 

And  as  the  people  now  began  to  complain  of  the  do- 
nothing  spirit  of  the  Administration,  in  the  face  not  only 
of  the  great  wrong  in  Europe  but  of  the  attempted  violation 
of  American  neutrality  by  the  outrageous  German  propa- 
ganda carried  on  officially  in  the  nation's  capital,  Dr.  Bern- 
hard  Dernberg,  the  chief  propagandist  on  the  rostrum,  was 
gently  invited  to  discontinue  his  operations.  But  the  propa- 
ganda continued  in  greater  volume  and  with  greater  effect 
than  ever.  A  great  effort  was  made  to  control  the  leading 
newspapers  of  the  country. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  method  was  being  delved  into. 
The  facts  were  being  set  before  the  Administration,  not  by 


1 6      The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

its  own  agents,  but  by  some  of  the  shrewdest  private  detec- 
tives in  the  land.  The  revelations  made  by  the  Providence 
Journal  astonished  the  country.  Even  the  Administration, 
with  the  proof  in  its  own  hands,  was  slow  to  believe.  It 
did  not  like  to  admit  that  while  it  was  asking  the  people 
to  be  neutral  in  thought  and  undisturbed  in  spirit,  there  was 
being  carried  on,  under  the  very  shadow  of  the  White 
House,  by  the  accredited  ambassador  of  Germany,  a  scheme 
to  divide  the  Republic  by  enemies  within  and  by  force  with- 
out. 

And  when  the  notable  book  of  James  M.  Beck,  "The 
Evidence  in  the  Case,"  set  before  the  people  the  causes 
leading  up  to  the  open  rupture  in  Europe,  there  was  such 
a  revulsion  as  is  seldom  seen,  in  so  short  a  time. 

It  is  doubtful  whether  history  can  credit  the  Adminis- 
tration with  dealing  fairly  with  the  American  people  in 
this  matter.  With  all  the  evidence  it  had  or  should  have 
had  with  the  opportunities  of  knowledge,  it  is  difficult  to 
credit  the  Administration  with  the  purpose  of  square-deal- 
ing with  the  people,  in  its  effort  to  lead  them  in  a  direction 
not  warranted  by  the  facts.  The  President's  own  accred- 
ited and  trusted  minister  to  the  Netherlands  at  the  time  the 
conflagration  burst  forth,  in  referring  to  the  events  of  vast 
magnitude  that  were  rapidly  crowding  upon  each  other 
beginning  with  the  last  week  in  July,  1914,  said: 

We  who  stood  outside  the  secret  councils  of  the  Central  Powers 
were  both  bewildered  and  dismayed.  Could  it  be  that  Europe  of 
the  twentieth  century  was  to  be  thrust  back  into  the  ancient  barbarism 
of  a  general  war?  It  was  like  a  dreadful  nightmare.  There  was 
the  head  of  the  huge  dragon,  crested,  fanged,  clad  in  glittering  scales, 
poised  above  the  world  and  ready  to  strike.  We  were  benumbed  and 
terrified.  There  was  nothing  that  we  could  do.  The  monstrous 
thing  advanced,  but  even  while  we  shuddered  we  could  not  make 
ourselves  feel  that  it  was  real.  It  had  the  vagueness  and  the  horrid 
pressure  of  a  bad  dream.1 

1  Henry  van  Dyke's  "Fighting  for  Peace,"  p.  45,  Scribners,  New  York,  1917. 


Coming  Storm  and  Preparation  17 

Doctor  van  Dyke  was  keenly  aware  of  the  unblushing  bru- 
tality of  the  Hohenzollerns,  and  all  that  belong  with  them, 
whom  he  best  knew  as  the  Potsdam  Gang. 

And  yet,   two  years  later  the  President  went  so   far 
as  to  declare : 

This  Great  War  that  broke  so  suddenly  upon  the  world  two  years 
ago,  .  .  .  has  affected  us  very  profoundly,  and  we  are  not  only  at 
liberty,  it  is  perhaps  our  duty,  to  speak  very  frankly  of  it  and  of 
the  great  interests  of  civilization  which  it  affects.  With  its  causes 
and  objects  we  are  not  concerned.  The  obscure  fountains  from  which 
its  stupendous  flood  has  burst  forth  we  are  not  interested  to  search 
for  or  explore. 

Is  that  true?  Was  not  Bishop  Rhinelander's  perception  of 
the  great  moral  issues  involved  the  keener?  And  had  it 
become  true  that  America  had  no  conscience?  Where 
there  is  a  lively  conscience  in  a  great  people  there  is  cer- 
tain to  be  a  lively  interest  against  a  wrong-doer,  whether  he 
be  a  private  or  a  public  character,  and  there  will  be  an  ever- 
increasing  volume  gathering  until  the  wickedness  is  swept 
away.  At  first  the  people  resented  Theodore  Roosevelt's 
broadsides  against  President  Wilson;  but  as  the  conflict  pro- 
ceeded and  the  right  and  wrong  of  it  became  clearer,  they 
swerved  from  Washington  to  Oyster  Bay;  they  were  learn- 
ing that  it  was  not  the  President  of  the  United  States,  but 
the  sage  of  Sagamore  who  was  to  pilot  America  through 
safe  channels  in  the  storm  that  was  rocking  the  world. 

Indeed,  the  President  knew  better,  as  witness  his  next 
inaugural  expressions : 

The  war  inevitably  set  its  mark  from  the  first  alike  upon  our 
minds,  our  industries,  our  commerce,  our  politics,  and  our  social 
action.  To  be  indifferent  to  it  or  independent  of  it  was  out  of  the 
question. 

And  on  the  same  occasion  he  described  the  German  methods 
as  "organized  wrong." 

It  was  during  this  period  that  there  came  into  being 


1 8       The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

many  societies  with  beguiling  names  to  win  American  favor. 
Among  these  were  American  Neutrality  League,  American 
Independence  Union,  American  Truth  Society,  American 
Peaceful  Embargo  Society,  Friends  of  Peace,  Friends  of 
Truth.2  That  these  influenced  Mr.  Wilson  may  be  ac- 
cepted as  fact.  His  sense  of  right  was  not  so  far  gone  that 
he  did  not  know.  It  may  have  been  blunted  by  an  over- 
weening ambition.  The  course  of  the  presidential  campaign 
and  the  methods  used  by  his  managers  and  accepted  by  him, 
suggest  that  it  was  held  in  abeyance.  He  was  unsteady, 
wavered  when  firmness  in  the  right  was  the  only  safe  course 
to  pursue.  It  led  to  doubt,  created  uncertainty.  This  led 
a  prominent  member  of  Congress  to  declare,  when  urged 
to  stand  by  the  President,  that  he  would  gladly  do  so  if  the 
President  would  but  take  a  stand  for  something.  It  was 
this  wobbling  that  gave  Germany  her  opportunity  which  she 
used  to  the  full.  The  President,  while  in  the  attitude  of 
what  he  described  as  "watchful  waiting"  in  another  interna- 
tional matter,  displayed  what  became  a  marked  character- 
istic of  his  as  he  remained  the  longer  in  the  presidency — an- 
tagonizing the  course  which  he  admittedly  knew  to  be  the 
right,  and  showing  favor  to  the  admittedly  wrong. 

At  this  time  of  serious  business  in  the  world's  history, 
the  President  manifested  a  partiality  for  pacifists.  He  had 
them  in  all  the  cabinet  positions  that  were  of  chief  impor- 
trance  at  such  a  time  as  then  marked  the  world.  Mr.  Garri- 
son, a  fighting  secretary  of  war,  was  displaced  by  a  man 
so  notedly  a  pacifist  as  to  be  known  as  antagonistic  to  the 
best  Americanism.  Henry  Ford,  who  later  received  Mr. 
Wilson's  support  for  United  States  senator,  spent  freely 
of  his  money,  said  to  run  into  the  millions,  first  in  full-page 
advertisements  in  American  newspapers,  and  then  on  his 
peace-ship  trip  to  Europe,  a  plan  that  received  adverse  at- 
tention in  the  English  Parliament.  Prominent  men  in  the 

2  John  B.  McMaster's  "United   States  in  the  World  War,"  p.   140,   D. 
Appleton  &  Co.,  New  York,  1918. 


Coming  Storm  and  Preparation  19 

President's  cabinet  were  prominently  connected  with  dis- 
tinctively pro-German  meetings  in  New  York,  his  former 
Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Bryan,  openly  identifying  himself 
with  one  of  them. 

These  pacifists,  who  exerted  a  powerful  influence  in  the 
Administration,  sought  to  create  in  the  United  States  a  senti- 
ment that  was  at  all  times  of  the  greatest  value  to  Germany, 
whether  before,  during,  or  after  the  war.  They  divided 
sentiment  when  it  should  have  been  united  and  firm  against 
the  brute  forces  then  seeking  to  overturn  civilization;  they 
weakened  the  already  weak  Administration  in  a  clear  per- 
ception of  duty  to  country  and  to  humane  principles. 

But  in  time  the  forces  of  righteousness  swept  all  bar- 
riers away.  The  dignity  of  the  American  nation  had  been 
flung  to  the  winds.  Her  vessels  on  lawful  missions  were 
sunk.  Her  peaceful  citizens  lawfully  travelling  the  high- 
ways of  the  sea  were  murdered.  Even  her  government's 
representatives  going  to  or  from  their  posts  of  official  duty 
were  drowned  in  the  depths.  All  these  things  were  as  noth- 
ing to  a  pacifist  and  pro-German.  But  the  shame  of  it  was 
that  a  national  Administration  permitted  it.  Good  ringing 
notes  were  written  by  the  American  Government,  and  then 
the  same  outrages  were  permitted  repetition.  The  Admin- 
istration faltered  when  it  should  have  been  strong  in  action; 
it  wavered  when  it  should  have  been  clear  and  unhesitating; 
it  talked  when  it  should  have  performed.  It  led  to  the 
expression  that  became  common  throughout  the  land :  "Oh, 
for  a  Roosevelt  in  the  White  House  I" 

When,  on  May  7,  1915,  the  "Lusitania"  was  sunk  by  a 
German  torpedo,  after  advertisements  in  American  news- 
papers by  the  German  Embassy  at  Washington  warning  that 
American  travellers  on  it  would  be  endangered,  and  of  the 
1,153  persons  who  thereby  lost  their  lives,  114  were  Ameri- 
can men,  women  and  children,  a  cry  of  horror  mingled  with 
rage  went  up  from  every  quarter  of  the  land.  May  16  the 
Secretary  of  State  sent  his  first  "Lusitania"  note  to  Germany 


2O       The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

on  the  outrage.  Midway  between  these  two  events,  Presi- 
dent Wilson  in  an  address  to  a  vast  throng  in  Philadelphia 
used  the  words,  "There  is  such  a  thing  as  a  man  being  too 
proud  to  fight."  This  became  known  as  his  "too-proud-to- 
fight"  speech.  All  other  incidents  connected  with  it  were 
soon  forgotten.  But  it  was  a  sad  commentary  upon  the 
President's  shrewdness  and  mental  acumen  that  he  could 
not  have  seen  that  that  was  a  poor  answer  to  the  German 
militaristic  power  which  had  already  determined  that  no 
sense  of  right  or  honor  or  neighborly  obligation  or  treaty 
obligation  should  interfere  with  its  desperate  purpose. 

Sinkings  now  come  in  rapid  succession.  On  April  19, 
1916,  the  President  went  before  Congress  with  the  whole 
question,  declaring  that  "tragedy  had  followed  tragedy  on 
the  seas  in  such  fashion"  and  that  "the  roll  of  Americans 
who  have  lost  their  lives  on  ships  thus  attacked  and  de- 
stroyed has  grown  month  by  month  until  the  ominous  total 
loss  mounted  into  the  hundreds."  And  he  declared  that 
the  severance  of  diplomatic  relations  was  the  only  course 
open  unless  Germany  immediately  and  radically  mended  her 
ways.  And  in  this  he  met  the  best  thought  of  the  nation. 

But  the  presidential  election  was  to  be  held  that  year, 
and  again  he  dallied.  And  the  campaign  slogans  of  his 
party  are  suggestive  of  motives :  "He  kept  us  out  of  war," 
and  "You  are  at  work,  not  at  war."  He  had  repeatedly 
told  the  German  Government  that  no  further  outrages  would 
be  tolerated,  and  there  was  the  same  reason  for  a  war  with 
Germany  April  6,  1916,  as  April  6,  1917. 

After  the  election  he  sought  to  ascertain  upon  what 
terms  peace  between  the  warring  nations  could  be  made. 
To  this  end,  he  went  before  the  Senate  January  22,  1917. 
It  is  not  clear  why  he  went  or  what  he  expected  to  accom- 
plish; but  it  is  a  part  of  the  Administration's  record.  And 
in  this  address  he  used  a  notable  phrase  that  has  been  fol- 
lowing him  as  a  nemesis  ever  since,  when  he  declared  for 
"peace  without  victory" — willing  to  condone  all  the  worst 


Coming  Storm  and  Preparation  21 

horrors  and  brutalities  imposed  upon  civilized  society.  It 
took  a  permanent  place  with  his  utoo  proud  to  fight"  and 
"with  its  causes  and  objects  we  are  not  concerned." 

When  James  J.  F.  Archibald,  pro-German  lecturer  in 
the  United  States,  was  detained  by  the  British  in  August, 
1915,  he  was  found  to  possess  high  recommendations  from 
the  Austrian  Ambassador  Dumba  and  the  German  Ambas- 
sador Bernstorff.  By  papers  found  on  him  it  was  also  dis- 
closed that  Bernstorff,  while  making  explanations  to  the 
State  Department  of  his  connections  with  compromising 
transactions,  was  seeking  to  purchase  or  destroy  manufac- 
turing plants  in  the  United  States,  and  to  cause  strikes 
among  the  employes  and  disloyal  union  labor.  It  was  early 
in  1916  that  the  noted  usink-without-a-trace"  messages  were 
being  sent,  and  that  Bernstorff  was  a  party  to  acts  of  war 
against  the  United  States.  He  was  a  party  to  the  infamous 
Zimmerman  notes  seeking  to  engage  Mexico  and  Japan 
in  disrupting  the  integrity  of  the  American  Republic.  The 
President  knew,  the  world  knew,  these  things. 

But  no  step  had  been  taken  by  the  Administration  look- 
ing toward  preparation  for  eventualities.  General  Leonard 
Wood  opened  at  Plattsburg,  N.  Y.,  the  training-camp  that 
became  the  model  for  the  Government  once  war  was  de- 
clared. It  brought  down  upon  his  head  the  wrath  of  the 
Administration.  Colonel  Roosevelt  stirred  the  people  to 
the  importance  of  getting  ready  for  the  war  into  which  the 
country  was  drifting,  pleading  for  one  hundred  per  cent 
robust  Americanism,  for  a  united  front  against  German 
encroachments  upon  American  rights,  for  substituting  in 
the  fighting  departments  of  the  Government  fighting  men  for 
pacifists,  and  above  all  for  preparation  for  the  inevitable 
conflict. 

The  Administration  at  first  sought  to  neutralize  the  ef- 
fects of  Roosevelt's  speeches  and  his  articles  written  for 
magazines  and  newspapers.  He  became  the  leader  of 
robust  Americanism,  while  President  Wilson  became  the 


22       The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

leader  and  exponent  of  diluted  Americanism  and  robust 
pacifism.  "The  two  stood  for  irreconcilable  doctrines:  the 
one  for  justice  at  any  cost;  the  other  for  peace  at  any  price; 
the  one  for  decision  and  preparedness  to  enforce  it,  the 
other  for  evasion  and  compromise. "  The  pacifist  War  Sec- 
retary Baker  declared  there  was  ample  time  to  prepare, 
since  the  war  was  3,000  miles  away;  George  Creel,  social- 
ist and  internationalist,  was  chairman  of  the  committee  on 
public  information.  Men  of  this  stamp  at  such  a  time  cast 
a  shadow  over  the  entire  Administration,  which  side-tracked 
the  resolution  of  Representative  Gardner  for  a  National  Se- 
curity Commission,  introduced  October  15,  1915,  for  the 
purpose  of  ascertaining  the  state  of  the  nation's  prepared- 
ness. 

And  the  President,  after  seeking  to  lull  the  people  to 
sleep,  declared  they  did  not  want  war.  Meanwhile,  Col- 
onel Roosevelt's  editorials  appearing  in  the  Kansas  City 
Star,  with  its  wide  circulation,  were  having  a  marked  influ- 
ence through  the  central  West.  The  President  toured  the 
central  northwest  and  the  section  in  which  the  Star  circu- 
lated. He  returned  to  Washington  and  stated  that  the  peo- 
ple wanted  war.  The  company  Mr.  Bryan  was  keeping  in 
those  large  days  of  history-making  was  not  up  to  Roosevelt's 
standard.  After  the  sinking  of  the  "Lusitania,"  Mr. 
Bryan  issued  an  address  to  German-Americans  stating  that 
the  President  was  their  warm  friend.  At  the  moment  they 
were  seeking  to  destroy  America,  he  received  numerous  tele- 
grams from  German-American  societies,  and  under  the  aus- 
pices of  one  he  gave  an  address  in  New  York  City,  presided 
over  by  the  president  of  the  United  German-American 
Societies  of  that  State.  Others  addressing  this  meeting 
were  Frank  Buchanan,  later  of  rather  undesirable  notoriety 
for  alleged  unamericanism ;  Henry  Vollmer,  noted  pro-Ger- 
man; the  notorious  Jeremiah  O'Leary  of  pro-German  fame; 
and  among  the  worthies  at  the  meeting  were  the  Turkish 
ambassador;  Austrian  Ambassador  Dumba,  who  did  all  in 


Coming  Storm  and  Preparation  23 

his  power  to  destroy  American  integrity;  Captain  Boy-Ed 
and  Captain  von  Papen,  both  notoriously  active  against 
Americanism. 

And  these  were  the  influences  that  were  operating  upon 
the  President  until  he  went  out  among  the  people  where 
Roosevelt  had  been  preaching  by  pen  and  by  tongue  that 
form  of  Americanism  that  always  prevails  when  right  is 
matched  against  wrong,  and  the  people  are  permitted  to 
see  the  truth.  At  a  late  day  he  admitted  the  dernier  forces 
at  work  had  "poured  the  poison  of  disloyalty  into  the  vari- 
ous arteries  of  our  national  life,"  and  that  the  time  had 
come  to  make  greater  preparation.  And  on  Flag  Day,  June 
14,  1916,  he  marched  at  the  head  of  a  parade  in  the  interest 
of  preparedness,  in  Washington.  In  an  address  on  that 
occasion  he  said: 

There  is  a  disloyalty  active  in  the  United  States  and  it  must  be 
crushed.  It  proceeds  from  a  minority,  a  very  small  minority  but  a 
very  active  and  subtle  minority.  It  works  underground  but  it  also 
shows  its  ugly  head  where  we  can  see  it,  and  there  are  those  at  this 
moment  who  are  trying  to  levy  a  species  of  political  blackmail,  saying, 
"Do  what  we  wish  in  the  interest  of  foreign  sentiment  or  we  will 
wreak  our  vengeance  at  the  polls."  That  is  the  sort  of  thing 
against  which  the  American  Nation  will  turn  with  a  might  and 
triumph  of  sentiment  which  will  teach  these  gentlemen  once  for  all 
that  disloyalty  to  this  flag  is  the  first  test  of  tolerance  in  the  United 
States. 

Herein  President  Wilson  was  speaking  America's  best 
thought.  But  soon  thereafter  came  another  sagging,  as 
witness  the  campaign  slogan  of  the  party  of  which  he  was 
the  head,  "He  kept  us  out  of  war." 

Diplomatic  relations  with  Germany  were  severed  on 
February  3.  The  McLemore  resolution,  seeking  to  block 
the  President's  policy  of  arming  merchantmen,  had  been 
ardently  debated  in  and  out  of  Congress,  and  every  force 
standing  for  Germany  and  pro-Germanism  backed  the 
resolution.  The  President  was  bitterly  attacked  by  his  own 


24       The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

party,  and  every  power  Germany  could  exert  was  now  used. 
Bernstorff  sought  to  influence  Congress  and  the  newspapers. 
This  was  a  year  before  diplomatic  relations  were  severed. 
President  Wilson  replied  to  the  vicious  attacks :  "You  are 
right  in  assuming  that  I  shall  do  everything  in  my  power  to 
keep  the  United  States  out  of  war."  But  when  the  time  for 
action  came,  he  was  ready  to  assume  his  part  of  the  respon- 
sibility after  the  breaking  off  of  diplomatic  relations. 
April  2  he  went  before  Congress  and  asked  for  the  declara- 
tion that  a  state  of  war  existed.  This  was  granted  by  reso- 
lution on  April  6. 

Thus  the  nation  was  thrust  into  the  stupendous  conflict 
without  adequate  preparation,  a  condition  for  which  the 
pacifist  Secretary  of  War  Baker  thanked  God.  And  the  cost 
in  money  and  blood  for  this  condition  can  never  be  com- 
puted. America  was  suddenly  turned  into  a  military  camp, 
making  "confusion  worse  confounded."  At  the  nation's 
capital  everything  was  topsy-turvy.  Men  were  getting  into 
each  other's  way  in  the  attempt  to  do  something.  "The  call 
to  arms  found  our  country  ill  prepared  for  the  great  work 
that  lay  before  it."  3  The  herculean  task  thus  laid  upon  the 
nation  by  pacifism  must  be  undertaken  with  the  utmost  ex- 
pedition. The  military  and  naval  forces  in  great  numbers 
were  to  be  gathered  and  trained.  Money  in  unheard-of 
sums  must  be  raised.  Peace  industries  had  to  be  placed  on 
a  war  footing.  Transportation  facilities  must  be  converted 
to  war  purposes.  The  Council  of  National  Defense  must  be 
organized  and  set  about  its  serious  duties,  and  there  came 
into  being  a  great  number  of  boards,  and  committees  of 
various  sorts  and  sizes. 

The  President,  on  April  15,  urgently  appealed  to  pro- 
ducers of  war  material  and  foods  to  increase  their  output. 

Theodore  Roosevelt  was  granted  authority  by  Congress, 
in  the  face  of  strenuous  opposition  from  the  President's 
supporters,  to  raise  a  force  of  100,000  men  at  once  from 

3McMaster's  "United  States  in  the  World  War,"  p.  366. 


Coming  Storm  and  Preparation  25 

men  outside  the  draft  age  of  21  to  31  years,  to  go  to  the 
front  in  Europe.  Men  from  every  section  of  the  land, 
even  from  Alaska,  were  eager  to  join  his  standard,  and  as 
soon  as  Congress  acted  some  even  took  the  long  trip  from 
Alaska.  But  the  President  said  him  nay:  "The  business 
now  in  hand  is  undramatic,  practical,  and  of  scientific 
definiteness  and  precision." 

At  once  the  country  was  immersed  in  the  task  of  armies, 
airplanes,  navies,  finance.  The  order  for  mobilization  of 
the  navy  showed  a  lack  by  35,000  of  the  87,000  authorized 
for  peace.  To  put  it  on  a  war  footing  required  substan- 
tially 100,000  regulars  and  45,000  reserves.  The  work  of 
enlistment  began  at  once,  with  all  the  devices  of  novelty 
known  to  American  ingenuity.  The  countryside  was  at- 
tracted by  cartoons  and  posters  put  up  on  fences,  trees, 
stumps,  rocks,  and  in  every  other  conceivable  place  where 
they  would  catch  the  public  eye.  In  the  cities  they  were 
displayed  in  shop  windows,  at  recruiting  stations,  in  hall- 
ways of  public  buildings,  on  billboards,  on  vehicles.  Naval 
men  gifted  in  speech  and  song  went  in  groups  or  singly  in 
automobiles  and  caught  the  crowds  on  street  corners  where 
the  throngs  were  passing,  the  hour  of  special  value  being  at 
noon.  And  it  was  remarkable  how  the  boys  poured  out  of 
the  unexpected  places;  as  the  lumber  town  of  Bemidji,  in 
the  woods  of  northern  Minnesota,  or  the  prairie  town  of 
Pierre,  South  Dakota,  both  of  which  went  quickly  far  be- 
yond their  quotas. 

Appeals  for  army  service  were  not  less  cogent,  and  vol- 
unteering went  rapidly  forward  until  the  time  for  the  draft. 
Meanwhile  Congress,  in  a  bitter  debate  over  the  selective 
draft  measure,  was  closely  divided,  and  compromise  meas- 
ures were  offered.  All  of  these  the  President  wisely  turned 
aside  and  stood  firmly  by  his  position  for  the  selective  draft, 
and  June  5  was  made  registration  day.  The  Census  Bur- 
eau estimated  the  number  who  would  fall  within  the  regis- 
try at  10,000,000.  The  number  actually  was  9,586,508. 


26       The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

Mobilization  began  September  5,  when  five  per  cent  of  the 
men  went  to  the  sixteen  instruction  and  training  camps  of 
the  country,  one-fifth  of  them  starting  each  of  five  succes- 
sive days.  After  October  3,  the  remaining  fifteen  per  cent 
went  as  soon  as  practicable.  It  was  a  new  event  in  the 
nation's  history  to  witness  these  young  men — physicians, 
clerks,  farmers,  lawyers,  laborers,  business  men,  rich  and 
poor  alike — leaving  their  homes  in  every  city,  town  and 
hamlet  of  the  land,  to  go  into  training  to  be  made  fit  to 
fight  in  Europe. 

Two  days  before  the  first  men  started  for  their  camps, 
President  Wilson  took  occasion  to  address  them  in  this 
fine  message  worthy  of  place  by  every  fireside : 

You  are  undertaking  a  great  duty.  The  heart  of  the  whole  coun- 
try is  with  you. 

Everything  that  you  do  will  be  watched  with  the  deepest  interest 
and  with  the  deepest  solicitude,  not  only  by  those  who  ate  near  and 
dear  to  you,  but  by  the  whole  nation  besides. 

For  this  great  war  draws  us  all  together,  makes  us  all  comrades 
and  brothers,  as  all  true  Americans  felt  themselves  to  be  when  we 
first  made  good  our  national  independence. 

The  eyes  of  the  world  will  be  upon  you,  because  you  are  in  some 
special  sense  the  soldiers  of  freedom.  Let  it  be  your  pride,  therefore, 
to  show  all  men  everywhere  not  only  what  good  soldiers  you  are  but 
also  what  good  men  you  are,  keeping  yourselves  fit  and  straight  in 
everything,  and  pure  and  clean  through  and  through. 

Let  us  set  for  ourselves  a  standard  so  high  that  it  will  be  a  glory 
to  live  up  to  it  and  add  a  new  laurel  to  the  crown  of  America. 

My  affectionate  confidence  goes  with  you  in  every  battle  and 
every  test.  God  keep  and  guide  you. 

But,  true  to  their  color,  all  who  were  willing  to  assist 
the  German  autocracy  in  every  way  possible,  except  to  go 
to  the  German  front  and  fight  like  men,  were  ready  to  do 
everything  in  their  power  to  thwart  the  purposes  of  Amer- 
ica, once  she  had  taken  a  definite  stand,  ready  to  stab  her 
soldier  boys  in  the  back.  Anti-draft,  anti-war,  anti-America 


Coming  Storm  and  Preparation  27 

demonstrations  were  made  by  Socialists  and  slackers  in  every 
large  city  of  the  land.  They  paraded  the  streets  carrying 
red  flags  with  such  inscriptions  as,  "War  is  Hell — We  De- 
mand Peace."  The  Young  People's  Socialistic  Society,  or- 
ganized throughout  the  country  in  the  larger  cities,  held 
secret  meetings  to  protest  the  war,  though  unwittingly  they 
furnished  some  of  the  best  secret-service  material  the  Gov- 
ernment had.  Like  the  larger  and  more  open  meetings, 
such  as  that  addressed  by  Mr.  Bryan  in  New  York,  they 
were  doing  the  things  German  autocracy  liked  best  to  have 
done.  Some  had  taken  their  cue  from  men  high  in  admin- 
istration circles,  getting  their  inscriptions  from  pre-war 
utterances  such  as  Speaker  Champ  Clark's  that  a  conscript 
looked  much  like  a  convict.  In  Oklahoma  there  was  open 
resistance  that  amounted  to  civil  war,  in  which  several  were 
killed  and  some  two  hundred  were  made  prisoners  and  held 
under  a  charge  of  treason  to  the  United  States. 

Everywhere  pacifists,  Socialists,  Industrial  Workers  of 
the  World,  anti-war,  anti-conscription,  anti-America,  pro- 
German  organizations  were  busy  with  their  propaganda,  and 
operated  under  almost  every  conceivable  name  and  designa- 
tion, chief  of  which  became  "conscientious  objectors  to 
war."  They  were  usually  of  the  radical  type  found  in 
European  countries,  chiefly  from  the  Central  Powers. 

A  call  for  funds  with  which  to  prosecute  the  war  ear- 
nestly engaged  the  Treasury  Department  immediately  the 
war  was  declared.  Sums  beyond  the  common  reach  of  the 
American  imagination,  big  as  it  is  accustomed  to  view  things, 
were  asked.  Seven  billion  dollars  was  asked  by  popular 
subscription,  the  largest  sum  any  nation  had  ever  under- 
taken to  raise  at  one  time  in  all  the  world's  history.  And 
it  was  over-subscribed,  as  were  all  the  subsequent  amounts, 
totalling  some  $30,000,000,000,  part  of  which  was  loaned 
to  the  Allies. 

America's  conscience  must  never  be  dulled  to  a  great 
wrong,  by  a  lulling  pacifism  in  high  places  of  power. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  FOOD  ADMINISTRATION 

Once  the  country  had  engaged  in  the  world  struggle,  the 
Administration  wisely  perceived  that  food  was  a  vital  fac- 
tor in  determining  the  tide  of  conflict. 

The  Council  of  National  Defense  appointed  Herbert 
C.  Hoover  chairman  of  the  Commission  on  Food  Supply 
and  Prices.  His  experience  and  success  at  the  head  of  the 
Belgium  Relief  Commission,  until  the  brutal  acts  of  Ger- 
many made  it  no  longer  possible  for  him  to  serve  there, 
pointed  to  him  at  once  as  the  individual  best  fitted  for  such 
service.  His  Commission  was  charged  with  the  high  task 
of  gaining  the  co-operation  of  all  food  distributing  agencies, 
and  of  securing  an  increased  production  of  food  while  pre- 
venting profiteering  and  waste.  And  nine  days  after  our 
declaration  of  war,  in  a  public  appeal,  the  President  urged 
the  supreme  need  to  be  "especially  foodstuffs,"  calling  upon 
men  and  boys,  "to  turn  in  hosts  to  the  farms"  and  declaring 
that  it  was  "the  time  for  America  to  correct  her  unpardon- 
able fault  of  wastefulness  and  extravagance."  To  the 
South  he  particularly  appealed  to  raise  food  as  well  as 
cotton. 

The  nation  gave  quick  and  generous  response.  Gardens 
were  intensively  cultivated.  Vacant  lots  became  gardens. 
Front  yards,  boulevards,  railway  rights-of-way,  even  in 
the  great  agricultural  states  of  Minnesota  and  the  Dakotas, 
were  turned  into  lots.  A  campaign  was  started  to  teach 
saving  in  the  kitchen  with  printed  instructions  from  the 
Food  Administration.  "Preach  the  gospel  of  the  clean 
plate"  became  a  cardinal  principle  of  patriotic  housekeep- 
ing. 

28 


The  Food  Administration  29 

In  mid-summer,  1917,  the  Food-Control  Law  was 
enacted,  placing  in  the  hands  of  Mr.  Hoover  so  great 
powers  over  food  that  he  was  termed  the  Food  Dictator. 
And  he  forthwith  stated  to  the  public  that  while  it  was  not 
the  purpose  of  the  Food  Administration  to  seek  to  apply 
punitive  measures,  he  would  not  hesitate  to  apply  in  full 
measure  "the  drastic,  coercive  powers"  with  which  Congress 
had  invested  him  should  occasion  arise.  And  promptly  there 
was  mapped  out  a  course  of  action  for  control  of  dealers  as 
well  as  for  conservation  by  consumers.  Wisdom  and  tact 
marked  the  course  of  the  Administration  in  dealing  with 
the  food  problem  during  the  war  period. 

"Food  Will  Win  the  War— Don't  Waste  It"  became  a 
slogan  on  farm,  in  mill,  in  kitchen,  everywhere.  The  peo- 
ple, a  great  people,  always  accustomed  to  plenty,  merely 
upon  a  request  denied  themselves  of  what  they  had  grown 
to  be  accustomed  to.  There  was  never  a  murmur,  except 
in  a  few  isolated  instances.  The  administration  of  Mr. 
Hoover  has  become  one  of  the  bright  spots  in  the  national 
Administration  during  the  Great  War.  His  work  was  thor- 
ough and  scientific. 

Once  the  American  people  were  placed  on  a  war  diet, 
they  were  brought  into  immediate  touch  with  one  large 
meaning  of  war  and  understood  the  better.  It  brought  war 
home  to  the  people  repeatedly  every  day.  The  form  of  the 
appeals  made  by  the  Food  Administration,  "for  the  boys 
over  there,"  gave  a  patriotic  turn  to  American  thought  in 
the  saving  of  food.  The  importance  of  saving  such  prime 
foods  as  wheat,  sugar  and  meat  was  advertised  everywhere 
and  all  the  time.  It  was  before  the  people  riding  on  trains, 
eating  their  meals  in  public  places,  in  the  thoroughfares  of 
business,  in  the  home.  Corn  bread  and  corn  cakes,  bran 
bread  and  bran  muffins — these  graced  the  tables  of 
American  eaters  and  were  good  for  the  health.  They  were 
aided  by  rye  bread  and  rice  cakes,  and  the  value  of  barley 
as  a  food  was  soon  learned.  To  all  was  added  the  joy  of 


30       The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

the  humor  of  it;  for  there  came  the  "wheatless  days"  and 
the  "meatless  days." 

"Sugar — save  a  lump  every  day  for  the  boys  over 
there,"  became  a  part  of  the  daily  menu.  Sugar  became 
scarce  because  of  the  wasted  beet  fields  of  Europe,  and  be- 
cause of  the  lack  of  ships  to  carry  it  where  abundant.  Fac- 
ing all  passengers  on  railroad  trains  were  large  cards 
neatly  printed  in  colors  with  this: 

SUGAR 

1.  None  on  Fruits 

2.  None  on  Desserts 

3.  Less  on  Cereals 

4.  Less  in  Coffee  and  Tea 

5.  Less  in  Preserving 

6.  Less  Cake  and  Candy 

7.  Use  Other  Sweeteners. 

SAVE    IT. 

Errors  were  made  here  as  elsewhere.  While  sugar 
was  piled  up  in  Honolulu  because  of  no  vessels  to  carry  it, 
yet  the  refined  product  was  being  carried  into  the  Hawaiian 
Islands,  a  large  sugar  producer  with  an  abundance  of  the 
kind  the  people  in  the  United  States  would  have  been  glad 
to  use. 

With  the  shortage,  unnecessary  confections  were  cut 
down,  though  to  but  a  limited  degree,  soda-fountains  were 
closed,  sugar-bowls  were  removed  from  the  tables  in  pub- 
lic eating  places,  and  families  were  limited  to  three  pounds 
per  person  a  month,  then  to  two,  still  later  to  three,  then 
again  to  four,  and  at  length  the  limit  was  removed.  It 
was  not  until  the  month  before  the  armistice  was  signed 
that  the  Food  Administration  discovered  that  by  permitting 
the  public  to  purchase  sugar  weekly  at  the  rate  of  two  pounds 
per  person  for  each  four  weeks  instead  of  for  the  calendar 
month,  it  was  allowing  the  people  to  use  approximately 
200,000,000  pounds  of  sugar  extra,  annually.  Accord- 
ingly, new  regulations  went  into  effect  October  15,  1918, 


The  Food  Administration  31 

requiring  that  thereafter  purchases  be  made  semi-monthly 
instead  of  bi-weekly. 

Admittedly,  Mr.  Hoover's  administration  was  scarcely 
less  than  miraculous  when  the  unpreparedness  of  the  nation 
with  which  he  had  to  contend  in  the  first  onrush  of  the  war 
is  considered.  Notwithstanding  this  great  efficiency,  it  was 
not  understood  why  a  limit  was  placed  upon  the  price  and 
use  of  primary  food  articles,  such  as  wheat  and  wheat- 
flour,  while  substitutes  which  people  were  compelled  to  use 
were  given  an  unlimited  range  in  price.1  This  gave  a  solid 
basis  for  severe  criticism  of  the  Food  Administration,  and 
there  grew  up  in  the  great  grain-growing  sections  of  the 
country,  even,  a  feeling  of  antagonism  toward  the  Food 
Administration  that  was  akin  to  disloyalty,  during  the  most 
stressful  days  of  the  war,  because  of  the  open  profiteering  on 
substitutes.2 

Bacon  was  in  first  rank  as  the  meat  of  the  soldier,  since 
most  easily  kept  and  most  easily  shipped.  Readily  the  peo- 
ple granted  the  request  to  use  less  of  it  "for  the  boys  over 
there."  Already  accustomed  to  heatless  Monday,  lightless 
Tuesday,  wheatless  Wednesday,  meatless  Thursday,  the 
people,  with  light  heart,  talked  of  "earless  days" — which 
never  came.  For  all  through  the  campaign  for  food  con- 
servation the  people  were  admonished  not  to  allow  them- 
selves to  be  undernourished. 

Among  the  injunctions  of  the  Food  Administration  were 
those  of  dispensing  with  the  fourth  meal,  using  simple  hos- 
pitality in  the  home,  at  church  and  community  suppers  serv- 

1  Under  the  Food  Administration's  orders,  when  bran  wag  selling  at  $28 
per  ton  in  carload  lots,  the  housewife  was  compelled  to  pay  for  that  same 
bran  at  the  rate  of  $180  per  ton.    While  this  was  put  up  in  paper  boxes,  she 
could  not  purchase  it  in  any  other  form,  even  at  the  world's  greatest  primary 
market,  Minneapolis.     She  could  not  obtain  this  palatable  substitute  in  5-, 
10-,  or  25-pound  packages  as  she  could  the  wheat  flour. 

2  At   that    period    of    the    war,    the    author,    while    awaiting    a    belated 
train  at  the  little  town  of  Philbrook,  Minnesota,   listened  to  the  townsmen 
engaged  in  a  quiet  discussion  of  this  matter  at  the  station  platform.     Their 
views  were  unanimous.    While  none  of  them  objected  to  the  use  of  rye  flour 
as  a  substitute,  they  protested  vigorously  the  permitted  profiteering  on   an 
enforced  substitute. 


32       The  Wilson  Administration,  and  the  Great  War 

ing  the  simplest  kinds  of  home  products  well  cooked  and 
making  such  suppers  a  substitute  for  one  of  the  three  regu- 
lar meals.  A  new  word  coined,  bearing  a  cordial  signifi- 
cance, was  uhooverize,"  meaning  the  clean  platter.  It 
meant  even  more  in  war  time,  signifying  elimination  of 
waste  as  in  the  injunction  not  to  "nibble  crackers"  while 
waiting  for  one's  order  to  be  brought  on  the  table.  It 
meant  eating  just  sufficient  to  keep  life  at  its  best,  wasting 
nothing. 

Some  splendid  gains  were  shown  as  the  result  of  this 
gastronomical  self-denial  of  the  people.  For  it  was  largely 
through  the  economies  they  practiced  that  in  wheat  and 
other  cereals  the  fiscal  year  of  1917-1918  showed  an  in- 
crease over  the  preceding  year  of  nearly  31  per  cent  in 
exports;  while  in  meats,  meat  products  and  fats  there  was 
an  increase  in  exports  of  844,000,000  pounds,  or  nearly  39 
per  cent.  And  large  as  was  this  increase,  it  is  still  greater 
when  contrasted  with  the  conditions  before  the  war. 

But  it  was  in  the  increased  production  that  the  Food 
Administration's  chief  opportunity  for  winning  the  war 
lay.  While  politicians  and  statesmen  were  arguing  about 
$2.20  wheat  and  a  minimum  of  $2.50  a  bushel  for  wheat, 
the  farmers,  aided  by  the  towns-people,  were  seeding  and 
harvesting.  For  it  became  the  practice,  during  the  shortage 
of  labor  with  the  millions  in  the  army  and  navy,  for  business 
men  to  close  their  places  of  business  early  and  in  automobile 
loads  hurry  to  the  fields  to  aid  the  farmers  in  caring  for  the 
crops. 

At  the  very  beginning  of  America's  share  in  the  armed 
conflict,  the  President's  call  was  sounded  to  6,000,000  farm- 
ers. During  that  year,  these  farm  units  planted  in  food 
crops  23,000,000  acres  more  than  in  1916,  and  32,000,000 
acres  more  than  the  five-year  pre-war  average.  During 
1918  this  acreage  was  still  further  increased.  Every  farmer 
in  the  land  was  on  the  firing  line  of  food  production,  with 
no  pacifism  and  slackism  in  the  task.  It  was  well  that  it 


The  Food  Administration  33 

was  so;  for  the  appalling  fact  was  later  .revealed  that  at 
the  opening  of  the  wheat  harvest  in  1918  there  was  on  hand 
but  a  ten-day  wheat  supply.  It  was  one  of  the  real  crises 
of  the  Great  War.  Yet,  there  was  a  slight  decrease  in  the 
production  of  all  grains  in  1918,  the  difference  as  compared 
with  that  of  1917  being  160,000,000,  bushels.  This,  how- 
ever, was  not  a  reduction  in  nutritive  value;  for  the  wheat 
crop  of  that  year  totalling  918,920,000  bushels  was  a  dis- 
tinct advance;  and  the  corn  crop  of  2,749,000,000  bushels 
exceeded  the  five-year  pre-war  average  by  17,000,000 
bushels,  and  greatly  superior  to  that  of  1917. 

And  in  the  matter  of  live-stock,  the  total  of  beef,  pork 
and  mutton  in  1918  was  19,495,000,000  as  compared  with 
16,587,000,000  pounds  in  1914,  the  year  preceding  the 
European  outbreak.  On  January  i,  1918,  there  were  on 
American  farms  23,284,000  milch  cows,  compared  with  20,- 
676,000  of  the  previous  five-year  average;  and  43,546,000 
other  cattle  as  compared  with  the  five-year  average  of  38,- 
000,000;  also  71,374,000  swine  to  the  previous  five-year 
average  of  61,865,000.  In  1918  the  milk  produced  was 
8,429,000,000  gallons,  or  141,000,000  more  than  in  1917; 
299,921,000  pounds  of  wool,  or  18,029,000  more  than  in 
1917;  1,921,000,000  dozen  of  eggs,  which  is  37,000,000 
dozen  more  than  in  1917;  and  589,000,000  head  of  poul- 
try, exceeding  the  1917  product  by  11,000,000. 

On  the  morning  of  January  29,  1919,  with  President 
Wilson  in  Europe,  the  people  were  confronted  with  a  news 
item  of  strange  import.  It  was  that  a  bill,  drawn  by  the 
Administration  and  taken  on  the  previous  day  to  the  capitol 
by  W.  A.  Glasgow,  chief  counsel  of  the  Food  Administra- 
tion, asked  for  an  appropriation  of  $1,250,000,000  to  be 
available  at  once  and  to  be  used  in  such  manner  as  Presi- 
dent Wilson  should  desire  in  carrying  out  the  1918  and 
1919  guarantees  to  the  farmers,  through  such  agencies  as 
he  might  create,  or  to  utilize  any  department  or  agency  of 
the  Government;  by  the  terms  of  which  the  President  was 


34       The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

authorized  to  buy  and  sell  wheat  and  wheat  products  and 
"foods  and  foodstuffs,"  and  was  given  power  to  assume 
absolute  control  over  dealers,  millers,  elevators,  exchanges, 
and  all  others  having  anything  to  do  with  the  distribution; 
and  he  was  given  complete  control  of  all  exports  and  im- 
ports of  such  articles  of  food.  It  placed  in  one  man's  hands 
virtual  control  of  all  the  food  of  the  country  for  a  year  and 
a  half  following.  Compared  with  this  proposed  measure, 
the  Food-Control  Law  of  war  time  was  mild  in  the  powers 
delegated  to  the  President. 

There  sprang  up  at  once  general  opposition  and  there 
was  created  in  the  minds  of  the  people  a  suspicion  touching 
the  matter  of  appropriating  a  billion  and  a  quarter  dollars 
and  telling  the  President  to  use  it  as  he  might  see  fit.  The 
bill  was  passed  only  in  greatly  modified  form  by  the  Con- 
gress in  which  the  President's  own  party  was  the  majority. 

The  average  consumption  of  beans  by  the  army  was 
125,000  pounds  per  day.  Dried  beans  were  a  favorite  food 
with  the  soldiers,  and  their  food  value  was  high  and  they 
were  especially  suitable  under  intensive  training.  Early 
in  October,  1918,  the  War  Department  stated  to  the  public 
that  2,000  carloads  of  potatoes  and  onions  had  been  pur- 
chased for  the  army  in  the  United  States  for  that  month, 
representing  36,000,000  pounds  of  potatoes  and  nearly  3,- 
000,000  of  onions,  supplying  the  119  camps,  training-sta- 
tions and  posts.  Nearly  a  thousand  bids  were  received  for 
delivery  of  these  vegetables. 

A  report  giving  the  subsistence  stocks  on  hand  as  of 
November  i,  1918,  and  covering  the  more  important  arti- 
cles shows  the  following,  among  others,  for  the  camps  and 
depots  in  the  United  States  and  France:  123,772,643 
pounds  of  bacon,  52,850,249  pounds  of  fresh  frozen  beef; 
26,247,563  pounds  of  canned  roast  beef;  44,664,577 
pounds  of  canned  corn  beef;  14,493,479  pounds  of  canned 
beef  hash;  39,383,656  pounds  of  canned  salmon;  353,- 


The  Food  Administration  35 

377,836  pounds  of  flour;  19,823,364  pounds  of  hard  bread; 
9,722,521  pounds  of  corn  meal;  3,816,785  pounds  of  oat- 
meal; 53,375,065  pounds  of  dry  beans;  76,534,807  pounds 
of  canned  baked  beans;  24,180,947  pounds  of  rice;  1,139,- 
224  pounds  of  hominy;  86,512,001  pounds  of  canned  toma- 
toes; 27,306,466  pounds  of  canned  peas;  17,778,075 
pounds  of  canned  corn;  2,656,311  pounds  of  canned  string- 
less  beans;  4,105,064  pounds  of  dehydrated  vegetables; 
12,597,987  pounds  of  prunes;  9,280,288  pounds  of  evapor- 
ated fruit;  12,364,599  pounds  of  jam;  2,560,160  pounds  of 
canned  apples;  2,051,543  pounds  of  canned  peaches;  2,998,- 
299  pounds  of  canned  apricots;  1,688,794  pounds  of  canned 
pears;  1,275,530  pounds  of  canned  cherries;  1,170,034 
pounds  of  canned  pineapple;  31,269,335  pounds  of  coffee; 
80,924,813  pounds  of  sugar;  82,355,725  pounds  of  evapo- 
rated milk;  7,368,108  pounds  of  lard  and  lard  substitutes; 
3,099,960  pounds  of  butter  and  butter  substitutes;  956,467 
gallons  of  vinegar;  572,155  gallons  of  pickles;  17,239,631 
pounds  of  salt;  2,693,793  gallons  of  syrup;  2,129,098 
pounds  of  candy  and  sweet  chocolate;  752,371  pounds  of 
full  cream  cheese;  4,317,556  pounds  of  chewing  tobacco; 
18,982,095  pounds  of  smoking  tobacco;  49,314,150  cigars; 
95,257,399  cigarettes.  The  meats  included  465,604 
pounds  of  ham. 

Also,  early  in  December,  1918,  it  was  announced  that 
contracts  were  made  for  the  purchase  of  9,000,000  pounds 
of  candy  for  the  American  Expeditionary  Forces,  to  supply 
each  overseas  soldier  with  a  half-pound  of  candy  every  ten 
days  as  a  part  of  his  regular  ration.  And  later  in  the  same 
month  it  was  officially  announced  that  the  largest  single 
order  for  candy  of  record  had  been  given.  This,  too,  was 
for  overseas  soldiers,  consisting  of  the  highest  grade  of  can- 
dies, including  bar  chocolate,  sweet  chocolate,  chocolate 
vanilla  bars,  almond  bars  and  peanut  bars,  aggregating  i,- 
412,000,00  pounds.  At  the  same  time  announcement  was 


36       The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

made  that  the  largest  single  purchase  of  chewing-gum  in  the 
history  of  the  army  had  been  made,  consisting  of  11,686,- 
ooo  packages  of  the  most  popular  brands. 

Gradually,  even  before  the  signing  of  the  armistice,  the 
ban  on  the  use  of  foods  was  lifted.  In  the  early  autumn 
of  1918,  in  the  use  of  flour  there  was  a  change  made  from 
the  required  50  per  cent  of  substitutes  with  50  per  cent  of 
wheat  flour  to  a  proportion  of  substitutes  as  low  as  20  per 
cent.  Yet  at  this  time  it  was  found  necessary  to  apply  some 
strictures  in  order  to  conserve  more  fully  essential  foods 
of  the  nation,  particularly  in  hotels  and  restaurants,  it  be- 
ing estimated  that  approximately  9,000,000  people  ate  their 
meals  at  public  eating  places. 

And  on  December  4  there  went  throughout  the  country 
from  Washington  the  joyous  dispatch  that  all  restrictions 
on  the  use  of  sugar  were  lifted;  for  immediately  prior 
thereto,  grocers  were  required  to  keep  a  record  showing 
the  amounts  of  sales  to  individual  purchasers.  And  on 
December  25,  new  joy  was  added  to  Christmas  by  the 
sugar-bowls  going  back  onto  the  tables  in  public  eating 
places. 

In  the  first  week  in  December,  1918,  the  prices  of  some 
of  the  substitutes  were  these:  ten  pounds  of  barley,  65 
cents;  ten  pounds  of  corn-meal,  65  cents;  ten  pounds  of  com- 
mon buckwheat  83  cents;  ten  pounds  of  New  York  special 
buckwheat,  $1.22.  While  bananas  were  70  cents  a  dozen 
for  a  very  common  grade,  eggs  70  cents  a  dozen,  and  but- 
ter 70  cents  per  pound.  These  were  Twin  City  prices. 

And  at  his  weekly  conference  with  newspaper  men,  Mr. 
Hoover  stated,  on  the  afternoon  of  the  day  the  armistice 
was  signed,  that  since  October,  1917,  from  reports  re- 
ceived throughout  the  United  States,  the  combined  prices 
per  unit  of  twenty-four  most  important  foodstuffs  were  of 
the  average  cost  of  $6.55  for  the  quarter  ending  June  30, 
1918,  as  against  $6.62  in  October,  1917.  This  showed  a 
small  drop,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  there  had  been 


The  Food  Administration  37 

a  steady  increase  in  costs :  wages,  materials,  rents,  and 
transportation. 

A  fine  quality  developing  from  the  necessities  of  co-op- 
eration during  the  war  was  the  cordial  spirit  in  which  the 
United  States  Food  Administration  worked  with  various 
food  administrations  of  the  Allies.  Ample  food  of  proper 
nutritive  quality  for  the  fighting  forces  is  always  a  matter 
of  vital  importance.  And  with  the  submarine  menacing  the 
food  supply  of  our  own  men  as  well  as  the  Allies,  food  must 
be  sent  to  France,  submarines  or  no  submarines.  There  was 
cordial  support  from  the  naval  forces  of  the  Allies  in  giv- 
ing protection,  there  was  no  less  cordial  co-operation  from 
our  Food  Administration  in  the  distribution  of  the  food 
from  America. 

For  the  Food  Controller  of  France,  after  the  1918  crop 
had  been  gathered,  reported  to  his  government  that  the  total 
nutrition  value  of  the  crop  of  cereals  for  that  year,  as  well 
as  of  beans  and  potatoes,  in  France,  was  below  the  total 
nutrition  value  of  those  products  for  the  preceding  year; 
the  potato  crop  yielding  but  7,500,000  tons,  while  the  aver- 
age for  the  ten  preceding  years  had  been  12,000,000,  and 
yet  they  must  supply  all  the  armies  in  France,  including  Eng- 
lish and  American  troops,  out  of  this  decreased  potato 
crop. 

And  on  September  24,  1918,  the  United  States  Food  Ad- 
ministration stated  that  under  agreement  entered  into  with 
the  food  controllers  of  the  Allies  our  footstuffs-export  pro- 
gram for  the  ensuing  year  was:- — wheat,  rye,  barley  and 
corn,  and  flours  calculated  as  grain  for  breadstuffs,  429,- 
320,000  bushels,  of  which  some  100,000,000  to  165,000,- 
ooo  might  be  cereals  other  than  wheat. 

And  it  had  become  clearly  apparent  a  full  month  before 
the  armistice  was  signed  that  the  necessity  for  feeding  not 
only  the  millions  of  soldiers,  but  as  well  the  hundreds  of 
millions  of  less-than-half-fed  peoples  in  Europe,  would  re- 
quire still  greater  food  need. 


38       The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

These  obligations  necessitated  sending  50  per  cent  more 
food  than  was  sent  the  year  previous.  Whereas  1 1,750,000 
tons  had  gone  then,  now  17,500,000  tons  must  be  provided 
by  America.  And  it  was  made  plain  to  the  people  that  vir- 
tually the  same  estimate  would  stand  whether  the  war 
would  end  then  or  a  year  later,  the  Food  Administration 
putting  out  this  suggestive  announcement: 

For  1918-1919  we  have  a  clear-cut,  business-like  program  that 
calls  for  steady  marching  and  hard  campaigning.  We  have  pooled 
food  resources  with  the  Allies  and  planned  to  distribute  the  food  to 
meet  the  needs  of  the  hour.  That  means  to  keep  in  full  health  and 
strength  the  Allies,  the  armies,  and  our  people  at  home;  and  at  the 
same  time  to  build  up  safe  food  reserves  in  this  country.  .We  know 
now  how  much  food  there  is,  where  it  is  needed,  and  just  .how  much 
can  be  shipped.  The  program  agreed  to  calls  for  67  per  cent  more 
meat  and  fat,  52  per  cent  more  breadstuff,  and  21  per  cent  more 
sugar  than  was  shipped  last  year.  .  .  .  The  army  of  women,  trained 
by  a  year  of  food-saving  in  the  United  States,  must  forge  ahead 
relentlessly,  and  sweep  even  laggards  with  them. 

While  this  program  was  planned  before  the  armistice 
was  signed,  the  Food  Administration  did  not  relax  its  effort 
after  that  event.  Late  in  November  it  planned  to  have 
read  in  all  the  churches  of  the  land  at  a  fixed  date  a  state- 
ment showing  even  an  enlarged  program  to  save  famishing 
Europe.  This  statement  informed  the  people  that,— 

America's  food  pledge  for  this  year  is  20,000,000  tons,  two- 
thirds  more  than  last  year ;  for  the  relief  of  more  than  three  hundred 
million  hungry  people  of  the  world  will  be  brought  home  to  the 
people  of  the  United  States  during  the  first  week  in  December.  An 
intensive  campaign  to  be  known  as  conservation  week  for  world  relief 
will  be  carried  on. 

With  Europe  famished,  its  millions  dead  from  under- 
nourishment and  absolute  starvation,  its  many  more  millions 
in  serious  condition  from  lack  of  proper  food,  America 
would  have  been  derelict  in  its  moral  obligations  to  the 
world  had  it  not  exerted  itself  as  a  great  people  to  the 


The  Food  Administration  39 

utmost  to  serve  Europe  in  its  supreme  distress  when  the 
clash  of  arms  had  ceased.  And  President  Wilson's  first 
legislative  recommendation  based  on  a  study  of  conditions 
in  Europe  looked  to  the  relief  of  distress  of  populations 
"outside  of  Germany."  He  asked  for  an  appropriation  of 
$100,000,000  to  be  used  at  his  discretion  to  supply  food  to 
liberated  peoples  of  Austria,  Turkey,  Poland  and  western 
Russia — peoples  who  had  no  recognized  governments  and 
were  unable  to  finance  international  obligations.  The  ap- 
propriation was  granted  and  on  March  2  President  Wilson 
appointed  Mr. 'Hoover  as  Director-General  of  the  Ameri- 
can Relief  Administration.  The  United  States  food-relief 
ship  "Westward  Ho"  arrived  at  Danzig  on  March  6,  and 
it  was  the  first  vessel  to  pass  through  the  Kiel  Canal  after 
the  outbreak  of  the  war. 

Public  opinion  was  agreed  that  the  national  Food  Ad- 
ministration was  free  in  a  remarkable  degree  from  anything 
savoring  of  scandal,  when  the  general  Administration 
seemed  like  a  seething  mass  of  scandal  in  one  form  or  an- 
other. This  is  peculiarly  gratifying  when  it  is  remembered 
that  the  forces  and  individuals  with  whom  and  through 
whom  it  had  to  operate  were  so  diverse  in  their  char- 
acteristics. Perhaps  the  most  scathing  contribution  to 
the  literature  of  the  subject  is  that  of  Alfred  W. 
McCann,3  who  declared  that  the  last  week  in  April,  1919, 
witnessed  a  shameless  drive  upon  the  wheat  necessities  of 
the  nation  with  no  justification  other  than  the  greed  of  the 
grain  speculators  and  millers,  and  accused  Food  Adminis- 
trator Hoover  of  predicting  a  needlessly  high  price  for 
wheat. 

While  profiteers  in  food  have  the  age  merit  back  of 
them,  and  are  regarded  with  no  less  favor  in  modern  days 
than  they  were  in  ages  past,  they  have  always  been  looked 
upon  with  detestation.  Hoarders  of  food  were  severely 
punished  in  ancient  days.  Pericles,  the  Athenian,  450  years 

*  Reconstruction  for  June,  1919,  New  York. 


40      The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

before  Christ  issued  a  decree  that  persons  found  hoarding 
food  should  be  compelled  to  drink  the  fatal  hemlock;  and 
some  700  years  later  the  Roman  Emperor  Diocletian  issued 
decrees  similar  to  a  modern  "fair-price  list"  and  directed 
that  profiteers  should  be  put  to  death. 

With  alacrity  America  will  feed  a  famishing  world; 
with  equal  alacrity  will  she  smite  those  who  would  tear 
her  down  from  her  pedestal  of  fairness  and  justice  and 
generosity. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  FUEL  ADMINISTRATION 

But  fuel  became  the  inseparable  and  essential  partner 
of  food  in  winning  the  war.  This  fact  became  well  estab- 
lished after  some  depressing  delays. 

As  in  practically  all  things  else  when  the  country  was 
hurried  into  war  unprepared,  it  was  to  the  Council  of 
National  Defense  to  which  the  country  had  to  turn  for  ac- 
tion in  the  matter  of  fuel.  Accordingly,  in  May,  the  next 
month  after  the  declaration  of  war,  this  Council  appointed 
a  commission  on  coal  production,  which,  in  turn,  called  to- 
gether coal  operators,  some  four  hundred  in  number. 
These,  through  a  committee,  agreed  upon  a  price  for  coal, 
of  $3  a  ton  east  of  Pittsburg,  and  $2.75  west  thereof.  Sec- 
retary of  the  Interior  Franklin  K.  Lane  was  chairman  of 
the  committee  making  these  prices,  with  what  was  believed 
ample  precaution  to  avoid  congestion  of  traffic  and  to  speed 
production  to  the  utmost  limit,  so  that  ample  reserve  stores 
could  be  accumulated.  The  Columbus,  Ohio,  and  other 
papers  attacked  the  prices  as  too  high,  and  Secretary  of 
War  Baker,  chairman  of  the  Council  of  Defense  repudiated 
the  agreement  as  fixing  too  high  a  price.  He  was  unwilling 
that  the  operators  should  receive  more  than  $2.45  a  ton. 
The  result  was  that  many  operators  were  compelled  to  close 
their  mines,  while  those  that  continued  operation  could  not 
increase  their  output  as  would  have  been  done  at  the 
higher  and  previously-fixed  price  by  the  Lane  committee.  In 
consequence,  a  fuel  famine  followed  with  the  loss  of  hun- 
dreds of  millions  of  dollars  to  the  industry  of  the  country 
and  the  still  further  enforced  and  more  serious  delay  in  war 
equipment,  incalculable  suffering,  disease  and  death.  And 

41 


42      The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

after  all  the  mischief  was  done,  the  Administration  sanc- 
tioned an  increase  in  price  to  a  figure  higher  than  had  been 
provided  in  the  agreement  made  with  the  Lane  committee. 

It  was  in  the  midst  of  these  chaotic  conditions  in  Au- 
gust, that  President  Wilson  appointed  Harry  A.  Garfield, 
president  of  Williams  College,  to  the  position  of  national 
Fuel  Administrator. 

Previous  to  this,  orders  for  coal  by  the  million  of  tons 
were  cancelled  and  little  coal  was  moving.  But  now,  with 
the  approach  of  cold  weather,  new  orders  came  in  great 
volume.  And  there  followed  such  a  congestion  of  freight 
on  the  Atlantic  seaboard  for  lack  of  ships  to  take  it  abroad, 
and  such  a  dearth  of  cars  to  haul  the  coal,  that  by  the  end 
of  the  year  the  situation,  because  of  the  coal  shortage,  be- 
came most  threatening,  and  was  particularly  serious  in  New 
England  and  New  York. 

On  December  28  the  Government  had  taken  over  con- 
trol of  the  railroads;  and  the  Director-General  of  Railroads 
promptly  directed  such  routeing  of  cars  as  would  most 
promptly  and  effectually  relieve  the  situation  which  arose 
from  the  disastrous  fuel  shortage  then  confronting  the  coun- 
try. 

In  these  circumstances,  for  the  purpose  of  saving  fuel, 
manufactured  gas  was  burned  in  some  cities  for  heating  pur- 
poses. Churches  were  urged  to  consolidate;  coal  on  the 
sidetracks  or  in  transit  was  seized  for  local  use;  the  use  of 
electricity,  whose  production  required  the  use  of  coal,  in 
hallways  and  offices,  and  for  advertising  purposes  on  the 
streets  as  well  as  for  street  lighting,  was  ordered  cut.  But 
in  this  matter  there  was  a  very  generous  difference  of  action 
in  different  sections  of  the  country,  even  in  different  cities 
of  the  same  section  of  the  country.  In  Indianapolis,  saloons, 
poolrooms,  and  theaters  were  closed  until  further  notice;  in 
Philadelphia,  office  buildings  were  required  to  eliminate 
the  use  of  steam  for  heating  purposes  from  seven  o'clock  in 


The  Fuel  Administration  43 

the  evening  until  seven  in  the  morning,  and  all  on  Sundays 
and  holidays  except  to  keep  pipes  from  freezing;  in  Michi- 
gan, churches  were  not  allowed  to  be  heated  more  than 
six  hours  a  week,  or  business  places  more  than  nine  hours 
each  week  day;  in  St.  Paul  there  was  a  radical  cut  in  street 
lighting,  while  in  Duluth  the  streets  blazed  with  light  as 
though  nothing  had  happened. 

So  serious  a  situation  developed  that  on  January  16, 
1918,  the  Fuel  Administrator  ordered  a  drastic  cut  in  the 
use  of  coal  and  directed  the  order  in  which  coal-sellers  were 
to  give  preference  in  coal  deliveries.  In  all  the  country 
east  of  the  Mississippi  River,  including  Minnesota  and 
Louisiana,  all  industrial  plants,  including  those  manufactur- 
ing war  munitions,  were  required  to  shut  down  for  five  days, 
January  18  to  22,  and  in  them  no  fuel  was  to  be  used  ex- 
cept in  the  manufacture  of  perishable  foods,  the  printing 
of  daily  newspapers  and  the  current  issues  of  other  periodi- 
cals. The  priority  of  deliveries  was  in  the  following  order : 
railroads;  domestic  users,  hospitals,  food  stores  and  hotels; 
public  utilities;  bunkers;  municipal,  county  and  state  gov- 
ernments and  public  use  generally;  manufacturers  of  per- 
ishable goods. 

Immediate  and  angry  protest  came  from  all  parts  of 
the  country  affected  by  the  order.  Even  newspapers  in 
west-Mississippi  territory  voiced  pronounced  opposition. 
Industry  declared  that  it  was  uneconomical  and  would  have 
disastrous  effects  and  entail  great  loss  upon  industry  and 
hardships  upon  working  men  of  whom  it  would  deprive 
wages  aggregating  millions  of  dollars.  The  United  States 
Senate  by  resolution  requested  the  Fuel  Administrator  to 
udelay  for  five  days  the  order  suspending  the  operation  of 
industrial  plants  in  portions  of  the  United  States  in  order 
that  protests  may  be  heard,  investigation  made  and  informa- 
tion presented."  1  Had  this  request  been  heeded,  the  whole 

1  McMaster's  "United  States  in  the  World  War,"  p.  422,  op.  cit. 


44       The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

purpose  of  the  order  would  have  been  nullified.  Winter  and 
the  emergency  would  have  passed  before  hearings  could 
have  been  completed. 

Holding  to  the  order,  Fuel  Administrator  Garfield  de- 
clared that  it  was  necessary  in  order  to  prevent  a  crisis  and 
widespread  suffering.  And  when  appeal  was  made  to  the 
President,  his  reply  was : 

This  war  calls  for  many  sacrifices,  and  the  sacrifices  called  for  by 
this  order  are  infinitely  less  than  sacrifices  of  life  which  might  other- 
wise be  involved.  .  .  .  Halfway  measures  would  not  have  accom- 
plished the  desired  end. 

In  fact,  the  local  fuel  administrator  in  Chicago  had  an- 
nounced that  in  Chicago  industrial  plants  and  factories 
would  be  obliged  to  close  in  five  or  six  days  unless  relief 
came. 

The  fact  is  that  when  the  stress  in  the  fuel  situation 
came  during  the  severe  winter  of  1917-1918,  the  industrial 
production  of  the  country  was  greater  than  the  available 
ships  could  transport,  with  the  delay  caused  by  the  lack  of 
coal.  The  measure  was  drastic;  but  it  Was  a  war  emergency 
and  anything  short  of  a  drastic  measure  would  have  been 
futile. 

Moreover,  there  immediately  followed  another  order 
that  for  ten  consecutive  Mondays,  beginning  January  28, 
no  fuel,  other  than  necessary  to  prevent  freezing  pipes, 
could  be  used  to  heat  business  places  except  those  used  as 
public  official  offices  and  other  specified  places,  such  as  for 
food  supplies,  physicians'  offices  and  drugstores.  It  was  esti- 
mated that  this  would  effect  a  saving  of  30,000,000  tons  of 
coal  and  return  the  supply  to  normal. 

Besides,  it  is  doubtful  whether  there  was  any  one  single 
event,  save  the  calling  of  the  sons  of  the  nation  to  arms, 
that  so  completely  brought  the  American  people  to  a  sharp 
realization  of  the  kind  of  war  that  was  upon  them. 

To    emphasize    the    seriousness    of    the    situation    yet 


The  Fuel  Administration  45 

further,  "heatless  Mondays"  were  followed  by  "lightless 
Tuesdays. "  Church  services  were  greatly  curtailed  and 
many  schools  were  compelled  to  close,  while  many  other 
unusual  conditions  attended  the  Government's  successful 
efforts  to  keep  coal  moving  toward  industrial  establishments; 
particularly  to  munition  plants  and  all  those  engaged  in  war- 
equipment  operations,  and  to  the  seaboard  for  the  country's 
naval  and  merchant  vessels.  The  extensive  industries  that 
sprang  up  because  of  the  war,  the  railroad  congestion  due 
to  the  heavy  shipment  of  material  across  the  continent  to 
the  Atlantic  seaboard,  the  most  severe  and  exacting  of 
thirty  winters,  and  unsettled  labor  conditions — all  these  con- 
tributed to  the  fuel  famine  the  first  year  the  country  was  in 
the  war.  The  winter  of  1917-1918  was  probably  the  most 
difficult  for  the  people  to  pass  through  of  any  experienced 
since  modern  appliances  came  into  use. 

The  saving  effected  by  these  several  measures  was 
large.  In  early  August,  1918,  the  Fuel  Administrator  made 
public  the  statement  that  from  the  records  which  had  been 
kept  there  was  shown  a  saving  of  more  than  60,000  kilo- 
watt-hours, the  equal  of  about  100  tons  of  coal,  on  the  first 
of  the  "lightless  nights"  in  the  borough  of  Manhattan,  New 
York  City,  indicating  a  saving  in  Manhattan  alone  of  40,000 
tons  of  coal  a  year. 

As  a  further  means  of  saving  as  a  war  measure,  day- 
light saving  was  put  into  operation  by  turning  the  clock  one 
hour  ahead.  It  was  estimated  that  by  this  method,  from  the 
facts  gathered  from  various  sections  of  the  country  by  the 
Fuel  Administration  to  determine  the  saving  in  fuel  that 
might  be -effected  by  the  operation  of  the  daylight  saving 
law,  a  saving  of  1,250,000  tons  of  coal  had  been  effected 
during  the  seven  months'  operation  of  the  law  during  the 
summer  of  1918. 

Broadly  speaking,  farmers  opposed  the  plan  while  city 
workers  favored  it.  Laboring  people  in  the  cities  probably 
received  the  greatest  benefit  from  its  operation — workers 


46      The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

in  factories,  shops,  stores  and  offices,  for  it  not  only  gave 
them  more  hours  of  daylight  for  recreation  in  the  evening, 
or  for  gardening,  but  it  meant  a  large  saving  to  the  house- 
holder in  the  matter  of  lighting.  To  the  last,  those  who 
furnished  artificial  light  were  witnesses,  for  it  entailed  an 
appreciable  reduction  in  the  aggregate  of  their  income.  And 
the  total  of  savings  from  it,  in  homes  and  places  of  busi- 
ness, is  estimated  as  high  as  $60,000,000  each  summer. 

The  position  of  the  farmers  on  this  plan  is  well  stated 
by  a  newspaper  correspondent  in  the  heart  of  the  agricul- 
tural West: 

The  daylight-saving  plan  takes  an  hour  from  the  morning  and 
adds  it  in  the  evening.  When  there  has  been  a  heavy  dew  during 
the  night,  which  is  true  most  of  the  time,  we  cannot  begin  work  in 
the  fields  until  this  has  dried  off,  usually  between  eight  and  nine 
o'clock  by  the  old  time. 

That  wouldn't  be  so  bad  if  one  didn't  have  hired  help.  I  stay  in 
the  field  myself  until  seven  or  eight  in  the  evening,  but  my  men, 
hired  by  the  month,  insist  that  their  day's  work  is  done  at  five  or  six, 
and  won't  stay  on  into  the  evening.  That  is  their  right,  of  course. 
Not  all  of  them  are  that  way,  but  the  majority  of  them  are.  They 
wait  around  until  the  dew  is  gone,  for  they  are  not  hired  to  do  chores 
in  many  cases,  then  go  out  and  work  in  the  field  until  twelve,  and 
quit  at  five  so  that  they  can  go  to  town  in  the  evening.2 

Also  came  "gasless  Sundays,"  the  requirements  of  which 
the  people  accepted  with  the  utmost  good  nature.  It  was 
not  by  an  order,  but  merly  a  request  on  the  part  of  the  Fuel 
Administrator,  that  the  people  forego  automobiling  on  Sun- 
day, for  the  purpose  of  saving  gasoline  for  war  needs. 
Though  criticism  resulted,  and  some  that  was  not  good- 
natured,  the  result  was  more  than  the  mere  saving  of  essen- 
tials in  war  needs,  important  as  was  that.  The  people  were 
alert,  and  keen  to  see  who  was  unwilling  to  forego  a  mere 
personal  pleasure  for  the  sake  of  successfully  carrying  for- 
ward the  war.  On  the  first  of  the  few  Sundays  it  was  in 

a  Sioux  Falls,  S.  D.,  Daily  Argus-Leader,  July  21,  1919. 


The  Fuel  Administration  47 

operation,  there  was  alertness  on  the  part  of  the  public  to 
note  to  what  extent  the  request  was  observed.  Weight  of 
public  opinion  was  probably  never  felt  more  than  in  the 
matter  of  this  one  simple  request.  They  were  but  few  who 
ventured  out;  but  whoever  had  the  hardihood  to  ignore  the 
request,  whether  rich  or  poor,  were  made  to  understand 
unmistakably  that  ignoring  the  request  would  not  be  tol- 
erated. This  was  made  plain  in  the  yellow  stripes  that  were 
made  to  adorn  the  automobiles  of  offenders,  in  almost  any 
town  in  which  they  stopped  in  any  part  of  the  nation.  And 
if  they  did  not  stop,  they  were  made  to  stop  long  enough  to 
apply  the  yellow  stripes  of  disapproval  of  disregard  of  the 
Fuel  Administrator's  course  as  to  "gasless  Sundays." 

On  October  17,  1918,  he  withdrew  his  request  for  gas- 
olineless  Sundays.  The  loyal  response  of  the  people  to  the 
appeal  east  of  the  Mississippi  River,  it  was  stated  by  the 
Fuel  Administration,  had  saved  at  least  1,000,000  barrels, 
and  to  have  made  it  possible  to  give  to  the  men  at  the  front 
the  supplies  required  in  the  prosecution  of  the  war. 

The  Fuel  Administrator  found  it  necessary  to  fix  the 
price  of  coke  and  coal  even  after  the  signing  of  the  armis- 
tice. On  November  15,  1918,  he  ordered: 

Coke  produced  in  Taylor  County,  in  the  State  of  West  Virginia, 
may  be  sold  at  prices  per  ton  of  2,000  pounds,  f.  o.  b.  cars  at  ovens, 
not  to  exceed  the  following,  viz.,  for  blast-furnace  coke,  $6.75 ;  for 
selected  72-hour  foundry  coke,  $7.75. 

Coke  produced  in  Hopkins  County,  in  the  State  of  Kentucky,  may 
be  sold  at  prices  per  ton  of  2,ooo  pounds,  f.  o.  b.  cars  at  ovens,  not 
to  exceed  the  following,  viz.,  for  blast-furnace  coke,  $7.25 ;  for  se- 
lected 72-hour  foundry  coke,  $8.25. 

This  order  shall  be  effective  at  seven  a.  m.,  November  18,  1918. 

Also  this,  pertaining  to  a  wholly  different  section  of  the 
country : 

Bituminous  coal  mined  by  Temple  Fuel  Company,  at  its  mine 
in  the  State  of  Colorado,  may  be  sold  at  prices  f.  o.  b.  cars  at  the 


48       The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

mine,  not  to  exceed  $2.15  per  net  ton  for  run  of  mine,  $3.40  per 
net  ton  for  prepared  sizes,  $1-55  per  net  ton  for  slack  or  screenings 
passing  through  a  1. 25-inch  screen.  To  these  prices  may  be  added  the 
forty-five  cents  allowance  for  wage  increase  if  the  producing  company 
is  entitled  to  add  such  allowance  under  the  President's  order  of 
October  27,  1917.  The  maximum  price  herein-above  fixed  for  pre- 
pared sizes  is  subject  to  the  following  monthly  summer  reductions: 
April  i,  70  cents;  May  i,  50  cents;  June  i,  35  cents;  July  i,  15 
cents. 

This  order  to  become  effective  at  seven  a.  m.,  November  18,  1918. 

One  of  the  best  results  of  the  Fuel  Administration's 
efforts  was  the  order  against  putting  upon  the  market  dirty 
coal.  After  the  signing  of  the  armistice  it  had  not  relaxed 
its  vigorous  dealing  with  mine  operators  who  willfully  ig- 
nored the  regulations  laid  down  for  the  careful  prepara- 
tion of  coal  to  free  it  from  impurities  before  placing  it  on 
the  market  for  consumers.  During  the  week  ending  No- 
vember 1 6,  1918,  four  mines  were  ordered  shut  down  be- 
cause of  this  offense.  After  the  Fuel  Administration  had 
placed  the  ban  on  dirty  coal,  a  total  of  119  mines  had  been 
closed,  12  of  which,  up  to  the  week  ending  November  16, 
1918,  had  received  permission  to  resume  operations. 

The  order  of  the  Fuel  Administrator  that  coal  might  be 
delivered  to  the  curb  and  dumped  there  without  further  ado, 
raised  a  furor  in  certain  circles.  But  it  was  war  time,  and 
there  was  a  great  shortage  of  men;  the  people  smilingly 
accepted  any  hard  or  undesirable  situation  that  arose,  while 
fortifying  themselves  for  the  next.  But  when  the  man 
ordering  coal  was  informed  by  the  dealer  that  he  might 
have  the  coal  but  that  he  would  have  to  put  it  into  the  bin 
himself  because  of  the  lack  of  man  power,  and  that  he 
would  therefore  have  a  reduction  of  thirty-five  cents  per 
ton,  and  the  driver  delivering  it,  when  about  to  dump  it  on 
the  sidewalk  as  ordered,  said  that  for  a  dollar-and-half  per 
ton  he  would  put  it  into  the  bin,  the  householder  looked  less 
philosophically  upon  the  new  situation. 


The  Fuel  Administration  49 

The  severe  criticism  heaped  upon  Fuel  Administrator 
Garfield's  shoulders,  following  his  drastic  fuel-saving  order 
of  January  16,  1918,  was  hardly  properly  placed.  The  sit- 
uation in  which  the  country  was  found  was  the  logical  result 
of  the  pacifist  practices  of  the  Administration  for  the  previ- 
ous three  years,  long  before  Doctor  Garfield  had  any  connec- 
tion with  the  Administration's  activities.  It  was  only  three 
days  after  this  order  that  Senator  Chamberlain  made  his 
notable  speech  in  New  York,  declaring  that  the  Adminis- 
tration had  ceased  to  function  in  practically  all  branches, 
though  his  criticism  was  directed  at  the  War  Department. 

The  serious  fuel  situation  had  developed  before  Doctor 
Garfield  was  appointed.  When  Secretary  of  War  Baker 
overthrew  the  coal  prices  fixed  by  the  Lane  Committee  in 
June,  1917,  two  months  before  Doctor  Garfield  was  ap- 
pointed, he  committed  the  first  serious  blunder  in  the  fuel 
situation,  as  he  had  constantly  blundered  in  the  War  De- 
partment; and  before  Fuel  Administrator  Garfield  could 
remedy  the  error,  the  railroads  were  ceasing  to  furnish  full 
service  to  the  country,  either  under  private  or  government 
control.  And  immediately  thereafter  followed  the  ex- 
tremely severe  winter  eating  into  the  coal  stocks  to  an  un- 
precedented extent. 

To-day  scarcely  anyone  denies  the  wisdom  of  Fuel  Ad- 
ministrator Garfield's  course.  As  soon  as  the  extreme  win- 
ter was  past,  he  began  gripping  the  situation  in  a  manner 
promising  well  for  the  months  to  follow.  He  had  deter- 
mined that  whatever  difficulties  might  ensue  for  the  follow- 
ing winter,  the  country  would  be  well  cared  for  in  the  matter 
of  fuel.  In  October,  1918,  the  nation's  fuel  supplies  were 
adequate  and  well  distributed,  but  he  still  urged  the  need 
of  economy.  The  coal  stocks  then  on  hand  were  greater 
than  ever  before;  but  he  urged  that  the  needs  were  also 
greater.  The  upper  Great  Lakes  territory  which  cuts  most 
deeply  into  transportation,  had  received  the  greatest  pro- 
portionate supply.  Fewer  workers  than  ever  before  had 


50      The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

produced  38,000,000  tons  more  coal  in  the  first  six  months 
of  1918  than  were  produced  in  the  corresponding  months  of 
1917.  But  now  the  railroads,  under  public  control,  had 
awakened  to  the  situation  which  Fuel  Administrator  Gar- 
field  had  tried  to  impress  upon  them  before  the  desperate 
situation  in  the  winter  of  1917-1918,  when  the  Director- 
General  of  Railroads  failed  to  place  an  embargo  upon  the 
transportation  of  non-essentials. 

Bolshevism,  whether  of  American  citizens  or  aliens,  must 
never  be  permitted  to  control  an  essential  to  all  the  activi- 
ties of  the  genuine  American  life. 


CHAPTER  IV 

LABOR  AND  WAGES 

With  two  large  movements  President  Wilson's  name 
must  be  inextricably  linked:  Labor  and  League.  The  big- 
ness of  the  former  was  so  lost  sight  of  in  the  overshadowing 
importance  of  the  other  that,  in  large  measure,  it  dropped 
from  the  public  thought.  In  the  form  in  which  it  was  pre- 
sented it  became  a  problem,  the  solution  of  which  would 
have  been  sufficiently  notable  in  the  career  of  any  one  man 
to  give  him  a  worthy  place  in  the  history  of  his  country  in 
time  of  peace ;  doubly  so  in  time  of  war. 

When,  however,  any  man  by  his  deliberate  purpose, 
whether  that  purpose  be  high  or  low,  creates  his  own  prob- 
lem and  seeks  to  make  it  the  problem  of  society,  he  deserves 
no  consideration  from  history,  other  than  the  bare  record, 
if  he  fails  to  solve  that  problem  for  the  future.  And  if  his 
handiwork  leaves  incomplete  the  solution  of  a  problem  which 
is  of  his  creation  and  not  of  the  demands  of  either  the  pres- 
ent or  the  future,  he  cannot  be  assigned  the  role  of  states- 
man, but  rather  of  blunderer  or  traducer. 

When,  in  the  summer  of  1916,  President  Wilson  under- 
took to  secure  an  understanding  between  the  railroads  and 
their  trainmen,  the  public  at  once  took  keen  interest,  hoping 
for  a  happy  solution.  When,  however,  he  undertook  to 
force  through  Congress  the  Adamson  bill,  the  interest  was 
no  less  keen,  but  it  became  a  depressing  episode  in  the 
Administration's  labor  activities.  It  then,  for  the  first  time, 
became  plain  to  the  great  public  that  President  Wilson  was 
willing  to  play  autocrat  to  favor  a  strongly  organized  body 
of  voters.  That  a  subservient  Congress  yielded  in  ill  humor 
did  not  relieve  of  executive  odium.  This  course  on  the  part 

51 


52       The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

of  the  President  marks  the  labor  policy,  if  it  be  worty  of 
such  designation,  pursued  by  the  Administration  in  time  of 
peace. 

But  the  Administration's  attitude  on  the  matter  of  sal- 
aries, labor,  and  the  wage  problem  was  a  strange  jumble 
during  the  entire  eight  years.  That  its  course  was  inconsist- 
ent was  a  matter  of  minor  importance ;  that  it  was  a  matter 
of  injustice  was  a  matter  of  great  importance;  that  it  was 
a  matter  involving  Americanism  itself  was  a  matter  of  prime 
importance.  Even  for  his  own  reputation  the  President 
failed  to  see  in  advance  the  natural  consequences  of  his 
driving  through  the  Adamson  bill  in  1916.  Or  if  he  did  see 
it,  that  was  a  matter  of  minor  importance  at  that  moment. 
It  was  the  presidential  election,  then  just  before  him,  that 
was  of  leading  importance.  But  when  the  same  unions  that 
forced  his  hand  in  1916,  came  three  years  later  with  a  like 
demand  for  increase  of  wages,  he  woke  to  the  peril  he  had 
stirred  in  1916.  Now  it  was  almost  the  time  to  begin  se- 
curing delegates  for  the  presidential  conventions,  and  once 
more  the  organized  labor  forces  deemed  it  time  to  strike. 
They  again  approached  the  President  with  well-defined 
threats  unless  their  demands  for  increased  wages  were 
granted.  This  time  they  came  with  some  basis  for  their 
demands :  greatly  increased  cost  of  living.  That  the  great 
mass  of  the  people,  the  great  unorganized  public,  had  to 
meet  this  increased  cost  of  living  without  the  greatly  in- 
creased pay  granted  to  the  railroad  men  by  the  President's 
action  of  1916  and  by  the  Railroad  Administration  during 
the  war  and  now  by  their  new  demand  for  increased  pay,  all 
of  which  must  be  loaded  upon  the  public,  did  not  disturb  the 
trainmen. 

The  Adamson  law  had  given  the  Big  Four  Brotherhoods 
— firemen,  engineers,  conductors,  and  brakemen — a  wage 
increase  of  about  $70,000,000;  to  these  was  given  a  further 
increase  of  about  $160,000,000  two  years  later  upon  the 
recommendations  of  the  Lane  Commission  to  Director-Gen- 


Labor  and  Wages  53 

eral  McAdoo.  While  all  this  was  added  to  the  burdens  of 
the  public  with  little  or  no  increase  in  salaries  or  wages,  the 
trainmen  unblushingly  came  with  the  still  larger  demand  of 
1919,  at  which  time  the  President  was  getting  ready  to 
tour  the  country  in  the  interest  of  the  League  of  Nations, 
and  after  Mr.  McAdoo  had  added  to  the  rail  employes 
approximately  $250,000,000  per  annum  in  addition  to  that 
of  the  Lane  report. 

Under  these  circumstances,  the  President  did  not  meet 
the  issue  squarely  as  in  1916.  He  went  immediately  before 
Congress  with  the  matter,  apparently  to  seek  a  way  to  re- 
duce living  costs,  so  as  to  meet  the  complaint  of  the  train- 
men that  it  was  because  of  the  increased  cost  of  living  that 
they  came;  and  he  frankly  spoke  of  the  "vicious  cycle" 
which  another  increase  of  railroad  wages  would  but  con- 
tinue. And  in  order  to  rid  himself  of  the  matter  until  he 
could  tour  the  country  in  the  interest  of  the  Covenant  of 
the  League  of  Nations,  he  agreed  to  call  a  conference  of 
labor  men,  with  others,  to  meet  in  Washington  two  months 
later.  This  met  his  immediate  purpose.  Always  accommo- 
dating toward  organized  labor,  the  other  laborers  mattered 
little.  Seeking  to  support  the  contention  that  while,  under 
the  enormous  totals  added  to  the  railway  pay-rolls  of  em- 
ployes, the  increase  of  wages  had  been  but  fifty  per  cent 
while  the  increased  cost  of  living  was  fifty-five  per  cent,  no 
heed  was  paid  to  the  more  imperative  demands  of  the  third 
party,  the  great  unorganized  public.  The  Housewives1 
League  of  the  country,  the  Consumers'  League  of  the  na- 
tion, representing  the  tens  of  millions  of  the  common  folks, 
had  published  far  and  wide  the  intolerable  increases  in  the 
costs  of  living.  To  it  all  the  President  was  deaf.  One 
might  have  thought  he  would  feel  some  interest  in  the  em- 
ployes directly  under  his  jurisdiction,  the  employes  of  the 
executive  departments  of  the  government,  some  of  wRom 
were  receiving  the  same  salaries  that  were  paid  before  the 
Civil  War  with  an  increase  of  thirty-three  cents  a  day;  or, 


54      The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

one  might  think  that  he  would  take  an  interest  in  a  matter 
of  supreme  importance  in  the  District  of  Columbia,  at  the 
very  seat  of  government,  where  seventy-five  per  cent  of  the 
teachers  are  paid  annually  $800  or  less.  But  they  could 
not  get  his  ear.  Yet  as  soon  as  organized  voters  made  de- 
mands, they  had  his  attention. 

But  this  time  the  "rubber-stamp"  Congress  had  gone 
out  of  existence. 

On  the  floor  of  the  Senate,  December  5,  1919,  Senator 
Kellogg,  of  Minnesota,  stated  that  while  he  had  no  criti- 
cism upon  the  wage  increases  given  to  railroad  workers 
upon  the  report  of  the  Wage  Commission,  of  which  Secre- 
tary Franklin  K.  Lane  was  chairman,  he  did  criticise  the 
Administration's  issuing  many  orders  reclassifying  em- 
ployes, placing  them  in  the  higher-wage  class  without  change 
in  actual  employment.  In  this  connection  he  pointed  out 
that  office  boys  of  twelve  or  thirteen  years,  studying  short- 
hand or  going  to  school  part  of  the  time,  had  their  wages 
raised  to  as  high  as  eighty  and  ninety  dollars  a  month,  and 
that  in  many  instances  men  in  subordinate  positions  were 
receiving  salaries  higher  than  their  superiors;  he  also  added 
that  these  gross  inequalities  added  greatly  to  the  cost  of 
operation  of  the  railroads,  created  unrest!  and  had  a  bad 
effect  on  the  morale  of  the  service.  Proceeding  in  his  re- 
marks, the  Senator  further  stated: 

Men  are  constantly  being  taken  out  of  one  class  and  placed  in 

a  higher  skilled  class In  one  case,  men  engaged  in  cleaning 

Pullman  cars  were  taken  out  of  the  ordinary  day-labor  class  and 
placed  in  the  class  of  expert  upholsterers  and  their  pay  raised  from 
40  cents  to  68  cents  an  hour,  and  they  still  continue  to  perform  their 
old  duties.  .  .  .  That  is  going  on  all  over  the  country. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  it  was  not  a  reduction  in  the  number 
of  hours  of  labor  that  the  railroad  men  sought  in  their 
1916  demands.  What  they  put  out  for  the  public  was  just 
that.  What  they  really  demanded  and  obtained  was  a  ten- 


Labor  and  Wages  55 

hour  wage  for  an  eight-hour  day,  and  pay-and-half  for  all 
time  over  the  eight  hours.  Indeed,  they  hoped  to  work 
every  hour  they  could  crowd  in  at  that  pay,  up  to  the  six- 
teen-hour  limit.1  And  they  accomplished  that,  in  the  de- 
velopment of  this  personal  policy  of  President  Wilson. 

For  there  was  no  more  demand  for  the  President's 
backing  a  demand  such  as  that  made  by  the  Big  Brother- 
hoods of  1916,  as  a  public  policy,  than  that  his  forced  meas- 
ure should  embrace  all  underpaid  groups  of  workers  or 
individual  workers.  Indeed,  there  was  relatively  less  de- 
mand than  for  increased  pay  for  such  social  forces  of  the 
nation  as  teachers  who  had  to  pay  out  large  sums  in  prepara- 
tion for  their  work,  while  the  others  were  always  receiving 
pay  while  in  preparation  for  their  life  calling.  The  Presi- 
dent's policy  tended  to  develop  the  material  side  of  the  na- 
tion rather  than  the  spiritual. 

As  a  further  result  of  this  policy,  when  the  nation  found 
itself  suddenly  thrust  into  the  war  it  was  thrown  into  as 
great  a  muddle,  with  all  its  opportunity  for  preparation,  as 

*I  had  occasion  to  be  in  Williston,  N.  D.,  in  November,  1918,  from 
which  town  I  took  an  early  freight  to  a  station  a  few  miles  east.  In  the 
caboose  alone  with  a  commercial  traveller  and  myself,  the  brakeman  was 
freely  expressing  his  joy  over  conditions.  He  said  the  next  day  "the  ghosts 
would  be  about,"  which  he  explained  as  meaning  that  it  was  pay-day,  and 
he  would  receive  $110  for  half  a  month's  work.  He  stated  further  that  he 
had  been  on  the  railroad  but  a  short  time,  that  he  had  no  experience  as  a 
railroad  man,  that  he  was  aged  about  22  or  23  years,  that  their  trains  were 
very  light,  and  that  unless  they  had  at  least  one  way-car  they  could  not  go 
out;  that  his  run  to  Minot  was  very  light,  that  they  had  to  reach  that  point 
not  later  than  9  o'clock,  since  at  that  hour  the  1 6-hour  limit  expired,  and  that 
they  had  to  kill  time  on  the  way  to  make  it  cover  the  sixteen  hours  (a  cold- 
blooded method  of  bleeding  the  people  with  which  any  intelligent  travelling 
man  of  experience  is  wholly  familiar).  That  evening  I  met  him  in  Minot 
at  9  o'clock  and  when  I  asked  how  long  he  had  been  in,  he  hilariously  re- 
plied: "Just  now  got  in." 

In  Minneapolis  at  the  Soo  shops  worked  a  boy  of  17  years,  with  little 
education,  who  had  no  one  dependent  upon  him,  and  lived  at  home  with  his 
parents.  He  received  upwards  of  $200  a  month.  His  preparation  had  cost 
him  nothing,  and  he  was  paid  for  every  hour  of  his  preparation  for  his 
work. 

In  the  P.  R.  R.  shops  at  Sunbury,  Pa.,  was  a  man  engaged  who  gleefully 
wrote  his  friends  that  he  had  scarcely  time  to  write  as  he  was  receiving 
$11  for  every  day  he  was  at  work.  These  three  instances  in  three  widely 
separated  sections  of  the  country  came  to  my  attention  at  about  the  same 
time. — Author. 


56       The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

was  England  or  France  with  the  shells  dropping  at  their 
doors  and  the  very  integrity  of  their  territory  threatened, 
with  not  a  day  for  preparation.  In  consequence,  there  was 
an  immediate  demand  for  labor  in  all  branches  of  industry 
in  war  preparation;  and  labor,  in  turn,  made  immediate  de- 
mands for  increased  pay  to  meet  that  allowed  the  railroad 
brotherhoods  under  the  President's  pressure  in  1916.  It 
was  confusion  worse  confounded;  the  "cost-plus-a-per- 
cent"  plan  was  adopted  by  the  Administration,  under  which 
grabbing  contractors  cared  nothing  as  to  how  much  they 
paid  for  labor  for  it  was  merely  added  to  the  cost  and  to 
that  the  per  cent,  which  put  into  their  pockets  the  more 
money  as  the  cost  became  the  greater — a  plan  under  which 
even  the  cantonments  were  built  by  contractors,  instead  of 
having  it  done  by  the  government's  own  engineer  corps  and 
other  suitable  branches  of  the  service,  thereby  releasing 
hundreds  of  thousands  of  skilled  laborers  for  essential 
work  elsewhere,  as  was  done  in  France. 

Nor  was  it  till  the  war  was  well  done  that  the  Adminis- 
tration adopted  a  general  labor  policy.  On  June  15,  1918, 
Secretary  of  Labor  Wilson  in  a  letter  to  the  President 
stated : 

A  dispensable  industry  competes  for  the  labor  of  an  essential 
plant.  Instances  are  frequent  where  one  government  project  secures 
men  at  the  expense  of  another.  As  a  result,  the  labor  turnover  is 
alarmingly  great,  with  a  loss  in  war  efficiency  which  we  cannot 
afford. 

And  he  added  that  one  of  the  serious  consequences  of  this 
situation  was  the  effect  upon  the  morale  of  the  workers, 
producing  and  encouraging  restlessness.  And  the  Presi- 
dent responding  to  the  Secretary's  suggestion  that  a  central 
agency  should  be  established  to  determine  where  labor 
should  go,  pointed  to  the  United  States  Employment  Serv- 
ice. Prior  to  this,  the  Administration  was  fumbling  to  find 
a  policy  that  would  fit  the  emergency  of  backing  up  at 


Labor  and  Wages  57 

home  the  boys  that  were  doing  the  fighting  at  the  front. 

From  this  grew  the  uwork-or-fight"  order.  When  this 
policy  was  announced  it  met  approval  from  one  end  of  the 
land  to  the  other.  But  some  of  the  edge  was  taken  from  it 
by  the  announcement  in  early  July  that  it  would  apply  only 
to  men  of  draft  age.  In  his  explanatory  statement,  Gen- 
eral Crowder  said  that  it  was  not  a  satisfying  spectacle  to 
see  a  contingent  of  one  class  of  men  marching  down  the 
street  to  camp,  while  other  men  of  their  own  age,  patching 
them  from  the  shop  windows  remained  behind  to  sell  cigar- 
ettes or  dispense  soda-fountain  drinks.  'Work  or 
fight' — there  is  no  alternative,"  he  declared,  to  the  delight 
of  real  Americans. 

And  the  later  draft  law  meant  the  same  principle  was 
to  become  operative;  for  the  conscripting  of  all  men  be- 
tween the  ages  of  18  and  45  was  not  so  much  a  conscription 
of  men  to  fight  as  it  was  of  men  to  work.  It  meant  work 
or  fight  and  meant  it  with  a  certainty  that  could  not  be  mis- 
understood.2 The  new  edict  became  effective  July  i,  1918. 

And  from  about  this  time,  the  federal  employment  serv- 
ice became  a  most  effective  branch  of  government  activity. 
Starting  originally  as  a  part  of  the  immigration  service,  it 
was  later  placed  upon  a  firm  foundation  that  enabled  it  to 
render  real  service  to  the  nation.  As  the  harvest  season 
of  1918  approached,  the  director-general  at  Kansas  City, 
as  an  example,  was  in  receipt  of  daily  reports  from  his 
representatives  in  the  field  whereby  he  was  fully  informed 
as  to  the  stages  of  the  ripening  grain,  the  probable  time 
when  harvesters  would  be  required,  and  the  number  at 
each  place.  It  linked  the  mariless  job  with  the  jobless  man. 
It  did  good  service  in  aiding  the  returned  fighters,  at  the 
close  of  hostilities,  to  get  employment  promptly  and  with 
little  loss  of  time. 

2 General  Crowder  stated  it  naively  in  this  way:  "I  believe  the  effect 
of  the  additional  registration  will  be  to  recruit  industry  up  to  the  point 
where  there  will  be  no  shortage  of  industrial  man  power." 


58       The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

The  growth  of  unionism  was  a  notable  result  of  the 
Adamson  law.  The  government  had  opposed  the  unioniz- 
ing of  its  employes;  but  as  soon  as  the  railways  passed 
under  its  control,  the  Director-General  prohibited  inter- 
ference with  efforts  of  the  employes  to  organize.  If  per- 
missible in  one  branch  of  the  service,  why  not  in  all?  Ac- 
cordingly, every  branch  of  the  service  in  the  departments 
in  Washington  and  out  was  unionized.  The  irony  of  it 
all  was  that  it  was  done  to  protect  the  employe  against  the 
government's  injustice  itself — one  of  the  sternest  comments 
upon  President  Wilson's  social-justice  ideas  in  forcing  upon 
the  country  the  demands  of  the  railroad  brotherhoods  in 
1916,  while  some  of  the  employes  in  his  own  executive  de- 
partments were  living  on  starvation  salaries,3  established 
in  1857,  when  a  $500  salary  was  as  good  as  a  $1500  salary 
in  1916.  And  it  was  known  that  the  greatly  increased  pay 
then  allowed  to  the  railroad  men,  in  addition  to  the  previous 
advances,  $300,000,000  increase  recommended  in  the  Lane 
report,  effective  January  i,  1918,  and  still  later  another 
$500,000,000,  with  still  other  increases  later,  was  all  added 
to  the  increased  cost  of  living,  of  which  those  whose  sal- 
aries had  not  been  increased  had  to  pay  the  larger  pro- 
portionate share. 

If  President  Wilson  did  not  foresee  some  of  the  logical 
results  of  the  policy  which  he  inaugurated  in  1916  when, 
under  threat  of  a  strike  on  the  part  of  the  railroad  men, 
he  discarded  the  principle  of  arbitration,  that  fact  does 
not  add  to  his  qualification  as  statesman.  It  was  the  threat 
that  was  repeated  in  1919  by  the  railroad  workers,  one 
of  whose  leaders  declared  they  were  using  the  method  of 
the  cavemen — sheer  brute  force  to  gain  their  ends.  And  on 
September  22,  four  days  before  the  tie-up  of  the  British 
railroads,  the  great  steel  strike  in  the  United  States  oc- 
curred, led  by  one  Fitzpatrick,  a  horseshoer  who  had  never 

"Hearings  by  House  Committee  on  Labor,  spring  of  1916.  And  in  1918 
cabinet  and  other  high  officials  asked  that  salaries  of  department  employes 
be  based  at  least  upon  decency  and  humanity. 


Labor  and  Wages  59 

worked  in  a  steel  plant,  and  William  Z.  Foster,  a  syndicalist. 
These  were  followed  by  the  soft-coal  strike  on  November 
i,  1919,  in  violation  of  a  contract  of  the  miners  with  the 
government.  These  were  not  bona  fide  labor  moves,  but 
plans  to  break  the  will  of  the  public.  And  yet  another  con- 
sequence of  President  Wilson's  labor  policy  was  the  inordi- 
nately high  wages  paid  in  industrial  centers,  withdrawing 
from  the  farms  the  essential  help  that  would  otherwise  have 
remained  on  the  farm.  And  the  warning  going  out  from 
the  farms  is  that  the  farmers  will  produce  what  they  may 
be  able  to  supply  the  hungry  world  in  the  great  depletion 
of  help,  but  that  if  the  world  goes  hungry  it  will  not  be 
their  fault.4  This  is  a  serious  problem  for  the  future, 
created  by  President  Wilson  when  he  whipped  the  Adamson 
bill  through  Congress  in  1916  to  aid  a  favored  class.  And 
from  that  day,  classism  has  grown  by  leaps  and  bounds  in 
the  United  States.  It  sought  to  control  the  Administration 
and  to  become  the  government  during  1919.  By  this  time 
the  Administration  seeing  its  plight  took  the  firm  position 
it  should  have  assumed  in  1916.  It  is  well  illustrated  in  the 
attitude  of  laboring  men  in  the  "outlaw"  switchmen's  strike, 
April,  1920.  John  Grunau,  Chicago  radical  leader,  de- 
clared that  "the  fight  has  become  one  between  the  new  and 
old  unions";  while  W.  G.  Lee,  president  of  the  brother- 
hoods of  railroad  trainmen,  demanded  that  some  law  be 
enforced  against  the  "outlaw"  strikers.  Yet  Lee  was  among 
the  first  to  object  to  the  anti-strike  clause  in  the  Esch-Cum- 
mins  railroad  bill.  The  logic  of  this  is  that  he  was  willing 
that  his  brotherhood  may  strike  against  the  interest  of  the 
public  but  that  he  rejected  the  idea  that  any  organization 
might  strike  against  the  policy  of  his  own  brotherhood.  In 
other  words,  he  was  ready  to  exalt  his  Brotherhood  above 

4  See  Senator  Capper  of  Kansas  in  the  North  American  Review,  August, 
1920.  A  serious  omission  in  the  review,  as  Senator  Capper  sees  it,  is  that 
he  fails  to  call  attention  to  marked  decrease  in  the  number  of  farm-pro- 
duced boys  and  girls  in  the  last  two  decades,  a  factor  upon  which  the  farmer 
and  the  whole  nation  has  relied  heretofore. 


60       The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

Government  and  People.  If,  as  held  by  organized  labor 
leaders,  the  unrestricted  right  to  strike  is  "natural  and  in- 
herent," then  it  must  be  a  right  common  to  all  and  cannot 
be  monopolized  by  some  favored  Brotherhood  or  Federa- 
tion. But  this  was  an  unworthy  frame  of  mind  into  which 
they  were  led  by  the  favoritism  of  the  coddling  Adminis- 
tration. 

Was  labor  loyal  during  the  war?  This  was  a  question 
often  asked  by  the  public.  Labor  as  a  whole  was  thor- 
oughly loyal.  Too  many  labor  leaders  were  utterly  disloyal, 
though  they  took  every  precaution  to  conceal  it  from  the 
public.  They  adopted  the  camouflaging  method  character- 
istic of  the  National  Administration.  In  support  of  this 
view  are  cited  the  Bridgeport  strike  which  was  completely 
demolished  by  the  energetic  action  of  President  Wilson; 
the  threatened  strike  of  railroad  laborers,  in  which  Direc- 
tor-General McAdoo's  prompt  action  was  decisive ;  and  the 
letter  Samuel  Gompers,  President  of  the  American  Feder- 
ation of  Labor,  wrote  Senator  Thomas  when  the  news- 
papers were  stating  that  the  latter  was  about  to  introduce 
a  bill  to  penalize  workmen  who  absented  themselves  from 
their  employment  in  war  plants,  which  meant  in  war  time, 
when  stating: 

The  workmen  in  the  United  States  are  doing  their  full  share  of 
service  and  duty.  They  are  whole-heartedly  supporting  the  war 
program.  They  are  giving  themselves,  their  sons,  their  brothers,  and 
other  blood  relations  on  the  firing  line.5 

In  this  pronouncement  Mr.  Gompers  appears  to  proclaim 
the  doctrine  of  vicarious  patriotism,  and  to  hold  that  men 
engaged  in  war  plants  were  to  be  privileged  above  any 
other  class  in  the  country;  that  labor,  per  se,  had  a  right 
to  a  preferred  classification.  And,  like  so  many  other  labor 
leaders,  he  placed  these  highly-paid  laborers  above  any  other 

'Contrast,  in  Collier's  Weekly  for  September  14,  1918,  a  statement  of 
a  shirk  paid  $9.90  a  day — a  method  quite  common  by  laborers  on  govern- 
ment work  during  the  war. 


Labor  and  Wages  61 

civilian  class  and  even  above  the  very  men  who,  at  that 
time,  were  giving  their  lives  to  the  country  and  even  for  the 
high-priced  shirks  in  war  plants.  Then,  was  labor  loyal? 

It  was  common  for  labor,  in  its  organized  form,  to 
point  the  finger  at  the  men  fattening  in  the  munition  plants 
and  in  war  industries  of  all  kinds.  It  was  proper.  Profiteer- 
ing by  such  industries  was  notorious.  Yet  these  same  labor- 
ing men  were  willing  to  fatten  off  the  very  life-blood  of 
the  boys  who  so  earnestly  put  themselves  into  the  conflict 
for  civilization.  The  labor  man  was  willing  to  grasp  all 
he  could  in  the  hour  of  the  Government's  need,  while  the 
boys  fighting  for  the  very  man  who  hid  himself  as  a  work- 
man in  the  munition  plants  at  home  was  suffering  and  dying 
in  the  trenches  for  a  miserable  pittance.  Nor  was  this  all. 
While  the  so-called  laboring  man  was  squeezing  the  last 
possible  nickel  out  of  the  Government  through  organized 
labor  and  was  receiving  it  with  commendable  regularity, 
the  man  with  the  fighting  forces  found  it  difficult  to  receive 
his  little  pay  from  the  government,  because  of  the  ineffi- 
ciency of  the  Administration,  for  himself,  his  wife,  and  his 
babe  at  home.6 

Why  the  Administration  of  the  war  period  should  be 
willing  to  tolerate  any  such  condition  was  inexplicable.  The 
money  was  on  hand  for  the  government  civilian  employe  who 

B  This  became  so  notorious  as  to  amount  to  a  national  scandal.  The 
Administration  promptly  advanced  the  pay  of  well-organized  railroad  men, 
at  first  by  the  tens  of  millions,  then  by  hundreds  of  millions,  and  later  by  the 
billion;  while  the  neglect  of  the  pay  to  the  fighting  men  tarnished  the  na- 
tion's fair  name.  No  civilian  officer  of  the  Administration  from  President 
down  went  without  his  pay  regularly,  nor  did  well-paid  laboring  men  3000 
to  6000  miles  from  the  firing  line.  One  case  illustrates  the  method.  It  is 
within  my  personal  knowledge:  No  allotment  was  being  paid  *the  wife  of 
the  enlisted  man  until  a  law  was  enacted  that  all  allotments  to  the  wife 
should  date  back  to  the  man's  entry  into  the  service.  Then  the  Admin- 
istration, instead  of  acting  in  a  straight-forward  manner,  took  from  the 
pay  of  the  fighter  the  $15  per  month  of  governmental  allotment  due 
the  wife,  and  dating  this  allotment  from  January  13,  1918,  though  he  had 
been  in  the  service  a  full  month  previous;  and  up  to  the  following  December 
he  had  not  been  able  to  get  from  the  Government  any  of  that  due  to  his 
infant  child.  This  is  in  marked  contrast  with  the  Administration's  care 
to  pay  promptly  and  with  enormously  increased  wages  organized  labor.— 
Author. 


62       The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

remained  away  from  danger  and  at  a  high  salary  or  wage; 
why  not  for  the  fighting  man  who  left  wife  and  babe  behind 
at  one-third  to  one-fifth  of  the  pay  the  other  was  receiving? 
Nor  was  this  the  only  matter  pertaining  to  labor  and  wages 
in  which  the  Administration's  attitude  will  not  bear  scru- 
tiny. The  public,  after  hostilities  ceased,  asked  why  organ- 
ized labor  was  making  so  frequent  appeals  for  amnesty  for 
political  prisoners  of  the  Debs  and  Mooney  type,  and  why 
the  Administration  was  responding  by  the  release  of  those 
of  the  type  of  Kate  O'Hare.  Other  elements  of  the  Ameri- 
can citizenship  were  not  worried  lest  some  disloyalist  should 
serve  in  prison  the  sentence  imposed  by  the  courts  in  the 
regular  course  of  legal  procedure  after  full  sifting  of  the 
case.  The  public  also  wanted  to  know  why,  after  the  Ad- 
ministration's marked  favors  to  organized  labor,  the  pay- 
roll of  labor  was  two  and  a  half  times  as  high  as  before  the 
war  while  labor  was  less  efficient,  the  work  produced  per 
man  being  greatly  reduced.  When  Lloyd  George  was  fight- 
ing the  bolshevistic  tendency  of  workingmen  in  England,  he 
won  by  the  proof  that  every  previous  wage  increase  had  been 
followed  by  a  lessening  of  production:  that  with  100,000 
more  miners  at  work  at  wages  172  per  cent  higher  there 
was  a  decline  of  16  per  cent  in  production.7  His  position 
was  quite  in  contrast  with  that  of  the  American  Adminis- 
tration in  favoring  the  coal  strikers  in  the  fall  of  1919. 
Fuel  Administrator  Garfield  fixed,  upon  a  scientific  basis, 
the  miners'  wages  at  a  14  per  cent  increase.  His  position 
was  favored  by  the  cabinet.  President  Wilson,  however, 
overturned  all  in  favor  of  the  radical  element  among  the 
miners  who  were  violating  a  contract  with  the  Government 
and  practically  threatening  rebellion. 

In  that  connection  Doctor  Garfield  uttered  the  words  of 
a  statesman  when  he  said: 

If  one  class  of  workers  demands  more  than  like  workers  are  get- 
ting, that  class  is  trying  to  levy  tribute  upon  the  people  of  the  coun- 
'  See  page  78, 


Labor  and  Wages  63 

try  arid  does  not  differ  from  corporations  which  seek  profits  for  the 
few  at  the  expense  of  the  many.  They  certainly  put  themselves  in 
the  position  of  law-breakers. 

This  attitude  of  sound  sense  was  more  than  the  Adminis- 
tration could  bear,  and  Doctor  Garfield  promptly  resigned 
his  position  of  national  Fuel  Administrator,  thwarted  in 
his  efforts  to  aid  the  vast  unorganized  public  in  its  battle 
against  organized  labor  and  organized  industry;  for  it  was 
becoming  notorious  that  between  these  two  the  public  was 
being  crushed,  and  in  some  instances  evidence  was  not  want- 
ing that  the  two  were  working  in  harmony  to  squeeze  from 
the  purse  of  the  public  all  it  would  endure.  Garfield  felt 
that  sound  principle  had  been  deserted  for  a  makeshift;  he 
was  unwilling  to  keep  step  in  a  march  that  was  sure  to  be 
fatal  to  the  future. 

The  public  was  glad  of  the  opportunity  to  meet  with 
captains  of  industry  and  captains  of  labor,  in  the  Industrial 
Conference  called  by  President  Wilson  to  meet  in  Washing- 
ton, October  6,  1919.  It  was  the  first  of  the  kind.  The 
great  steel  strike  was  on  at  this  time,  and  passions  were 
aroused.  The  public  group  had  little  opportunity  in  this 
Conference,  which  was  presided  over  by  Secretary  of  the 
Interior  Franklin  K.  Lane,  representing  this  group.  He 
stated  practically  the  same  principle  as  Garfield,  He 
declared  that  "Increase  in  the  wage  rate  does  not  always 
give  relief.  The  more  productive  we  are,  the  sooner  we 
shall  replace  the  wastage  of  war,  return  to  normal  price 
levels  and  abolish  the  opportunity  of  profiteering."  But  the 
conference  was  dashed  to  pieces  on  the  rocks  of  selfishness 
of  the  industrial  and  labor  groups. 

It  is  always  thus.  And  it  is  doubtful  whether  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  right  to  strike  announced  by  Judge  George  W. 
Anderson,8  of  the  federal  bench  in  Boston,  is  as  sound  as  it 
may  appear  at  first  sight.  For  in  almost  all  instances  it  is 
the  great  unorganized  public  that  suffers,  while  the  labor 

8  Opinion  in  the  deportation  of  aliens  cases,  June  23,  1920. 


64       The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

leaders  and  the  industrial  leaders  continue  to  bleed  this  pub- 
lic. Says  one  writer  touching  this  matter  of  the  relations  of 
the  two  selfish  groups  toward  the  public : 

Labor  unions  and  manufacturers'  associations  are  morally  on  a 
par.  Both  are  recruited  by  a  changing  personnel  concerned  about 
"getting  on."  9 

The  public  is  coming  to  understand  this  unity  of  purpose 
on  the  part  of  these  two  groups,  so  well  concealed  under 
the  cloak  of  a  savage  warfare  in  too  many  instances;  and 
it  is  one  of  the  items  charged  by  the  public  sternly  against 
the  Wilson  Administration  from  the  time  President  Wilson 
undertook,  as  a  personal  policy,  to  favor  strongly  organized 
voters,  while  ignoring  the  general  public  and  workers  in 
more  important  positions  at  a  greatly  less  salary  or  wage. 
The  insolence  of  wealth  may  deserve  all  the  anathemas 
hurled  against  it;  but  the  relentlessness  of  the  autocracy  of 
organized  labor  cannot  escape  the  scathing  it  is  receiving 
from  the  great  American  public  now  arousing  itself  to 
the  real  situation.  If  the  Administration  has  innocently 
brought  this  about,  it  should  be  so  recorded  as  a  matter  of 
historical  significance. 

During  the  spring  of  1920,  the  cost  of  materials  and 
of  labor  was  so  exorbitant  that  building  operations  were 
practically  at  a  standstill.  At  that  time  builders  would  not 
assure  any  prospective  building  patron  that  material  could 
be  obtained,  and  owing  to  the  uncertainty  of  the  labor  situa- 
tion some  would  contract  to  erect  houses  only  on  the  cost- 
plus  plan — an  adaptation  of  the  plan  upon  which  the 
Administration  operated  during  the  war  period.  But  it  did 
not  work.  The  people  were  better  economists  than  the 
National  Administration.  And  while  the  situation  was 
eased  as  to  material  by  July  i,  there  was  no  change  in 
the  labor  situation.  Soon  there  was  a  shortage  of  houses 
in  the  United  States  estimated  at  a  million. 

°H.  M.  Kallen,  "The  League  of  Nations,"  pp.  168-169,  Marshall  Jones 
Company,  Boston,  1919. 


Labor  and  Wages  65 

Nor  did  the  condition  greatly  change  in  the  spring  of 
1921.  It  was  only  after  the  Railroad  Labor  Board  ren- 
dered its  decision,  effective  July  i,  materially  reducing 
wages  on  the  railroads,  that  labor  was  forced  to  confess 
that  it  could  not  remain  the  only  favored  class  in  the  coun- 
try. Though  late  in  the  season  to  begin  building  operations, 
there  was  a  very  perceptible  increase  in  activities  in  July. 

Autocracy  of  labor  controlling  the  Government  and 
ruling  the  people  means  unfree  labor  and  enforced  sub- 
serviency of  a  helpless  public.  America  must  be  kept  free. 
The  people  are  determined  it  shall  be.  The  unwarranted 
threat  of  a  strike  October  30,  1921,  on  the  part  of  railroad 
employes  was  so  heartily  disapproved  by  the  public  as  a 
strike  against  the  public  rather  than  against  the  railroads, 
that  its  failure  was  foredoomed. 


CHAPTER    V 

SHIPBUILDING 

Here  are  some  of  the  familiar  sayings  uttered  during 
the  war: — 

President  Wilson:  "Food  and  other  supplies  must  be 
carried  across  the  seas,  no  matter  how  many  ships  are  sent 
to  the  bottom." 

Edward  N.  Hurley  of  the  United  States  Shipping 
Board:  "The  whole  war  depends  upon  ships — ships  de- 
pend upon  labor,  and  labor  depends  upon  the  ability  of  this 
board,  through  an  adequate  reserve,  to  supply  the  yards." 

David  Lloyd  George,  Prime  Minister  of  Great  Britain : 
"The  road  of  victory,  the  guarantee  of  victory,  the  absolute 
assurance  of  victory,  has  to  be  found  in  one  word,  ships, 
and  a  second  word,  ships,  and  a  third  word,  ships. 

"The  collapse  of  Russia  and  the  reverses  to  Italy  make 
it  even  more  imperative  that  the  United  States  send  as  many 
troops  as  possible  across  the  Atlantic  as  early  as  possible." 

The  Shipping  Board  made  its  promises  and  statements 
to  the  country  extravagant  enough  to  appeal  to  one  of 
America's  most  fundamental  characteristics — a  spirit  of 
boastfulness  that  likes  to  believe  in  its  own  ability  to  accom- 
plish anything  that  can  be  accomplished  by  man.  The 
Shipping  Board  said,  "We  will  build  ships."  America  said: 
"Of  course  we  will  build  ships."  The  Shipping  Board  said: 
"We  will  span  the  ocean  with  ships;  we  will  carry  grain  and 
munitions  and  men  to  Europe  over  this  bridge  of  ships,  and 
not  over  a  bridge  of  sighs."  America  said :  "We  will  span 
the  seas;  we  will  carry  grain  and  munitions  and  men  to 
Europe  over  this  bridge;  we  will  send  the  pirates  to  the 

66 


Shipbuilding  67 

bottom  of  the  ocean;  we  will  back  our  Allies  to  the  last 
dollar."  But  the  bridge  of  ships  became  a  bridge  of 
sighs.1 

To  any  one  knowing  the  real  situation  which  was  de- 
veloping, the  game  played  by  the  chairman  of  the  Shipping 
Board  and  his  associates  during  the  last  half  of  1917  and 
early  part  of  1918  was  a  staggering  commentary  on  the 
power  of  publicity  upon  the  people  when  administered 
through  the  governmental  agencies  of  that  day.  It  was  also 
a  somewhat  disquieting  commentary  upon  the  intelligence  of 
American  public  opinion,  except  for  the  fact  that  America 
had  no  standard  by  which  to  judge  the  propaganda  put  out 
by  the  Administration. 

Long  before  America  entered  upon  the  armed  conflict 
of , the  world,  it  was  a  recognized  truth  that  the  issue  would 
be  determined  by  the  world's  shipping.  When  it  became 
an  acknowledged  reality  that  the  ruthless  destruction  advo- 
cated as  a  policy  by  the  German  naval  leader  Tirpitz  had 
become  the  policy  of  his  government,  then  the  world  under- 
stood. America  then  understood. 

Accordingly,  by  virtue  of  the  Act  of  September  7,  1916, 
the  United  States  Shipping  Board  was  created  and  it,  in 
turn,  created  the  Fleet  Corporation.  And  as  a  consequence, 
America  went  into  shipbuilding  as  no  other  nation  had  ever 
previously  gone  into  the  business. 

But  it  was  put  aside  for  so  long  a  time,  that  when  the 
crisis  came,  affairs  came  to  be  a  muddle  and  efforts  had  to 
be  redoubled  to  straighten  them  out,  at  a  very  great  ex- 
penditure. 

The  upshot  of  the  matter,  however,  shows  that  when 
America  was  aroused  and  set  her  shoulder  to  the  wheel,  she 
was  capable  of  bringing  to  pass  things  hardly  conceivable ; 
that  a  prodigious  program  could  be  executed,  even  under 
the  handicap  of  previous  neglect  and  incapable  management. 

*War  Weekly. 


68       The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

This  chapter  will  seek  to  set  out  some  of  the  things  that 
should  become  a  matter  of  permanent  record  for  the  gen- 
eral reader. 

In  April,  1917,  when  war  was  declared  by  the  United 
States,  there  were  in  the  thirty-seven  steel  shipyards  of 
the  country  only  162  launching  ways.  In  June,  1918,  there 
were  398  ways  so  designed  as  to  permit  the  construction  of 
steel  ships,  three-fourths  of  them  on  the  Atlantic  coast  north 
of  Norfolk,  or  on  rivers  directly  tributary.  Upon  the 
operation  of  these  depended  the  success  of  the  nation's  ship- 
building project  for  the  purpose  of  prosecution  of  the  Great 
War's  aims — replacing  the  shipping  which  the  Central 
Powers  had  been  destroying  at  the  rate  of  a  million  tons  a 
month,  and  transporting  to  Europe  food,  soldiers,  and  war 
implements. 

But  at  a  time  when  prompt  action  was  urgently  needed, 
there  arose  an  unfortunate  and  aggravating  wrangle  be- 
tween Mr.  Goethals  and  Mr.  Denman,  men  holding  official 
positions  of  equal  authority,  as  to  whether  steel  or  wooden 
ships  should  be  built  under  the  circumstances,  including 
the  great  need  of  haste  then  demanded.  Wooden  ships,  at 
first  decided  upon,  were  later  discarded  in  favor  of  steel, 
for  which  Mr.  Goethals  contended  from  the  first. 

The  urgent  need  of  united,  prompt,  and  efficient  action 
at  this  time  was  indicated  by  the  wholesale  destruction  of 
shipping  by  the  submarines  of  the  enemy  countries.  At 
the  beginning  of  the  Great  War,  the  total  tonnage  of  the 
merchant  marine  of  the  Allies  and  neutral  powers  was  ap- 
proximately 40,050,000.  Of  this,  some  21,404,000  tons 
were  destroyed,  and  the  destruction  was  at  an  appalling 
rate  when  the  Allies  were  not  ready  to  replace  it  with  new 
ships;  this  was  what  made  it  look,  at  one  time,  as  if  the 
toll  of  shipping  which  the  enemy  U-boats  were  taking  would 
settle  the  war  by  starving  the  Entente  Powers  into  submis- 
sion before  the  United  States  could  furnish  sufficient  ships 
to  replace  the  excessive  losses.  But  when  the  ravages  of 


Shipbuilding  69 

the  under-sea  enemy  boats  were  slackened,  there  was  a 
breathing  space  during  which  this  country  had  opportunity 
to  retrieve,  in  a  measure,  its  past  errors. 

But  while  more  than  half  of  the  Allies'  shipping  was 
going  to  the  bottom  of  the  sea,  it  was  replaced  by  two-thirds 
of  the  amount  destroyed,  or  14,270,000  tons  of  new  ship- 
ping, besides  3,795,000  tons  of  enemy  shipping  seized. 
How  much  new  shipping  was  constructed  by  the  enemy  is 
not  known. 

An  error  made  by  the  United  States  Emergency  Fleet 
Corporation  in  the  beginning  of  its  existence  was  the  policy 
of  not  using  to  the  full  the  shipbuilding  facilities  which  then 
existed  in  the  country  and  expanding  them  to  the  limit. 
Instead,  it  constructed  many  and  expensive  and  extensive 
new  yards,  some  of  which  were  located  in  mere  swamps. 
This  policy  not  only  delayed  the  start  in  the  construction 
of  new  ships,  but  it  rendered  less  simple  the  problems  of 
labor  and  management — most  important  factors  at  a  time 
when  the  enemy  was  destroying  1,000,000  tons  of  ships 
a  month. 

A  man  in  the  person  of  Edward  N.  Hurley,  who  was 
not  a  shipbuilder  and  who  had  had  no  experience  in  ship- 
ping matters,  was  placed  at  the  head  of  the  Shipping  Board. 
As  if  this  were  not  bad  enough,  he  persistently  ignored  the 
advice  of  practical  shipping  men  and  began  making  the 
country  the  most  extravagant  promises,  so  that  he  led  the 
people  to  forget  that  there  was  any  submarine  menace. 
Before  he  had  been  in  office  many  weeks,  the  country  was 
told  that  something  like  10,000,000  tons  had  been  con- 
tracted for.  His  press  agents  made  the  most  of  this  prom- 
ise to  convince  the  country  that  this  amount  of  tonnage 
was  to  be  expected  in  1918.  Later  the  figure  was  reduced 
to  8,000,000,  then  to  6,000,000.  Real  shipbuilders  warned 
the  chairman  against  his  unfounded  promises,  and  urged 
him  to  save  wrecking  the  facilities  that  already  existed,  since 
his  policy  was  merely  disturbing  normal  production  without 


yo       The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

enlarging  it,  while  it  was  hopelessly  congesting  transporta- 
tion facilities.  But  the  warnings  went  unheeded,  men  who 
had  spent  their  lives  in  shipbuilding  were  cast  aside,  and 
Mr.  Hurley's  press  agents  filled  the  newspapers  with  prom- 
ises which  led  the  public  to  believe  that  a  thousand  or  more 
ships  would  be  available  for  transportation  of  troops  and 
supplies  during  1918,  of  which  number  two  hundred  would 
be  turned  out  at  Hog  Island  yard  alone. 

This  method  of  misleading  the  people  continued 
throughout  the  fall  and  winter  of  1917-1918.  And  when 
the  promises  were  not  fulfilled,  Mr.  Hurley  pleaded  rail 
congestion,  the  most  severe  winter  known  and  the  labor 
situation,  and  at  length,  no  longer  able  to  hold  back  the 
demands  of  the  country,  he,  directly  or  indirectly,  laid  the 
blame  upon  the  shipbuilders,  and  in  an  address  at  South 
Bend,  Indiana,  middle  of  July,  1918,  he  named  3,000,000 
tons,  merely  adding  that  Mr.  Schwab  "believes  3,000,000 
tons  can  be  exceeded." 

The  situation  became  acute  by  the  early  spring  of  1918. 
On  March  26,  just  five  days  after  the  tremendous  drive 
of  the  enemy  began  and  within  a  few  days  of  a  year  after 
we  had  entered  the  conflict,  Mr.  Hurley,  in  an  address  in 
New  York  before  the  National  Marine  League  of  the 
United  States  stated  that  all  of  the  shipyards  of  the  coun- 
try were  full  when  the  Shipping  Board  took  them  over,  and 
added: 

It  is  only  recently  that  America  awoke  to  the  vital  needs  of  ships 
at  a  belated  hour.  At  a  belated  hour  came  the  realization  that  con- 
stant supplies  must  go  to  our  boys  already  on  the  fighting  line.  At  a 
belated  hour  came  the  realization  that  without  ships  we  can  neither 
keep  up  the  line  of  supply  nor  get  our  new  armies  to  the  front.  We 
are  faced  with  the  necessity  of  creating  an  entirely  new  industry. 
We  had  to  undertake  a  job  that  would  have  daunted  anyone  but 
America. 

And  his  hearers  knew  that  had  the  Shipping  Board  kept 
hands  off,  the  ships  then  filling  the  yards  would  have  slipped 


Shipbuilding  7 1 

off  the  ways  a  good  deal  sooner  than  they  did.  And  the 
real  shipbuilders  of  the  country  knew  that  the  statements 
of  the  chairman  were  not  based  upon  fact.  The  truth  is, 
he  was  an  amateur  and  easily  accepted  proposals  of  men 
who  had  nothing  to  lose  by  experimenting. 

Secretary  of  War  Baker's  serious  error  of  judgment  may 
have  had  something  to  do  with  the  bad  shipbuilding  situa- 
tion in  January,  1918,  when  seventy  8,oooton  troop-ships 
were  under  construction.  Believing  that  the  war  would  be 
won  without  sending  a  large  army  to  Europe,  he  changed 
the  order  for  these  vessels  to  cargo  carriers,  causing  serious 
delay.  Then  when  the  great  March  German  offensive 
showed  the  necessity  for  sending  help  quickly,  the  order  for 
transports  was  renewed.  And  yet  later  it  was  again  changed 
to  cargo  carriers. 

But  though  the  plans  of  the  Shipping  Board  may  have 
been  slightly  interrupted  by  this  wavering  attitude  of  Mr. 
Baker,  it  was  not  sufficient  warrant  for  the  propaganda  so 
vigorously  put  out  by  the  Board  to  deceive  the  public,  by 
taking  credit  for  seized  and  commandeered  vessels,  as  if 
they  were  ships  constructed  by  the  Shipping  Board  and 
added  that  much  to  what  the  country  could  not  have  had 
otherwise. 

But  while  the  American  public  was  being  fed  on  false 
propaganda  as  to  the  amount  of  shipping  that  could  be 
put  out  by  the  Shipping  Board,  the  British  admiralty  was 
in  possession  of  something  akin  to  the  truth.  Sir  Eric 
Geddes,  first  lord  of  the  admiralty,  in  discussing  the  sub- 
marine menace  before  the  House  of  Commons  on  March 
5,  1918,  said,  among  other  things:  "Despite  glowing  re- 
ports in  the  American  press,  there  is  no  doubt  that  a  con- 
siderable time  must  elapse  before  the  desired  output  is 
obtained." 

The  Shipping  Board  had  actually  built  and  placed  in 
foreign  service  up  to  and  including  March  22,  1918,  two 
vessels  aggregating  17,600  dead-weight  tons.  And  this 


72       The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

contribution  to  the  world's  supply  of  shipping  in  the  months 
when  it  was  needed  by  the  million  tons  a  month  represented, 
according  to  the  British  admiralty's  somewhat  cryptic  re- 
ports of  the  day,  the  amount  that  was  being  destroyed 
every  eight  hours  by  the  submarines  for  the  eighteen  months 
just  previous. 

In  brief,  notwithstanding  the  promises  of  what  might 
have  been  success  had  the  war  lasted  long  enough,  America's 
shipbuilding  program  was  a  failure.  But  the  situation  was 
so  obscured  by  misleading  propaganda,  as  were  the  failures 
in  other  important  war  branches  of  the  government,  that  the 
public  did  not  sense  what  was  going  on.  It  had  no  standard 
of  measurement. 

And  this  system  of  camouflaging  was  so  thorough  in  its 
operation  that  Congress  was  no  better  informed  than  the 
general  public.  Nor  was  this  latter  fact  known  until  it 
came  out  in  a  hearing  before  the  Senate  Committee  on 
Commerce  in  March,  1918,  when  Harris  D.  H.  Connick, 
vice-president  of  the  American  International  Corporation, 
which  was  responsible  for  the  Hog  Island  yard,  the  most 
extensive  of  them  all,  was  called  before  the  committee.  It 
was  his  testimony  that  disillusioned  the  country.  It  ran 
in  this  fashion: 

SENATOR  NELSON  :  When  will  we  get  the  first  ships?  How  soon 
will  we  get  any  on  the  water,  so  we  can  use  them? 

MR.  CONNICK:  You  are  going  to  get  twenty-five  A  ships  the 
first  of  October,  or,  say,  the  first  of  November. 

SENATOR  NELSON:  Those  are  the  first  we  will  get? 

MR.  CONNICK  :  Those  are  the  first  you  will  get. 

SENATOR  NELSON:  And  that  will  not  be  until  next  October? 

MR.  CONNICK:  That  will  be  next  October.  You  get  your 
twenty-five  B  ships  in  the  middle  of  December.  It  will  be  over  seven 
months  then  before  we  can  get  any  ships  out  of  those  ways.  We  have 
to  build  the  yard  and  then  build  the  ships. 

SENATOR  NELSON:  It  will  be  over  seven  months  before  we  can 
get  any  of  these  ships? 


Shipbuilding  73 

MR.  CONNICK:  Yes,  sir;  I  would  say  up  to  that  date. 

SENATOR  NELSON  :  And  then  we  may  get  as  many  as  twenty-five  ? 

MR.  CONNICK:  You  will  get  fifty. 

SENATOR  NELSON:  Within  seven  months? 

MR.  CONNICK:  I  will  count  up.  (After  making  calculation.) 
It  is  going  to  be  about  eight  months  before  you  can  get  your  first 
twenty-five  ships,  and  it  is  going  to  be  about  nine  and  one-half 
months  before  you  get  your  next  twenty-five  ships.  We  can  not  get 
them  by  October.  In  eight  months  you  are  going  to  get  about  twenty- 
seven  or  twenty-eight,  and  then  you  are  going  to  get  the  fifty  ships  in 
the  next  six  weeks. 

And  after  that  they  come  very  fast.  You  are  going  to  have  fifty- 
nine  ships — that  is,  if  the  material  and  the  labor  functions  as  it  has 
done  before — by  the  first  of  April;  you  will  have  your  fifty  small 
ships  and  your  seventy  big  ships  by  the  middle  of  July — that  is,  if  we 
get  the  material  and  everything  comes  along  the  way  it  is  supposed  to 
come.  We  see  no  reason  now  why  it  should  not  do  so. 

SENATOR  NELSON:  The  main  thing  I  am  interested  in — what 
are  we  going  to  get  soon — this  year? 

MR.  CONNICK  :  All  you  can  expect  are  those  fifty  ships  this  year. 

SENATOR  NELSON:  And  we  will  not  get  any  until  next  winter? 

MR.  CONNICK:  That  is  right,  you  will  not  get  any  ships  until 
next  winter;  no,  sir;  not  one. 

SENATOR  HARDING:  We  are  not  getting  many  ships  this  year 
at  all  except  commandeered  ships  that  have  been  completed  ? 

MR.  CONNICK  :  I  do  not  know  what  the  Shipping  Board  is  doing 
at  other  yards. 

SENATOR  NELSON:  Not  over  ten  outside  of  the  commandeered 
ships. 

SENATOR  HARDING:  That  is  what  I  say — all  of  our  ships  put 
into  service  will  be  the  requisitioned  ships,  English  and  Norwegian 
shi^:,  which  are  built  here  in  the  yards,  the  biggest  share  being  Eng- 
lish ships.2 

And  this  was  the  most  optimistic  statement  of  the  situa- 
tion that  could  be  offered.  That  it  was  disheartening  to  that 
real  veteran  of  heroic  mould,  Senator  Nelson,  is  evident 
from  his  form  of  questioning. 

3  War  Weekly. 


74       The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  W ar 

When  hostilities  had  ceased  and  the  country  was  no 
longer  fearful  of  permitting  the  light  to  shine  in,  various 
investigations  were  started  to  let  the  public  know  who 
was  at  fault  in  the  serious  delays  and  great  waste  that 
grew  out  of  the  perilous  situation  in  which  the  country  was 
found  when  the  war  was  upon  it.  And  then  it  developed 
how  accurate  had  been  the  outlining  of  the  situation  by  Mr. 
Connick. 

In  speaking  to  one  such  resolution  adopted  by  the  Senate 
on  November  22,  1918,  Senator  Harding  severely  criti- 
cized the  shipping  situation.  Three  great  fabricating  ship- 
building plants  had  been  built  by  the  government  to  save 
the  nation  from  the  ravages  of  the  enemy  submarines.  Of 
these,  to  the  end  of  1918,  the  total  output  was  four  ships. 
One  plant  which  was  to  have  delivered  124,  delivered  one; 
while  another  which  was  to  have  delivered  24,  failed  to 
deliver  even  one. 

It  was  frequently  asked  why  the  government  during  the 
crisis  such  as  the  world  then  saw  often  selected  the  wrong 
man  for  an  important  position.  For  the  man  selected  is 
the  heart  of  the  program.  Every  problem  is  a  problem 
of  personnel.  It  appeared  to  be  the  politics  that  was  at 
the  bottom  of  it. 

The  Administration  discarded  men  of  practical  ship- 
ping experience,  though  it  would  have  seemed  to  appeal  to 
the  ordinary  intelligence  that  that  was  a  most  essential  quali- 
fication, for  a  man  serving  in  so  important  a  position  at  a 
crucial  time.  There  was  no  argument  whatever  for  making 
up  a  shipping  board  of  non-shipping  members  except  the 
argument  of  prejudice.  What  was  needed  was  a  ship- 
ping board  to  centralize  shipbuilding  and  ship-operating 
in  the  hands  of  a  federal  agency  and  to  control  rates  and 
prices  and  to  enter  into  arrangements  with  similar  agencies 
in  the  Allied  countries.  American  shipping  men  were  the 
first  to  recognize  this  necessity. 

The  conspicuous  failure  of  the  non-shipping  board  was 


Shipbuilding  75 

on  the  score  of  general  policies.  The  board  had,  for  the 
last  half  of  1917  and  early  in  1918,  definitely  starved  the 
existing  ship  facilities  of  the  country  at  the  expense  of  new 
units  which  were  its  own  creation.  It  had  fostered  competi- 
tion in  the  labor  market,  established  immense  new  yards  in 
the  vicinity  of  old  yards,  diverted  materials  to  the  new 
yards,  and  at  the  same  time  failed  to  come  to  proper 
financial  agreements  with  the  old  yards,  thus  making  it  diffi- 
cult or  even  impossible  for  them  to  hurry  the  work. 

But  by  mid-summer  of  1918,  with  Charles  M.  Schwab 
as  director-general  of  the  Emergency  Fleet  Corporation,  the 
Administration  appeared  to  get  a  grip  on  the  labor  situa- 
tion and  to  prevent  the  labor  turn-over  which  had  been  dis- 
astrous to  shipbuilding  and  every  other  war  energy  at  a 
crucial  period  in  war  time. 

The  main  results  of  the  Administration's  shipbuilding 
policy  were,  first,  less  tonnage  was  launched  in  America 
during  the  last  six  months  of  1917  and  early  1918  than 
would  have  been  launched  if  the  Shipping  Board  had  not 
been  in  existence;  second,  the  new  units,  children  of  the 
Shipping  Board,  were  just  getting  ready  to  build  ships  when 
hostilities  ceased,  and  had  proved  to  be  the  prime  profiteers 
of  the  war.  Hog  Island  became  a  synonym  of  profiteering. 

After  hostilities  ceased,  there  appeared  to  persist  the 
same  lack  of  policy.  There  appeared  to  be  no  reason  why 
shipping  men,  whose  ships  had  been  taken  over  by  the  gov- 
ernment during  the  war  emergency,  should  not  have  their 
ships  returned  to  them.  They  went  to  Washington  to 
ascertain  what  they  might  expect.  Mr.  Hurley  had  gone 
to  Europe,  no  one  in  Washington  seemed  to  be  authorized 
to  speak  on  the  matter. 

The  purpose  of  the  government  to  place  at  the  dis- 
posal of  all  the  forces  opposing  Germany's  raid  upon  the 
cause  of  civilization  was  nowhere  manifested  more  clearly 
than  in  prodigious  plans  for  shipbuilding — such  a  large 
scheme  of  shipbuilding  as  the  world  had  never  before  seen 


76       The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

or  contemplated.  In  such  enormous,  almost  inconceivably 
large,  undertakings  much  must  be  allowed  for  errors  in  the 
human  factor.  The  American  people  have  always  been 
generous  in  their  estimate  of  what  is  accomplished  in  rela- 
tion to  what  is  undertaken,  whether  in  war  or  in  peace,  but 
particularly  in  time  of  war. 

Yet  so  ample  had  been  the  warning  given  to  the  Ameri- 
can Administration  that  the  United  States  was  almost  cer- 
tain at  any  moment  to  be  thrust  headlong  into  the  war, 
that  the  apparent  indifference  upon  the  part  of  the  Adminis- 
tration to  making  adequate  preparation  for  the  inevitable 
conflict  will  always  stand  as  a  stigma  upon  America's  fair 
name  and  upon  her  record  for  efficiency  and  energy.  Had 
war  been  thrust  upon  America  in  a  manner  in  which  it  was 
thrust  upon  France  and  Belgium  and  Great  Britain,  there 
would  have  been  excuse  for  almost  any  deficiency  in  admin- 
istrative processes.  But  two  years  and  a  half  of  the  terrible 
conflagration  in  Europe  appeared  to  be  no  warning  to  the 
national  Administration  in  America.  Apologists  for  the 
Administration  have  been  quick,  when  burning  criticism  was 
heaped  upon  Mr.  Wilson's  failure  of  accomplishment,  to 
call  attention  to  the  blunders  of  the  European  Allies,  as  if 
they  had  had  as  ample  warning  to  prepare  for  the  conflict  as 
America  had.  The  two  cases  are  in  no  respect  parallel  or 
even  approaching  a  parallel. 

As  a  consequence  of  the  tremendous  scope  of  the  gov- 
ernment's plan  for  shipbuilding,  in  the  great  effort  to  rush 
everything  at  top  speed,  there  were  failures  that  were  so 
inexcusable  that  they  must  be  set  down  in  history  as  against 
American  efficiency,  though  as  a  matter  of  fact  it  was  simply 
administrative  incompetency.  It  was  in  view  of  these  facts 
that  Senator  Calder,  about  two  months  after  the  close  of 
the  armed  conflict,  called  attention  to  the  deplorable  failure 
that  was  unfolded  to  the  American  public  after  the  armi- 
stice was  signed.  Aggravating  as  were  these  failures,  there 
was  no  one  on  the  Democratic  side  of  the  Senate  chamber 


Shipbuilding  77 

capable  of  or  willing  even  to  attempt  a  defense  of  Mr.  Hur- 
ley, except  Senator  Fletcher  of  Florida.  It  was  shown  that 
virtually  all  the  shipping  that  Mr.  Hurley  advertised  as 
his  own  accomplishment  was  laid  down  in  private  yards,  on 
private  order,  and  was  taken  over  by  the  Shipping  Board 
and  completed  by  virtue  of  the  President's  order  com- 
mandeering all  shipping. 

Leaving  out  of  consideration  altogether  the  gross  waste 
of  the  people's  money  in  construction  of  yards  and  ships, 
and  discussing  merely  the  results  from  this,  the  principal 
part  of  Mr.  Hurley's  endeavor,  Senator  Calder  gave  this 
resume : 

Complete  failure  to  deliver  ships  in  time  to  be  of  actual 
use  in  the  war  program.  Ninety-three  were  promised,  none 
was  delivered. 

Failure  to  the  extent  of  87  per  cent  in  the  number  of 
ships  launched.  164  were  promised,  22  were  launched. 

Failure  to  the  extent  of  57  per  cent  in  the  number  of 
ships  placed  in  construction.  249  were  promised,  107  were 
laid  down. 

Failure  to  the  extent  of  66  per  cent  in  the  amount  of 
steel  erected  and  of  74  per  cent  in  the  number  of  rivets 
driven. 

The  supply  of  steel  from  the  mills  was  nearly  up  to 
scheduled  requirements  and  much  in  excess  of  the  quantity 
actually  used  in  construction. 

The  supply  of  fabricated  steel  was  35  per  cent  short  of 
estimated  requirements,  but  always  exceeded  the  actual  re- 
quirements of  the  shipbuilders  by  many  thousands  of  tons. 

Senator  Harding  in  a  statement  on  the  floor  of  the  Sen- 
ate in  November,  1918,  said: 

No  matter  what  the  policy  of  the  government  may  be  in  the 
future,  and  no  matter  how  earnestly  we  all  favor  the  construction 
of  the  largest  mechant  marine  in  the  world,  it  is  inconceivable  that 
the  government  will  go  on  appropriating  money  for  ship  construction 
at  the  present  rate,  which  is  from  four  to  six  times  the  normal  cost. 


78       The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

The  shipbuilding  costs  became  so  notorious,  during  the 
war  emergency,  as  to  threaten  to  become  a  national  scandal. 

In  the  case  of  a  well-managed  yard  on  the  Pacific  coast 
in  which  the  number  of  men  increased  threefold  in  a  little 
over  a  year,  a  comparison  of  wages  and  output  with  cor- 
responding items  of  two  years  before  revealed  the  fact 
that  before  the  signing  of  the  armistice  wages  had  ad- 
vanced seventy  per  cent  of  the  former  output.  The  result 
was  a  labor  cost  2.4  times  that  of  two  years  previous.  In 
the  case  of  two  well-managed  yards  on  the  Atlantic  coast 
the  results  in  the  one  were:  Labor  advance,  120  per  cent; 
output,  80  per  cent;  resulting  labor  cost,  two  and  three- 
quarters  times  that  of  the  former  period.  In  the  other, 
labor  advance,  100  per  cent;  output,  66  2/3  per  cent;  re- 
sulting labor  cost,  three  times  that  of  two  years  ago.3 

In  defending  the  item  of  $660,000,000  for  the  Shipping 
Board  and  Emergency  Fleet  Corporation  in  the  sundry  civil 
appropriation  bill,  Representative  Shirley,  chairman  of  the 
Appropriation  Committee,  stated  on  the  floor  of  the  House 
near  the  end  of  February,  1919,  that  while  the  investment 
of  the  completed  shipping  program  would  be  nearly  $4,000,- 
000,000,  the  actual  value  of  the  ships  would  not  exceed 
$2,000,000,000.  Andhestateu. 

That  there  has  been  great  extravagance  and  waste  in  many  par- 
ticulars, I  haven't  the  slightest  doubt.  .  .  .  The  only  justification 
was  the  great  need  for  many  ships  at  a  period  when  it  was  feared 
the  war  would  be  lost  without  them. 

We  authorized  the  expenditure  altogether  of  $3,900,000,000  for 
the  ship  construction.  Of  this  $2,800,000,000  was  for  building 
ships  ourselves,  $515,000,000  payment  for  requisitioned  ships,  $55,- 
000,000  was  for  yards,  $75,000,000  was  for  housing  at  shipyards. 

Notwithstanding  these  dismal  failures,  whose  lesson 
should  not  be  lost  on  the  future,  America  planned  in  the 
large;  and  had  the  war  continued  another  year,  her  great 
weight  could  not  have  failed  to  impress  itself  with  irresist- 

8 North  American  Review,  March,  1919. 


Shipbuilding  79 

ible  power.  Despite  all  efforts,  the  deadly  problem  of  the 
submarine  remained  until  after  this  nation  began  its  ample 
shipbuilding  operations. 

And  the  stupendous  shipbuilding  project  of  America 
grew  into  reality.  Hog  Island,  the  greatest  plant  of  the 
kind  in  the  world,  rose  like  magic  where  there  had  been 
but  a  desolate  swamp.  The  German  leaders  discerned  the 
sign,  and  were  convinced  that  this  nation  was  at  length  in 
the  war  whole-heartedly,  and  that  America's  productive 
power  had  doomed  the  mightiest  weapon  of  Prussianism 
on  sea.  This  gigantic  enterprise  put  fear  into  the  heart  of 
autocracy.  The  evidence  that  this  country  would  be  able 
eventually  to  launch  a  great  ocean  steamship  every  forty- 
eight  hours  was  as  much  an  inspiration  to  America  as  it  was 
a  shock  to  their  enemies. 

It  was  on  the  first  Sunday  in  May,  1918,  that  the  5500- 
ton  collier  "Tuckahoe"  went  into  the  waters  of  the  Dela- 
ware at  Camden,  New  Jersey.  The  launching  of  this  boat 
formed  the  front-page  stories  for  the  newspapers  of  Amer- 
ica and  lines  for  the  bulletins  of  London  and  Paris  and 
probably  interesting  news  for  the  consideration  of  royal 
eyes  in  Germany. 

This  ship  was  built  in  twenty-seven  days,  and  never  be- 
fore in  all  shipbuilding  history  had  a  ship  of  its  size  been 
done  in  that  time,  virtually  a  complete  vessel  in  every  de- 
tail, 330  feet  long  and  50  feet  beam.  On  May  15,  it 
steamed  out  of  the  yards  of  the  New  York  Shipbuilding 
Corporation  at  Camden,  ready  to  take  her  place  in  smiting 
the  German  pirates. 

On  the  same  day,  a  few  miles  down  the  Delaware,  there 
was  a  double  launching  at  the  shipbuilding  yards  at  Chester, 
Pennsylvania.  And  from  that  time  on  the  country  was 
thrilled  by  the  frequent  reports  given  to  the  public  on  what 
was  being  done  on  shipbuilding,  sometimes  true,  unfor- 
tunately often  untrue. 

Yet  the  general  trend  was  in  the  right  direction.     It 


8o      The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

was  not  until  the  middle  of  1918  that  the  country  was  get- 
ting its  swing  in  the  shipbuilding  operations. 

By  August  i,  1918,  America's  great  chain  of  ship- 
building plants  was  approaching  completion.  At  that  time 
there  were  118  fully-equipped  yards  in  the  United  States 
and  44  others  partly  completed.  Many  of  these  were  built 
from  the  ground  up,  while  others  were  enlarged  to  so 
great  an  extent  as  to  make  them  practically  new  plants. 
One  of  the  Bethlehem  Shipbuilding  Corporation  was  au- 
thorized to  add  ten  new  ways  at  a  cost  of  $20,000,000,  and 
three  more  to  the  same  company's  yards  at  another  point. 
The  New  York  Shipbuilding  .Corporation  at  Camden,  New 
Jersey,  was  at  that  time  building  five  new  ways  at  a  cost 
of  $7,000,000.  Of  the  118  completed,  the  Pacific  coast 
had  48,  the  Atlantic  38,  the  Great  Lakes  16,  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico  1 6. 

Then  came  such  a  rapid  succession  of  broken  records 
in  the  shipbuilding  line  as  had  never  been  known  in  all 
shipbuilding  history.  On  July  25,  1918,  Secretary  Daniels 
announced  the  breaking  of  the  record  in  shipbuilding  at  the 
Mare  Island  navy  yard,  California,  in  these  words :  "Be- 
fore the  war  from  20  to  24  months  were  required  to  com- 
plete a  destroyer.  The  keel  of  the  "Ward"  was  laid  at 
7:30  a.  m.  on  May  15.  The  vessel  was  launched  at  8:30 
p.  m.  June  i — seventeen  and  one-half  days  after  her  keel 
was  laid.  She  was  put  into  commission  July  24 — seventy 
days  after  the  laying  of  her  keel." 

And  while  men  had  been  pinning  steel-plates  together 
for  a  generation  with  pneumatic  hammers,  one  who  could 
average  more  than  sixty  rivets  an  hour  was  a  first-rate 
riveter.  But  by  mid-summer,  1918,  there  were  riveters  on 
the  shipbuilding  job  who  could  drive  400  rivets  an  hour 
and  exceed  it. 

In  the  early  autumn  of  1918,  building  had  made  so 
great  strides  in  the  United  States  that  the  country  was 
then  the  greatest  shipbuilding  country  in  the  world,  having 


Shipbuilding  8 1 

leaped  from  third  to  first  place  in  a  little  over  a  year.  At 
that  time  the  number  of  ships  under  our  flag  was  2,185, 
with  a  total  dead-weight  tonnage  of  9,511,915,  and  there 
were  over  200  yards  engaged  in  construction  work,  with 
1,020  ways. 

In  the  building  of  her  merchant  fleet,  America  was 
planning  first  of  all,  to  win  the  war;  after  that  her  purpose 
was  to  overcome  her  own  neglect  in  providing  ocean  trans- 
portation for  her  own  trade. 

The  outlook  of  the  American  merchant  fleet  as  it  stood 
in  the  first  month  of  1919,  was  as  follows:  Steamers  now 
owned  by  the  United  States,  3,000,000  tons;  steamers  under 
construction  for  the  United  States,  6,000,000  tons;  steamers 
owned  by  private  individuals,  3,000,000  tons;  a  total  of 
twelve  million  tons  dead-weight. 

April  29,  1919,  Mr.  Hurley,  chairman  of  the  United 
States  Shipping  Board,  announced  the  cancellation  of  2,000,- 
ooo  tons  more  of  shipping  contracts,  making  a  total  to 
that  time  of  5,500,000  tons. 

The  low  estate  to  which  our  merchant  marine  had  fallen 
prior  to  the  Great  War  is  common  knowledge.  Americans 
should  feel  a  blush  of  shame  when  they  realize  that  in  the 
golden  days  before  the  Civil  War  80  per  cent  of  our  com- 
merce was  carried  in  American  bottoms,  and  that  prior 
to  the  outbreak  of  war  in  1914  only  9  per  cent  of  our  ex- 
ports and  imports  were  carried  under  the  American  flag. 
But  twelve  million  tons  of  ships  is  another  picture. 

In  the  opinion  of  competent  and  impartial  commen- 
tators, there  were  two  achievements  of  ttu's  country  during 
the  war  that  surpassed  all  others.  One  was  the  rapid  and 
orderly  registration  of  10,000,000  men  for  military  service, 
under  a  law  which  was  a  complete  innovation  in  American 
history  followed  by  another  of  14,000,000;  the  other  was 
the  sending  of  more  than  2,000,000  troops  to  Europe  within 
a  few  months,  an  unequaled  feat  in  transportation. 

Of  the  2,079,880  men  taken  over  up  to  mid-December, 


82      The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

more  than  1,000,000  were  carried  on  British  ships,  which 
were  diverted  to  that  undertaking  from  the  vital  work  of 
conveying  food. 

The  performances  wrought  a  decisive  effect  upon  the 
world's  history  at  one  of  its  great  critical  junctures.  Credit 
for  this  movement  is  assigned  in  large  measure  to  the  Allies, 
to  the  Brkish  in  particular,  since  approximately  half  of  the 
troops  were  carried  in  their  ships.  But  of  the  cargo  of 
5,153,000  tons,  less  than  5  per  cent  was  carried  by  Allied 
ships.  Of  all  the  cargo  shipped,  only  79,000  tons  were 
lost  at  sea. 

Just  prior  to  the  middle  of  December,  1918,  the  Navy 
Department  gave  out  the  statement  that  of  the  men  in  the 
army  transported  from  America  to  France,  forty-six  and 
one-fourth  per  cent  were  carried  in  American  ships,  forty- 
eight  and  one-half  in  British,  the  balance  in  French  and 
Italian  vessels.  Of  the  total  strength  of  the  naval  escort, 
the  United  States  furnished  eighty-two  and  three-fourths 
per  cent,  Great  Britain  fourteen  and  one-eighth  per  cent  and 
France  three  and  one-eighth  per  cent. 

It  gave  the  people  a  rude  shock  to  be  informed  that 
most  of  the  transports  used  to  carry  America's  soldiers 
were  furnished  by  other  nations. 

Developments  by  investigations  of  wastefulness,  profit- 
eering and  fraud  in  connection  with  shipbuiling,  after  the 
close  of  the  war,  pointed  to  the  fact  that  the  government 
should  not  engage  in  business  that  properly  belongs  to  pri- 
vate enterprise. 

Socialism  must  not  be  permitted  to  throttle  the  best 
there  is  in  American  initiative.  The  capacity  is  in  the 
average  American.  Yet,  at  the  end  of  June,  1921,  the 
government  was  seeking  to  dispose  of  $300,000,000  worth 
of  shipping  and  to  eliminate  the  shipping  board's  monthly 
deficit  of  $16,000,000  for  operating  purposes. 


CHAPTER   VI 

GOVERNMENT  RAILROADING 

When,  a  few  decades  ago,  a  Senator  on  the  floor  of 
the  United  States  Senate  made  the  famous  motion  that,  "If 
the  Pennsylvania  Railroad  Company  has  no  further  busi- 
ness to  come  before  this  body,  I  move  that  the  Senate  do 
now  adjourn,"  or  words  of  similar  purport,  even  when 
spoken  ironically,  it  was  implied  that  the  people  had  at  that 
time  come  to  believe  that  arrogance  and  gratuitous  assump- 
tions were  manifesting  themselves  on  the  part  of  the  rail- 
road companies  in  operating  a  public  utility  under  a  public 
franchise.  It  was  this  intolerable  arrogance  and  these  un- 
warranted assumptions  that  drove  the  people  to  compel 
Congress  during  the  last  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  and  the 
first  decade  of  the  twentieth  century  to  adopt  regulative 
measures  which  became  steadily  more  drastic,  despite  the 
strenuous  and  continuous  resistance  on  the  part  of  the  cor- 
porations. And  some  of  the  States  adopted  regulations 
even  more  severe. 

This  regulative  process  became  cumulative  in  volume. 
So  onerous  were  the  resulting  restrictions  that  the  roads 
were  hampered  in  obtaining  credits  necessary  for  extensions 
and  improvements.  Then  came  the  war  with  its  extraor- 
dinary demands,  the  railroads  were  found  inadequately 
equipped,  the  transportation  system  was  unable  to  bear  the 
strain,  and  the  whole  life  of  the  nation  was  threatened  with 
disorganization.  It  was  at  this  point  that  the  govern- 
ment stepped  in  and  took  over  the  country's  transportation 
system. 

This  control  began  December  28,  1917,  and  ended 
February  29,  1920,  with  a  modified  control  six  months 

83 


84      The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

longer.  When  the  federal  Administration  assumed  opera- 
tion of  the  railroads,  President  Wilson  announced  that  it 
was  done  for  three  chief  reasons:  To  enable  them  to 
handle  more  traffic,  to  save  the  companies  from  bankruptcy 
and  thereby  prevent  a  national  financial  catastrophe,  and  to 
solve  the  railroad  labor  problem.  The  claim  made  by  advo- 
cates of  government  operation  was  that  under  that  policy 
the  railways  would  be  able  to  handle  more  traffic  and  to 
handle  it  better  than  under  private  operation,  that  the  sys- 
tem would  be  operated  more  economically,  and  that  under 
it  labor  would  be  treated  better. 

William  G.  McAdoo,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  was 
appointed  by  the  President  the  Director-General  of  Rail- 
roads, a  position  which  placed  him  in  possession  of  a  power 
never  surpassed  by  that  of  any  manager  of  any  industry, 
governmental  or  private,  in  all  the  world.  One  of  the  most 
forceful,  aggressive  and  daring  of  men,  Mr.  McAdoo, 
with  astonishing  dash  and  thoroughness,  proceeded  in  mas- 
terful fashion  to  administer  the  operation  of  the  various 
transportation  systems  of  the  country,  upon  a  plan  favored 
by  advocates  of  government  operation  by  first  of  all  unify- 
ing operation  of  the  complication  of  systems. 

Not  only  the  railway  systems  were  involved  in  this  con- 
trol. Besides  the  397,014  miles  of  railroad  controlled  by 
2,907  companies  and  employing  1,700,814  persons,  he 
swayed  with  a  free  hand  steamship  lines  engaged  in  coast- 
wise transportation  and  navigating  an  inland  waterways 
system  which  included  fifty-seven  canals  aggregating  3,057 
miles,  as  well  as  many  thousands  of  miles  of  navigable 
rivers,  lakes,  bays,  sounds  and  inlets.  And  it  was  with  prac- 
tically unnanimous  approval  that  the  public  greeted  the 
President's  announcement  that  the  government  would  take 
over  the  operation  of  the  country's  transportation  system. 
The  readiness  of  all  parties  for  expected  results — the  labor 
men  and  the  general  public — was  evident  in  the  desire  to 


Government  Railroading  85 

waive  all  special  preferences  in  a  genuine  purpose  to  co- 
operate for  the  common  good  and  for  the  winning  of  the 
war.  The  public  saw  the  government  take  over  all  these 
systems  of  transportation  and  advance  almost  immediately 
carrying  charges  from  25  to  50  per  cent,  a  right  which  the 
interstate  commerce  commission  had  emphatically  refused 
the  companies. 

And  it  was  freely  stated  by  Administration  officials  that 
from  the  very  beginning  Mr.  McAdoo  had  to  contend  with 
a  practically  broken-down  transportation  system,  that  the 
government  caught  and  saved  the  wreck  just  as  it  was  slip- 
ping over  the  brink,  and  that  he  then  had  to  contend  immedi- 
ately with  the  worst  winter  ever  known  to  transportation 
circles,  causing  one  of  the  worst  freight  blockades  in  eastern 
territory,  with  New  York  City  as  a  center,  ever  known, 
with  a  resulting  unparalleled  transportation  tangle. 

Mr.  McAdoo  declared  his  policy  to  be  uto  humanize 
the  railways  and  negative  the  idea  that  corporations  have  no 
souls."  He  stated  succinctly  his  purposes  to  be:  First, 
the  winning  of  the  war ;  second,  service  to  the  public  at  the 
lowest  cost  consistent  with  the  payment  of  fair  wages  to 
railroad  employes  and  the  maintenance  of  the  transporta- 
tion system  as  a  self-supporting,  rather  than  a  money-mak- 
ing, agency.  In  his  report  to  the  President  after  seven 
months  of  government  operation  he  stated  that  under  gov- 
ernment control  the  highest  salaries,  ranging  from  $40,000 
to  $50,000  per  annum,  were  paid  to  regional  directors  whose 
responsibilities  were  far  greater  than  those  of  the  railroad 
presidents  who  had  been  receiving  as  high  as  $100,000; 
and  that  the  2,325  officers  receiving  salaries  of  $5,000  and 
over,  aggregating  $21,320,187  yearly,  were  reduced  in 
number  to  1,925,  with  an  aggregate  of  salaries  reduced  by 
$4,814,889.  This  was  after  he  had  performed  one  of  the 
most  spectacular  acts  of  his  administration  in  dismissing, 
in  the  spring  of  1918,  the  presidents  of  all  the  large  lines 


86       The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

of  railroad.  Whatever  had  been  the  salaries  of  some  of 
the  men  dismissed,  as  President  Ripley  of  *  the  Santa  Fe, 
no  sum  equaled  his  value  to  the  road  in  its  upbuilding,  his 
constructive  genius  taking  the  road  from  the  clutches  of 
bankruptcy  and  making  a  property  worth  three-quarters 
of  a  billion,  earning  seven  per  cent  annually,  and  at  the 
same  time  winning  popular  support  which  is  only  too  likely 
to  be  hostile  to  railroads.  But  Mr.  McAdoo  was  at  the 
head  of  all  the  nation's  rail  systems  as  a  part-time  employ- 
ment and  without  compensation — and  he  resigned. 

The  Administration  made  large  claims  in  efficiency  and 
expedition  in  transportation  after  the  passing  of  the  exas- 
perating situation  which  developed  from  the  congestion  of 
traffic  immediately  after  the  government  took  control.  It 
deserves  credit  for  many  suggestions  which  railroads  could, 
and  in  some  instances  did,  profitably  adopt,  both  for  their 
own  benefit  and  to  the  advantage  of  the  public.  A  poster 
that  became  an  old  familiar  friend  of  everyone  about  rail- 
road stations  and  that  was  well  known  to  all  travellers 
contained  many  valuable  suggestions.  It  appeared  in  1918 
in  this  form: 

SAVE  A  CAR  A  DAY  AND  HELP  WIN  THE  WAR 

Transportation  is  a  vital  necessity  and  may  be  the  deciding  factor. 

1.  Avoid  Congestion. 

2.  Unload  Cars  Promptly. 

3.  Order  Only  What  Cars  Can  Be  Loaded  Promptly. 

4.  Load  to  Capacity. 

5.  If  Loads  Are  Light,  Load  to  Cubic  Capacity. 

6.  Ship  Direct. 

7.  Give  Shipping  Directions  in  Time  to  Bill  Same  Day  as  Loaded. 

8.  Avoid  Shipping  "To  Order." 

We  loaded  one  million,  four  hundred  fifty-five  thousand,  three 
hundred  eighty-one  (1,455,381)  cars  in  1917.  A  saving  of  half  a 
car  a  day  would  equal  seven  hundred  twenty-seven  thousand,  six 
hundred  ninety  car-days,  equal  to  the  continuous  use  of  two  thousand 


Government  Railroading  87 

cars,  and  two  thousand  cars  would  handle  fifty  thousand  additional 
car-loads  in  the  same  period. 

Few  additional  cars  can  be  obtained.  There  is  more  freight  to 
transport.  Therefore  we  must 

"DO  MORE  WITH  LESS" 
If  the  commerce  of  the  country  is  to  be  moved 
YOU  MUST  HELP. 

This  was  suggestive  of  methods  at  all  times  urged  by 
the  government  during  its  control  of  the  railroads.  But 
the  autocratic  powers  which  the  Director-General  exercised 
should  have  been  entirely  effective.  His  first  great  admin- 
istrative act  was  to  sweep  away  all  barriers  that  savored 
of  competition  and  to  unite  all  lines  into  one  harmonious 
whole.  By  one  wave  of  the  magic  wand,  the  law  against 
pooling,  theretofore  looked  upon  as  the  very  palladium  of 
the  liberties  of  the  people,  was  cast  into  the  discard;  the 
whole  structure  of  orders  and  decisions,  so  industriously 
erected  through  the  years  for  the  regulation  of  railroads, 
was  thrown  to  the  winds.  After  seven  months  of  govern- 
ment operation,  he  estimated  that  the  elimination  of  solicit- 
ing freight  traffic  and  of  exploitation  of  passenger  routes 
had  effected  a  saving  of  $23,566,633.  For  the  saving  of 
time  and  energy,  all  freight  was  routed  most  directly,  re- 
gardless of  the  roads  that  were  to  carry  it. 

At  the  same  time  there  were  given  to  the  public  reports 
of  great  improvement  in  freight  movement,  of  cars  in  sup- 
ply abundant.1  For  the  two-month  period  of  June-July 
the  director  of  the  Allegheny  region  reported  conditions  fair 
and  improving,  with  no  congestion,  since  business  to  the 
larger  industrial  centers  and  for  export  were  governed  by 

1The  Georgia  Fruit  Exchange  of  Atlanta  reported  that  it  was  about  to 
complete,  in  the  first  week  in  August,  1918,  the  movement  of  the  largest 
crop  of  peaches  ever  shipped  from  that  or  any  other  state,  the  largest 
single  day's  shipment  being  600  cars,  and  a  total  to  July  17  of  7,432  cars. 
Similar  reports  were  coming  from  the  West  Virginia  coal  snippers  and  the 
Pacific  Coast  lumbermen. 


88      The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

permits;  and  that  the  car  supply  had  been  met,  with  64,187 
cars  of  anthracite  coal  loaded  in  June,  as  against  59,008 
a  year  earlier;  and  191,767  of  bituminous,  an  increase  of 
22,781  over  June,  1917,  with  a  similar  increase  in  July;  and 
that  the  coal  dumped  at  tidewater  was  increased  by  223,537 
tons  in  June  and  by  444,916  in  July. 

And  as  young  men  were  being  drafted  for  military  serv- 
ice, the  Railroad  Administration  opened  schools  for  the 
training  of  women  to  take  their  places  as  ticket-sellers. 
But  when  complaints  began  to  reach  him  in  August  of  a 
lack  of  courtesy  upon  the  part  of  the  employes  that  was 
unknown  under  private  operation,  Director-General  Mc- 
Adoo  issued  strict  orders  requiring  the  utmost  courtesy  at 
all  times.  In  that  connection  he  invited  attention  to  the  in- 
crease of  operating  expenses  of  over  $475,000,000  per  an- 
num because  of  increased  pay. 

When  the  much-heralded  efficiency  of  government  opera- 
tion of  railroads  is  written  sight  should  not  be  lost  of  the 
fact  that  there  was  never  known  in  railroad  history  in  the 
United  States  such  centralization  of  authority  as  was  pos- 
sessed by  the  Director-General.  To  this  the  people  did  not 
object;  but  they  felt  that  by  virtue  thereof  they  had  the 
right  to  expect  correspondingly  better  results.  Not  once 
did  the  public  feel  aggrieved  over  accomplishment,  even  in 
the  most  direct  and  drastic  form.  On  the  contrary,  they 
approved  when  it  brought  results  which  they  knew  to  be 
essential  to  success  in  the  conflict  across  the  seas.  Pas- 
senger and  sleeping-car  service  were  severely  curtailed  in 
order  to  produce  speed  results  in  getting  food  to  its  destina- 
tion, in  the  transcontinental  movement  of  lumber  for  ship- 
building,2 and  in  hastening  the  shipment  of  munitions  ma- 
terial. 

"It  was  no  unusual  matter  along  northern  routes  of  transcontinental 
travel  to  see  residents  gazing  in  amazement  at  double-headers  pulling 
trains  of  great  length  that  dashed  through  their  towns  loaded  with  lumber 
or  grain  with  the  speed  of  limited  passenger  trains. 


Government  Railroading  89 

To  this  end  every  known  means  was  brought  into  play. 
Waste  was  brought  to  a  minimum,  but  through  regulations 
that  cannot  govern  in  the  free  play  of  competition.  Yet 
it  seemed  like  good  sense  to  which  Director-General  Mc- 
Adoo  gave  expression  in  his  testimony  before  the  interstate 
commerce  committee  of  the  Senate  in  January,  1919,  when 
he  declared  for  heavy  loading  of  cars,  pooling  of  repair- 
shops,  unification  of  terminals,  consolidation  of  ticket-offices, 
universal  mileage  tickets,  uniform  rate  classification,  high 
demurrage  rates,  way-billing  of  freight  from  point  of  origin 
to  destination,  and  the  utilization  of  water  routes  for  the 
relief  of  crowded  rail  lines.  There  is  probably  no  civilized 
nation  in  the  world  with  so  little  appreciation  of  the  value 
of  its  water  means  of  transportation  as  the  United  States. 

Though  the  Administration  sought  to  discourage  pas- 
senger traffic  in  order  to  speed  the  transportation  of  war 
materials  and  increased  passenger  fares  50  per  cent,  pas- 
senger traffic  during  the  first  calendar  year  of  the  war  in- 
creased 1 6  per  cent.  And  for  the  first  nine  months  of  1918, 
the  number  of  persons  carried  one  mile  totalled  32,586,- 
390,878  as  compared  with  28,513,155,775  passenger-miles 
for  the  corresponding  period  of  1917,  a  figure  largely  in- 
creased by  the  soldiers  and  sailors,  as  well  as  very  many 
others  carried  incident  to  the  war.  In  August,  1918,  the 
Railroad  Administration  stated  that  over  5,000,000  sol- 
diers had  been  transported  on  American  railroads  in  four- 
teen months — half  of  which  time  they  were  under  gov- 
ernment control.  In  the  district  west  of  the  Mississippi 
the  elimination  of  passenger-train  mileage  totalled  2,000,- 
ooo  a  year,  with  further  reduction  to  be  made;  while  in 
the  section  east  of  the  Mississippi  the  elimination  aggre- 
gated 26,420,000. 

Mr.  McAdoo  was  a  man  of  very  real  accomplishment. 
Bold,  energetic,  courageous,  he  was  undismayed  in  grap- 
pling with  the  largest  problems  of  administration,  whether 


90      The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

Liberty  Loans  or  railroads.  And  his  leaving  the  govern- 
ment service  was  a  distinct  loss  to  the  country,  the  removal 
of  a  chief  pillar  of  the  Administration. 

And  yet,  what  became  the  general  practice  of  the  Wilson 
Administration  of  taking  credit  for  accomplishment  that 
did  not  belong  to  it,  serving  to  the  people  in  their  homes 
news  that  was  not  fact,  crept  into  Mr.  McAdoo's  depart- 
ment. Later  developments  led  the  country  to  ask  whether 
government  railroading  was  the  success  people  had  been 
led  to  believe  it  was.  That  it  should  have  been  was  plain. 
The  method  was  direct.  Redtape  was  cut  to  bits.  The 
power  vested  in  the  Director-General  was  autocratic.  Pro- 
cedure was  aptly  described  in  this  fashion  by  a  leading 
weekly : 

Under  government  control,  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  merely 
dropped  in  on  the  Director-General  of  Railroads,  handed  out  a  cigar 
and  a  new  story,  mentioned  casually  that  he  would  like  a  billion  to 
meet  railroad  bills,  and  walked  out  with  the  increased-rate  order  in 
his  pocket.3 

But  in  time  the  people  were  disillusioned.  They  came 
to  see  the  real  accomplishment  in  railroading  by  the  gov- 
ernment. The  Administration  had  taken  over  stations, 
shops,  rolling  stock,  rights  of  way,  rails — all  of  which  had 
been  built  up  through  long  years  of  arduous  effort  by  private 
enterprise.  And  when,  in  January,  1919,  Mr.  McAdoo 
was  giving  his  testimony  before  the  Senate  committee  in 
favor  of  continued  government  operation,  Edmond  Pen- 
nington,  president  of  the  Soo  system,  was  asking  this  perti- 
nent question : 

We  hear  much  from  the  news  bureau  of  the  Administration.  .  .  . 
The  talk  of  economy  has  not  been  hacked  by  a  single  set  of  figures. 
I  should  like  to  know  where  the  money  is  coming  from  to  meet  the 
tremendous  overhead  expenses  of  the  railway  administration  and  the 
cost  of  the  expensive  office  force  maintained  by  the  Director-General. 

*  Leslies  Weekly,  June  22,  1918. 


Government  Railroading  91 

Within  ten  days  after  the  adverse  elections  in  the  fall 
of  1918,  Mr.  McAdoo  resigned  as  Director-General  of 
Railroads  and  as  Secretary  of  the  Treasury.  This  came 
as  a  real  surprise  to  the  public.  Various  reasons  were  as- 
signed for  his  action,  such  as  that  he  had  differed  with  the 
President  over  the  latter's  partisan  appeal  to  the  country 
immediately  preceding  the  election,  that  he  had  urged 
against  the  President's  contemplated  trip  to  Europe,  and 
that  he  himself  had  designs  upon  the  presidential  nomina- 
tion in  1920.  The  reason  he  gave  was  that  his  salary  was 
insufficient.  It  was  not  publicly  announced  that  the  moun- 
tains of  debt  piling  up  in  government  operation  of  the  rail- 
roads had  anything  to  do  with  his  resignation;  yet  there 
was  a  strong  suspicion  in  the  public  mind  that  Mr.  McAdoo 
did  not  care  to  shoulder  the  burden  of  the  reaction  that  was 
sure  to  follow  full  knowledge  of  the  situation  of  the  rail- 
roads. Upon  leaving  office,  he  announced  that  the  total 
sum  advanced  to  December  31,  1918,  by  the  United  States 
Railroad  Administration  to  all  transportation  lines  under 
government  control  was  $689,034,759. 

In  a  long  and  carefully  prepared  statement  to  the  Senate 
committee  on  interstate  commerce,  in  January,  1919,  Mr. 
McAdoo  asked  Congress  to  permit  government  control  for 
five  years,  instead  of  the  twenty-one  months  authorized  in 
the  Control  Act  under  which  the  government  assumed  con- 
trol in  the  first  instance.  The  reasons  he  gave  were,  chiefly, 
that  the  twenty-one  months  period  was  insufficient  time  to 
give  the  matter  a  fair  test,  that  the  war  period  had  required 
methods  that  could  have  little  application  in  time  of  peace, 
and  that  the  months  immediately  following  the  war  were 
certain  to  be  so  abnormal  in  conditions  as  to  be  practically 
worthless  as  a  test. 

This  was  the  signal  for  the  two  sides  to  align  their 
forces,  one  for  government  control,  the  other  for  private 
control.  Unfortunately  for  the  merits  of  the  matter,  Mr. 
McAdoo  expressed  his  purpose  of  turning  back  the  roads 


92       The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

at  once  to  private  control  unless  his  wish  as  to  the  five-year 
plan  were  acquiesced  in.  For  this  threat  brought  forth 
a  bill  in  Congress  to  prevent  this  action  on  the  part  of  the 
Administration,  action  that  would  have  tended  to  entail 
financial  chaos  upon  the  railroad  world,  if,  indeed,  it  did 
not  bring  a  financial  crash  upon  the  nation.  This  one  stroke 
on  his  part  unsettled  the  public's  confidence  in  him  as  a 
public  administrator. 

The  prompt  action  of  Congress  was  probably  hastened 
by  a  letter  from  President  Wilson  in  Europe,  addressed  to 
Congress,  in  which  he  declared  that  the  roads  "will  be 
handed  over  to  their  owners  at  the  end  of  the  calendar 
year." 

Organized  labor  as  a  class  had  fared  so  well  under 
Administration  auspices  that  immediately  after  Mr.  Mc- 
Adoo's  five-year  proposal,  the  railroad  brotherhoods 
throughout  the  country  made  a  drive  on  Congress  to  force 
its  adoption.  Beginning  the  very  week  next  after  the  Mc- 
Adoo  plan  was  submitted  to  Congress,  a  deluge  of  petitions, 
resolutions  and  individual  letters  began  pouring  in  upon 
members  of  both  branches  of  the  national  legislature.  It 
grew  to  so  great  a  volume  that  the  Senate  committee  on 
interstate  commerce  began  considering  the  advisability  of 
investigating  what  source  was  responsible  for  this  propa- 
ganda. There  was  a  notable  textual  similarity  in  it  all.4 

On  the  other  hand,  at  the  same  time  the  presidents  of 
one  hundred  and  twenty-five  railroads,  representing  every 
large  system  in  the  country,  with  the  single  exception  of  the 
Southern  Railroad,  met  in  Philadelphia  and  drew  up  a  list 
of  proposals  to  submit  to  the  Senate  committee  as  the 

*  These  substantially  uniform  resolutions  coming  from  all  railroad  cen- 
ters of  the  country  began  in  these  words: 

"Whereas,  The  public  press  is  boldly  circulating  the  news  that  the 
people  want  the  roads  back  to  private  ownership;  and, 

"Whereas,  We  consider  this  to  be  an  injustice,  because  private  owner- 
ship has  proved  a  failure  in  peace  as  well  as  in  war,  it  being  demon- 
strated to  everybody's  satisfaction  by  facts"  .  .  , 


Government  Railroading  93 

recommendation  of  the  railroads  of  the  country.     Among 
them  were  these : 

1.  Opposition  to  the  McAdoo  plan  for  a  five-year  extension  of 
government  control. 

2.  Refusal   to   accept  a   return  of   the   roads   in   their   present 
"scrambled"  state  brought  about  by  the  Administration. 

3. 'Demand  for  thoroughgoing  remedial  legislation  that  will  pre- 
serve all  the  good  features  of  governmental  control,  with  the  inclusion 
of  the  benefits  of  private  ownership. 

4.  Inauguration  of  some  form  of  national  control  that  will  per- 
mit pooling  of  stations,  ticket-offices,  and  equipment. 

5.  Rate  revision  upward  to  care  for  increase  of  expenses. 

6.  Combination  of  the  rate-making  power  with  the  legislative  con- 
trol over  railroads. 

7.  Removal  of  railroads  from  politics. 

It  was  at  this  time  that  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission was  taking  a  firm  stand  against  government  owner- 
ship or  operation  of  railroads.  In  its  statement  to  the  same 
Senate  committee,  it  said: 

Considering  and  weighing  as  best  we  can  all  of  the  arguments  for 
and  against  the  different  plans,  we  are  led  to  the  conviction  that  with 
the  adoption  of  appropriate  provisions  and  safeguards  for  regulation 
under  private  ownership,  it  would  not  be  wise  or  best  at  this  time  to 
assume  government  ownership  or  operation  of  the  railways  of  the 
country. 

This,  however,  was  no  simple  problem  of  two  and  two 
make  four.  There  were  subtractions,  divisions,  and  multi- 
plicity galore.  Many  diverse  elements  were  involved — 
fairness  to  the  companies,  fairness  to  individuals,  industrial 
justice,  social  justice,  the  destructive  forces  of  radicalism 
then  at  work  seeking  to  undermine  the  whole  mighty  indus- 
trial and  governmental  structure.  To  this  last,  the  organ- 
ized railroad  men,  wittingly  or  unwittingly,  gave  their 
influence. 


94       The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

And  this  last  was  a  large  factor  in  determining  the 
problem.  The  matter  of  the  increase  of  wages  was  brought 
to  the  front  on  all  occasions.  And  as  a  final  attempt  the 
railroad  unions  placed  themselves  behind  the  Plumb  Plan. 
The  author  of  this  scheme,  Glenn  E.  Plumb,  maintained 
palatial  offices  in  Washington  and  was  supplied  with  a  large 
fund  to  care  for  all  expenses.  He  proposed  that  the  rail- 
road management  be  placed  in  the  hands  of  three  parties 
to, be  equally  represented:  employes,  officials,  the  public, 
under  government  ownership.  It  was  thought  the  public 
was  in  a  frame  of  mind  to  take  the  bait.  But  the  public  was 
sitting  by  and  quietly  noting  events.  It  had  observed  at- 
tempts at  Winnipeg  to  overcome  the  public  through  de- 
stroying the  railroads;  it  had  noted  the  desperate  attempt 
to  overthrow  the  Seattle  government;  it  had  its  eyes  on 
the  steel  and  coal  strikes  and  the  defiance  of  the  United 
States  government  itself.  It  was  in  no  mood  for  further 
trifling  on  the  part  of  radicalism,  whether  found  in  Admin- 
istration circles,  organized  railroad  employes,  or  elsewhere. 
Moreover,  it  was  making  up  its  mind  to  ube  done  with 
wiggle  and  wobble."  It  had  its  mind  set  upon  steadiness 
of  purpose  and  back  to  American  tradition.  It  had  seen 
the  railroads  manhandled  and  bedevilled  to  the  limit  of 
endurance,  and  was  ready  to  demand  their  return  to  their 
owners  and  with  new  demands  for  improvements. 

And  it  began  to  appear  to  the  great  public  that  the  per- 
sistent demand  of  the  railroad  employes  for  an  increase  of 
wages  out  of  all  proportion  to  the  demands  of  others  who 
were  receiving  much  smaller  pay  had  some  ulterior  motive. 
The  facts  seemed  to  warrant  the  suspicion.  The  brother- 
hoods were  insisting  that  they  must  be  paid  more  to  meet 
the  increased  cost  of  living.  But  such  demands  had  been 
met  under  private  management.  In  1907  the  average  wage 
of  the  rail  worker  was  $641  per  year,  while  in  1917  it  was 
$1,003,  an  increase  of  56  per  cent.  This  kept  pace  with 
the  increased  cost  of  living.  But  under  government  control, 


Government  Railroading  95 

the  workers  insisted  that  the  pay  was  not  keeping  pace  with 
living  costs.  In  1916  the  payrolls  of  rail  employes  totalled 
$1,470,000,000,  which  grew  to  $1,739,000,000  in  1917, 
to  $2,500,000,000  in  1918  and  to  substantially  $3,000,- 
000,000  in  1919,  and,  had  the  demands  of  the  workers  been 
yielded  to,  they  would  have  received  $3,800,000,000  in 
1920.  At  no  time  was  the  United  States  Railroad  Admin- 
istration free  from  controversy  and  threat  of  a  strike  to  en- 
force a  higher  scale  of  wages,  though  the  amount  had  to 
be  made  up  out  of  the  pockets  of  the  people  receiving  less 
than  half  the  pay  of  these  organized  men  who  had  never 
lost  any  time  or  spent  any  money,  as  had  teachers  of  the 
country  and  many  others,  in  learning  their  business;  but 
on  the  contrary  were  being  paid  while  learning  railroading. 

When  radicalism  was  asserting  itself  in  mid-summer 
of  1919  among  these  organized  railroad  men,  Director- 
General  Hines,  who  had  succeeded  Mr.  McAdoo  as  head 
of  the  Railroad  Administration,  reporting  to  the  President 
on  July  30,  declared  that  a  deadlock  existed  over  the  de- 
mands of  the  shopmen,  and  that  the  granting  of  their  de- 
mands and  of  the  others  to  follow  involved  another  increase 
of  $800,000,000  a  year,  and  at  a  time  when  the  railroads 
were  already  piling  up  an  enormous  deficit  every  month. 

President  Wilson  was  ready  with  the  simple  expedient 
of  loading  the  burden  onto  the  already  overburdened  pub- 
lic; and  the  very  next  day  asked  Congress  to  create  a  body 
to  determine  all  railroad  wage  questions.  Congress  as 
promptly  rejected  his  suggestion  upon  the  ground  that  he 
was  already  invested  with  full  power  to  deal  with  the 
matter. 

In  all  this  controversy  it  is  well  to  note  that  the  Presi- 
dent was  now  confronted  with  the  growing  fire  which  not 
only  he  lacked  the  courage  to  stamp  into  and  extinguish  in 
1916,  but  which  he  at  that  time  actually  fanned  into  a  blaze; 
that  these  demands  were  not  the  demands  of  the  great  pub- 
lic who  had  for  months  been  beseeching  the  President 


96       The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

unavailingly  for  relief  or  recognition;  and  that  the  organ- 
ized labor  of  the  railroads  declared  its  purpose  to  enforce 
these  demands  upon  the  government  and  the  public  by  a 
nation-wide  strike  that  would  compel  the  American  people 
on  their  knees  to  beseech  organized  classism  to  spare  them 
the  agony  of  freezing  and  starvation. 

For  it  was  the  Winnipeg  experience  to  be  repeated.  Mr. 
Hines'  report  to  President  Wilson  and  the  latter's  appeal 
to  Congress  to  be  rid  of  a  threatening  matter  at  the  very 
moment  that  he  was  preparing  to  give  his  undivided  atten- 
tion to  laying  his  League-of-Nations  scheme  before  the  peo- 
ple, were  followed  immediately  by  the  threatened  railroad 
strike  in  August,  1919,  jeopardizing  transportation  and  the 
lives  of  the  people  in  southern  California,  Nevada,  and 
Arizona.  And  now  Director-General  Hines  took  a  firm 
stand,  such  as  Director-General  McAdoo  had  taken  in  a 
similar  crisis  during  the  war,  making  it  plain  that  no  further 
mutiny  against  the  United  States  would  be  tolerated.  He 
gave  warning  that  in  those  states  he  would  undertake  to 
restore  complete  railroad  service  at  a  specified  hour  and  that 
all  who  did  not  return  to  work  by  that  time  would  be  out  of 
a  job;  and  that  any  one  undertaking  to  interfere  with  or 
to  impede  the  use  of  railroad  property  would  be  dealt  with 
as  having  committed  an  offense  against  the  United  States. 
His  firm  stand  was  backed  by  the  American  public.  The 
days  of  the  "rubber-stamp"  Congress  had  already  been 
written  into  history.  Organized  classism  was  losing  ground, 
though  the  railroad  men  felt  that  they  had  chosen  a  most 
propitious  time — when  the  country  was  in  the  grip  of  an 
unsettled  state  following  the  war  and  at  the  moment  when 
the  President's  chief  concern  was  to  obtain  support  for  the 
Covenant.  It  was  on  this  occasion  that  a  member  of  the 
President's  own  party  in  Congress  declared:  "The  broth- 
erhoods got  a  taste  of  power  when  the  Adamson  law  was 
passed  under  whip  and  spur,  and  they  have  been  intoxicated 
by  it  ever  since." 


Government  Railroading  97 

And  in  referring  to  the  Plumb  Plan,  to  which  the  rail- 
road -brotherhoods  were  now  turning,  one  public  journal 
stated  the  situation  in  brief  when  it  said: 

Most  of  us  feel  that  the  interests  of  a  hundred  million  people  are 
of  greater  importance  than  the  interests  of  either  railroad  owners  or 
workers.  For  either  of  these  two  groups  to  endeavor  to  secure  some 
permanent  advantage  at  the  cost  of  permanent  advantage  to  the 
body  of  the  nation  would  be  wrong  and  unfair.5 

But  all  through  the  war  and  during  the  reconstruction  days, 
the  leaders  of  organized  labor  and  a  few  select  groups, 
as  the  railroad  brotherhoods,  manifested  as  thoroughly  a 
selfish  spirit  as  did  the  capitalistic  groups,  and  with  more 
classism  attaching  to  its  conduct. 

Whatever  other  cause  may  be  assigned,  it  is  probable 
that,  in  large  measure,  the  Administration's  failure  in  rail- 
roading must  be  laid  at  the  door  of  this  class  spirit  which 
puts  the  selfishness  of  its  group  above  the  public  good  and 
above  the  government  itself.  But  did  the  Administration 
fail? 

Before  government  operation  was  adopted,  advocates 
of  the  policy  held  that  under  it  the  railways  would  be  oper- 
ated much  more  economically  than  when  operated  pri- 
ately.  Do  the  facts  bear  out  or  support  this  theory? 

Government  operation  reduced  the  quantity  of  freight 
handled  per  car  daily  and  failed  to  increase  the  amount  of 
freight  per  train  in  any  degree  approaching  the  proportion 
of  increase  under  private  operation — a  fact  which  accounts, 
in  large  measure,  for  the  increase  in  expenses.  In  fact,  there 
was  practically  no  increase  in  the  freight  moved;  yet  there 

5  Times-Union,  Rochester,  N.  Y. 

Plumb  was  the  general  counsel  of  the  railroad  brotherhoods.  On  Au- 
gust 2,  the  president  of  the  four  brotherhoods  and  the  head  of  the  Feder- 
ation employes'  department  stated  that  their  unions  "were  in  no  mood  to 
brook  the  return  of  the  railway  lines  to  their  former  control";  and  that 
economic  disaster  would  follow  unless  the  Plumb  Plan  was  adopted.  And  on 
August  3  the  president  of  the  brotherhood  of  locomotive  engineers  said 
the  Plan  would  be  made  an  issue  in  the  next  congressional  campaign. 
The  public  accepted  this  as  a  threat 


98       The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

was  an  increase  of  1 1  per  cent,  almost  200,000,  in  the 
number  of  men  employed.  It  was  chiefly  because  of  de- 
creased efficiency  'in  operation  that  there  was  so  great  an 
increase  in  operating  expenses.  Under  private  operation 
the  railways  had  increased  wages  during  the  ten-year  period 
of  1907-1917  by  over  $600,000,000,  in  face  of  the  fact 
that  freight  and  passenger  rates  were  lower  in  1917  than 
in  1907.  But  the  companies  did  not  accumulate  a  deficit. 
It  became  a  passing  remark,  in  referring  to  a  railroad  man 
under  government  operation,  that  "he  was  wearing  out  the 
seat  of  his  overalls  in  looking  for  something  to  do."  Yet 
at  the  time  the  roads  were  returned  to  private  operation, 
the  employes  were  claiming  advances  in  wages  aggregating 
another  $1,000,000,000. 

In  his  statement  to  the  Senate  committee,  in  January, 
1919,  Mr.  McAdoo  expressed  the  hope  that  there  would 
be  no  considerable  deficiency  in  government  operation.  The 
event  did  not  justify  the  hope.  With  all  the  advantages 
of  pooling,  which  privilege  was  forbidden  the  companies 
by  law,  the  first  year  of  government  operation  cost  the  sum 
of  $4,007,000,000,  an  increase  of  40  per  cent  over  that 
of  1917.  True,  war  was  a  disturbing  factor.  But  the  next 
year,  when  the  war  was  past,  it  had  increased  to  $4,420,- 
000,000.  And  while  a  large  part  of  this  was  in  wages  alone, 
$1,200,000,000  from  1917  to  1919,  yet  wages  had  been 
keeping  pace  with  living  costs  under  private  operation. 

When  Congress,  in  the  Control  Act,  gave  the  Adminis- 
tration the  power  to  increase  rates  to  cover  operating  ex- 
penses and  the  returns  guaranteed  the  companies,  it  ob- 
viously meant  that  the  rates  should  be  made  sufficiently 
high  to  cover  all  by  rates  to  be  paid  by  those  who  used  the 
transportation,  without  laying  any  portion  of  the  burden 
upon  the  taxpayers  of  the  country.  And  in  June,  1918, 
the  Railroad  Administration  increased  passenger  rates  to 
three  cents  a  mile,  an  increase  of  50  per  cent;  and  freight 
rates  by  25  per  cent,  in  addition  to  the  increase  granted 


Government  Railroading  99 

the  February  previous,  making  a  total  in  freight  to  that 
time  of  32^  per  cent  higher  than  had  been  allowed  under 
private  operation.  Thereupon,  Mr.  McAdoo  issued  a  state- 
ment that  it  was  expected  that  the  increased  earnings  would 
cover  all  increases  in  expenses,  basing  his  estimates  upon 
the  returns  actually  made  by  the  roads  during  the  three 
years  ending  June  30,  1917. 

Yet,  the  first  year  of  government  operation  fell  short  of 
this  estimate  by  almost  $240,000,000,  the  deficit  officially 
admitted  by  the  Railroad  Administration.  And  upon  his 
surrender  of  his  office  at  the  end  of  that  year,  he  estimated 
that  the  roads  should  earn  a  surplus  over  the  guarantees  of 
$100,000,000.  But  after  paying  expenses,  including  taxes, 
there  was  a  deficit  of  about  $360,000,000  for  the  year  1919  ; 
and  for  the  last  two  months  of  government  operation,  Janu- 
ary and  February,  1920,  the  deficit  was  $103,000,000. 

When  government  operation  ceased  on  March  I,  1920, 
Director-General  Hines  estimated  the  total  losses  to  the 
government  during  the  twenty-six  months  of  its  operation 
at  $904,000,000,  in  his  statement  submitted  to  the  House 
committee  on  appropriations.  But  the  committee  found 
other  items  which  he  had  omitted,  and  stated  that  before 
the  accounts  were  closed  uthe  total  loss  to  the  government 
chargeable  to  federal  control  and  operation  of  railroads 
would  amount  to  $1,375,000,000."  This  was  loaded  upon 
the  taxpayers  of  the  country.  And  Mr.  Hines  asked  for  an 
appropriation  of  the  people's  money  to  see  the  roads 
through  the  year  1919  in  the  sum  of  $1,200,000,000;  on 
June  10  Congress  gave  him  $750,000,000. 

Much  of  the  beginning  of  government  failure  in  rail- 
roading was  attributed  to  the  extreme  weather  in  its  second 
month  of  operation  and  to  the  scarcity  of  coal.  But  the 
corresponding  month  of  1919,  when  freight  rates  had  been 
materially  increased,  coal  was  plentiful,  and  the  weather 
was  extraordinarily  mild  and  pleasant,  was  a  worse  month 
for  the  railroads  financially  than  the  direful  February, 


ioo    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

1918.  For  in  the  later  month  the  net  operating  income  of 
the  roads  was  $2,225,000  less  than  for  the  disastrous  Febru- 
ary of  1918.  While  rates  were  increased  fully  25  per  cent, 
the  income  decreased  14  per  cent  and  with  slower  service. 
And  there  was  a  progression  of  deficits.  During  the  year 
1918  the  monthly  average  of  deficits  was  $17,000,000; 
the  first  quarter  of  1919,  they  averaged  $37,000,000.  And 
Mr.  Hines'  request  of  Congress  for  $1,200,000,000  to 
the  end  of  that  year,  suggests  a  very  great  increase. 

Were  these  great  deficits  due  to  better  service  under 
government  operation?  Scarcely  had  the  Railroad  Ad- 
ministration given  to  the  public  the  statement  that  traffic  of 
all  kinds  was  being  handled  with  expedition  and  with  cars 
in  abundance  to  spare,  when  it  became  known  that  there 
was  an  acute  car  shortage  in  the  central  northwest.  On 
September  4,  1918,  the  grain  elevators  were  closing  be- 
cause they  were  full,  with  no  cars  available  to  carry  the 
wheat  to  the  great  markets  of  the  east.  In  1917  the  rail- 
roads of  the  country  handled  10  per  cent  more  freight 
than  in  1916,  in  which  latter  year  it  was  of  much  greater 
volume  than  in  any  previous  year.  In  freight  traffic  the  in- 
crease alone  of  1917  over  that  of  1916  was  135,000,000,- 
ooo  ton-miles — substantially  equal  to  the  combined  total 
of  all  the  railroads  of  Canada,  Great  Britain,  France,  Rus- 
sia, Germany  and  Austria  for  an  entire  year. 

Nor  was  the  tremendous  deficit  under  government  opera- 
tion the  whole  of  the  story.  The  Administration  ineffi- 
ciency was  demonstrated  further  by  the  condition  in  which 
the  equipment  and  traffic  were  found  when  the  companies 
received  the  roads  back  from  the  government.  On  March 
i,  1920,  there  were  over  90,000  loaded  cars  accumulated 
in  the  various  terminals  awaiting  movement.  The  follow- 
ing months  came  the  railroad  strikes  and  the  number  soon 
ran  up  to  300,000.  In  July  of  that  year  the  Railroad  Labor 
Board  rendered  an  award  granting  employes  advances  in 
wages  aggregating  $625,000,000.  During  the  last  month 


Government  Railroading  101 

of  government  operation,  though  there  was  a  great  deficit 
and  the  business  was  greater  than  ever  before  handled  in 
any  February,  the  Administration  had  not  adequately  main- 
tained the  properties,  laying  upon  the  companies  the  im- 
mediate necessity  of  largely  increasing  their  maintenance 
expenditures  in  tracks  and  equipment.  After  seven  months 
of  returned  private  control,  the  number  of  loaded  cars 
awaiting  movement  was  normal,  or  about  50,000. 

And  the  railroad  executives  had  already  taken  steps  to 
improve  the  service^  in  spite  of  the  "outlaw"  strike  in  April, 
agreeing  that  the  matter  of  first  importance  was  an  increased 
daily  average  in  the  movement  of  freight  cars,  an  increase 
in  the  average  loading,  and  a  reductiop  in  the  number  of 
cars  in  bad  order. 

To  this  end  they  turned  every  energy.  The  greatest 
average  freight  mileage  per  car  per  day  ever  attained  was 
in  1916,  when  it  was  26.9  miles.  Under  government  opera- 
tion, this  mileage  had  decreased  to  less  than  25  in  1918, 
to  23  in  1919,  and  at  the  time  the  roads  were  returned  on 
March  i,  1920,  it  was  only  22  mfles.  Every  increase  of 
one  mile  per  car  per  day  is  equivalent  to  the  addition  of 
100,000  cars  to  the  available  supply.  In  July,  1920,  the 
average  for  all  railroads  had  increased  to  25  miles  and  the 
executives  agreed  to  attempt  to  reach  30  miles.  Increase 
in  loading,  urged  strongly  by  the  United  States  Railroad 
Administration,  was  also  urged  by  the  companies  when  the 
roads  came  back  into  their  hands ;  since  an  increase  of  one  ton 
in  the  average  car-load  is  equivalent  to  increasing  the  avail- 
able car  supply  by  about  75,000.° 

With  the  roads  the  government  took  over  129,000 
freight  cars  in  bad  order,  or  5.7  per  cent  of  the  total.  When 
it  returned  the  properties  it  reported  153,727  bad-order 
cars,  an  increase  of  nearly  25,000,  or  approximately  20 
per  cent.  Moreover,  the  cars  were  scattered  all  over  the 

""The  Railroad  Situation  to  Date":  an  address  by  Samuel  M.  Felton, 
president  of  the  C.  G.  W.  R.  R.,  before  the  Central  Manufacturing  Dis- 
trict Club,  Chicago,  September  29,  1920,  p.  3. 


102    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

country;7  and  when  returned  home,  the  number  in  bad 
order  was  found  to  be  much  larger  than  the  Railroad  Ad- 
ministration reported.  It  was  estimated  that  to  meet  the 
demand  of  the  freight  traffic  of  the  next  two  years  800,000 
new  cars  were  needed;  and  so  greatly  was  the  greatest  rail- 
way system  in  the  world  neglected  under  government  control 
that  these  cars  had  not  been  ordered  when  it  was  turned 
back  to  private  control. 

But  there  was  a  more  appalling  deficit  than  the  financial 
deficit  or  that  in  maintaining  equipment.  One  of  the  most 
disastrous  effects  of  government  control  was  the  undermin- 
ing of  the  railway  organizations  and  of  the  discipline  of 
the  employes.  One  leading  newspaper  of  the  Atlantic  sea- 
board, after  showing  how  government  operation  had  de- 
pleted the  railroad  equipment  and  after  citing  the  decreased 
production  per  man  with  greatly  increased  wages,  said : 

But  the  most  damaging  result  was  that  it  destroyed  the  morale 
of  the  workers  and  sowed  discord  between  them  and  the  manage- 
ments. By  urging  all  the  workers  to  organize  under  the  union 
rules,  the  government  helped  to  transform  the  railroad  brother- 
hoods from  the  most  conservative,  contented  and  loyal  labor  organi-* 
zation  in  the  country  into  an  aggressively  radical  machine,  which  is 
now  in  open  competition  with  the  managements  for  future  control 
of  this  great  industry.8 

The  Administration's  method  of  government,  which  found 
ready  expression  in  its  railroading  as  in  other  directions, 
produced  a  greater  deficit  in  the  morale  of  the  people  than 
the  financial  deficit,  whether  in  airplanes,  shipbuilding,  mu- 
nitions of  war,  or  railroading.  It  taught  the  spendthrift 
habit  by  the  most  open  and  notorious  concrete  examples, 
in  utter  disregard  of  the  first  principles  of  business  man- 
agement. Staggering  as  the  figures  are  in  dealing  with 

T  It  was  not  unlike  the  situation  in  which  the  shipping  men  of  the 
country  found  themselves  at  the  close  of  hostilities.  They  could  find  neither 
their  ships  nor  any  one  at  Washington  who  could  tell  them  where  they 
were,  or  when  or  how  they  could  get  them  back.  See  chapter  on  "Ship- 
building." 

"Philadelphia  North  American,  March  5,  1920. 


Government  Railroading  103 

railroad  operation,  it  is  scarcely  a  matter  of  wonder  that 
the  American  people  are  charged  with  spending  annually 
$22,000,000,000  on  non-essentials. 

The  Act  of  Congress  restoring  the  railroads  to  private 
operation  and  control,  insured  the  railroads  against  bank- 
ruptcy and  collapse ;  assured  labor  of  no  reduction  in  wages 
for  six  months  and  the  companies  an  income  for  the  same 
period,  and  instead  of  penalizing  pooling  as  in  the  past, 
it  was  encouraged.  The  Act  forbade  any  increase  of  wages 
during  the  six  months,  a  feature  of  the  bill  that  brought  a 
storm  of  protest  from  labor  organizations.  A  prominent 
feature  of  the  law  related  to  the  adjustment  of  wages  and 
the  conditions  of  labor,  creating  a  board  of  appeals  con- 
sisting of  nine  members:  three  representing  the  roads,  em- 
ployes and  the  public  each.  This  board  was  to  reach  a  de- 
cision by  a  majority,  including  at  least  one  representative 
of  the  public.  It  was  made  compulsory,  under  penalty,  for 
both  sides  to  submit  their  dispute  to  this  board.  But  a  re- 
markable fact  is  that  neither  party  was  required  to  accept 
the  decision  and  the  board  was  given  no  power  to  enforce 
its  findings. 

Pleased  to  have  the  government  take  over  the  railroads, 
the  public  was  more  pleased  to  have  them  returned  to  pri- 
vate control.  Inefficiency  and  the  attempt  to  play  politics 
with  the  thing  created  a  violent  reaction  in  public  sentiment 
touching  government  operation.  Said  one  newspaper  that 
has  always  stood  firmly  for  working  people's  rights: 

Never  did  the  pendulum  of  popular  judgment  on  any  economic 
question  swing  so  far  in  so  short  a  time — from  virtually  unanimous 
approval  when  the  lines  were  taken  over  by  the  Government  twenty- 
six  months  ago,  to  virtually  unanimous  relief  when  they  were  given 
back.9 

Indeed,  there  was  practically  nothing  to  be  said  in  favor 
of  government  operation  after  the  Administration  had  tried 

"Philadelphia  North  American. 


IO4    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

it  for  over  two  years.  The  public  was  not  at  first  permitted 
to  know  the  facts  concerning  the  monumental  deficits  that 
were  loaded  upon  the  people.  And  when  the  light  was  per- 
mitted to  shine  out  from  the  dark  corners,  the  Administra- 
tion, in  answer  to  the  outcry,  felt  obliged  to  explain.  This 
Director-General  Hines  undertook  to  do  before  the  mem- 
bers and  guests  of  the  Chamber  of  Commerce  and  Traffic 
Club  of  Philadelphia  in  June,  1919.  But  the  figures  later 
given  out  indicated  that  the  situation  was  far  worse  than 
he  at  that  time  permitted  the  public  to  know.  The  gross 
figures  later  showed  that  the  last  year  before  the  govern- 
ment took  over  the  roads,  operating  expenses  aggregated 
$2,957,000,000.  And  though  there  was  notable  failure  to 
maintain  the  properties  at  the  standard  at  which  taken  over, 
the  operating  expenses  the  year  the  government  ended  con- 
trol totalled  about  $5,350,000,000,  an  annual  increase  of 
about  $2,400,000,000,  of  which  some  $2,000,000,000  is 
chargeable  to  labor.  And  with  the  total  operating  expenses 
and  taxes  aggregating  $5,600,000,000  per  annum,  while 
the  total  earnings  for  the  year  1919  were  $5,200,000,000, 
there  was  a  shortage  of  $400,000,000  merely  to  meet  ex- 
penses, with  nothing  on  investment.  The  employes  in  Sep- 
tember, 1920,  were  receiving  more  than  twice  as  much  in 
wages  as  in  1916. 

The  people  were  gradually  learning  the  truth.  On  the 
floor  of  the  Senate  on  December  5,  1919,  Senator  Kellogg 
stated  that  federal  operation  of  the  previous  two  years  had 
demoralized  the  railroad  service  and  impoverished  the  rail- 
road properties.  He  cited  the  fact  that  in  the  last  nine 
months  of  1917  the  roads,  under  private  operation,  handled 
virtually  as  much  business  as  during  the  same  months  in 
1918,  and  more  than  for  the  corresponding  months  of  1919; 
and  that  they  did  it  with  190,000  fewer  men  and  at  a  cost 
less  by  $1,500,000,000.  And  that  notwithstanding  the  in- 
crease in  rates  from  25  to  50  per  cent,  the  Government  was 
losing  in  operation  at  the  rate  per  year  of  $350,000,000. 


Government  Railroading  105 

Thus  had  the  Administration  written  another  chapter 
in  the  history  of  its  operations  during  the  Great  War.  But 
it  did  not  end  with  that.  When  the  roads  were  returned  to 
private  management  in  March,  1920,  the  law  perpetuated 
the  system  of  adjusting  the  relations  of  the  workers  through 
a  board,  now  in  the  Railroad  Labor  Board,  to  fix  the  rates 
of  wages  the  roads  should  pay,  and  the  system  was  made 
nationally  applicable.  In  July,  1920,  an  increase  in  freight 
rates  from  25  to  40  per  cent  and  in  passenger  rates  of  20 
per  cent  was  granted.  This,  it  was  estimated,  would  yield 
an  additional  revenue  of  $1,500,000,000.  It  did  not  ma- 
terialize. Wages  remained  the  same,  while  revenues  de- 
creased. At  the  beginning  of  1921  it  was  evident  that  the 
lines  were  facing  financial  straits,  and  in  April  the  Railroad 
Labor  Board  abrogated  the  national  rules  effective  July  i. 
And  early  in  June  it  granted  the  request  of  the  roads  that 
there  be  a  cut  in  wages  approximating  an  average  of  12  per 
cent,  effective  July  i.  Thereafter  the  roads  were  on  a  safer 
basis.  But  in  the  late  summer  of  1921,  the  amounts  due 
the  roads  from  the  government  for  the  obligations  incurred 
during  the  war  were  still  unpaid  and  the  lines  were  ham- 
pered for  the  want  of  this  money. 

As  a  logical  result  of  the  Administration's  policy  in 
showing  favoritism  to  a  strongly  organized  class  beginning 
in  1916,  this  same  class,  "big  four"  brotherhoods  of  rail- 
road employes,  to  which  was  added  a  fifth,  the  switchmen, 
undertook  to  play  the  game  that  was  played  in  Winnipeg 
two  years  previously — starving  and  freezing  the  people 
into  submission  to  their  demands  by  refusing  to  move 
trains.  The  strike  which  they  called  for  October  30,  1921, 
ostensibly  a  strike  against  the  railroads,  was  in  fact  a  strike 
against  the  people  and  the  people's  government.  With  no 
popular  support,  the  strike  order  was  cancelled  by  the  lead- 
ers three  days  before  it  was  to  become  effective. 

The  transportation  system  of  the  country,  the  best  in 
the  world,  is  the  main  artery  of  the  nation's  progress.  And 


IO6    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

the  radical  element  of  society  must  never  be  permitted  to 
gain  control  thereof.  The  President  or  other  official  at- 
tempting to  sell  the  nation's  birthright  for  a  mess  of  politi- 
cal pottage  deserves  the  execration  of  his  countrymen. 


CHAPTER    VII 

SECRETARY  BAKER  AND  MR.  CREEL  IN  WAR 

As  delightful  a  gentleman  as  any  one  could  care  to  meet 
personally;  as  studiously  scholarly  as  any  in  the  land;  as 
rich  in  experience  as  one  could  wish  along  certain  but  ill- 
defined  lines;  a  pacifist  of  pacifists — such  is  the  man  whom 
President  Wilson,  of  his  own  accord,  selected  for  the  all- 
important  fighting  branch  of  the  government's  service  in  the 
greatest  war  of  recorded  time,  displacing  Secretary  of  War 
Garrison,  who  was  a  real  fighting  man. 

It  was  when  the  Germans  were  making  great  headway 
in  their  terrific  March  drive  against  the  Allies  in  1918 
that  Mr.  Baker  made  a  notable  address  that  was  heralded 
throughout  the  country  and  the  world;  for  the  War  De- 
partment had  been  excoriated  in  Congress  and  by  the  peo- 
ple for  its  failures  at  the  crucial  time,  and  the  world  hung 
breathlessly  upon  the  words  of  the  nation's  war  head. 

This  address  to  the  publishers  in  New  York  is  an  in- 
stance of  what  he  was  confidently  seeking  to  lead  the  Ameri- 
can public  to  believe.  He  spoke  well  of  our  soldiers,  "men 
prepared  to  make  the  supreme  sacrifice  in  order  that  we 
who  remained  behind  and  those  who  come  after  us  may  be 
free  from  a  philosophy  too  hateful  to  govern  the  world." 
As  to  our  own  country,  he  said:  "Long  live  the  United 
States — not  a  place  on  the  map,  not  a  system  of  political 
institutions  hemmed  in  by  the  seas,  but  a  living  moral  in- 
fluence in  the  world,  liberating  the  spirits  of  men  and  pre- 
serving the  freedom  of  opportunity  for  the  children  of 


men." 


Then  Mr.  Baker  concluded  his  address  with  an  impres- 
sive and  characteristic  reference  to  the  magnitude  of  our 

107 


io8     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

task  as  indicated  by  the  alleged  fact  that  the  warehouses 
planned  for  American  use,  "now  in  France  and  projected  to 
be  there,"  would  cover  a  tract  of  land  fifty  feet  wide  by 
two  hundred  and  fifty  miles  long — his  imagination  un- 
equaled  except  probably  by  the  actual  production  of  one 
airplane  whose  arrival  in  France  had  not  yet  been  heralded 
to  the  world,  when  20,000  were  promised. 
George  Harvey  put  it  thus : 

This  is  substantially  all  that  Mr.  Baker  had  to  say, — the  same 
old  slush  about  things  too  beautiful  to  perish;  the  lulling  of  our 
people  to  sleep  upon  the  theory  that  the  French  and  English  can 
win  without  our  aid;  the  virtual  intimation  that  we  should  be  most 
careful  not  to  tread  upon  German  toes;  the  plain  declaration  that 
we  are  in  the  war  only  to  keep  free  from  a  hateful  "philosophy"; 
the  easy  putting  aside  as  of  slight  importance  the  breaking  of  the 
vital  battle  line,  the  inferential  but  no  less  certain  loading  of  the 
whole  burden  upon  our  stricken  Allies;  the  cautious  avoidance  of 
distinguishing  between  the  causes  for  which  the  two  forces  were 
striving  with  might  and  main  and  the  very  hearts'  blood  of  millions 
of  men,  women  and  children.  .  .  . 

Not  a  word  about  the  war  itself;  not  a  suggestion  of  warning; 
not  a  shadow  of  appeal  for  help  from  the  people  in  hurrying  forward, 
"for  God's  sake,"  the  work  of  succor  and  relief;  not  a  syllable  of 
denunciation  of  the  barriance;  not  a  sound  above  a  whisper  in  praise 
and  appreciation  of  our  brothers  in  arms;  not  a  hint  of  peril  to  the 
mother  and  sister  countries  and  to  our  own;  not  one  clear  bugle 
note  to  rouse  and  thrill  a  mighty  people  into  overpowering  action; 
nothing,  nothing  under  heaven  but  piffle — piddling,  pacifist  piffle 
from  an  American  Secretary  of  War,  basking  in  the  sunlight  of  his 
chief  while  hundreds  of  thousands  of  those  left  at  home,  no  less  surely 
than  the  best  of  our  manhood  who  have  gone  and  are  going,  sit  in 
the  shadow  of  death. 

Can  one  wonder  that,  after  having  seen  and  heard  such  a  repre- 
sentative of  our  great  and  fearless  Nation,  our  Allies  began  to  look 
askance  at  America,  and  even  to  murmur  their  doubts  and  misgiv- 
ings? For  more  than  a  year  they  have  held  their  breath  in  suspense, 
in  hope,  in  unparalleled  generosity  and  considerateness,  and  for  policy's 
sake.  How  they  have  felt  during  the  past  few  months,  many  of  us, 


Secretary  Baker  and  Mr.  Creel  in  War          109 

to  our  humiliation  and  shame,  know  only  too  well,  but  it  took  their 
own  death  agonies,  accentuated  by  the  smiling  smugness  of  our 
Secretary  of  War  to  fetch  utterance  of  their  disappointment  and 
dispair.1 

It  is  doubtful  whether  a  better  idea  of  the  two  views 
at  that  time  prevailing  in  the  country  is  obtainable  than  in 
this  characteristic  speech  of  Mr.  Baker  and  the  comment 
of  George  Harvey — the  one  the  Administration  view,  the 
other  the  popular  view.  The  one  is  given  to  glittering 
generalities;  the  other  to  pushing  the  war  preparation  to  the 
limit,  both  in  men  and  equipment.  The  one  is  intended 
to  soothe  the  people;  the  other  to  arousing  the  people 
to  the  critical  situation  and  to  the  fighting  spirit.  If 
each  is  extreme,  each  best  represents  the  views  then  cur- 
rent. 

If  it  seems  strange  that  two  men  as  unlike  as  George 
Creel  and  Secretary  Baker  are  linked  together  in  recording 
events  of  the  Great  War,  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that 
three  outstanding  facts  bring  them  into  this  connection: 
Both  were  members  of  the  federal  Committee  on  Publicity, 
of  which  Creel  was  made  chairman ;  both  were  imbued  with 
the  so-called  liberal  spirit  and  of  definite  pacifist  taint; 
each  believed  he  was  better  able  to  endure  difficult  situations 
which  their  beliefs  had  engendered  than  were  the  great 
public,  for  which  reason  each  believed  it  was  right  to  mis- 
lead, even  grossly  to  deceive,  the  public,  and  in  his  own  way 
this  each  sought  to  do. 

The  extent  to  which  this  was  done  will  be  revealed  only 
when  the  records  of  all  departments  of  the  government  shall 
be  made  accessible  to  the  world,  records  which  were  then 
hidden  away  from  the  public  for  fear  of  the  result  had  the 
people  been  permitted  to  know  the  exact  facts  concerning 
the  failures  of  the  Administration  in  its  efforts  to  make  it 
appear  that  it  and  its  partisans  had  conducted  a  great  war 
to  a  successful  conclusion. 

1  War  Weekly,  May  4,  1918. 


no     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

The  Great  War  brought  into  popular  use  some  new 
words  that  are  likely  to  become  living  parts  of  the  language, 
as  Bolshevist,  camouflage,  over  the  top,  Hooverize.  The 
last  named  is  used  fondly  at  every  table.  There  is  one, 
however,  that  is  not  used  to  conjure  with,  but  which  has 
gotten  for  itself  a  place  rather  of  obloquy  than  of  affection. 
It  is  the  term  Bakerize,  which  came  to  symbolize  official 
deception,  official  promises  without  fulfillment,  shiftiness. 
And  there  is  its  near  relative,  Creelism.  Though  each  has 
but  a  brief  history,  it  is  not  known  whether  the  verb  or 
the  noun  came  first  into  being.  The  latter  means  all  that  the 
former  does;  but  though  it  has  less  of  official  flavor,  it  is 
a  slightly  stronger  term,  a  senator  from  Missouri  intimat- 
ing that  it  meant  licensed  lying. 

Nor  is  it  strange  that  these  two  men  should  thus  char- 
acterize the  two  words.  To  Secretary  Baker  the  nation 
owes  the  creation  and  operation  of  an  elaborate  system  of 
official  deception  designed  to  protect  incompetence,  conceal 
failure,  and  mislead  the  public.  Close  examination  showed 
that  the  prepared  statements  which  he  made  to  the  Senate 
Committee  on  Military  Affairs  were  wholly  untrustworthy, 
while  his  communications  to  the  public  were  almost  always 
descriptive,  sometimes  mere  fabrication.  Creelism  was  his 
conception — a  system  of  propaganda  using  the  war  powers 
of  the  government  to  compel  the  local  press  to  spread 
official  misinformation.2 

More  discouraging  to  millions  of  Americans  than  all 
the  rest  of  his  failures  was  the  fact  that  Secretary  Baker 
continued  his  efforts  to  deceive  the  public  after  exposure. 
It  seemed  that  he  did  not,  and  could  not,  learn;  that  re- 
peated exposure  of  mendacity  and  duplicity  on  his  part 
taught  him  nothing;  that  his  conception  of  the  important 
duties  of  his  office  was  camouflaging  and  deceiving  the 
American  public,  rather  than  making  the  performance  of  his 

2  See  chapter  on  "The  Press  and  Public  Opinion." 


Secretary  Baker  and  Mr.  Creel  in  War         ill 

department  conform  to  the  expectations  of  the  people  and 
the  necessities  of  war. 

When  Mr.  Kahn,  of  California,  was  obliged  to  assume 
the  duties  of  Chairman  Dent,  of  Alabama,  to  carry  for- 
ward the  work  of  the  chairman  of  the  Military  Affairs  Com- 
mittee of  the  House  because  Mr.  Dent  was  not  ready  to 
turn  in  to  help  drive  the  crusher  of  civilization  out  of  busi- 
ness— when  Mr.  Kahn  artlessly  asked  whether  the  statement 
made  by  the  War  Department  in  1917  that  we  would  have 
20,000  airplanes  in  France  by  July  i,  1918,  was  not  re- 
sponsible for  this  tendency  in  all  branches  of  the  govern- 
ment service  to  exaggerate,  he  put  his  finger  on  the  exact 
spot.  The  department's  aircraft  statement,  and  a  dozen 
other  incorrect  statements,  were  distinctly  responsible  for 
the  evil  tendency  toward  exaggeration  during  the  entire 
career  of  the  Administration  in  the  war.  The  War  Depart- 
ment was  the  source  of  more  and  worse  exaggerations  than 
came  from  any  other  quarter.  It  became  the  father  of 
exaggerations. 

It  was  along  many  lines  and  in  regard  to  many  situations 
that  Secretary  Baker  sought  to  mislead  the  public  and  to 
cover  up  the  facts.  The  people  came  to  accept  it  as  a  fixed 
habit  of  his  thought.  And  the  partisan  newspaper  organs, 
to  avoid  embarrassment  for  the  Administration,  aided 
wherever  possible.  When  Governor  Allen  of  Kansas,  who 
had  been  on  the  front  lines,  spoke  from  personal  ex- 
perience and  unquestioned  knowledge  as  to  the  casualties, 
Mr.  Baker  replied  by  stating  that  it  was  not  excessive  at 
some  other  time  than  that  to  which  Governor  Allen  referred. 
When  the  Associated  Press  dispatches  were  telling  the  coun- 
try that  the  fighters  were  coming  home  penniless  and  de- 
pendent upon  charity  while  the  government  was  owing  them 
for  months  of  service,  Secretary  Baker  replied  by  referring 
to  certain  camps  which  were  free  from  the  condition  charged 
and  stated  the  men  were  paid  in  full  up  to  the  time  of  leav- 


112     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

ing  Europe.     This  statement  led  the  Boston  Transcript  to 
say: 

The  impression  conveyed  and,  as  we  believe,  intended  to  be 
conveyed,  by  this  cunningly  deceitful  official  declaration,  is  that  there 
is  no  truth  in  the  reported  return  to  this  country  of  soldiers  whose 
penniless  condition  is  due  to  their  failure  to  receive  the  pay  due 
them  for  periods  ranging  from  one  to  ten  months;  no  truth  in  the 
report  that  such  soldiers  have  arrived  at  Camp  Devens,  Camp  Sher- 
man, Camp  Funston,  and  various  Army  hospitals;  no  truth  in  the 
report  that  General  McCain,  General  Wood  and  one  or  two  other 
courageous  divisional  commanders  have,  upon  their  own  personal 
responsibility,  without  awaiting  any  authority  from  the  War  De- 
partment, ordered  these  returning  heroes  to  be  paid  forthwith;  no 
truth  in  the  report  that  the  Red  Cross  had  been  lending  money  to 
some  of  the  more  seriously  wounded  among  these  penniless  defenders. 
But  all  these  reports  are  true,  and  the  condition  is  even  more  dis- 
graceful than  the  reports  published  describe. 

Likewise,  when  charged  with  dilatoriness  in  the  work  of 
the  War  Department  in  connection  with  the  Archibald 
Stevenson  affair,  Mr.  Baker  promptly  abolished  the  par- 
ticular branch  of  the  Military  Intelligence  to  which  Mr. 
Stevenson  belonged  and  then  wrote  to  Senator  Overman 
that  no  such  man  as  Stevenson  belonged  to  that  branch  of 
the  service — which  was  technically  true  when  he  so  wrote. 

He  carried  through  the  same  principle  when,  in  regard 
to  the  severe  criticisms  of  his  department,  he  wrote  con- 
cerning the  very  efficient  Edward  Stettinius : 

It  is  within  his  province  to  keep  track  of  the  capacity  and  pro- 
duction of  contractors.  Mr.  Stettinius  will  also  watch  closely  the 
transportation  and  shipping  situation  in  order  that  the  production  and 
deliveries  of  war  materials  may  properly  proceed.  In  other  words, 
Mr.  Stettinius,  a  business  man  and  purchasing  agent  of  vast  experi- 
ence, may  figuratively  be  called  "the  surveying  eye  of  the  Director 
of  Purchases  and  Supplies." 

Mr.  Baker  very  well  understood  that  the  duties  which 
were  to  devolve  upon  Mr.  Stettinus  were  simply  advisory,  he 


Secretary  Baker  and  Mr.  Creel  in  War         113 

having  no  authority  to  compel  execution.  But  he  hoped 
it  would  serve  its  purpose  of  quieting  the  disturbed  public. 

When  Mr.  Gutzon  Borglum  undertook  to  uncover  the 
facts  in  the  airplane  scandal,  in  the  winter  of  1917-18,  the 
War  Department  connived  at  an  attempt  to  blackmail  him 
into  silence.  The  files  of  the  department  were  searched, 
and  an  unsubstantiated  series  of  allegations  charging  Mr. 
Borglum  with  attempting,  to  sell  his  influence  with  the 
President  were  handed  to  one  of  the  Administration's 
trusted  press  agents.  They  were  printed  far  and  wide. 
The  evidence  appeared  to  be  damning.  But  Mr.  Borglum 
scorned  it  all  and  insisted  on  telling  the  truth.  Time  has 
vindicated  his  character  and  proved  his  charges. 

Who  were  the  men  powerful  enough  to  use  the  War 
Department  in  an  attempt  to  blackmail  Mr.  Borglum  into 
silence?  Every  man  whom  the  Senate  committee  found  re- 
sponsible for  the  failure  was  appointed  by  Mr.  Baker. 

One  of  the  most  marked  characteristics  of  the  Admin- 
istration during  the  war  was  deliberate  evasion  of  responsi- 
bility, failure  to  measure  up  to  the  demands  of  the  occasion. 
This  was  particularly  pronounced  in  the  head  of  the  War 
Department.  It  was  on  the  fifth  day  of  December,  1917, 
that  he  said : 

From  the  moment  the  "Lusitania"  was  sent  to  a  watery  grave  by 
the  hand  of  the  assassin,  the  United  States  had  only  two  choices. 
The  United  States  could  have  crawled  on  its  knees  to  the  Hohen- 
zollerns,  crying  out  that  their  frightfulness  and  military  efficiency 
were  too  great,  that  we  submit  and  become  their  vassals,  or  as  an 
alternative  we  could  fight.  We  chose  to  fight. 

The  "Lusitania"  was  sunk  May  5,  1915.  Two  months 
later  the  field  secretary  of  the  National  Security  League  re- 
ported that  Mr.  Baker,  then  Mayor  of  Cleveland,  "refused 
absolutely  to  co-operate  with  the  League  because  he  said 
he  was  a  pacifist  and  opposed  to  the  agitation  for  pre- 
paredness," and  then  declared  that  "of  all  the  mayors  1 


114    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

interviewed  Mr.  Baker  was  the  most  pronounced  opponent 
of  preparedness."  At  that  time,  therefore,  and  with  full 
understanding  he  preferred  that  his  country  ^hould  crawl 
on  its  knees  to  the  Hohenzollerns  rather  than  fight  them. 
He  also  turned  aside  the  idea  that  his  nation  should  be 
equipped  for  acceptance  of  what  he  knew  to  be  the  only 
alternative  open  to  a  self-respecting  people.  He  declared 
on  December  28,  1917,  in  his  New  York  address  that  "this 
nation  has  shown  that  in  time  of  war  a  peace-loving,  prog- 
ress-making people,  when  the  time  came  had  but  to  watch 
the  magnet  of  the  spirit  to  defend  itself."  But  the  idle 
dream  and  more  idle  talk  were  immediately  dispelled  by 
the  rude  shock  of  the  Senate's  investigation.  "A  gentle 
egotist  commissioned  as  the  vice-regent  of  Mars.  Pacifism 
twirling  its  thumbs  while  hellish  Mars  was  wrecking  the 
universe.  Murder,  rapine,  and  sudden  death,  horror  piled 
upon  horror,  the  world  feverishly  burnishing  its  armour 
while  a  lamb-like  little  gentleman,  serene  in  his  security 
in  the  triumph  of  morality  sat  like  a  monk  in  his  cell,  un- 
vexed  by  gross  passions  rubricating  the  golden  rule!"  3 

As  if  the  fatuous  policy  of  unpreparedness  when  the 
war  burst  upon  the  land  had  not  been  sufficiently  impressed 
upon  the  nation,  Secretary  Baker  appeared  to  be  always 
looking  for  a  way  of  escape  from  the  consequences  of  his 
policy  of  delay  and  evasion.  He  always  found  a  story  to  ac- 
count for  the  responsibility  of  delay  and  shifting.  When  his 
department  was  receiving  a  gruelling  in  the  beginning  of 
1918  for  the  results  of  its  delay,  evasion,  and  incompetence, 
he  told  the  country  it  was  idle  to  draw  men  from  industrial 
pursuits  for  training  in  France  when  there  were  no  ships  to 
carry  them,  and  urged  the  absurdly  inadequate  restriction 
of  ages  from  21  to  26  years  for  army  service.  Six  months 
later,  on  July  4,  he  stated,  when  the  country  insisted  upon 
the  most  ample  army  possible  to  crush  civilization's  enemy, 
that  he  desired  uto  learn  the  effect  upon  vital  industries." 

9  North  American  Review,  March,  1918, 


Secretary  Baker  and  Mr.  Creel  in  War         115 

Eight  days  later  he  appeared  at  the  capitol  and  stated  that 
he  was  opposed  to  any  change  in  the  draft  ages,  without  re- 
vealing to  the  astonished  Senate  the  cause  for  this  complete 
change  of  front.  And  then  he  regaled  the  country  with  a 
statement  that  shows  the  turnings  and  twistings  of  a  mind 
that  seemed  to  warrant  the  conclusion  that  it  was  incapable 
of  straight-forward  utterance,  declaring  that  the  War  De- 
partment was  "constantly  anxious  to  expand  its  military 
program"  and  was  "now  very  actively  considering  an  in- 
crease, if  that  increase  is  possible" ;  and  that  after  the  sen- 
ators would  return  from  their  recess  in  September  he  might 
recommend  further  appropriations  for  men  and  measures. 
At  the  very  time  he  was  making  the  lack-of-ships  argument, 
Chairman  Hurley  was  promising  ships  to  the  limit,  what- 
ever might  be  the  number  of  men  to  be  transported. 
Mr.  Baker  continued: 

The  War  Department  has  from  the  beginning  been  expanding 
its  military  program.  We  are  many  months  ahead  of  what  was  our 
original  hope  in  regard  to  the  transportation  of  men.  We  are  con- 
stantly seeking  ways  to  expand  that,  and  we  are  in  the  midst  of  a 
plan  now  to  expand  it  again.  Should  we  so  expand  the  program  it 
may  turn  out  that  we  will  need  an  increased  number  of  men  and 
it  may  turn  out  that  the  best  we  can  do  won't  require  it.  When  we 
have  determined  what  is  best  we  will  then  ask  congress  to  provide 
additional  money  and  men.  For  the  present  there  is  no  such 
necessity. 

As  put  by  George  Harvey  in  his  War  Weekly : 

This  was  the  same  old  song!  The  war  may  be  over!  Schwab 
may  not  produce  the  ships!  We  may  all  be  dead!  Anything,  any- 
thing for  an  excuse  for  doing  nothing. 

Senator  Wadsworth  depicted  the  situation  succinctly  in 
these  words : 

Can  we  not  get  out  of  that  habit  of  mind  which  leads  us  to  en- 
deavor to  meet  emergencies  after  they  overtake  us,  in  this  country  and 
in  the  management  of  this  war  at  large,  not  only  by  ourselves  but  by 


n6     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

our  Allies?  Can  we  not  anticipate  emergencies  before  they  over- 
take us?  ...  It  passes  my  understanding  how  those  responsible  for 
the  conduct  of  the  military  preparations  of  this  great  republic  can 
solemnly  advise  us  at  this  day  that  for  the  time  being  nothing  more 
is  desired. 

One  of  the  glaring  outrages  of  Secretary  Baker  was  his 
attempt  to  throttle  the  press  that  was  not  willing  to  do  his 
bidding.  This  was  exemplified  in  his  treatment  of  the 
newspapers  which,  without  any  notice  from  him  or  his  de- 
partment not  to  do  so,  printed  the  official  report  of  the  com- 
mittee of  the  United  States  Senate  on  the  airplane  failure, 
the  first  summary  of  which  was  given  out  by  the  committee 
for  the  evening  papers  of  August  22,  1918.  After  the  re- 
port had  been  given  to  the  news  agencies  of  the  country,  had 
been  printed  in  the  Congressional  Record,  and  was  given 
full  liberty  of  the  press  anywhere  in  the  world,  Mr.  Baker 
forbade  copies  of  the  American  newspapers  carrying  the 
report  to  leave  the  country.  But  the  papers  were  already 
in  the  mails,  and  on  the  way  to  the  soldiers  in  Europe,  hun- 
dreds of  thousands  of  whom  had  paid  their  subscriptions 
thereto,  with  postage  prepaid. 

When  the  second  installment  of  the  committee's  report 
was  ready  two  days  later,  Mr.  Baker  sent  a  confidential 
warning  against  using  it  for  overseas  circulation;  and  im- 
mediately thereafter  a  second  confidential  communication 
to  the  effect  that  it  did  not  make  so  much  difference  whether 
the  part  of  the  report  dealing  with  the  aircraft  failure  went 
abroad,  provided  the  newspapers  would  see  to  it  that  the 
overseas  editions  contain  no  hint  of  the  disclosures  made 
in  the  report  of  the  committee  of  the  program  which  Mr. 
Baker  was  preparing  for  the  following  year.  In  fact,  this 
time  it  was  practically  the  "official  denial"  in  advance.4 

4  The  three  great  agencies  carried  as  their  introduction  to  this  portion 
of  the  report  on  the  appalling  failure,  this  paragraph:  "America's  aircraft 
program  for  the  great  army  that  is  counted  on  to  win  the  war  next  year 
allows  for  350  complete  squadrons  of  planes,  and  the  main  part  of  the 
program  already  is  ahead  of  the  schedule,  with  3,000  trained  pilots." 


Secretary  Baker  and  Mr.  Creel  in  War         117 

There  could  be  no  pretense  that  it  was  necessary  to 
the  military  success  of  the  United  States  to  keep  the  Sen- 
ate report  out  of  the  American  newspapers.  It  was  an 
official  document  and  was  already  sent  abroad  and  in  the 
hands  of  the  Allies,  neutrals  and  enemy  alike,  a  fact  which 
Mr.  Baker's  censorship  already  knew.  He  appeared  to 
believe  that  by  harassing  the  newspapers  of  the  United 
States  he  could  intimidate  the  press  into  suppressing  vital 
facts  and  make  of  it  a  reptile  press.  But  it  was  regrettable 
that  the  same  censorship  did  not  see  its  way  clear  to  pre- 
vent Mr.  Creel's  pure  fabrications,  to  which  the  Senate's  re- 
port was  giving  the  lie.  Said  the  eminent  writer,  George 
Harvey :  "Surely  truth  should  not  be  handicapped  and  ham- 
strung in  her  effort  to  overtake  falsehood." 

Each  time  an  investigation  to  determine  the  progress 
of  the  war  program  was  proposed,  Secretary  Baker  blocked 
it.  And  as  the  startling  truths  leaked  out  he,  in  keeping 
with  his  habitual  practice  of  misleading  the  public,  made  use 
of  the  official  denial,  knowing  that  the  public  would  prefer 
the  denial  that  anything  was  wrong  to  believing  the  almost 
unbelievable  facts  concerning  War  Department  shortcom- 
ings. The  investigators  went  off  the  stage  branded  by  his 
Department  officials  as  friends  of  Germany  bent  upon  giv- 
ing "information  of  value  to  the  enemy."  President  Wil- 
son sustained  this  attitude  when  he  undertook  to  brand  Sen- 
ator Chamberlain,  who  first  fully  opened  to  the  public  the 
deplorable  situation  in  January,  1918. 

One  of  the  phases  of  Secretary  Baker's  war  activities 
was  his  effort  to  save  the  slacker  who  became  known  as  the 
"conscientious  objector."  Treated  more  fully  elsewhere,5 
this  matter  cannot  properly  be  wholly  passed  over  in  con- 
nection with  its  chief  exponent  in  high  circles  of  the  Ad- 
ministration. 

That  there  were  organized  efforts  to  encourage  draft- 
dodgers  in  refusal  to  obey  military  orders  when  inducted 

"Chapter  on  "Disloyalty." 


n8     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

into  camps  was  but  common  knowledge  to  Secretary  Baker. 
Conspicuous  among  these  efforts  was  the  National  Civil 
Liberties  Bureau  of  New  York,  which  issued,  two  months 
prior  to  Secretary  Baker's  "Confidential"  Order,  a  confi- 
dential pamphlet  which  stated : 

We  see  no  reason  to  change  our  policy  of  handling  this  matter 
quietly,  without  any  publicity.  Secretary  Baker  has  been  and  is 
giving  the  whole  subject  personal  attention,  and  nothing  would  be 
gained  by  our  going  into  the  press  where  hostile  news  notices  and 
damning  editorials  are  certain.  We  have  far  more  to  gain,  both 
for  the  men  themselves  and  for  the  cause  itself,  through  Secretary 
Baker  than  through  the  newspapers. 

While  there  are  those  who  are  conscientiously  opposed  to 
war,  such  as  the  Quakers,  they  have  been  conscientious 
through  the  centuries,  and  did  not  become  so  over  night 
as  a  war  threatening  the  nation's  integrity  approached. 

But  these  "conscientious  objectors"  who  feared  public 
opinion  and  counted  on  Secretary  Baker's  support,  were  far 
from  the  Quaker  type.  And  if  they  did  not  know  of  his 
"confidential  order"  two  months  before  it  was  issued,  they 
could  not  have  better  written  their  own  confidential  pam- 
phlet if  they  had  known  it.  The  records  are  crowded  with 
instances  of  Secretary  Baker's  expressions  of  warm  sym- 
pathy with  the  scoundrels  ready  to  stab  the  nation  in  its 
day  of  distress.6 

At  the  end  of  his  first  year's  work,  Mr.  Creel  asked 
Congress  for  $2,000,000  with  which  to  carry  forward  his 
scheme  for  the  ensuing  year.  He  was  granted  $125,000 
by  the  House  measure,  only  because  the  President  had  de- 
clared the  work  of  the  Committee  on  Public  Information  as 
a  means  of  winning  the  war.  Said  one  keenly  analytical 
editorial  comment,  solid  to  the  core  in  its  Americanism : 

eA  valuable  contribution  to  the  literature  of  this  subject  is  found  in 
Basil  M.  Stevens'  "With  Kindly  Consideration"  in  The  North  American 
Review  for  January,  1920,  p.  57. 


Secretary  Baker  and  Mr.  Creel  in  War         119 

The  real  purpose  of  the  propaganda  in  which  Creel  is  the  most 
active  figure  is  to  overlay  the  facts  of  history  with  studied  inventions, 
in  order  to  build  up  the  reputation  and  influence  of  President  Wilson 
and  his  Administration.  The  official  utterances  that  are  being  sent 
throughout  the  world  are  calculated  to  make  it  appear  that  from  the 
beginning  Mr.  Wilson  was  for  war,  but  could  not  act  because  the 
American  people  had  not  reached  his  heights  of  discernment  and 
moral  inspiration. 

False  in  substance  and  implication,  this  propaganda  under  the 
present  circumstances  is  an  especially  atrocious  thing.  For  Wash- 
ington authority  behind  it  causes  it  to  find  reflection  in  the  press  of 
the  Allied  countries,  which  pays  glowing  tribute  to  President  Wilson 
for  having  overcome  the  reluctance  and  stimulated  the  patriotism  of 
his  countrymen,  so  that  they  were  at  last  aroused  to  defend  them- 
selves and  civilization. 

It  is  discreditable  enough  that  public  funds  should  be  employed  to 
serve  partisan  political  interests.  But  it  is  shameful  that  this  means 
should  be  employed  to  pervert  history  for  the  benefit  of  a  blundering 
statesmanship  by  traducing  a  loyal  people;  and  it  is  indecent  that 
because  of  this  campaign  American  troops  on  the  way  to  the  battle- 
field should  meet  the  suggestion  abroad  that  they  represent  a  nation 
of  slackers  regenerated  by  President  Wilson's  leadership.7 

The  cost  to  the  country,  it  developed  when  the  official  report 
came  before  Congress  almost  a  year  after  the  armistice  was 
signed,  of  the  operation  of  the  Committee  on  Public  Infor- 
mation was  about  $6,600,000. 

Like  so  many  other  matters  touching  the  relations  of  the 
Administration  to  the  Great  War,  the  appointment  of 
George  Creel  as  chairman  of  this  committee  of  vast  im- 
portance during  war  has  always  been  a  deep  mystery 
to  the  American  people,  unless  they  regard  it  as  an  ex- 
pression of  Wilsonism;  then  it  becomes  plain.  He  was  a 
"liberal,"  and  with  that  class  President  Wilson  seemed 
desirous  of  aligning  himself,  though  it  developed  that  they 
were  the  dangerous  element  of  the  country,  and  very  far 

T  Philadelphia  North  American,  August  28,  1918. 


I2O    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

from  liberal.  Mr.  Creel's  views  on  public  questions,  and 
particularly  upon  constitutional  government,  if  known  to  the 
Administration  when  appointed  to  his  responsible  position, 
were  damning  to  the  Administration  itself. 

His  attitude  to  German  propaganda  was  not  less  dan- 
gerous.    He  wrote   the   introduction  to  the  book  "Two 
Thousand  Questions  and  Answers  About  the  War,"  de- 
claring that  in  his  view  it  "constitutes  a  vital  part  of  the 
national   defense, "   a   book  which  the   National   Security 
League,  a  patriotic  organization,  pronounced  "a  master- 
piece of  Hun  propaganda,"  declaring  that  the  German  gov- 
ernment itself  "could  not  have  devised  anything  more  in- 
siduous,  more  calculated  to  destroy  our  faith  in  our  Allies 
and  to  insinuate  into  the  American  mind  excuses  for  Ger- 
many."    And  an  indorsement,  such  as  Creel's,  gave  the 
work  almost  an  official  character,  making  it  particularly 
dangerous.     His  known  sympathies  with  syndicalism  and 
various  radical  programs,  even  before  the  war,  created  such 
an  incongruity  in  his  appointment  to  become  the  chief  of 
American  propaganda  for  democracy  as  to  become  ludi- 
crous, except  for  the  seriousness  of  it.     He  used  his  official 
position  to  give  wide  publicity  to  writings  whose  tendency 
was  to  weaken  the  national  cause.    That  politics  was  at  the 
bottom  of  the  whole  of  it  is  hardly  questioned.    His  resort 
to  distortion  of  the  truth  and  the   fabrication  of  official 
"news"  brought  from  Senator  Reed,  after  citing  typical 
Creelisms,  the  title  of  "licensed  liar,"  so  named  after  his 
aircraft  inventions.8 

When,  at  Christmas  time,  1918,  Mr.  Creel  announced 
at  Paris  that  he  had  severed  his  relations  with  the  United 
States  government,  as  the  news  reached  America  it  came 
as  a  refreshing  breath  of  pure  air  after  a  night  of  dense- 
ness,  with*  the  prospect  of  his  complete  extinguishment  as 

8  A    crushing    editorial    expose    of    his    mendacity    is    contained    in    the 
Philadelphia  North  American  for  September  25,  1918. 


Secretary  Baker  and  Mr.  Creel  in  War         121 

a  public  character  and  official.    There  was  a  sense  of  relief 
from  a  heavy  burden  in  the  land. 

All  the  distortions  of  fact,  the  wrenching  of  truth  to  con- 
ceal blunders  piled  upon  blunders  mountain  high,  the  cov- 
ering up  of  the  need  of  a  man  with  a  plan  at  the  head  of 
the  War  Department — these  were  ample  to  warrant  the 
contortions  of  Mr.  Creel  and  Secretary  Baker  when  they 
lacked  the  courage  to  permit  the  public  to  know  the  facts. 
The  situation  was  appalling  and  almost  beyond  human 
conception. 

The  nation  richest  in  material  resources  and  in  genius 
for  accomplishment,  as  well  as  having  had  amplest  time  for 
thorough  preparation,  when  the  great  German  drive  began, 
on  March  21,  1918,  had  been  at  war  almost  a  year,  with  a 
stubborn  warning  of  a  full  year-and-half  before  that  we  were 
practically  certain  to  enter  the  war  before  its  conclusion;  and 
when  the  Allies  had  been  worn  down  by  the  continuous 
pounding  the  greatest  war  machine  the  world  had  ever  seen 
could  administer  to  them  on  Belgian  and  French  soil,  we 
had  two  regiments  engaged  somewhere  in  the  line — two 
regiments  of  American  soldiers  and  there  were  a  million 
men  on  each  side.  It  was  just  two  regiments  from  a  nation 
of  100,000,000  people,  too,  "making  the  world  safe  for 
Democracy,"  against  the  mightiest  and  most  ruthless  war 
machine  of  recorded  history, — and  they  were  railroad  en- 
gineers. 

Secretary  Baker's  department  produced  the  two  out- 
standing scandals  of  the  whole  war,  hardly  exceeded  in 
magnitude  by  those  due  to  the  corruption  and  incapacity  of 
Russian  bureaucracy  under  czarism.  The  one  billion  dol- 
lars devoted  to  aviation  did  not  place  the  first  squadron  of 
American  fighting  machines  at  the  front  until  sixteen  months 
after  the  declaration  of  war,  and  the  program  as  a  whole 
was  a  disastrous  failure.  With  billions  appropriated  for 
ordnance,  the  department  did  not  place  at  the  front,  in 


122     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

time  to  be  used,  a  single  American  gun  of  6-inch  caliber  or 
over,  nor  a  single  high-explosive  shell  larger  than  the  3-inch. 

The  ordnance  collapse  in  the  midst  of  the  greatest  ex- 
actions of  the  fiercest  battling  on  the  front  in  Europe  was 
astounding.  But  those  on  the  inner  side  were  particularly 
careful  to  keep  the  facts  from  public  view,  some  of  which 
will  be  read  with  amazement  by  future  generations :  Total 
appropriations  to  September  24,  1918,  for  facilities  and 
munitions  were  $4,837,044,550,  of  which  slightly  over 
$600,000,000  went  for  facilities,  leaving  a  good  margin 
over  $4,000,000,000  for  artillery  munitions  alone. 

What  the  American  army  in  France  was  urgently  de- 
manding and  not  getting  were  8-inch  guns  and  9.2-inch 
guns  with  which  to  blast  the  enemy  out  of  his  position.  The 
appalling  facts  were  that  from  the  time  the  independent 
American  army  began  its  drive  toward  the  strong  German 
front  up  to  the  end  of  the  war,  there  was  not  received  in 
France  from  the  United  States  one  shell,  either  shrapnel 
or  high  explosive,  for  a  4.7-inch,  a  5-inch,  a  6-inch,  an 
8-inch,  a  9.2-inch,  or  a  lo-inch  gun.  Not  a  finished  gun, 
with  a  complete  round  of  ammunition,  of  a  caliber  above 
6  inch,  was  ever  shipped  from  the  United  States  to  the 
army  in  France  up  to  the  time  of  the  signing  of  the  armi- 
stice. 

Complete  and  utter  failure  to  deliver  American  artillery 
and  shells  to  the  fighting  front  marked  the  floundering  of 
the  ordnance  bureau;  and  as  late  as  the  month  when  the 
armistice  was  signed,  General  Pershing,  after  repeatedly 
calling  for  proper  material,  virtually  demanded  the  reor- 
ganization of  that  bureau. 

When  the  cabled  demands  of  the  American  comman- 
ders became  insistent,  the  War  Department  replied  that  our 
rate  of  fire  was  too  high — they  were  sending  too  many 
shells  at  the  Germans.  The  fact  is  our  ordnance  bureau 
did  not  supply  the  American  troops  in  France  with  ammu- 
nition adequate  in  size  or  in  quantity;  and  that  its  troops 


Secretary  Baker  and  Mr.  Creel  in  War         123 

had  to  win  their  battles  by  sheer  courage,  and  the  expendi- 
ture of  blood  and  by  means  of  supplies  they  obtained  from 
the  French. 

At  a  time  when  the  First  American  Army  was  engaged 
in  its  greatest  effort,  ammunition  was  supplied  only  by  the 
most  strenuous  efforts.  It  had  no  reserve  supply,  and  it  was 
officially  reported  that  troops  could  not  be  sent  forward  be- 
cause of  the  shortage  of  guns  and  ammunition.  The  definite 
statement  was  given  out  in  September  that  155-mm.  guns 
(6-inch)  were  shipped  to  France;  and  as  late  as  October  16, 
1918,  word  came  from  the  supply  bases  in  France  that 
no  such  guns  were  received,  nor  the  ammunition  to  fit 
them. 

Two  months  after  we  entered  the  war,  Mr.  Baker 
issued  an  official  bulletin  in  which  he  admitted  the  "diffi- 
culty, disorder,  and  confusion  in  getting  things  started, 
but,"  he  said,  "it  is  a  happy  confusion.  I  delight  in  the 
fact  that  when  we  entered  this  war  we  were  not,  like  our 
adversary,  ready  for  it,  anxious  for  it,  prepared  for  it,  and 
inviting  it.  Accustomed  to  peace,  we  were  not  ready.77 

In  the  following  October  he  announced  with  undis- 
guised self-satisfaction:  "We  are  well  on  the  way  to  the 
battle-field."  This  was  too  much  for  Roosevelt,  who  wrote : 
"For  comparison  with  this  kind  of  military  activity  we  must 
go  back  to  the  days  of  Tiglath-Pileser,  Nebuchadnezzar 
and  Pharaoh.  The  United  States  should  adopt  the  stand- 
ard of  speed  in  war  which  belongs  to  the  twentieth  century 
A.D. ;  we  should  not  be  content  with,  and  still  less  boast 
about,  standards  which  were  obsolete  in  the  seventeenth 
century  B.C."  9 

On  December  31,  1917,  General  Crozier,  head  of  the 
Ordnance  Department,  testified  before  the  Senate  committee 
on  military  affairs  that  in  the  first  seven  months  in  the  war 
contracts  for  $1,500,000,000  had  been  let.  "All  the  huge 
machinery  of  the  War  Department  has  been  going  at  top 

9  North  American  Review,  November,   1919. 


124    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

speed  for  months.  The  work  accomplished  is  something  of 
which  the  people  may  be  proud,"  he  declared. 

On  January  10,  1918,  Secretary  Baker  told  the  commit- 
tee of  contracts  totaling  $1,677,000,000  out  of  an  appro- 
priation of  almost  twice  that  amount.  On  the  next  day 
under  cross-examination  he  stated:  "Our  initial  needs  have 
been  met,  every  man  in  France  has  full  equipment."  On 
January  18,  Senator  Chamberlain,  chairman  of  the  commit- 
tee, declared  in  a  public  address:  "The  military  establish- 
ment of  America  has  fallen  down."  On  January  21,  Presi- 
dent Wilson  characterized  this  as  an  astonishing  and  abso- 
lutely unjustifiable  distortion  of  the  truth,"  and  declared: 
"The  War  Department  has  performed  a  task  of  unparal- 
leled magnitude  and  difficulty  with  extraordinary  promptness 
and  efficiency.  .  .  .  My  association  and  constant  confer- 
ence with  the  Secretary  of  War  have  taught  me  to  regard 
him  as  one  of  the  ablest  public  officers  I  have  ever  known." 

January  24.  Senator  Chamberlain,  replying  on  the  floor 
of  the  Senate,  said:  "America  today  is  unprepared  so  far 
as  ordnance  is  concerned.  France  is  furnishing  our  troops 
with  heavy  ordnance  and  machine  guns.  If  we  relied  upon 
the  Ordnance  Department  to  supply  our  troops  with  heavy 
ordnance,  the  war  would  be  over  before  the  guns  got  to 
the  front." 

January  28.  Secretary  Baker  testified  before  the  com- 
mittee: "The  American  army  in  France,  now  and  to  be 
there  is  provided  (by  the  Allies)  with  artillery  of  the  types 
they  want  as  rapidly  as  they  could  use  it.  Our  own  manu- 
facture is  in  process.  Deliveries  of  some  pieces  are  al- 
ready begun,  with  a  rising  and  steadily  increasing  stream  of 
American  production." 

March  26.  (Five  days  after  the  opening  of  the  Ger- 
man offensive)  Senator  Lodge  declared:  "We  have  no 
guns  in  France  except  a  few  old  coast  guns  for  which  the 
French  are  making  cartridges." 

May  8.     Following  a  minute  investigation,  the  Senate 


Secretary  Baker  and  Mr.  Creel  in  War         125 

committee  declared:  "The  condition  respecting  ordnance  is 
comparable  only  to  the  failure  of  the  aircraft  program." 
Members  said  that  production  of  6-inch,  8-inch,  and  9.2- 
inch  Howitzers,  the  three  vital  pieces  of  heavy  artillery,  was 
"pitifully  small."  Of  the  largest,  they  said,  not  one  would 
be  delivered  in  France  this  year  and  of  the  6thers  the  de- 
liveries would  be  "negligible." 

May  II.  Said  an  official  statement  from  the  Ordnance 
office :  "The  Ordnance  Department  has  thus  far  met  every 
demand  imposed  by  the  new  program  for  over-seas  ship- 
ment of  American  troops.  Tonnage  is  a  limiting  factor  in 
the  shipment  of  ordnance.  Sufficient  supplies  of  artillery 
— French  75-mm.  and  155-mm.  and  American  heavy  rail- 
way artillery — are  already  in  France  to  meet  the  present 
demand." 

May  17.  After  visiting  many  ordnance  plants,  the 
Senate  committee  reported:  "The  first  8-inch  Howitzers 
were  delivered  this  week,  and  the  9.2-inch  Howitzers  are 
in  an  advanced  state  of  manufacture.  But  during  the  present 
year  we  shall  be  compelled  to  depend  very  largely,  as  here- 
tofore, on  France  for  our  small  field  guns  and  to  some  ex- 
tent on  Great  Britain  for  our  large  field  guns." 

June  28.  Secretary  Baker  wrote  to  the  House  Military 
Affairs  Committee :  "The  artillery  program  is  now  ap- 
proaching a  point  where  quantity  production  is  beginning." 

July  2.  A  New  York  World  dispatch  from  Washing- 
ton states:  "The  American-built  155-mm.  Howitzers  are 
moving  to  France.  One  American  firm  is  turning  out  How- 
itzers at  the  rate  of  ten  a  day.  These  are  of  an  approxi- 
mately 6-inch  bore,  and  are  the  heavy  barrage  guns  which 
support  infantry  advances  into  intrenched  positions." 

At  various  times,  also,  the  committee  on  public  informa- 
tion issued  bulletins  and  photographs  respecting  the  ship- 
ment of  American  guns. 

On  November  20,  1918,  General  Pershing,  making  an 
official  report,  said: 


126    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

Among  our  most  important  deficiencies  in  material  were  artillery, 
aviation  and  tanks.  We  accepted  the  offer  of  the  French  government 
to  provide  us  with  the  necessary  artillery  equipment  of  3-inch  and 
6-inch  guns  for  thirty  divisions.  There  were  no  guns  of  the  calibers 
mentioned  manufactured  in  America,  on  our  front  at  the  date  the 
armistice  was  signed.  The  only  guns  of  these  types  produced  at  home 
thus  far  received  in  France  are  109  75-mm.  (3-inch)  guns.  In  avia- 
tion, we  were  in  the  same  situation.  We  obtained  from  the  French 
the  necessary  planes  for  training  our  personnel,  and  they  have  pro- 
vided us  with  a  total  of  2,676  pursuit,  observation  and  bombing 
planes.  As  to  tanks  we  were  also  compelled  to  rely  upon  the  French. 
Here,  however,  we  were  less  fortunate,  for  the  reason  that  the 
French  production  could  barely  meet  the  requirements  of  their  own 
armies.10 

After  the  severe  drubbing  given  the  War  Department 
in  the  early  part  of  1918,  not  only  by  the  Senate  Commit- 
tee on  Military  Affairs,  but  from  all  unbiased  sources  and 
from  all  sections  of  the  country,  there  was  a  spirit  of  work 
and  co-operation  developed  that  produced  marvelous  re- 
sults in  some  directions  though  not  in  all.  One  of  the  bu- 
reaus most  severely  criticized  was  that  of  ordnance.  It  took 
a  new  stride,  the  entire  Administration  having  felt  bitterly 
the  attack  that  was  being  made  upon  it  from  all  sides — and 
knowing  the  criticisms  were  well  based.  It  resulted  in  a 
marked  showing  of  improvement  soon  after  the  year  was 
half  over.  In  mid-summer,  1918,  a  report  was  authorized 
by  the  War  Department  showing  that  upwards  of  two  bil- 
lion cartridges  had  been  put  out  by  that  time,  the  average 
daily  approximating  fifteen  million  which,  however,  would 
be  only  fifteen  for  each  man  of  an  army  of  one  million  for 
all  kinds  of  arms:  rifles,  pistols,  machine-guns.  And  the 
total  number  of  rifles  made  was  then  1,886,769,  about  one 
for  each  man  in  the  service,  but  none  to  replace  the  fearful 
destruction  of  modern  battles,  as  compared  with  the  almost 
nothing  of  five  or  six  months  earlier.  This  improvement, 

10  Confirming  this  deficiency  is  Andre  Tardieu's  "Truth  about  the  Treaty," 
p.  35,  Bobbs-Merrill  Company,  Indianapolis,  1921. 


Secretary  Baker  and  Mr.  Creel  in  War         127 

however,  but  strongly  brought  into  relief  the  fearful  short- 
comings of  the  entire  previous  period  of  the  year  and  a 
quarter  that  the  nation  had  been  in  the  war. 

Not  only  was  the  American  soldier  now  armed  with  a 
weapon  superior  in  range  and  adaptability,  but  capable  of 
from  30  to  50  per  cent  greater  quickness  in  action.  That 
is  to  say,  two  men  could  fire  approximately  as  many  bullets 
in  a  given  space  of  time  as  three  men  using  inferior  rifles. 

In  the  summer  of  1918  there  was  established  an  Ameri- 
can assembling  plant  for  tanks  in  France,  and  contracts  were 
let  to  English,  French  and  Americans  for  about  500  tanks 
each.  When,  in  a  short  time,  the  thousand  tanks  con- 
tracted for  in  France  and  Great  Britain  had  been  delivered 
and  assembled,  the  parts  of  not  one  complete  American 
tank  had  arrived.  The  War  Department  program  provided 
for  the  contract  for  4,400  tanks  in  this  country.  On  Sep- 
tember i,  just  eight  tanks  had  been  completed.  There  was 
prospect,  it  was  officially  stated  to  members  of  the  Senate 
Military  Affairs  Committee,  that  the  total  of  40  tanks 
would  be  delivered  during  that  month.  Months  previously 
a  tank  training-camp  was  established  in  Gettysburg,  Penn- 
sylvania. On  September  i,  not  one  tank  had  been  deliv- 
ered at  the  camp,  and  the  men  who  had  enlisted  for  and 
been  assigned  to  tank  service  were  being  trained  with  blue 
prints,  paper  representations  of  the  machines  they  were 
supposed  to  master. 

The  United  States  was  capable  of  turning  out  more 
tanks  in  a  given  time  than  England  and  France  combined. 
When  members  of  Congress  asked  Secretary  Baker  about 
the  collapse  of  the  tank  program,  his  reply  was  that  it  was 
"military  information  not  proper  to  disclose." 

At  first  an  attempt  was  made  by  the  War  Department 
to  deny  that  no  American-made  gas  in  an  American  shell 
was  ever  fired  by  the  American  forces  overseas.  A  little 
later,  however,  General  William  L.  Sibert  admitted  the  fail- 
ure of  the  War  Department  in  this  respect  General 


izS    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

Sibert,  who  took  charge  of  the  chemical  warfare  service  in 
the  summer  of  1918,  when  it  was  in  a  deplorable  state,  made 
it  efficient  by  the  time  the  war  ended. 

Some  of  the  ardent  friends  of  the  Administration,  par- 
ticularly apologists  for  Secretary  Baker,  doubted  that  he 
ever  made  the  statement  that  the  war  was  3,000  miles  away, 
when  seeking  to  excuse  the  dilatoriness  of  his  department. 
On  page  1615,  of  Part  III,  of  Senate  public  documents,  in 
a  hearing  before  the  committee  on  military  affairs,  are  these 
words : 

SECRETARY  BAKER:  The  War  was  not  on  us  in  the  the  sense 
that  the  enemy  was  at  our  doors.  He  was  3,000  miles  away. 

And  on  the  next  page  was  this: 

SECRETARY  BAKER:  I  ask  permission  to  call  your  attention  to  the 
fact  that  the  battle  front  was  3,000  miles  away. 

SENATOR  WEEKS:  I  want  to  say  that,  to  my  mind,  it  does  not 
make  any  difference  practically  whether  it  was  10,000  miles  away 
or  one  mile  away.  Our  obligation  was  the  same. 

When  the  criticism  of  the  War  Department  was  at  its 
height,  following  the  celebrated  speech  of  Senator  Cham- 
berlain in  New  York,  in  January,  1918,  Secretary  Baker 
started  in  upon  the  theory  that  his  patchwork  reorganiza- 
tion of  his  department  would  placate  public  opinion.  Per- 
haps the  best  single  example  of  the  way  his  plan  was  work- 
ing out  is  shown  by  his  method  of  letting  contracts,  at  that 
time  five  different  branches  of  the  W,ar  Department  bidding 
against  each  other  for  leather,  this  sending  the  price  rap- 
idly upwards  and  the  government  buying  at  the  top  price. 

In  September,  1918,  there  were  millions  of  fully-loaded 
shells  on  this  side  of  the  water  waiting  to  be  shipped  to  the 
front.  Most  of  them  lacked  some  essential  part.  Others, 
which  had  been  manufactured  for  Russia,  were  in  perfect 
condition,  but  the  ownership  of  them  was  in  question. 
Orders  for  twenty  million  small  caliber  shells  had  been 


Secretary  Baker  and  Mr.  Creel  in  War         129 

placed  in  Canada,  and  they  were  not  delivered;  for  the  Can- 
adian manufacturers  seemed  to  be  in  doubt  as  to  whether 
they  were  to  manufacture  the  shells  complete  or  simply 
build  them  in  parts  and  ship  them  to  the  United  States  to 
be  finished.  Also  a  firm  in  Indiana  had  a  contract  for 
some  ten  million  parts.  It  was  expected  that  it  would  be 
producing  about  20,000  of  these  parts  each  day  beginning 
months  before  the  armistice  was  signed.  But  after  some 
thousand  of  them  had  been  finished,  it  was  discovered  that 
they  were  made  wrong,  they  were  worthless.  Delay  fol- 
lowed delay,  there  must  be  correction  of  fault  after  fault, 
while  precious  days  and  weeks  and  months  were  lost  in  the 
crucial  days  of  1918,  and  finally  production  was  begun  again 
just  as  the  conflict  closed.  The  entire  trouble  from  begin- 
ning to  end  of  the  war,  so  far  as  the  Administration  was 
concerned,  was  an  entire  failure  to  co-ordinate. 

Said  a  member  of  the  United  States  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce, a  business  man,  as  a  witness  before  the  investigating 
committee : 

There  is  no  central  control  or  planning.  What  is  needed  is 
someone  who  shall  have  power  or  responsibility  for  making  decisions. 
The  difficulty  in  getting  decisions  in  Washington  to-day  is  apparent 
to  every  one.  It  is  an  extraordinarily  difficult  thing  to  have  any 
matter  definitely  and  positively  decided.  The  thing  that  we  are  trying 
to  impress  upon  you  is  that  the  experience  of  business  men  has  been 
universal,  that  without  central  control  and  responsibility  no  enterprise, 
large  or  small,  could  succeed.11 

"President  Ferguson,  of  one  of  the  large  ship-building  plants  that  were 
relied  upon  to  put  out  the  ships  necessary  to  carry  forward  the  war,  told 
how  there  was  no  head  work  in  the  preparation  of  places  in  which  to  carry 
forward  the  great  plan.  He  told  how  in  one  little  town  where  they  could 
not  get  water  in  the  shipyard,  though  he  was  ordered  to  hasten  the  ship- 
building work,  the  army  had  15,000  horses  all  using  water  and  20,000 
soldiers  all  using  water,  and  that  in  the  same  week  he  had  instructions 
from  either  one  of  two  government  departments  to  give  its  work  priority. 
And  he  stated: 

"We  cannot  get  hard  coal,  for  which  our  houses  are  built  with  latrobe 
stoves,  yet  the  army  has  put  a  lot  of  hard-coal  stoves  in  their  camps  which 
might  as  well  have  burned  soft  coal.  I  took  this  matter  up  with  the  Secretary 


130     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

And  it  was  at  this  point  that  the  very  personality  of  the 
war  secretary  due  to  his  mental  attitude  created  the  chief 
difficulty. 

The  record  is  crowded  with  examples  of  failure  to  co- 
ordinate, to  plan  ahead.  The  Secretary  of  War  appeared 
to  have  no  appreciation  of  the  size  of  his  job.  Up  to  Jan- 
uary i,  1918,  there  had  been  ordered  over  21,000,000  pairs 
of  shoes.  That  was  more  shoes  than  had  been  ordered  for 
the  very  much  larger  British  army  during  the  entire  three 
and  one-half  years  of  war.  At  the  same  time,  the  army 
was  short  by  several  hundred  thousand  of  the  number  of 
overcoats  needed.  Clothing  in  the  navy  was  so  worthless 
that  the  sailors  had  to  pay  out  of  their  own  slender  pay 
about  as  much  to  replenish  them  as  the  whole  was  supposed 
to  cost  in  the  first  place.  Our  shortage  in  several  lines  of 
arms  and  ammunition  was  serious,  one  alarming  shortage 
being  in  powder,  our  shortage  in  production  for  our  own 
use  at  that  time  being  about  a  million  pounds  a  day  when 
we  were  supposed  to  be  also  supplying  the  Allies,  and 
orders  for  the  new  buildings  to  increase  our  powder  supply 
were  not  given  until  December,  1917,  though  the  great 
shortage  was  already  alarming  by  the  middle  of  1917. 

What  Secretary  Baker  cost  the  country  in  money  and 
lives  will  probably  never  be  known.  Some  of  his  state- 
ments, however,  may  suggest  it.  When,  early  in  1918, 
Senator  Chamberlain,  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Mili- 
tary Affairs,  declared  that  "the  military  establishment  of 
America  has  fallen  down;"  and  when,  a  few  weeks  later, 

of  War,  and  wrote  him  a  letter,  and  discussed  it  with  everybody  in  Washing- 
ton I  could  discuss  it  with,  and  the  Secretary  is  investigating,  and,  I  under- 
stand, proposes  to  put  up  some  temporary  quarters  for  the  soldiers  and  the 
regular  officers." 

Then  followed  this  colloquy: 

SENATOR  JOHNSON:  "That  indicates  lack  of  management  and  utter  lack  of 
co-operation. 

MR.  FERGUSON:  "It  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  people  have  the  power  to 
arbitrarily  give  orders  without  knowing  the  consequence  of  the  orders  they 
give. 

SENATOR  JOHNSON:    "And  without  knowing  who  else  gives  orders?" 

MR.  FERGUSON:    "Yes,  sir." 


Secretary  Baker  and  Mr.  Creel  in  War         131 

Senator  Hitchcock,  one  Democratic  member  of  the  commit- 
tee, arraigned  the  department  for  "confusion,  red  tape,  and 
incapacity,"  and  supported  his  charges  with  an  extended 
summary  of  delay  and  neglect  in  equipping  the  soldiers,  they 
were  letting  the  country  know  something  about  the  disasters 
which  were  certain  to  befall  as  a  result  of  this  utter  con- 
fusion in  the  War  Department,  and  that  Mr.  Baker's  fail- 
ure to  place  men  with  a  just  sense  of  proportion,  at  the  head 
of  important  bureaus,  was  the  chief  cause. 

To  the  soldiers  across  the  sea,  failure  to  receive  their 
pay  was  a  matter  secondary  to  failure  to  hear  from  their 
loved  ones  at  home.  While  many  of  these  poor  fellows 
were  lying  sick  or  wounded  in  hospitals,  to  their  physical 
suffering  was  added  the  mental  torture  of  not  being  able 
to  get  a  line  from  the  folks  at  home.  They  were  kept  in 
the  dark  as  to  whether  fathers,  mothers,  wives  were  dead 
and  buried.  Tons  of  these  precious  letters  which  they  were 
longing  for  were  being  dumped  in  great  masses  in  France, 
until  the  pathetic  missives  were  boxed  up  for  reshipment 
to  the  distracted  souls  back  in  the  old  home  who,  on  their 
return,  were  unable  to  learn  from  the  War  Department  as 
to  whether  and  how  their  sick  and  wounded  ones  were. 
It  was  one  of  the  shameful  things  which  attended  the  in- 
competence of  the  War  Department  in  its  direct  dealing 
with  American  soldiers.12 

13  Representative  Mann,  on  the  floor  of  the  House,  read  a  batch  of 
these  letters  both  from  soldiers  and  from  soldiers'  wives  and  mothers  bear- 
ing on  this  unhappy  state  of  affairs.  Some  of  these  missives  from  the  sol- 
diers to  the  home  folks  were  fairly  heartrending  in  their  pitiful  appeal  for 
tidings  of  any  sort  from  those  dear  to  them.  On  the  other  hand,  he  read 
letters  from  agonized  mothers  and  wives  here  who  knew  their  soldiers 
were  wounded  and  ill  somewhere,  but  who  could  get  no  information  other 
than  this  maddening  fact  from  the  War  Department.  In  one  such  case 
Adjutant  General  Parker  told  the  applicant  for  information  to  write  to  the 
Red  Cross  in  Washington.  Commenting  on  this,  Mr.  Mann  said: 

"Here  is  a  man  wounded  severely  in  the  service  of  the  United  States 
on  the  firing  line  in  September  last.  His  wife  has  been  informed  of  the 
injury,  and,  as  I  shall  show  later,  with  other  letters,  is  probably  unable 
to  get  into  communication  directly  with  the  soldier  and  writes  to  the  Adju- 
tant General's  office  to  inquire  about  him.  Now  it  would  be  just  as  cheap 
for  the  Adjutant  General's  office  to  cable  to  France  as  it  is  for  the  Red 
Cross  to  do  it.  I  can  conceive  no  meaner  disposition  on  the  part  of  the 


132     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

Cruel  was  the  infliction  of  suspense  and  anguish  through 
deception  and  delay  in  publication  of  the  casualty  lists.  Be- 
fore election  Mr.  Baker  had  assured  the  country  that  a 
total  number  of  killed  and  wounded  would  not  exceed  100,- 
ooo;  after  election  the  estimate  was  raised  to  "more  than 
200,000,"  then  to  262,000  and  late  January,  1919,  it  was 
disclosed  that  the  lists  might  not  be  completed  until  the 
following  September.  Final  announcement  was  made  on 
Armistice  Day,  1919,  showing  a  total  of  casualties  of  293,- 
089  to  the  American  forces,  the  wounded  in  action  number- 
ing 215,489. 

Great  criticism  was  leveled  at  the  War  Department  for 
its  failure  in  reporting  casualties  as  they  occurred.  The 
Red  Cross,  not  a  government  service,  had  the  confidence  of 
the  men  in  the  service  as  well  as  of  the  people  at  home  who 
knew  their  method.  Why  the  Red  Cross  should  be  able  to 
get  information  as  to  what  had  happened  to  a  boy  at  the 
front  more  quickly  than  the  regular  Government  channels 
of  the  War  Department  was  never  explained  but  the  fact 
is  that  people  learned  to  have  confidence  in  the  one  and  to 
distrust  the  other.  The  latter  forbade  the  former  to  send 
home  lists  and  this  ban  was  not  removed  until  September 
27,  1918. 

The  negligence  of  the  War  Department  service  respon- 
sible for  the  announcement  of  casualties  in  the  American 
forces  was  admitted  December  9,  1918,  by  Assistant  Secre- 
tary of  War  Keppel  to  the  Senate  committee  on  military 
affairs. 

The  very  first  day  that  Congress  was  in  session  in  the 
year  of  1919  an  attack  was  made  upon  Mr.  Baker  for  his 
carelessness,  if  not  deliberate  method,  in  notifying  parents 
as  to  what  had  happened  to  their  sons  on  the  European  bat- 
tle front.  Senator  Weeks  declared  that  the  War  Depart- 

Government  than  to  tell  a  wondering  and  grieving  wife,  "Your  husband 
was  severely  wounded  nearly  four  months  ago,  and  if  you  want  to  know 
how  he  is,  communicate  with  a  private  party." 


Secretary  Baker  and  Mr.  Creel  in  War         133 

ment  information  as  to  casualties  had  been  wrong.  He 
stated  that  during  the  week  ending  December  14,  1918,  the 
Red  Cross  had  received  an  average  of  twenty  letters  a  day 
from  parents  who  had  been  advised  by  the  War  Depart- 
ment that  their  sons  had  been  killed  on  a  specific  date,  and 
that  in  every  one  of  these  cases  the  parents  wrote  that  they 
had  received  communication  from  their  boys  subsequent  to 
the  date  of  death  given  by  the  War  Department.  Referring 
to  the  Red  Cross  methods,  Senator  Weeks  said  that  agency 
in  August  located  in  French  hospitals  200  American  soldiers 
reported  missing  by  the  War  Department.  And  he  stated 
that  they  believed  that  through  it  their  relatives  would 
learn  of  their  condition;  but  that  information  was  never 
transmitted  because  of  the  order  by  the  War  Department 
prohibiting  the  mailing  of  such  letters. 

When  Senator  Chamberlain  made  his  attack  upon  the 
failure  of  the  War  Department  in  taking  care  of  disabled 
men  after  the  armistice  was  signed  he  stated:  "Take  the 
number  of  men  on  the  battle  front  and  the  casualties — the 
dead,  wounded  and  missing — there  has  been  practically  17.6 
per  cent  of  the  boys  on  the  front  killed,  wounded  or  miss- 
ing." Then  he  stated  that  what  he  criticised  was  the  fact 
that  we  have  not  the  hospital  facilities.  "If  the  War  De- 
partment," he  declared,  "had  paid  half  the  attention  to 
preparation  for  receiving  these  boys  as  they  are  to  getting 
legislation  through  Congress  in  order  to  protect  contractors 
who  made  contracts  for  war  supplies  over  the  telephone  and 
in  violation  of  law,  this  matter  would  soon  be  settled." 

No  satisfactory  reason  was  ever  given  for  the  gross 
misrepresentation  of  the  nation's  losses  and  the  shocking 
delay  in  making  known  the  names  of  the  victims.  But  the 
matter  of  greatest  moment  was  the  high  percentage  of  casu- 
alties, nearly  three-eighths  of  the  force  being  put  out  of 
action.  It  is  true  that  American  divisions  were  heavily  en- 
gaged and  severe  losses  were  to  be  expected.  But  what 
makes  the  figures  significant  is  the  disclosure  that  to  the 


134    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

very  end  of  the  conflict  the  American  forces  were  imper- 
fectly armed;  that  they  had  to  go  against  the  German  de- 
fensive, bristling  with  machine-guns,  insufficiently  supported 
by  artillery  and  with  supply  of  ammunition  dangerously  in- 
adequate. 

Although  forced  to  abandon  the  Red  Cross  home-com- 
munication's service,  Governor  Allen  pointed  out  that  the 
system  of  personal  letters  was  being  used  by  the  British 
without  any  interference  with  war  office  reports.  Colonel 
Davis  retorted: 

Because  one  army  wears  red  pants  is  no  reason  why  our  army 
should  wear  red  pants. 

Secretary  Baker  felt  called  upon  to  issue  a  statement 
in  reply  to  criticisms  of  the  unpublished  casualties  after  the 
armistice  was  signed,  declaring  none  had  been  held  back. 

The  rapidity  with  which  the  American  troops  were 
transported  to  Europe  in  the  summer  of  1917  and  until  the 
American  army  had  reached  the  proportion  of  a  million 
and  more  men  was  characteristic  of  America's  method  once 
she  got  down  to  real  business.  It  was  as  much  as  the  most 
optimistic  could  hope  for. 

The  greater  part  of  these  troops,  however,  was  taken 
over  in  ships  of  the  Allies.  While  the  efforts  of  the  navy 
were  laudable  in  the  extreme,  we  were  simply  short  of  the 
necessary  means  of  transportation.  In  returning  the  troops 
there  was  a  different  situation.  They  were  returned  with 
all  the  speed  that  any  one  within  reason  could  have  asked, 
and  far  beyond  the  expectation  of  a  great  majority  of  the 
people.  They  were  returned  at  about  the  same  rate  at 
which  they  were  sent  over.  Of  the  320,000  troops  brought 
home  from  overseas  during  May,  1919,  vessels  operated 
by  the  cruiser  and  transport  force  of  the  United  States 
Navy  carried  more  than  300,000. 

In  the  spring  of  1919,  the  country  was  stirred  by  the  dis- 
pute between  Secretary  Baker  and  General  Ansell  over  the 


Secretary  Baker  and  Mr.  Creel  in  War         135 

court-martial  system  of  the  country,  resulting  in  the  de- 
motion of  the  latter  to  his  pre-war  rank  of  lieutenant  colonel. 
It  brought  Senator  Chamberlain  again  to  the  front  in  de- 
fending those  whom  the  position  of  Secretary  Baker  per- 
mitted him  to  castigate  in  what  he  denominated  the  inter- 
ests of  discipline.  It  was  well  known  that  Mr.  Baker  sanc- 
tioned the  intolerable  terms  of  the  system  upon  some  all  but 
innocent  youth,  while  he  was  making  use  of  all  the  prestige 
of  his  position  to  favor  worthless  scoundrels  known  to  the 
War  Department  as  "conscientious  objectors"  to  military 
service  to  their  country  in  time  of  war.  Under  the  system 
he  accepted  the  sentence  of  a  half-witted  youth  "to  99  years 
at  hard  labor  for  absence  without  leave,  desertion,  and  es- 
cape," while  Captain  Samuel  H.  Hodgson,  of  the  United 
States  Army,  tried  on  charges  showing  him  favorable  to 
the  Germans  at  a  time  when  his  country  was  at  war  with 
Germany,  and  particularly  to  Germans  in  Mexico,  sen- 
tenced to  dismissal  from  the  army  and  confinement  to  hard 
labor  for  two  years,  all  finally  commuted  to  a  reprimand  by 
the  general  commanding  the  camp  in  Porto  Rico. 

The  New  York  World  described  the  system  as  "lynch 
law  for  the  army,"  while  the  Washington  Post  declared 
that  "there  is  sometimes  justice  in  a  court-martial,  but  it  is 
purely  accidental."  Writing  Secretary  Baker  concerning 
the  injustice  of  the  system  and  the  Secretary's  attitude 
toward  those  with  whom  he  might  differ,  Senator  Chamber- 
lain pointedly  stated,  on  March  20,  1919: 

On  March  10  you  were  blind  to  any  deficiencies  in  the  existing 
system;  as  indeed  the  evidence  abundantly  shows,  you  have  been 
deaf  throughout  the  war  to  complaints  about  the  injustice  of  this 
system,  complaints  which  should  at  least  have  challenged  your  earnest 
attention,  rather  than  provoked  your  undisguised  irritation. 

And  then  again: 

You  elbowed  aside  the  one  officer  who  even  then  had  the  courage 
to  condemn  the  system  and  the  prevision  to  point  out  its  terrible  re- 


136    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

suits — General  Ansell — and  took  into  the  bosom  of  your  confidence 
a  trio  of  men  who  are  pronounced  reactionaries. 

And  he  pointed  out  to  the  Secretary  of  War  circum- 
stances indicating  that  the  Secretary's  position  was  not 
taken  in  good  faith  but  simply  designed  to  allay  public 
apprehension  and  inquiry  by  the  appearance  of  doing  some- 
thing, and  added: 

The  existing  system  does  injustice — gross,  terrible,  spirit-crushing 
injustice.  Evidence  of  it  is  on  every  hand.  The  records  of  the 
judge  advocate  general's  department  reek  with  it.  ... 

You  have  taken  a  terrible  stand  upon  a  subject  which  lies  close 
to  a  thousand  American  hearthstones.  The  American  people  will  not 
be  deceived  by  self-serving,  misleading  reports  and  statistics.  Too 
many  American  families  have  made  a  pentecostal  sacrifice  of  their 
sons  upon  the  altar  of  organized  injustice. 

A  group  of  lawyers  who  held  commissions  during  the 
war  and  were  assigned  to  the  Judge  Advocate  General's 
Department  joined  in  giving  out  a  statement  to  the  press 
which  declared  that: 

Our  court-martial  system  has  been  inherited  from  English  law 
as  it  existed  prior  to  the  American  Revolution ;  it  had  its  inception  in 
medieval  days  when  soldiers  were  not  free  citizens  of  the  flag  under 
which  they  served,  but  were  either  paid  mercenaries  or  armed  retainers 
of  petty  lords.  Those  were  times  when  armies  were  made  up  of  men 
who  constituted  the  dregs  of  society,  or  were  no  more  than  the  chat- 
tels of  military  commanders.  England,  France,  and  other  democratic 
countries  have  changed  and  liberalized  their  military  codes  so  as  to 
insure  justice  to  their  soldiers;  but  our  armies  are  still  governed  by 
this  brutal,  medieval  court-martial  system  which  has  survived  outside 
of  the  United  States  only  in  Germany  and  in  Russia. 

But  these  were  the  things,  not  only  which  the  pacifist 
Secretary  of  War  tplerated,  but  which  he  insisted  upon 
when  it  came  to  punishing  the  peccadillos  of  real  men  wear- 
ing their  country's  uniform  and  ready  to  lay  down  their 
lives.  But  when  it  came  to  the  contemptible  cowards  who 
saved  their  hides  by  sneaking  under  pleas  that  they  were 


Secretary  Baker  and  Mr.  Creel  in  War         137 

"conscientious  objectors"  then  the  pacifist  secretary  was  all 
tenderness  and  consideration.  "For  a  real  soldier  caught 
smoking  a  cigarette  and  refusing  to  obey  a  petty  order,  40 
years  at  hard  labor  with  no  appeal  to  a  reviewing  court. 
For  a  cowardly  cur  openly  refusing  to  wear  a  uniform,  re- 
fusing to  obey  any  military  orders,  openly  defying  the  whole 
authority  of  military  law — for  such  as  these,  considerate 
treatment  and  no  punishment  until  the  Secretary  of  War  had 
passed  upon  the  case !"  13 

Similarly,  when  the  demand  for  a  universal  draft  be- 
came so  great  that  General  Crowder  was  called  before  the 
Senate  committee,  and  he  there  showed  the  compelling  and 
immediate  need  for  enlarged  man  power,  Secretary  Baker 
and  General  March  took  an  opposite  view.  General  Crow- 
der's  advice  was  followed,  and  the  great  army  which  was 
sent  across  the  seas  came  as  a  result. 

But  General  Crowder's  patriotism  was  his  undoing. 
Secretary  Baker  and  General  March  could  no  more  en- 
dure his  activities  than  they  could  those  of  General  Wood. 
Accordingly,  General  March  ordered  General  Crowder  to 
his  office  and  reprimanded  him  for  having  encroached  on 
the  duties  of  the  general  staff;  yet  Crowder  was  wholly  re- 
sponsible for  the  men  until  they  were  actually  sworn  into 
the  service.  But  the  reprimand  was  stamped  on  General 
Crowder's  record,  and  the  Secretary  of  War  did  not  lift  a 
finger  to  stay  the  unjust  act  against  this  soldier,  this  officer 
who  had  never  blundered  when  the  whole  war  machine  of 
the  W^ar  Department  was  blundering;  who  hewed  to  the 
line  when  the  Secretary  of  War  was  wobbling;  who  had 
prepared,  perfected,  and  executed  the  mechanism  for  a  draft 
which  had  done  more  than  any  other  single  thing  in  our  his- 
tory to  make  a  great  army  possible. 

There  is  a  large  element  in  the  consideration  of  Mr. 
Baker's  elevation  to  his  high  place.  Judge  Garrison,  from 
the  day  he  took  office,  devoted  himself  zealously  to  strength- 

"  Harvey's  Weekly,  February  22,  1919. 


138    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

ening  the  national  defenses,  and  as  the  shadow  of  coming 
war  darkened  the  country's  path  he  redoubled  his  efforts 
to  promote  preparedness.  Then  came  the  inadequately  ex- 
plained resignation  of  Secretary  Garrison.  When  Presi- 
dent Wilson,  in  the  first  months  of  1916  made  a  series  of 
addresses  in  New  York  and  the  middle  west  in  behalf  of 
the  policy  of  preparation  for  the  inevitable  conflict,  the 
President  went  so  far  as  to  urge  that  the  United  States 
should  have  "incomparably  the  greatest  navy  in  the 
world."  After  the  President's  return,  Secretary  Garrison 
called  at  the  White  House  to  express  his  loyal  enthusiasm 
and  to  say  that  preparedness  was  to  be  forwarded.  To  his 
amazement,  the  response  was  an  expression  of  disapproval, 
the  President  declaring  he  would  tolerate  no  agitation  or 
activity  in  this  direction  until  after  election — the  presiden- 
tial election  of  the  coming  fall,  when  the  issue,  as  it  later 
developed,  was  to  be,  "he  kept  us  out  of  war."  Hurt  and 
bewildered,  Secretary  Garrison  remarked  that  their  ideas 
seemed  to  be  at  variance ;  he  was  told  that  they  were.  He 
suggested  that  his  resignation  might  be  acceptable.  Presi- 
dent Wilson  said  promptly  that  it  would;  moreover,  on  his 
western  tour  he  had  selected  Mr.  Garrison's  successor,  a 
man  who  would  not  embarrass  the  Administration  with 
schemes  of  preparedness. 

Such  was  the  manner  and  inspiration  of  the  appointment 
of  Newton  D.  Baker,  avowed  pacifist  placed  in  charge  of 
the  defense  of  a  nation  that  was  being  driven  irresistibly 
into  war.  His  function  was  to  strangle  preparedness  and 
cultivate  the  pacifist  sentiment  of  the  country  until  after  the 
election  in  1916.  He  had,  besides,  other  valued  political 
qualifications — influence  with  the  radical  element  and  a 
readiness,  as  was  shown,  to  use  even  the  laws  against  sedi- 
tion and  espionage  to  promote  the  Administration's  political 
interests.  And  he  was  retained,  in  the  face  of  a  record  of 
incompetence  written  in  the  waste  of  colossal  wealth  ,and 
unnumbered  lives,  because  he  served  those  interests  and  re- 


Secretary  Baker  and  Mr.  Creel  in  War         139 

fleeted   secretly   the    spirit   and   purposes    of   the   Wilson 
regime.14 

The  editor  of  Harvey's  Weekly,  facetious  at  times,  de- 
nunciatory almost  beyond  endurance  at  other  times,  freely 
told  its  readers  how  it  had  misplaced  its  trust  in  one  mem- 
ber of  the  cabinet,  and  did  it  in  this  fashion: 

Oddly  enough,  the  one  member  of  the  Cabinet  in  whose  favor 
we  were  most  strongly  prepossessed  was  Mr.  Baker;  we  valued  his 
brains  as  a  sort  of  oasis  in  a  comparative  desert.  But  he  quickly 
proved  himself  to  be  utterly  incapacitated  by  surpassing  egotism  for 
the  performance  of  his  great  tasks  and  consequently  was  a  positive 
menace.  Anything  more  dangerous  than  his  attempts  to  lull  the 
American  people  into  a  sense  of  false  security  or  more  damnable  than 
his  perpetual  evading,  sidestepping,  deceiving  and,  when  cornered, 
actually  lying,  we  simply  cannot  imagine. 

Never  again  should  the  American  nation  permit  paci- 
fists to  be  in  control  of  the  government  when  the  country's 
life  is  threatened. 

"Philadelphia  North  American,  January  31,  1919. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  POST-OFFICE  DEPARTMENT 

From  some  forms  of  distemper,  President  Wilson's 
administration  made  fairly  good  recovery;  but  never  from 
the  blight  which  fell  upon  the  Post-Office  Department. 

By  some  it  was  called  incompetence  in  Washington,  by 
some  inefficiency  throughout  the  country;  some  said  it  was 
failure,  others  that  it  was  wreckage.  All  agreed  that  the 
Department  was  not  functioning — this  one  Department 
that  comes  closest  to  the  American  hearth,  this  one  service 
of  the  government  that  freely  enters  the  home  daily. 

For  its  letter-carrier  walks  the  crowded  street  and  as- 
cends the  tower-like  office  building  whose  head  is  buried  in 
the  cloud ;  or  hastens  with  his  car  into  the  thrifty  forty-acre 
farmer  settlements  of  Jersey  or  of  the  Keystone  State,  and 
back  home  for  dinner;  or  glides  along  the  western  trail 
which,  as  a  huge  serpent,  stretches  itself  from  the  Great 
River  away  to  the  snow-capped  Rockies;  or  more  slowly 
with  horse  and  cart  threads  his  way  to  the  secluded  home 
among  the  mountain  passes — this  carrier  who  bears  the 
heat  of  summer  and  faces  the  blistering  blasts  of  winter, 
who  drags  his  weary  way  through  sticky  mud  and  flounders 
through  unbroken  drifts — he  who  brings  the  expected  or 
the  unlooked-for  message  of  love  or  sadness,  of  joy  or  sor- 
row, of  hope  or  disaster;  this  man  whose  step  or  cart  or 
car  is  eagerly  watched  for,  and  whose  coming  sets  the  heart 
a-throb  or  brings  depression  to  the  spirit — this  man  is  al- 
ways welcome.  And  he  failed  not. 

Under  such  circumstances  it  was  very  fitting  that  the 
first  criticism  directed  against  this  great  Department  of  the 

140 


The  Post-Office  Department  141 

people  should  be  on  the  social  side,  rather  than  on  the  ma- 
terial. It  squares  best  with  America's  idealism. 

This  early  criticism  was  aimed  at  a  pronouncement  made 
officially  in  the  Administration's  beginning  days,  declaring 
that  its  old  employes,  when  they  became  aged  and  infirm 
from  long  service,  were  entitled  to  no  further  consideration 
from  the  government.  The  official  statement  further  an- 
nounced that  the  people  would  never  consent  to  civil  pen- 
sions, and  with  a  self-assurance  suggestive  of  the  final  word 
on  the  matter.  Yet  it  is  the  irony  of  history  that  before  the 
ruthless  incumbent  left  his  place  of  power,  civil  employees  in 
his  Department  were  not  pensioned,  it  is  true,  but  were  re- 
tired on  part  pay  with  the  greatest  favor  shown  to  them  of 
any  in  the  government  service.  He  poorly  assessed  the 
public  temper  when  he  assumed  the  position  that  as  the  eye 
became  dim  and  the  hand  shaky  these  faithful  servants  who 
had  given  the  best  of  their  years  to  the  government  on  a 
salary  insufficient  to  lay  aside  anything  for  the  uncertain 
day,  were  to  be  tossed  to  the  scrap-heap,  placing  the  gov- 
ernment in  the  class  of  the  soulless  employer  who  used  men 
and  women  only  as  cogs  in  a  machine.  The  Department's 
procedure  of  that  day  was  described  as  "a  mighty  mean 
policy." 

This  social  side  bore  a  close  relation  to  the  material 
side.  It  was  induced  by  Postmaster-General  Burleson's  de- 
sire to  make  a  showing  for  economy.  Its  tendency  was  to 
weaken  the  morale  of  the  entire  force.  Protest  after  pro- 
test was  entered  until  it  was  piling  Ossa  on  Pelion.  Officials 
became  hardened  to  the  process  and  gave  little  or  no  heed. 
As  complaint  after  complaint  came  in,  their  reply  became  a 
stock:  "Oh,  well,  I  guess  a  few  complaints,  more  or  less, 
will  not  make  much  difference." 

The  criticism  grew  in  strength  and  scope,  involving  every 
feature  of  the  Department's  activities.  It  would  have  been 
more  severe  but  for  the  fact  that  war  activities  diverted  the 


142    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

thoughts  and  energies  of  the  people.  A  subservient  Con- 
gress did  nothing  to  uncover  the  blight.  Secrecy  was  the 
final  official  word  in  this  Department,  as  in  many  of  them, 
throughout  President  Wilson's  incumbency.  It  was  impos- 
sible for  the  people  to  get  the  light. 

The  treatment  accorded  drove  the  railway-mail  men 
into  the  American  Federation  of  Labor  for  protection 
against  the  ravages  of  the  Department.  Immediately 
thereafter  came  the  unionizing  of  every  department  and 
bureau  of  the  government  service  as  a  protection  of  the 
employe  against  the  government  itself.  The  Administra- 
tion sowed  the  wind;  the  nation  will  reap  the  whirlwind. 

Business  men,  as  well  as  others,  fully  aware  of  the  de- 
generation of  the  postal  service,  used  what  means  they 
commanded  for  getting  the  facts  to  set  before  the  people. 
The  Department  refusing  all  information,  as  though  the 
public  has  no  right  to  know  about  its  own  business,  they 
set  out  to  gather  facts  showing  the  truth  of  the  matter.  To 
this  end  the  New  York  Merchants'  Association  conducted  an 
investigation  in  38  states,  through  165  business  agencies, 
representing  119  cities,  giving  substantial  basis  for  a  re- 
port upon  the  deficiencies  of  the  service  as  found  up  to  the 
middle  of  1918.  The  essential  facts  thus  developed  were 
these : 

That  mails  were  not  dispatched  with  former  frequency. 

That  they  were  not  fully  worked  in  transit. 

That  in  consequence  much  "stuck"  letter-mail  was  turned  into 
the  terminal  stations  and  there  materially  delayed. 

That  inferior  mails  moved  with  extreme  slowness. 

That  train  delays  were  not  a  principal  cause  of  slowness  in  the 
mails;  but  that 

Insufficiency  in  the  number  of  railway  postal  cars,  their  with- 
drawal from  a  great  number  of  routes  throughout  the  United  States, 
and  the  reduction  of  the  crews  on  the  railway  postal  cars  appeared 
as  the  main  causes  of  the  condition  shown.1 

*In  eighteen  months  there  was  either  total  abolishment  or  heavy  cur- 
tailment in  the  sorting  of  mails  on  1612  trains.  Railway-mail  clerks  well 


The  Post-Office  Department  143 

That  space  rental  on  trains,  instead  of  charge  by  weight,  was  a 
fertile  cause  of  inefficient  service. 

Of  9,612  letters  sent  out  by  business  men  as  a  fair  test,  to 
and  from  all  parts  of  the  country,  56  per  cent  were  delayed 
from  a  day  to  weeks  in  delivery.  Local-delivery  letters 
bearing  special  delivery  stamps  were  subject  to  the  same 
delays.  During  the  year  1919,  there  were  mailed  from  New 
York  119  letters  at  an  hour  when  proper  service  would 
have  delivered  them  the  same  day,  and  81  of  them  were 
not  delivered  until  the  next  day.2 

Curtailment  in  the  sorting  of  mails  on  the  trains  was  one 
of  the  economies  upon  which  Mr.  Burleson  prided  himself. 
In  his  1918  annual  report  he  stated  enthusiastically  that 
during  the  preceding  year  postal  revenues  exceeded  ex- 
penditures by  something  over  $19,600,000.  Was  the  gov- 
ernment in  the  postal  business  for  the  purpose  of  making 
money  regardless  of  how  it  was  made?  The  reduction  of 
the  human  mechanism  to  the  position  of  mere  machinery, 
resulting  in  human  wreckage  and  wastage,  and  a  loss  of 
morale  resulting  in  loss  in  efficiency  and  service,  is  a  mat- 
ter of  greater  consequence  to  the  nation  than  the  saving  of 
one  cent  every  eighteen  days  of  the  year  for  each  person. 
Through  his  effort  to  get  credit  for  cutting  expenses  he 
earned  the  title  of  postal-service  wrecker. 

In  the  same  report  he  further  stated  that  there  were 
formerly  "frequent  and  unnecessary  dispatches  of  mail;" 
but  those  paying  for  the  service  did  not  think  they  were 

knew  that,  owing  to  the  reduction  in  their  forces  in  face  of  a  largely  in- 
creasing mail  volume,  between  important  terminal  points,  as  Chicago  to 
the  Twin  City  or  Chicago  to  Omaha,  mail  was  worked  to  the  extent  possible 
and  the  rest  was  left  to  be  worked  on  the  trip  back  or  left  to  its  own  devices, 
thus  carrying  it  back  and  forth  indefinitely  before  reaching  its  destination. 

2  When  complaint  was  made  by  publishers  of  weekly  newspapers  in 
New  York  that  they  were  four-and-half  days  reaching  the  homes  of  sub- 
scribers in  Washington,  the  Department  stated  that  the  cause  was  the 
unprecedened  rail  congestion.  Questioning  and  testing  this  reason,  a  num- 
ber of  the  papers  were  taken  to  Washington  and  there  deposited  in  the  post- 
office  just  before  midnight  Thursday,  and  were  delivered  in  that  same 
city,  within  two  miles  of  the  post-office,  the  following  Monday,  some  not 
before  Tuesday. 


144    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

unnecessary.  The  fact  is,  no  date  was  permitted  to  be 
stamped  on  some  of  the  inferior  mail,  and  if  it  was  delayed 
a  month  no  one  was  the  wiser. 

It  was  a  theory  of  Mr.  Burleson  that  the  cost  of  de- 
livery of  newspapers  and  magazines  was  too  great  for  long 
distances.  Accordingly,  upon  his  recommendation  the  coun- 
try was  divided  into  eight  zones,  effective  July  i,  1918, 
with  a  higher  rate  of  postage  for  each  successive  zone  far- 
ther from  the  place  of  mailing.  This  created  opposition 
among  publishers  of  such  papers.  Others  knew  little  of 
the  matter,  though  it  was  really  they  who  suffered,  for  in 
many  instances  the  additional  cost  was  placed  upon  the 
reader. 

In  this  proposed  method  of  saving,  the  Postmaster- 
General  sectionalized  the  nation,  establishing  a  system  ob- 
noxious to  the  whole  plan  of  government  under  the  Con- 
stitution. It  was  bringing  back  the  system  under  which  the 
government  under  the  Articles  of  Confederation  had  failed, 
the  plan  so  opposed  to  the  American's  sense  of  the  fitness  of 
things  that  no  one  ever  objected  to  paying  the  same  rate  of 
postage  for  sending  a  letter  from  New  York  to  Brooklyn 
as  from  New  York  to  Seattle. 

The  direct  reply  to  this  theory  of  the  too  great  cost  was 
that  the  method  of  the  Department's  bookkeeping  was  so 
defective  that  it  was  impossible  to  determine,  with  even 
approximate  accuracy,  the  cost  to  the  Department  of  the 
various  branches  of  its  service. 

It  was  further  observed,  and  with  more  point,  that  the 
system  worked  a  discrimination  against  the  man  or  woman 
of  the  distant,  outlying  and  sparsely-settled  sections  of  the 
country;  for  while  enduring  the  hardships  of  pioneers,  they 
were  thus  penalized  for  seeking  the  best  in  the  way  of 
current  magazine  literature;  when,  as  a  matter  of  history, 
the  government  had  always  theretofore  conceded  to  the 
pioneer  the  privilege  of  having  the  best  obtainable  as  well 
as  he  whose  abode  was  near  the  centers  of  wealth  and  popu- 


The  Post-Office  Department  145 

lation  and  of  publications.3  Said  one  weekly  of  the  highest 
standing:  uln  this  eight-zone  system,  what  could  the  brain 
of  man  devise  that  is  more  unbusiness-like  and  more  un- 
scientific?" 4 

Another  favorite  plan  of  Mr.  Burleson  was  to  rest  con- 
trol of  the  wires  of  the  country  in  his  Department.  On  so 
important  a  matter,  the  Senate  did  not  like  to  yield  hastily; 
it  blustered  for  a  week  with  the  declaration  that  it  wquld 
not  be  forced  into  hasty  action.  Its  committee  was  making 
preparation  for  extensive  hearings  in  the  early  hours  of  the 
day,  July  10,  1918;  but  when  the  order  was  given  from  the 
White  House,  Senate  leaders  were  convinced  that  it  was 
time  to  take  a  vote,  and  on  that  day  capitulated,  not  even 
members  of  the  committee  having  opportunity  to  express 
their  views.  One  senator  in  picturesquely  describing  the 
swiftly  developing  situation  said:  "The  whip  has  been 
cracked  and  the  Senate  will  jump  through  the  hoop  just  as 
the  House  did  last  week."  Accordingly,  by  order  of  Presi- 
dent Wilson  the  government  took  over  control  of  all  land 
wires  on  August  i,  1918,  placing  them  in  the  hands  of  the 
Post-Office  Department. 

In  taking  control,  Mr.  Burleson  issued  a  public  state- 
ment in  which  he  said: 

I  earnestly  request  the  loyal  co-operation  of  all  officers,  operators 
and  employes,  and  the  public,  in  order  that  the  service  rendered  shall 
be  not  only  maintained  at  a  high  standard,  but  improved  wherever 
possible.  It  is  the  purpose  to  co-ordinate  and  unify  these  services 
so  that  they  may  be  operated  as  a  national  system  with  due  regard 
to  the  interests  of  the  public  and  the  owners  of  the  properties. 

With  what  loyalty  of  compliance  on  the  part  of  any,  will 
be  seen  presently.  In  his  1918  annual  report,  prepared 

8  In  the  spring  of  1918,  the  author  personally  witnessed  on  the  great 
ranches  of  Wyoming  and  Montana,  scores  of  miles  from  any  railroad, 
magazines  of  the  highest  class  in  the  homes  of  humble  herders,  the  ranch- 
houses  on  wheels  ready  to  be  moved  from  place  to  place  where  pasturage 
could  be  found  for  the  flocks,  among  them  Harper's,  Leslie's,  and  Scien- 
tific American. 

4 Scientific  American,  New  York,  June  15,  1918,  p.  542. 


146    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

but  a  few  weeks  later,  he  disclosed  his  desire  for  govern- 
ment ownership  of  these  utilities  when  he  stated: 

The  experiences  as  a  result  of  the  present  war  have  fully  demon- 
strated that  the  principle  of  government  ownership  of  the  telegraphs 
and  telephones  is  not  only  sound  but  practicable. 

Soon  after  he  had  taken  over  the  wires,  his  procedure  was 
described  as  having  reduced  all  competitive  systems  to  a 
state  of  chaos;  as  having  changed  the  best  telegraph  and 
telephone  systems  the  world  had  ever  known  to  one  of  the 
worst;  while  running  the  latter  at  a  loss  of  millions  of  dol- 
lars which  he  loaded  upon  the  taxpayers,  besides  loading 
telephone  users  with  heavily  increased  rates  and  a  greatly 
depreciated  service. 

On  December  6,  1919,  Chairman  Steenerson  of  the 
House  Committee  on  Post-offices  and  Post-roads,  having 
before  him  the  annual  report  of  the  Postmaster-General, 
then  but  recently  issued,  criticised  on  the  floor  of  the  House, 
Mr.  Burleson's  mismanagement  of  the  telegraph  and  tele- 
phone wires,  declaring  that  he  had  gotten  out  of  the  tax- 
payers of  the  country  $9,000,000  to  make  up  deficits,  in 
addition  to  $30,000,000  in  increased  rates;  and  he  sharply 
questioned  the  figures  by  which  the  attempt  wa,s  made  to 
show  the  savings  in  his  Department,  declaring  that  while 
the  report  showed  a  net  surplus  of  $35,000,000  in  the  previ- 
ous seven  years,  it  was  not  true  in  fact  and  was  misleading 
to  the  public,  and  in  all  probability  claims  for  losses  and 
increases  for  carrying  the  mail  would  wipe  out  the  entire 
alleged  net  savings  or  more. 

While  Mr.  Burleson  undertook  the  next  day  to  reply 
to  this  statement,  he  did  not  undertake  to  deny  the  enor- 
mously increased  cost  of  inferior  service  to  the  public.  And 
on  the  23rd  of  the  same  month,  the  Interstate  Commerce 
Commission  rendered  a  decision  whereby  on  space-rental 
plan  on  trains,  compensation  for  carrying  the  mail  was  in- 
creased 33  per  cent  from  November  i,  1916,  and  50  per 


The  Post-Office  Department  147 

cent  from  March  i,  1920,  which,  as  Assistant  Postmaster- 
General  Praeger  stated  in  the  Senate  hearings,  amounted 
to  between  $30,000,000  and  $40,000,000  a  year,  at  50  per 
cent.  And  in  discussing  the  necessary  appropriation,  Mr. 
Steenerson  on  the  floor  of  the  House  declared  on  April  15, 
1920,  that  the  space  rental  would  cost  about  8  per  cent  more 
than  the  old  weight-rental  method,  amounting  to  between 
$4,000,000  and  $5,000,000  a  year  on  the  slower  space-rent 
plan. 

Chairman  Steenerson  knew  whereof  he  spoke.  So  did 
Mr.  Burleson.  Announcement  by  the  latter  that  there  would 
be  a  reduction  in  telephone  rates  under  government  control 
was  immediately  followed  by  an  increase  ranging  from  14 
to  36  per  cent.  So  sharp  was  this  increase  from  the  various 
states  that  it  brought  vigorous  protest  from  practically 
every  section  of  the  land. 

North  Dakota  found  that  her  increase  approximated 
30  to  33  per  cent,  and  resented  interference  on  any  such 
basis.  Ohio  gave  deliberate  publicity  to  the  fact  that  any 
attempt  to  increase  rates  in  that  state  by  the  Post-Office  De- 
partment would  be  resisted  by  the  State.  In  Minnesota, 
Massachusetts,  and  other  states,  the  public  service  com- 
missions served  notice  of  rigid  scrutiny  at  points  of  interfer- 
ence with  local  regulations,  with  promise  of  contest  should 
the  government  attempt  to  override  rates  fixed  by  local 
authorities.  Some  one  declared  that  Mr.  Burleson's  state 
was  about  the  only  one  in  the  union  whose  rates  would  not 
be  about  doubled;  and  even  in  Houston  the  city  council  re- 
fused to  put  the  new  rates  into  operation,  and  at  a  largely 
attended  meeting  of  business  men  the  council's  action  was 
warmly  endorsed.  Surely  Mr.  Burleson  was  getting  a  taste 
of  the  State  Rights  doctrine. 

In  Illinois  there  was  actually  started  a  conflict  which  as- 
sumed a  serious  aspect.  Following  the  order  of  Postmaster- 
General  Burleson  fixing  a  schedule  of  rates  in  excess  of 
those  then  in  force,  an  action  brought  by  the  Attorney- 


148     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

General  of  Illinois  resulted  in  a  decision  rendered  by  the 
Superior  Court  whereby  the  State  refused  to  be  bound  by 
the  action  of  the  Postmaster-General,  and  whereby  the 
telephone  companies  of  the  state  were  restrained  from  in- 
creasing the  toll  rates. 

As  further  illustrating  the  method  during  Mr.  Burle- 
son's  incumbency,  a  well-known  weekly,  referring  to  the 
delivery  of  night  letters  assuming  to  be  sent  by  wire,  when 
under  government  control,  recites  this  episode: 

THE  CLERK:  That  will  be  all  right;  we  are  not  telegraphing 
night  letters  to  New  York;  we  are  sending  them  by  mail.  35  cents 
please. 

MYSELF:  You  are  going  to  send  this  telegram  by  mail  and  deliver 
it  by  mail? 

THE  CLERK:  That's  so. 

MYSELF:  And  can  you  tell  me  why  I  should  pay  you  35  cents 
to  deliver  a  letter  when  I  can  put  a  3-cent  stamp  on  it  and  get  the 
same  result? 

THE  CLERK:  Well,  that's  the  way  it's  being  done  these  days.5 

Nor  was  the  increase  in  rates  the  sole  objection  to  the 
Post-Office  Department's  wire  management.  Soon  after 
it  assumed  control,  strikes  and  threatened  strikes  became 
the  daily  news  served  to  a  patient  public.  Of  them  all 
probably  the  most  serious  was  that  of  Boston  and  vicinity, 
threatening  the  welfare  of  all  New  England.  In  this,  the 
incapacity  of  the  Department's  head  was  acknowledged 
when,  after  a  good  deal  of  bitterness,  he  agreed  to  leave  the 
matter  to  the  managers  of  the  properties  and  the  operators ; 
then  a  settlement  was  quickly  reached. 

So  far  as  the  public  knew  of  his  order  of  December  2, 
1918,  as  to  courtesy  on  the  part  of  wire  employes,  warning 
that  indifference  to  the  public  would  not  be  tolerated,  it  was 
but  to  smile.  Users  of  telephones  in  those  strenuous  days 
of  strikes  and  threatened  strikes,  became  accustomed  to 
waiting  fifteen  to  forty-five  minutes  to  get  the  operator  and 

5  Harvey's  Weekly,  New  York,  February  i,  1919. 


The  Post-Office  Department  149 

then  meeting  withering  insolence  from  the  operator  or  the 
unblushing  statement  that  the  line  was  busy. 

As  if  these  things  were  not  enough  for  the  public  to 
endure  at  the  hands  of  government  operation  of  the  wires, 
when  hostilities  were  at  an  end  and  the  silence  of  arms 
reigned  supreme  the  President  ordered  that  the  cables  be 
taken  over  as  a  war  necessity — for  which  purpose  alone  the 
authority  had  been  invested  in  the  President — and  placed 
them  into  the  hands  of  the  Postmaster-General.  It  is  prob- 
able that  there  was  no  single  act  of  the  Administration  for 
which  both  officials  were  so  severely  condemned.  It  was 
looked  upon  as  a  self-assumed  authority,  autocratic,  arbi- 
trary, unwarranted.  The  discussion  on  the  floor  of  the 
Senate  brought  out  the  fact  that  there  was  some  strange  and 
unwarranted  manipulation  in  the  matter  of  the  signing  of 
the  order  of  the  President  taking  over  the  wires,  assuming 
to  have  been  signed  November  2,  nine  days  before  the  sign- 
ing of  the  armistice,  but  incomplete  because  not  counter- 
signed by  the  Secretary  of  State.  After  inviting  attention 
to  this  unusual  course,  Senator  Kellogg  stated: 

The  law  authorized  the  President  to  take  over  the  cables  and  tele- 
graph lines  as  a  war  necessity,  and  not  a  senator  on  this  floor  or  any- 
where else  dreamed  that  we  were  giving  the  Postmaster-General 
power  to  force  on  this  country  government  ownership  whether  the 
people  wanted  it  or  not. 

And  Senator  Hitchcock,  Senate  leader  of  the  President's 
party,  declared  that  even  if  the  order  had  been  signed  on 
November  2  and  was  regular  in  every  other  respect,  it  was 
yet  a  breach  of  faith  with  Congress;  for  by  the  terms  of  the 
resolution  granting  the  power  and  by  the  reiterated  assur- 
ances of  its  advocates  when  it  was  up  for  consideration  it 
was  explicitly  set  forth  that  only  in  case  of  danger  from  war 
to  the  country's  security  was  the  authority  to  be  exercised. 
And  it  had  not  been  found  necessary  to  exercise  it  until 
after  war  had  ceased.  It  was  bitterly  denounced  in  the 


150    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

Senate  as  an  attempt  to  foist  socialism  upon  the  nation  by 
executive  order  and  the  President  was  freely  charged  with 
playing  to  the  radical  element. 

In  taking  over  the  cables,  the  President  said  the  neces- 
sity for  the  act  lay  in  the  need  of  keeping  two  cables  open 
between  France  and  the  War  and  State  departments  in 
Washington.  While  Mr.  Burleson  declared: 

There  never  was  a  time  in  the  history  of  this  war,  for  which  this 
joint  resolution  was  passed  giving  the  President  the  right  to  con- 
trol the  wire  and  cable  systems,  which  calls  for  such  a  close  control 
of  the  cable  system  as  to-day,  and  which  will  continue  during  the 
period  of  readjustment.  The  absolute  necessity  for  uninterrupted, 
continuous  communication  should  be  apparent  to  all. 

He  stated  further  that  the  cables  had  been  insufficiently 
managed  during  hostilities. 

It  was  asked  why,  if  this  were  true,  no  action  to  remedy 
the  evil  had  been  taken  until  hostilities  ceased.  And  the 
public  wondered  why  the  necessity  arose  November  16,  five 
days  after  the  armistice  was  signed,  when  the  President's 
order  was  published,  and  at  the  same  time  that  the  Presi- 
dent made  known  his  intention  of  going  to  Europe  as  a  mem- 
ber of  the  Peace  Congress,  and  why  they  were  placed  in 
charge  of  the  man  known  to  be  the  politician  of  the  Admin- 
istration. 

But  caustic  criticism  met  the  President's  statement,  com- 
ing from  every  section  of  the  country  and  from  every  com- 
plexion of  political  view,  denouncing  the  President  for  du- 
plicity in  his  treatment  of  Congress  and  the  people.  If  his 
reason  were  valid,  they  wanted  to  know  why,  after  the  war 
was  ended,  he  seized  fourteen  or  fifteen  cables  between 
America  and  Europe  and  all  the  cables  from  the  Pacific 
coast  to  China,  Japan,  the  Philippines  and  Hawaii,  as  well 
as  those  to  South  America,  Central  America,  and  the  West 
Indies,  including  all  of  the  Gulf-of-Mexico  lines — all  this 
that  there  might  be  two  clear  cables  between  Paris  and 


The  Post-Office  Department  151 

Washington.  The  people  saw  through  it  as  the  sole  pur- 
pose of  keeping  from  them  knowledge  of  what  was  trans- 
piring at  the  World's  Peace  Congress  at  Paris — the  center 
of  the  world's  interest. 

With  the  postal  and  the  wire  services  of  the  country  in 
the  hands  of  a  politician  and  both  deteriorating  in  useful- 
ness, with  the  President  in  a  European  capital  instead  of  at 
the  American,  with  reconstruction  problems  pressing  for 
settlement  at  home  and  no  one  to  give  them  direction — with 
these  matters  and  others  of  imposing  stature  forging  to  the 
front,  the  outburst  of  the  people  became  so  violent  in  the 
spring  of  1919  that  the  President,  stung  to  action  by  the 
criticisms  heaped  upon  himself  and  the  Postmaster-General, 
directed  that  the  wires  be  returned  to  private  control.  So 
virulent  and  insistent  became  the  strictures  upon  the  Ad- 
ministration that,  though  Mr.  Burleson  announced  that  the 
land  wires  would  be  returned  as  soon  as  Congress  should 
make  provision  therefor,  the  country  was  surprised  the  very 
next  day,  May  2,  by  his  turning  them  back  on  that  date  with- 
out awaiting  further  "provision;"  and  the  cables  were  re- 
turned more  than  a  week  earlier  than  the  announced  date. 

The  most  vitriolic  of  these  attacks  upon  the  Administra- 
tion came  from  the  President's  own  party,  one  group  of 
whom  cabled  the  President  at  Paris  demanding  that  Mr. 
Burleson  be  immediately  relieved  of  his  office. 

The  two  main  reasons  for  the  inveterate  attacks  upon 
the  Administration's  wire  control  were  inefficiency  of  service 
and  attempted  political  manipulation,  including  government 
ownership.  But  the  immediate  cause  was  the  refusal  of 
telegraph  officials,  under  government  control,  to  transmit  a 
message  from  the  New  York  World  offering  other  news- 
papers an  article  in  which  Mr.  Burleson  was  criticised. 
Said  Collier's  Weekly:  "The  newspapers  are  making  a 
fight  for  self-preservation."  And  the  veteran  journalist  of 
the  Southland,  Henry  Watterson,  declared : 


152     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

That  war  involves  autocracy  I  understand  well  enough,  but  in  the 
field,  not  in  the  White  House;  over  the  international  situation,  not 
over  our  domestic  affairs.  ...  I  reject,  loathe  and  spit  upon  the  plea 
that,  because  of  war,  the  press  should  abdicate  its  duty  to  the  people. 

Mr.  Burleson  undertook  to  answer  the  complaints  at  a 
meeting  of  representatives  of  business  organizations  and  of 
postal  service,  held  in  Washington  in  April,  1919.  But  it 
was  only  when  the  wires  were  taken  out  of  his  hands  that 
the  wrath  of  the  people  subsided. 

It  is  a  matter  of  historic  interest  that  postal  air  service 
was  established  in  the  most  pressing  of  war  activities,  on 
May  15,  1918.  The  first  route  lay  between  New  York  and 
Washington.  This  route  was  later  discontinued,  because 
it  was  said  mail  between  the  two  terminals  was  delayed 
rather  than  hastened  by  the  service. 

The  War  Department  at  first  operated  the  mail  planes; 
but  on  August  12,  1918,  the  transfer  of  the  equipment  and 
flying  operations  of  the  aerial  mail  service  to  the  Post- 
Office  Department  was  effected.  The  New  York-Chicago 
route  was  inaugurated  the  following  December,  and  in  three 
legs:  New  York  to  Belief onte,  Pennsylvania,  215  miles; 
thence  to  Cleveland,  250  miles;  the  last,  to  Chicago,  323 
miles.  Each  had  a  midway  emergency  station.  In  Decem- 
ber the  War  Department  turned  over  to  the  Post-Office 
Department  one  hundred  other  airplanes,  it  having  been 
found  feasible  to  carry  mail  by  air.  These  included  large 
bombing  planes  capable  of  carrying  a  ton  or  more. 

Though  there  had  been  doubt  among  aeronautic  au- 
thorities as  to  the  ability  to  maintain  the  service  in  all  kinds 
of  weather,  the  Post-Office  department  demonstrated  its 
practicability.  During  the  second  year  of  Its  service,  postal 
airplanes  covered  498,664  miles,  carrying  538,734  pounds 
of  mail,  with  a  reported  average  of  87  per  cent  perfect  per- 
formance, including  all  conditions  of  weather.  This  is  far 
higher  than  the  train  service,  which  is  placed  at  62  per  cent 
on  time. 


The  Post-Office  Department  153 

America's  best  ideals  must  be  saved  to  the  world,  and 
demagogic  performances  smothered.  The  nation  has  put 
too  much  into  its  Post-Office  Department,  and  its  operation 
conies  too  close  to  the  daily  life  of  the  people  to  have  it 
turned  into  a  politician's  paradise. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE  PRESS  AND  PUBLIC  OPINION 

One  of  the  undimmed  glories  of  America  is  the  liberty 
of  the  press  and  freedom  of  speech.  This  is  an  enduring 
heritage  from  her  foundation,  and  it  shall  continue  to  the 
last  roll-call  of  her  free  sons  and  daughters. 

If  ever  it  shall  be  lost,  then  America  of  noble  tradition 
is  lost,  replaced  by  an  alien  America.  If  ever  it  shall  wane 
or  grow  dim,  it  will  be  because  of  sinister  influences  seek- 
ing, not  America's  honor,  but  personal  aggrandizement.  It 
can  be  brought  about  only  by  some  stupendous  cataclysm, 
when  a  seeming  danger  may  close  the  eyes  of  her  citizenship 
to  the  real  danger. 

There  was  suggestion  of  this  during  the  Great  War. 
There  was  evident  at  the  very  fountain-head  of  the  gov- 
ernment an  autocratic  assumption  of  responsibility  for 
public  opinion.  The  nation  came  to  be  governed  by  organ- 
ized opinion.  It  was  a  result  of  this  system  that  the  Ameri- 
can people  were  kept  in  ignorance  as  to  the  conduct  of  the 
war  which  they  fought,  for  which  so  extravagant  a  price 
was  paid. 

As  a  means  of  getting  to  the  public  such  information  as 
it  was  deemed  proper  for  the  public  to  have  there  was  es- 
tablished a  daily  newspaper,  under  the  control  of  the  gov- 
ernment, edited  and  managed  by  the  committee  on  publicity 
with  George  Creel  at  its  head.  This  was  the  Official  Bul- 
letin. While  this  assumed  to  give  out  orders  and  state- 
ments that  were  deemed  proper  from  the  various  branches 
of  the  government  service,  it  was  turned  largely  into  a  pub- 
licity political  bureau  to  bring  the  President  into  favorable 
light,  by  the  shading  and  coloring  that  were  given  to  much 

154 


The  Press  and  Public  Opinion  155 

that  appeared  in  its  columns.  Hence,  despite  the  fact  that 
the  committee's  publicity  matter  was  supported  by  the  Gov- 
ernment, it  soon  fell  into  discredit.  The  New  York  World, 
an  Administration  organ,  declared  the  President  of  the 
American  Newspaper  Publishers'  Association  demanded 
that  the  "incompetent  and  disloyal"  head  of  the  committee 
be  let  out.  Stung  by  criticism,  Mr.  Creel  himself  admitted 
in  a  public  meeting  in  Philadelphia,  that  the  ostensible  pur- 
pose of  the  committee  was  a  failure.  He  stated:  "The 
fundamentally  important  news  of  the  war  for  the  enlighten- 
ment of  Americans  has  been  available,  but  not  one  paper  in 
a  hundred  has  had  the  brains  to  publish  it."  He  referred  to 
the  Official  Bulletin. 

There  were  three  classes  of  American  public  opinion 
at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  in  Europe :  A  powerful  minor- 
ity, clear-eyed  on  the  fundamentals  of  the  issue ;  a  viciously 
pro-German,  unscrupulous,  determined,  and  abundantly 
financed  class;  and  that  composed  of  persons  who  knew 
nothing  about  the  issues  raised  by  the  attack  of  the  German 
people  upon  civilization,  and  who  cared  less,  known  as 
"neutrals" — the  class  who  inspired  timid  statesmanship 
with  a  fear  at  the  ballot-box.  It  was  at  this  time,  when  the 
Administration  should  have  been  outspoken  and  should  have 
aroused  the  American  people  to  their  danger  in  clarion 
notes,  that  the  nation  was  deliberately  permitted,  if  not 
actively  encouraged,  by  the  Administration  to  drift  or  to 
be  carried  away  with  pro-German  propaganda  put  out  by 
such  men  as  Dernberg.  The  nation  thus  faced  the  home 
problem,  as  serious  as  that  across  the  water.  And  while 
the  newspapers  felt  it  to  be  necessary  to  deal  with  it  by 
drastic  methods,  they  found  themselves  already  shackled 
by  the  Administration  forces.  Learning  of  dangerous  hap- 
penings beneath  the  surface,  they  dared  not  print  them.  It 
was  practically  impossible  to  use  facts  in  a  way  to  benefit 
the  country  by  speeding  up  the  war.  The  newspapers,  by 
assisting  in  the  lynching  of  public  opinion,  had  created  such 


156    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

a  disordered  state  of  mind  in  the  country  that  if  they  them- 
selves had  raised  their  voices  to  full  strength  in  protest 
against  inefficiency  they  would  have  been  denounced  as  "pro- 
German."  That  fear  hung  over  the  head  of  everybody. 
The  very  incompetents  who  should  have  been  shown  up  and 
thrown  out  sought  refuge  behind  this  psychological  bar- 
rier. Newspapers  above  all  things  dreaded  that  German- 
propaganda  charge,  and  rightly.  The  country  was  so 
worked  up  that  any  newspaper  might  have  been  ruined  by 
falling  under  that  suspicion,  however  baseless.  The  trouble 
was  that  the  public,  that  was  getting  its  denatured  news 
from  the  government  news  factories,  had  nothing  upon 
which  to  base  an  intelligent  and  honest  opinion.  Congress 
itself  was  all  but  terrorized.1 

How  far  American  newspapers  would  have  sunk  in  this 
slough  into  which  the  Administration  had  driven  them,  had 
not  they  received  encouragement  from  some  strong  man  in 
a  commanding  position,  it  would  be  difficult  to  say.  Roose- 
velt in  stentorian  tones  was  proclaiming  Americanism  at  all 
times.  Senator  Chamberlain,  chairman  of  the  Military  Af- 
fairs Committee,  in  his  New  York  speech  charged  that  in 
some  branches  the  War  Department  had  almost  ceased  to 
function ;  and  he  gave  courage  to  some  of  the  more  daring 
newspapers  in  the  investigation  of  the  War  Department 
which  he  conducted  and  which  did  so  much  to  speed  up  the 
war.  His  boldness  brought  forth  a  volley  of  denunciation 
from  President  Wilson.  The  titanic  struggle  brought  to 
Washington  Theodore  Roosevelt  who  declared  he  cared 
less  what  they  were  saying  about  Jiim  personally  than  he 
did  as  to  what  the  Administration  was  trying  to  do  to  Sen- 
ator Chamberlain.  The  issue  was  immediately  formulated 
between  the  Administration  forces  seeking  to  cover  up  reck- 
less squandering  and  more  reckless  benumbing  of  the  Ameri- 
can conscience  on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the  other  the  forces 
that  were  urging  America's  utmost  in  getting  into  the  war, 

*  George  Rothwell  Brown  in  North  American  Review  for  June,  1919. 


The  Press  and  Public  Opinion  157 

represented  by  such  men  as  Roosevelt  and  Chamberlain. 
It  gave  the  thoroughgoing  American  newspapers  a  new 
courage  and  a  new  dignity. 

The  arrogant  methods  which  were  actually  applied  to 
American  newspapers  by  the  Administration,  and  to  which 
the  American  newspapers  out  of  a  sheer  feeling  of  patriot- 
ism submitted,  out-distanced  anything  that  the  American 
mind  could  conceive  in  advance.  If  anything  appeared  in 
some  newspaper  more  fearless  than  the  rest,  that  was  dis- 
pleasing to  the  Administration  press  agent,  the  editor  would 
receive  a  haughty  communication,  stating:  "please  make  a 
correction  and  send  us  a  copy  of  the  paper  containing  it!" 
It  is  almost  unthinkable  that  self-respecting  newspapers 
would  ever  be  compelled  to  submit  to  such  autocratic  im- 
perialism. But  the  few  Washington  correspondents  during 
the  war,  who  revolted  at  the  surrender  of  a  noble  profes- 
sion, and  who  still  undertook  to  write  frankly  the  truth  as 
they  found  it  in  occasional  undefiled  channels,  were  threat- 
ened and  insulted. 

The  situation  became  unbearable.  In  consequence  of 
the  Administration  method  there  was  a  steady  decline  in 
the  morale  of  newspaper  men  in  Washington.  Their  con- 
ferences with  responsible  heads  of  departments  or  bu- 
reaus degenerated  into  farces,  and  correspondents  who  had 
been  proud  of  their  profession  lost  that  pride  and  all  but 
their  self-respect.  The  situation  became  so  bad  in  Wash- 
ington during  the  war  period  that  practically  every  little 
minor  official  had  a  press  agent  of  his  own  for  his  own  per- 
sonal glorification. 

It  was  this  system  that  worked  so  well  so  long  as  the 
American  people  knew  nothing  better.  Denatured  news 
which  turned  the  noble  and  highly  responsible  calling  of 
news  gathering  to  doing  the  will  of  incompetent  or  head- 
strong officials,  was  all  that  the  American  people  were  al- 
lowed to  receive.  It  was  this  kind  of  news  that  told  the 
people,  and  led  them  to  accept  as  fact,  the  story  of  a  mar- 


158     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

velous  sea  battle  on  July  4,  which  was  never  fought,  and 
made  possible  the  Liberty  Motor  hoax;  the  kind  of  news 
that  caused  uselessly  many  lives  to  be  lost  because  American 
soldiers  had  to  fight  hand  to  hand  with  the  veterans  of  the 
German  army  in  the  Argonne  Forest,  looking  anxiously  into 
the  skies  for  the  fleets  of  Yankee  airplanes  which  they  had 
read  about  in  every  deceived  American  newspaper,  but 
which  never  came  to  their  aid  because  they  did  not  exist. 

A  form  of  control  exercised  over  newspapers  defied  all 
but  an  official  inquiry.  To  quote  the  editor  of  a  daily  in 
Portland,  Maine: 

Two  editors  of  my  acquaintance  have  been  called  to  the  phone 
recently  by  local  government  officials  who  notified  them  that  if  fur- 
ther material  of  the  nature  mentioned  was  published  their  papers 
would  be  suppressed. 

This  occurred  just  previous  to  the  Maine  election  early 
in  September.  The  matter  referred  to  was  solely  Republi- 
can political  matter,  and  its  only  bearing  on  the  war  lay  in 
the  fact  that  it  aimed  to  prevent  the  election  of  Democrats 
in  the  place  of  Republicans  of  sound  war  record. 

When  the  President  sought  to  obtain  from  Congress  a 
drastic  censorship  law,  there  was  one  time  that  Congress  re- 
fused to  become  a  rubber  stamp  in  his  hands.  The  remorse- 
lessness  with  which  the  censorship  could  be  used  by  the 
Administration  was  clearly  manifested  in  the  fictitious  manu- 
factures that  were  sent  out  from  Paris  while  the  World 
Congress  was  in  session.  It  was  also  shown  how  it  could 
be  abused  when  Washington  was  giving  out  that  the  total 
of  American  losses  in  the  war  would  not  exceed  100,000 
at  the  very  time  when  it  was  well  known  that  they  would 
exceed  250,000.  And  this  was  after  the  armistice  was 
signed  when  the  Administration  felt  that  the  American  peo- 
ple could  not  stand  the  truth  about  our  battle  casualties. 

Early  in  August,  1918,  Mr.  Burleson  announced  that, 
in  order  to  "provide  for  the  press  the  most  efficient  wire 


The  Press  and  Public  Opinion  159 

facilities  under  government  control,"  he  purposed  taking 
over  the  news  wire.  The  intent  of  this  was  plain  to  all 
newspaper  men,  for  the  unews  wire"  had  long  been  known 
as  the  best  organized  part  of  the  entire  telegraph  service. 
It  had  been  given  preference  over  market  and  commercial 
wires,  and  was  always  the  first  wire  up  after  disasters  such 
as  the  Galveston  flood,  the  San  Francisco  fire,  or  the  loss 
of  the  "Titanic."  It  was  always  as  nearly  perfect  as  any- 
thing human  could  make  it ;  and  it  was  less  in  need  of  atten- 
tion than  any  other  mechanical  device  in  the  country. 

The  fact  of  the  matter  is  that  Mr.  Burleson's  bring- 
ing the  news  service  under  his  control  and  the  political  in- 
terests he  represented  was  to  mean  a  censorship  of  all  news 
— not  by  the  usually  frank  method  of  the  blue  pencil,  but  by 
the  winding  method  of  official  delay,  holding  it  up  until  its 
news  value  was  lost.  It  was  easy  for  Burleson  and  his 
associates  to  say  to  correspondents  handling  material  ob- 
noxious to  him,  that  "the  pressure  of  official  business"  re- 
quired the  full  capacity  of  the  news  wires. 

When  the  New  York  Nation  was  suppressed  and  op- 
pressed by  the  Post-Office  Department,  it  threatened  to 
establish  its  rights  by  carrying  to  the  Supreme  Court  the 
case  of  its  disbarment  from  the  mails.  In  this  manner  it 
succeeded  in  having  the  Post-Office  Department  remove  the 
ban  against  its  circulation. 

Referring  to  its  experience  with  Mr.  Burleson  it  stated: 

Obviously,  what  happens  to  the  Nation  itself  is,  despite  its  fifty- 
three  years  of  honorable  and  patriotic  service,  of  little  importance 
compared  to  the  principles  at  stake.  .  .  .  Freedom  of  dissent  is  a  true 
national  safety  valve;  more  than  that,  it  is  a  mark  of  true  democracy 
without  which  in  war  time  any  pretension  to  democracy  lays  itself 
open  to  the  charge  of  hypocrisy. 

It  was  apparent  to  all  intelligent  observers  that  Mr. 
Burleson  was  no  longer  merely  seeking1  to  prevent  sedition 
and  treason,  but  he  aimed  more  to  control  public  opinion. 


160     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

The  one  central  will  which  dominated  the  powers  of 
government  in  Washington  was  that  one  in  the  White 
House.  Gathering  into  his  own  hands  all  the  powers  of 
press  and  legislature,  he  parceled  them  out  according  to  his 
pleasure,  to  bureaus  and  extra-governmental  boards  and 
commissions.  It  was  impossible  for  one  man  to  keep  track 
of  and  to  disseminate  all  the  news,  though  all  was  retained 
in  his  grasp.  The  news  agent  developed.  He  became  an 
important  figure  in  Washington — to  newspapers  of  the  coun- 
try be  became  a  dominant  figure.  Two  institutions  sprang 
into  existence  fatal  to  the  free  press — the  press  agent,  and 
its  corollary,  the  official  denial.  These  two  were  insepa- 
rable. The  institution  thus  developed,  the  press  agent 
became  a  pernicious  factor  in  the  formulating  of  public 
opinion.  It  developed,  during  the  war,  into  the  like  of 
which  this  country  had  never  before  known.  The  "denial" 
by  a  government  official  was  as  essential  to  government- 
owned  publicity  as  was  the  press  agent  himself.  The  pur- 
pose of  the  denial  was  to  strike  the  venturesome  newspaper 
that  would  seek  to  uncover  official  fiction  by  invading  the 
forbidden  fields  of  fact.  Both  publishers  and  news  gath- 
erers, in  many  instances,  felt  it  to  be  a  patriotic  duty  to 
close  their  eyes  to  what  was  obviously  going  on,  and  accept 
the  output  of  the  official  news  factories  and  send  it  broad- 
cast, accepting  the  theory  that  in  so  doing  they  were  per- 
forming a  conscientious  duty. 

It  became  evident,  after  a  little  close  observation,  that 
the  activities  of  the  Administration  in  suppressing  news- 
papers were  directed  not  solely  against  pro-German  publi- 
cations. The  Christian  Science  Monitor  of  Boston,  a  news- 
paper in  no  way  radical  in  its  editorial  policy  and  very  con- 
servative in  its  news  policy,  was  denied  circulation  for 
three  days  as  a  punishment  for  its  publication  of  the  avia- 
tion report  and  comment  thereon.  The  Detroit  News  was 
barred,  for  the  same  reason,  from  circulation  in  Canada, 


The  Press  and  Public  Opinion  161 

where  it  circulates  30,000  copies.  The  absurdity  of  this 
action  was  seen  in  the  fact  that  its  direct  competitor  for 
the  Canadian  circulation,  the  Montreal  Star,  published  the 
committee's  report  almost  in  full  and,  of  course,  without 
punishment.  The  New  York  Times,  never  accused  of  di- 
vulging military  secrets,  suffered  the  penalty  of  having  its 
foreign  edition  containing  the  report  suppressed  without 
notification. 

Commenting  on  these  facts  Senator  Lodge,  in  an  au- 
thorized interview,  said: 

The  purpose  of  the  government  is  plain.  If  material  appears 
which  the  government  says  cannot  be  sent  abroad,  that  will  tend  to 
make  every  newspaper  refuse  to  publish  that  matter.  The  effect  of 
this  governmental  order  would  be  to  prevent  the  publication  of  any- 
thing relating  to  the  aircraft  situation  in  the  newspapers  by  refusing 
the  mails  to  them  to  go  abroad.  All  important  newspapers  send  more 
or  less  copies  to  Europe.  If  the  publication  of  any  matter  will  pre- 
vent their  going  abroad,  cost  them  money,  involve  the  loss  of  postage 
and  all  of  that,  of  course,  they  will  omit  such  matter  altogether,  and 
it  will  never  reach  the  American  people.  .  .  . 

In  addition  to  all  this,  reports  have  come  to  me  that  many  small 
newspapers  throughout  the  country  fear  to  make  any  independent 
report  of,  or  any  independent  comment  on,  the  news  of  the  day  be- 
cause of  coercion,  and  the  attitude  taken  by  most  of  them  is  the  easy 
one  of  preferring  existence  on  the  government's  terms  rather  than 
the  surely  hazardous  one  of  attempting  to  perform  a  difficult  duty 
toward  their  readers.  .  .  . 

If  it  is  possible  to  prevent  the  full  text  and  meaning  of  such  a 
report  as  that  of  the  Senate  Sub-Committee  on  Aviation  from  reach- 
ing all  classes  of  American  citizens,  then  how  are  our  people,  who 
deserve  to  know  the  truth  about  their  war,  for  it  is  emphatically  their 
war,  to  be  sure  that  any  of  the  information  being  served  them  is  reli- 
able? If  the  corps  of  specially  trained  writers  accustomed  to  serve 
the  newspapers  from  Washington  and  other  chief  centers  is  to  have 
its  opportunity  for  expression  choked  off,  then  who  henceforth  will 
have  confidence  in  the  dry  official  reports,  relieved  only  by  the  ques- 
tionable interpretation  of  an  official  press  bureau? 


1 62     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

The  effect  on  the  people  was  inevitable.  Deprived  of 
fact,  they  often  ran  into  fancy,  forming  erroneous  conclu- 
sions upon  misinformation.  Public  opinion  was  lynched. 
Freedom  of  thought  for  the  first  time  in  American  history 
was  suppressed.  Only  a  few  brave  voices  were  heard  in 
the  land. 

The  evidence  of  the  abject  servitude  of  the  Associated 
Press  was  made  notable  by  a  fulsome  eulogy  of  the  wonder- 
ful results  of  the  diplomacy  of  Edward  M.  House  abroad 
which  was  spread  all  over  the  country  in  an  Associated 
Press  dispatch  from  Paris  under  date  of  November  25, 
1918.  It  undertook  to  establish  the  fact  that  upon  his  ar- 
rival there  he  "found  little  disposition  among  American  and 
European  friends  to  accept  as  a  totality  the  framework  of 
peace  as  expressed  by  President  Wilson."  And  making  it 
plain  that  through  his  efforts  the  desired  object  of  the  Ad- 
ministration was  fully  realized. 

With  the  Associated  Press  and  other  press  agencies 
under  its  authority,  the  Administration  not  only  distributed 
but  manufactured  the  news  of  the  day  to  suit  its  own  exi- 
gencies. 

Shortly  after  the  beginning  of  the  war,  the  various  news 
agencies,  such  as  the  Associated  Press  and  the  United  Press, 
voluntarily  announced  that  they  would  send  to  their  clients 
only  such  material  as  would  conform  to  government  re- 
quirements. While  the  attempt  was  made  to  have  this 
appear  as  a  restriction  to  prevent  the  circulation  of  infor- 
mation of  value  to  the  enemy,  in  effect  it  became  a  political 
control  denying  circulation  of  all  facts  which  it  was  proper 
that  the  American  public  should  know,  but  which  certain 
agents  of  the  Administration  might  desire  not  to  have 
known.  Such  an  instance  was  that  of  the  report  of  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Military  Affairs  on  aircraft  condi- 
tions. This  was  a  matter  of  momentous  import  to  the 
American  public.  Yet  only  one  newspaper,  the  New  York 
Times,  carried  it  in  full.  The  Associated  Press  sent  out  a 


The  Press  and  Public  Opinion  163 

relatively  small  amount  of  it,  and  that  made  up  largely 
of  generalizations  and  evidently  a  dispatch  previously  sub- 
mitted for  official  approval.  The  reason  given  was  that 
the  papers  feared  to  publish  what  the  Administration  de- 
sired to  have  kept  under  cover.  The  reason  officials  gave 
was  they  did  not  wish  it  to  reach  the  enemy,  as  it  would  re- 
veal the  military  secrets  of  the  United  States  Government. 

Senator  Lodge  very  truthfully  stated  on  the  floor  of 
the  Senate:  "Our  enemies  know  the  contents  of  the  re- 
port, our  Allies  know  the  contents  of  it,  and  the  only  people 
who  do  not  know  about  it  are  the  people  of  the  United 
States."  It  would  hardly  be  denied  that  the  people  of  the 
United  States  were  the  ones  who  had  the  most  right  to 
know  what  a  committee  of  their  senators  had  to  say  after 
a  full  investigation  of  the  aircraft  situation. 

Had  the  newspapers  submitted  to  the  outraged  sense  of 
decency  in  the  action  of  Mr.  Baker  in  refusing  newspaper 
distribution  containing  the  Senate  committee's  report  on  the 
aircraft  collapse,  it  would  have  meant  the  end  of  a  free 
press.  It  would  have  marked  the  beginning  of  the  decay 
of  American  manhood.  It  would  have  foreshadowed  the 
killing  at  home  of  the  American  freedom  for  which  the 
nation  made  sacrifices  so  many  and  so  great  on  the  fields  of 
France.2 

Already  the  cry  was  raised  by  the  more  alert  American 
newspapers,  Are  we  to  have  a  reptile  press?  And  with 
abundant  reason,  in  view  of  the  methods  pursued  by  the 
Administration  in  seeking  to  create  a  public  opinion  through 
the  news  columns  that  would  exalt  and  magnify  each  official 
under  Administration  influence  and  who  had  his  own  press 
agent. 

Theodore  Roosevelt's  expose  was  the  first  complete  view 
given  the  public  of  how  the  Administration  favored  power- 
ful papers  that  fawned  upon  its  acts.  Yet  it  was  well 
known  to  intelligent  editors  who  publish  throughout  the 

'Philadelphia  North  American,  September  9,  1918. 


164    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

country  that  the  Administration  sought  control  of  the  press 
through  rewards  of  favor  and  threats  of  punishment. 

One  of  the  first  demands  made  by  President  Wilson, 
after  the  declaration  of  war,  was  the  enactment  of  a  law 
that  would  have  empowered  him  to  suppress  arbitrarily  any 
critical  publication.  To  its  credit  Congress  declined  to 
accede  to  this.  There  was,  however,  a  measure  enacted 
sufficiently  drastic  to  intimidate  many  papers  that  did  not 
flatter  the  Administration.  Often  the  position  of  the  pub- 
lic press  was  humiliating  and  intolerable  for  loyal  American 
papers.  The  Administration  undertook  to  supply  informa- 
tion deemed  proper  for  the  public  to  have,  and  issued  daily 
great  masses  of  official  statements,  not  only  reciting  alleged 
facts,  but  urging  Administration  aims  and  policies.  In 
large  part,  the  statements  were  inaccurate,  misleading,  and 
conflicting.  Newspapers  disseminating  this  material  knew 
that  in  so  doing  they  were  often  helping  to  deceive  their 
readers.  But  there  was  nothing  else  for  them  to  do  if 
they  were  to  continue  as  newspapers.  It  was  sent  to  all 
alike;  and  if  any  of  the  flagrant  official  misrepresentations 
were  modified  or  omitted,  the  offending  newspaper  laid  it- 
self open  to  the  charge  of  not  "supporting  the  govern- 
ment." Few  newspapers  had  sufficient  command  of  the 
facts  to  make  it  safe  for  them  to  risk  a  controversy  by  chal- 
lenging statements  they  knew  to  be  untrue.  The  method 
was  simple  but  deadly. 

As  a  whole,  the  system  brought  the  American  press 
under  a  reign  of  terrorism,  few  of  the  newspapers  daring  to 
challenge  the  displeasure  of  an  Administration  which  had 
shown  that  it  did  not  scruple  to  use  the  postal  service  and 
the  Department  of  Justice  to  exact  servility.  Few  of  them 
had  the  strength  or  the  courage  to  risk  such  an  assault  as 
President  Wilson  made  upon  Senator  Chamberlain  when 
he  undertook  to  tell  the  nation  the  truth. 

One  Philadelphia  newspaper,  a  keen  analyst  of  the  Ad- 
ministration's acts  and  one  that  stood  notably  at  all  times 


The  Press  and  Public  Opinion  165 

for  unadulterated  Americanism  and  always  firmly  against 
the  murderous  tactics  of  Prussianism,  whether  in  Europe  or 
under  the  sea  or  on  the  sea  or  in  the  air  or  in  the  German 
propaganda  in  America,  had  an  experience  that  is  worthy 
of  permanent  record,  though  a  shameful  one  for  the  Ad- 
ministration. 

The  case  is  not  isolated  or  singular.  It  is  typical  of 
the  entire  Administration  method  in  dealing  with  that  class 
of  papers  which  was  so  independent  that  it  would  not  fawn 
upon  Administration  officials,  and  was  so  thoroughly  Ameri- 
can that  it  would  not  lower  its  standard  for  any  false  propa- 
ganda, German  or  other.  Because  of  this  the  story  is  re- 
corded in  substantially  its  own  words: 

In  discussing  editorially,  February  4,  1918,  the  Liberty  Motor, 
it  remarked  that  soon  the  original  model  "was  found  to  be  obsolete" 
and  "was  scrapped  and  the  name  adopted  for  a  new  and  radically 
different  model."  A  few  days  later  the  newspaper  received  an 
insolent  letter  from  one  Robert  C.  Benchley,  written  on  the  letter 
paper  of  the  chairman  of  the  aircraft  board,  stating  that  the  news- 
paper had  "put  itself  in  the  position  of  American  representative  of  the 
Berliner  Tageblatt"  by  spreading  such  "rumors."  There  had  been 
only  the  "normal"  change,  said  the  writer  of  the  letter,  from  eight 
to  twelve  cylinders,  and  he  bitterly  denounced  the  suggestion  that  that 
meant  the  original  model  had  been  found  "obsolete."  A  newspaper 
less  sure  of  its  facts  might  have  been  alarmed  by  this  "official"  re- 
buke, with  its  impudent  charge  of  disloyalty.  The  newspaper  simply 
kept  on  telling  the  truth  until,  on  May  15  (more  than  three  months 
later),  the  War  Department,  in  a  formal  description  of  the  Liberty 
Motor,  itself  employed  the  very  word  the  newspaper  had  used,  when 
the  report  said:  "The  first  sample  was  an  8-cylinder  model.  This, 
however,  was  never  put  into  production,  as  advices  from  France  indi- 
cated that  demands  for  increased  power  would  make  the  8-cylinder 
model  obsolete  before  it  could  be  produced."  Again,  on  March  25, 
the  same  newspaper  printed  over  the  day's  account  of  the  great  Ger- 
man drive  a  7-column  headline  in  more  conservative  form  than  the 
dispatches,  reading:  "British  Line  Bends,  But  Holds,"  and  on  the 
same  page  a  2-column  head,  strictly  accurate,  reading:  "Germans 


1 66     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

Capture  Peronne:  Berlin  Boasts  of  Victory."  At  midnight,  news- 
boys selling  the  paper  were  threatened  by  a  secret-service  agent ;  who 
later  took  into  custody  the  office  employe  in  charge  of  the  boys  and 
conducted  him  nearly  to  the  federal  building  before  he  would  state 
what  charge  he  intended  to  make  against  him.  When  he  said  that  the 
newsboys  were  giving  "aid  and  comfort  to  the  enemy"  by  calling  out 
that  the  Germans  had  captured  a  town  and  added  that  this  was  a 
part  of  the  North  Americans  pro-Germanism,  the  preposterous 
charge,  once  stated  in  words,  appeared  to  frighten  him,  he  lost  his 
nerve,  released  the  employe,  with  a  warning  that  the  newspaper  would 
hear  from  the  Department  of  Justice.  When  the  newspaper  under- 
took to  ascertain  who  the  agent  was,  the  department  declined  to  per- 
mit his  name  to  be  known. 

Einer  Barfod,  of  the  staff  of  the  same  paper,  is  of  Danish  birth. 
His  passionate  loyalty  to  America  is  equaled  only  by  his  detestation 
of  Germany.  Yet  from  government  circles  there  emanated  an  insin- 
uation that  he  was  a  German  spy  employed  by  a  German  sheet. 
Reginald  Wright  Kauffman,  a  former  correspondent  of  the  same 
newspaper  at  the  front,  a  member  of  the  vigilantes,  a  group  of  writers 
standing  for  Americanism  above  all  else,  and  standing  for  it  when 
the  Administration  was  truckling  to  German  frightfulness,  and  whose 
utter  devotion  to  the  cause  of  the  United  States  and  the  Allies  was 
so  well  known  that  he  had  confidential  relations  with  Lloyd  George, 
Mr.  Bryce,  high  French  statesmen  and  General  Foch, — because  he 
questioned  the  wisdom  of  some  Administration  policies  the  whisper 
was  sent  out  against  him  that  he  was  pro-German,  and  agents  of  the 
Department  of  Justice  were  instructed  to  examine  his  record.  The 
system  of  intimidation  was  so  villainous  that  even  the  name  of  the 
editor  of  the  newspaper,  Van  Valkenburg,  was  seized  upon  with  the 
false  suggestion  that  he  was  a  German,  though  it  is  no  more  German 
than  Wilson  and  Baker,  and  his  ancestors  had  been  in  America  250 
years  before  some  of  the  Bolsheviki  who  fawn  upon  the  Administra- 
tion had  set  feet  on  American  soil. 

The  revolting  disclosures  respecting  the  system  is  that  seditious 
utterances  against  the  United  States  might  be  safely  made  by  news- 
papers which  adulate  the  President,  while  truthful  and  helpful  criti- 
cism of  the  Administration  had  become  dangerous  for  publications 
which  were  wholly  and  devotedly  loyal  to  the  country,  and  it  was 
shown  that  the  price  of  immunity  was  undiluted  servility.  Just  criti- 


The  Press  and  Public  Opinion  167 

cism  of  governmental  blundering  and  inefficiency  mortally  offended 
the  authorities  which  tolerated  downright  disloyalty  from  journals 
which  flattered  the  President.3 

Perhaps  in  all  the  developments  that  the  Great  War 
produced  there  was  none  more  sinister  in  character  than  the 
lowering  of  the  American  press  to  idealize  an  individual, 
cloud  an  issue,  confuse  public  opinion,  as  seen  from  the 
point  of  view  of  American  institutions  of  liberty.  It  bred 
subserviency,  disguised  failure,  clothed  incompetency  with 
the  plumage  of  efficiency.  Back  of  the  wall  of  secrecy  and 
deceit,  reared  by  the  agile  manipulators  of  public  opinion 
throughout  the  war,  blunders  were  made  without  exposure 
and  repeated  the  frightful  course  because  of  that  very  lack. 
Gold  was  dissipated  without  detection,  fictitious  personages 
were  created  out  of  nothingness  and  pigmies  magnified  to 
the  stature  of  giants.4 

The  plan  of  the  Administration  was  merely  aided  by  the 
surrender  of  Congress  itself.  Congress  had  no  press  agent, 
had  no  need  for  any  under  conditions  that  existed.  As  a 
consequence,  congressmen  were  as  ignorant  of  what  was 
going  on  in  Administration  circles  as  any  one  else.  The 
only  real  source  of  news  was  an  inaccessible  figure  who  ter- 
minated his  intercourse  with  newspaper  men  shortly  after 
proclaiming  the  policy  of  "pitiless  publicity,"  and  who  re- 
sumed those  relations  only  after  his  return  from  Paris 
when  he  found  the  country  in  an  uproar  over  the  League 
of  Nations. 

As  illustrative  of  the  method  in  vogue,  Mr.  Taft's  ad- 
vocacy of  the  League  of  Nations  through  news  channels  was 
given  the  widest  publicity.  Although  long  a  private  citizen, 
as  an  advocate  of  the  President's  program  he  had  a  wider 
use  of  newspaper  columns  than  he  could  have  obtained  when 

3  Philadelphia  North  American,  May  30,  1918. 

4  A    very   enlightening   contribution    to    the    literature   of   the   war    upon 
the  method  adopted  by  the  Administration  for  the  purpose  of  formulating 
public  opinion  in  covering  up  its  own  defects  which  it  did  not  dare  to  per- 
mit  to   come   to   public   notice,    by    George   Rothwell    Brown    in   the   North 
American  Review  for  June,   1919. 


1 68    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

he  was  President,  except  in  interviews  and  signed  statements. 

As  a  result  of  the  thoroughness  of  the  Administration 
in  securing  control  of  the  news  channels,  by  fair  means  or 
foul,  there  came  to  exist  in  the  United  States  a  control  of 
the  press  and  a  suppression  of  vital  news  and  public  discus- 
sion which  it  would  be  difficult  to  parallel  in  English-speak- 
ing countries  except  to  go  back  300  years. 

On  the  great  issues  of  the  war  with  Germany  the  Ameri- 
can newspapers  were  almost  universally  right.  Loyal  to 
the  government,  they  were  far  in  advance  of  the  Adminis- 
tration in  upholding  the  views  of  liberty  and  proclaiming 
the  duty  of  America.  There  were  perhaps  not  to  exceed  a 
half-dozen  that  failed  to  exemplify  the  principles  of  democ- 
racy and  international  justice. 

Never  shall  a  free  press  loyal  to  free  institutions  be 
stifled  for  political  partisan  purposes  or  personal  aggran- 
dizement. 


CHAPTER  X 

LIQUOR  AND  VICE 

An  invariable  accompaniment  of  war  has  been  the  social 
evil.  And  the  social  evil  accepts  and  demands  intoxicating 
liquor  as  its  constant  companion  and  partner.  It  were  not 
just  to  President  Wilson  to  charge  that  he  in  any  manner  or 
degree  supported  the  former.  But  as  indicated  elsewhere,1 
it  appeared  to  be  a  marked  characteristic  of  his  to  be  found 
on  the  wrong  side  of  important  matters  affecting  the  great 
public;  so  he  was  found  on  the  great  matter  of  dealing  with 
the  latter. 

But  members  of  his  cabinet  who  had  to  take  care  of  the 
interests  of  the  fighting  boys  of  the  nation  and  to  look  after 
the  morale,  not  only  of  these  boys  but  of  the  nation  at 
large,  accepted  the  challenge  and  met  the  issue  squarely 
for  the  nation's  interests.  It  was  a  matter  of  large  con- 
cern to  the  millions  of  homes  whence  these  boys  came;  it 
was  a  matter  of  grave  interest  for  the  nation's  future. 

For  decades  the  liquor  problem  was  becoming  more 
acute  as  a  political  problem;  for  it  had  entered  the  political 
arena  under  the  guise  of  the  old  political  parties  which, 
in  large  measure,  it  controlled,  the  liquor  power  seeking  to 
keep  itself  hidden  from  public  view.  But  the  activities  of 
this  real  power  were  being  uncovered  just  before  the  Great 
War;  and  when  the  war  forced  to  the  front  the  necessity 
of  conserving  the  nation's  man-power  and  its  fuel  and  food 
supplies,  and  of  its  utmost  efficiency  in  workmanship  in  war 
preparations,  the  opposition  to  using  any  of  these  to  accom- 
modate the  politcal  and  commercialized  liquor  traffic  be- 
came more  emphatic.  And  when  the  Senate's  investigation 
1  Chapter  on  "Wilson  and  Wilsonism." 

169 


170    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

of  the  pro-German  propaganda  bared  the  fact  that  liquor's 
interests  were  inseparably  intertwined  with  that  propaganda, 
the  opposition  became  an  avalanche. 

As  to  the  social  vice,  it  is  a  matter  of  history  that  Con- 
gress had  taken  cognizance  of  it  as  an  interstate  affair  some 
years  previously  in  the  Mann  Act;  in  war  time  it  took  dras- 
tic action  in  dealing  with  its  associate  evil.  For  war  imparts 
new  life  and  new  energy  to  both;  and  it  was  realized  that  at 
such  a  time  both  must  be  handled  with  energy,  the  training- 
camp  being  a  particularly  fruitful  field  for  their  nefarious 
trade  at  the  time  when  the  best  that  is  in  man  is  demanded 
for  the  increased  burdens.  Said  the  eminent  Englishman, 
Lord  Haldane :  "If  the  country  were  free  from  tuberculosis 
and  venereal  disease,  the  nation  would  have  strength  and  vi- 
tality to  undertake  almost  any  burden."  And  the  British 
Royal  Commission,  seeking  to  overcome  the  recognized 
handicap,  declared  that  venereal  disease  was  responsible 
for  more  than  fifty  per  cent  of  the  incapacity  of  the  race 
to  have  children.  It  aims  straight  at  the  power  of  the  race 
to  perpetuate  itself.  Likewise,  Surgeon-General  Gorgas 
of  the  United  States,  in  urging  measures  that  were  later 
successfully  adopted  to  control  venereal  disease  within  the 
American  army  during  the  war,  stated  that  if  it  were  pos- 
sible to  get  rid  of  either  all  of  the  wounds  or  all  of  venereal 
disease  he  would  prefer  to  be  rid  of  the  latter. 

The  first  attack  upon  the  social  evil  during  the  war 
was  made  by  the  Council  of  National  Defense  and  the  Com- 
mission on  Training-Camp  Activities.  It  was  a  hard  fight 
against  the  forces  of  evil  organized  for  selfish  purposes 
even  against  the  boys  who  were  to  do  the  fighting  and 
against  the  very  morale  of  the  nation.  The  success  of 
the  crusade  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  one  hundred  and  ten 
cities  abolished  the  "red-light"  districts.  Laws  and  regula- 
tions were  adopted  in  the  various  states  requiring  physi- 
cians to  report  all  such  cases,  as  other  communicable  dis- 
eases were  reported. 


Liquor  and  Vice  171 

The  local  draft  boards  had  everywhere  uncovered  the 
ugly  fact  that  about  five  times  as  much  venereal  disease  ex- 
isted in  civil  life  as  was  found  proportionately  in  the  army. 
This  determined  the  army  and  navy  to  carry  its  fight  into 
civil  life.  In  doing  so  it  might  have  met  opposition,  had 
not  wide  circles  of  civilian  life,  which  otherwise  would  have 
remained  ignorant  and  complacent,  become  as  thoroughly 
aroused  at  the  conditions  thus  uncovered  as  did  the  army. 
And  what  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  undertook 
in  the  way  of  fighting  this  fearful  thing  came  as  a  result  of 
this  unwelcome  discovery.  The  fight  carried  on  by  the 
United  States  Public  Health  Service  after  the  war  became 
a  matter  of  utmost  importance. 

But  this  grievous  state  of  affairs  was  a  sad  admission  of 
inefficiency  in  American  municipal  government.  The  evil 
power  had  gained  the  upper  hand  largely  because  of  co- 
operation or  connivance  on  the  part  of  the  local  authorities. 
Great  cities,  when  called  upon  by  the  federal  authorities 
to  close  these  places  of  infamy,  at  the  beginning  of  the  war, 
declared  that  it  could  not  be  done,  that  the  police  forces 
were  incapable  of  it.  Secretary  of  the  Navy  Daniels  in- 
formed, first  the  local,  then  the  state  authorities,  that  unless 
they  were  able  to  abate  the  evil,  he  would  either  withdraw 
the  men  from  training  at  those  places,  or  else  would  take 
possession  by  the  strong  arm  of  the  navy.  It  had  become  a 
question  whether  these  corrupt  and  corrupting  forces  were 
mightier  than  the  municipal  and  state  authorities,  and  had 
become  so  powerful  as  to  dictate  to  the  national  govern- 
ment in  time  of  war. 

It  was  this  unyielding  attitude  toward  these  twin  vices 
that  brought  down  upon  his  head  the  malediction  of  power- 
ful interests  and  powerful  newspapers.  His  efforts  to  save 
the  men  under  him  from  these  evils  caused  vituperations 
to  be  heaped  upon  him  which  one  would  think  would  have 
been  heaped  rather  upon  the  evils  he  was  seeking  to  be  rid 
of.  It  was  the  very  old  story  over:  selfishness  seeking  its 


172    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

own,  at  no  matter  what  cost  in  money,  health,  self-respect, 
and  morale  for  the  sake  of  the  nation. 

But  while  war  is  the  prime  opportunity  of  these  evils,  it 
is  also  the  opportunity  to  organize  against  and  to  combat 
them.  In  a  public  statement  touching  this  phase  of  the 
matter,  Secretary  Daniels  declared: 

One  of  the  compensations  of  the  tragedy  of  the  war  is  the  fact 
that  an  enlightened  opinion  is  behind  the  organized  campaign  to  pro- 
tect the  youth  against  venereal  disease.  The  campaign  begun  in  war 
to  insure  the  military  fitness  of  men  for  fighting  is  quite  as  necessary 
to  save  men  for  civil  efficiency. 

And  future  generations  of  those  who  had  a  peculiar  interest 
in  the  sailor  boys,  many  of  whom  came  from  Christian 
homes,  will  rise  to  bless  the  Secretary  for  his  determined 
action  in  seeking  to  rid  naval  stations  of  these  training 
dens  of  vice  that  sprang  into  existence  as  if  by  magic  as 
soon  as  training  stations  were  opened  when  the  country 
entered  the  Great  War.  The  nation  was  placed  under  a 
great  debt  for  his  faithfulness  to  the  trust  reposed  in  him. 
Secretary  of  War  Baker  likewise  took  advanced  ground 
in  this  important  matter.  It  had  ever  been  declared  that 
the  evil  was  an  inevitable  accompaniment  of  war;  that  where 
armies  were  gathered,  there  it  was  sure  to  be  found;  that  it 
could  not  be  resisted.  Secretary  Baker  declared  not  only 
that  it  could  be  prevented,  but  that  it  must  be  prevented. 
In  a  letter  to  mayors  of  cities  he  plainly  stated: 

The  only  practical  policy  which  presents  itself  in  relation  to  this 
problem  is  the  policy  of  absolute  repression.  This  policy  involves,  of 
course,  constant  vigilance  on  the  part  of  the  police. 

Thus  he  was  strongly  backing  up  the  Council  of  National 
Defense  and  the  Commission  on  Training-Camp  Activities, 
and  Secretary  Daniels  was  in  hearty  accord. 

Yet  the  forces  of  unrighteousness  continued  their  efforts 
to  thwart  these  measures;  and  just  prior  to  the  middle  of 


Liquor  and  Vice  173 

August,  1918,  as  a  police  regulation  badly  needed,  and  its 
enforcement  no  less  required  because  of  the  incompetence 
or  indifference  of  the  police  of  the  various  cities  where  camps 
were  located,  there  were  issued  by  both  Secretary  Baker  and 
Secretary  Daniels,  the  result  of  conferences  held  by  repre- 
sentatives of  their  departments  with  the  Department  of 
Justice  and  the  Training-Camp  Commission,  orders  against 
prostitution  within  a  radius  of  ten  miles  of  any  army  or  navy 
camp,  station,  post  or  fort,  and  against  the  aiding  or  abet- 
ting of  it  in  any  way. 

In  the  same  manner  an  effort  was  made  in  good  faith 
to  break  up  the  sale  of  intoxicants  in  the  vicinity  of  camps 
and  to  those  in  the  camps;  and  stringent  measures  were 
taken  to  enforce  the  orders.  Special  care  was  taken  to  seek 
to  instil  into  the  minds  of  the  men  in  army  and  camp  the 
value  of  a  clean  life,  not  only  while  in  the  fighting  forces 
of  the  country  but  for  success  after  the  war  should  have 
concluded.  It  was  well  expressed  in  a  crude  manner  by 
a  somewhat  crude  mind:  "If  the  man  in  the  army  cannot 
mind  what  he  learned  there  how  to  take  care  of  himself 
after  he  gets  out,  it  is  all  the  worse  for  him;  I'll  say  they 
learned  me  somethings  I  didn't  know  about." 

One  of  the  important  results  attained  by  the  unceasing 
efforts  in  behalf  of  the  men  made  during  the  war  was  this 
looking  to  the  future  welfare.  It  set  civilian  agencies  at 
work  that  had  been  dormant.  Said  Chairman  Fosdick  of 
the  War  Department  Commission  on  Training-Camp  Ac- 
tivities, in  his  report  to  the  Secretary  of  War  in  1918 : 

It  has  been  our  purpose  to  keep  the  man  in  uniform  healthy  and 
clean,  physically  and  mentally,  by  safeguarding  him  against  evil  influ- 
ences and  surrounding  him  with  opportunity  for  sane,  beneficial  occu- 
pation for  his  spare  time. 

And  after  stating  that  the  army  section  and  the  navy  section 
were  so  closely  related  in  method  and  material  as  to  be 
treated  jointly,  he  adds: 


174    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

Their  purpose  is  to  give  to  every  soldier  and  sailor  in  the  service 
of  the  United  States  such  essential  facts  regarding  the  nature  and 
prevention  of  venereal  disease  as  will  contribute  to  the  protection  of 
his  health  and  to  the  efficiency  of  his  services  as  a  fighting  man. 

These  activities  began  in  August,  1917,  under  the  direction 
of  the  Council  of  National  Defense,  and  were  transferred, 
early  in  1918,  to  the  Commission  on  Training-Camp  Ac- 
tivities. And  it  was  the  more  than  50,000  letters  written 
to  citizens  in  700  communities  requesting  them  to  investigate 
local  conditions  and  to  urge  new  legislation  in  support  of 
the  government's  program  against  vice  and  liquor,  that 
brought  the  communities  into  full  co-operation  with  the 
army  and  navy. 

The  annual  reports  2  of  both  the  Secretary  of  War  and 
the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  for  1918,  stress  the  conditions 
under  which  the  men  trained  for  the  Great  War,  both  in 
the  army  and  the  navy;  and  state  how  men  that  had  for- 
merly been  turned  away  because  affected  by  the  vile  disease 
were  now  accepted  into  the  service  and  cured.  Secretary 
Daniels  called  attention  to  the  establishment  of  the  interde- 
partmental social  hygiene  board  in  the  effort  to  abate  and 
prevent  vice  conditions  throughout  the  country. 

In  furtherance  of  this  general  clean-up  plan,  fraternal 
organizations  and  commercial  bodies  wrote  the  Surgeon- 
General  that  they  were  ready  to  stand  by  him  shoulder  to 
shoulder  in  the  work.  And  medical  journals  and  physicians 
everywhere  enlisted  in  the  fight;  as  did  employers  in  industry 
by  awakening  their  employes  to  the  gravity  of  the  danger. 
And  the  United  States  Public  Health  Service  entered  upon 
a  campaign  of  education  for  the  public,  immediately  the  war 
ended.  In  December,  1918,  among  other  things  it  stated: 

Whatever  the  cost  of  this  campaign,  whether  that  cost  is  counted 
in  terms  of  money,  scientific  striving,  self-sacrificing,  educational 

3  Both  of  these  reports  are  full  of  food  for  reflection  on  this  vital  mat- 
ter. 


Liquor  and  Vice  175 

effort,  or  wise  restraint  in  personal  conduct,  it  will  be  immeasureably 
exceeded  by  the  gains. 

The  efforts  of  Secretary  Baker  and  Secretary  Daniels 
to  keep  the  army  and  navy  free  from  the  damning  influence 
of  intoxicants  were  seconded  by  Director-General  of  Rail- 
roads McAdoo  in  an  order  of  wide  influence  issued  August 
12,  1918,  wherein  he  stated: 

The  sale  of  liquors  and  intoxicants  of  every  character  in  dining- 
cars,  restaurants,  and  railroad  stations  under  federal  control  shall  be 
discontinued  immediately. 

In  the  midst  of  all  this  effort  to  keep  the  fighting  boys 
in  the  best  possible  trim  and  to  return  them  to  their  home 
as  free  from  the  liquor  taint  as  when  they  were  taken  thence 
to  fight  the  nation's  battles;  and  in  the  midst  of  all  the 
effort  to  conserve  man-power,  fuel,  food,  and  efficiency  to 
carry  the  war  to  a  successful  conclusion,  there  is  one  instance 
in  which  President  Wilson  made  an  order  that  appears  to 
be  against  the  liquor  business  and  in  favor  of  the  boys.  It 
was  issued  June  27,  1918,  promulgating  regulations  pro- 
hibiting the  furnishing  of  liquor  to  officers  and  men  of  the 
army  anywhere  in  the  United  States,  even  in  private  homes ; 
and  establishing  dry  zones  of  a  half-mile  within  any  camp 
where  as  many  as  250  men  were  stationed  for  more  than 
thirty  consecutive  days  where  there  was  a  city  permitting 
the  sale  of  liquors,  and  five  miles  in  all  other  places.  And 
this  order  was  issued  upon  recommendations  by  representa- 
tives of  the  Attorney-General,  the  Judge  Advocate  General 
of  the  army,  and  the  War  Department  Commission  on 
Training-Camp  Activities,  and  not  upon  the  President's 
initiative. 

On  the  contrary,  Secretary  Baker  continued  to  the  end 
to  plead  for  the  fighting  men,  even  on  December  6,  1918, 
appealing  to  friends  of  the  returning  soldiers  for  assistance 
in  discontinuing  the  giving  of  intoxicating  liquors  to  the 
men  as  a  part  of  home-coming  celebrations ; 


176    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

A  drunken  soldier  is  a  disgrace  to  his  uniform,  an  insult  to  the 
flag,  a  shame  to  himself,  and  a  danger  to  the  community.  .  .  . 

I  appeal  to  the  friends  of  our  boys  at  the  front  to  discourage  this 
abuse  of  hospitality.  Our  army  in  service  has  made  a  record  for 
cleanness  and  sobriety  of  which  the  country  has  the  right  to  be  proud. 
I  appeal  to  that  pride  to  help  the  men  to  live  up  to  their  record. 

This  was  the  first  effort  on  a  large  scale  to  reduce  to 
the  minimum  the  evils  of  drink  and  the  social  vice  in  time 
of  war.  Yet  even  in  this  effort,  the  voice  of  the  head  of 
the  Administration  in  support  of  the  liquor  interests,  when 
the  acute  stage  was  reached  during  the  struggle  at  arms, 
found  ready  echo  in  all  parts  of  the  land.  It  gave  encour- 
agement to  the  saloonists  and  the  lawless  elements  they 
represented.  This  was  true  of  the  lamentable  situation 
that  arose  at  the  great  naval  station  at  Newport,  Rhode 
Island;  of  the  worse  situation  that  developed  at  Chicago; 
of  that  in  Philadelphia,  where  the  governor  of  the  state 
had  to  inform  the  mayor  that  unless  the  local  authorities 
could  cope  with  the  situation  the  state  troops  would  be 
used.  Even  little  country  towns  in  the  inland  Middle  West 
felt  this  baneful  influence.3 

It  was  this  consistent  attitude  on  the  part  of  President 
Wilson  toward  the  liquor  interests  of  the  nation  that  en- 
couraged them  in  the  hope  and  opportunity  of  waging  a 
campaign  against  war-time  prohibition  long  before  it  was 
authorized  by  Congress.  After  Congress  had  authorized 
him  to  declare  war-time  prohibition,  he  delayed  as  long 

'The  small  village  of  Blooming  Prairie,  Minn.,  is  so  typical  an  in- 
stance of  this  influence  that  the  main  facts  are  cited.  In  mid-summer,  1918, 
the  saloonmen  of  this  village,  backed  by  some  stronger  but  unseen  hand, 
became  the  nucleus  of  lawless  bands.  The  state  commission  of  public 
safety  found  it  necessary,  owing  to  this  condition  in  war  time,  to  order 
the  saloons  closed.  Open  defiance  of  this  order  caused  the  governor  of  the 
state  to  station  troops  in  the  village  to  enforce  the  commission's  orders. 
The  saloonists  going  to  a  state  judge,  a  man  of  the  creation  of  their  own 
element,  undertook  to  hale  the  governor  of  the  commonwealth,  commander- 
in-chief  of  the  state's  military  forces,  into  court,  in  time  of  war,  to  answer 
the  charge  of  contempt  of  court  on  his  part  for  not  telling  the  court  why 
it  was  necessary  to  enforce  the  orders  of  the  commission  touching  the 
dangers  of  open  connivance  at  law  violation  at  such  a  time! 


Liquor  and  Vice  177 

as  it  seemed  possible.  Before  action  by  Congress,  he  in- 
terfered with  every  move  to  discontinue  the  manufacture 
of  liquor  from  the  beginning  of  the  war.  Immediately  after 
the  country  entered  the  war,  both  houses  of  Congress,  re- 
gardless of  party  lines,  went  on  record  for  the  suppression 
of  the  liquor  traffic  as  a  necessary  means  of  conserving 
the  nation's  resources  and  energies  for  the  conflict.  Senti- 
ment throughout  the  country  backed  this  action.  Hostile 
orders  from  the  White  House  prevented.  As  early  as  June, 
1917,  the  sentiment  was  so  strong  that  the  House  passed, 
by  a  vote  of  365  to  5,  an  amendment  to  a  food  bill,  for- 
bidding the  use  of  foodstuffs  in  the  manufacture  of  intoxi- 
cants during  the  war.  President  Wilson  intervened  and 
had  the  Senate  adopt  a  compromise  which  stopped  the  mak- 
ing of  distilled  spirits  and  empowered  the  President  to  limit 
the  alcoholic  content  of  beer.  From  the  time  this  bill  be- 
came a  law  in  August,  1917,  the  President  had  the  power 
of  life  and  death  over  the  liquor  industry.  It  was  from  this 
time  on  that  the  campaign  of  the  liquor  forces  became  more 
vigorous  than  ever.  They  now  knew  that  the  President  was 
with  them.  It  was  not  difficult  to  account  for  the  outbreaks 
of  disorder  and  the  resistance  to  the  orders  of  the  state 
commissions  of  public  safety  in  war  time. 

The  intelligence  of  the  nation  could  not  understand  the 
President's  conduct  in  this  matter.  The  pound  of  coal  re- 
quired to  make  a  pint  of  beer  he  was  unwilling  to  have  saved 
to  warm  shivering  children,  to  heat  school-houses  and 
churches  so  that  they  might  be  kept  open,  to  save  three 
million  tons  a  year  for  legitimate  purposes.  Moreover, 
reports  indicated  that  the  twenty-five  per  cent  increased  out- 
put of  fuel  requested  by  the  national  fuel  administration 
was  promptly  forthcoming  in  the  states  in  which  prohibition 
of  the  liquor  traffic  was  already  enforced,  while  the  other 
states  had  to  report  that  it  was  impossible  to  get  out  the 
desired  increase.  The  President's  action  was  understood 
only  from  one  possible  angle — he  was  angling  for  the  liquor 


178    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

vote,  with  the  hope  that  he  might  win  thereby  the  labor  vote. 
At  all  events,  it  was  not  till  September  16,  1918,  that  he 
issued  his  proclamation  under  Act  of  Congress  of  August 
10,  1917,  forbidding  the  use  of  foods  to  produce  malt 
liquors  after  November  30,  1918,  a  few  months  before  war- 
time prohibition  became  effective.  And  he  let  it  be  known 
that  his  action  was  taken  after  a  conference  with  the  Food, 
Fuel,  and  Railroad  Administrations  and  the  War  Indus- 
tries Board.  Had  it  not  been  for  his  determined  opposition, 
suspension  of  the  liquor  traffic  would  have  ceased  nearly 
two  years  earlier  than  it  did.  It  was  June,  1918,  that  an 
irrepressible  movement  for  war  prohibition  began.  White 
House  Intervention  postponed  action  until  the  end  of  Au- 
gust, and  it  was  November  21  (after  the  armistice  was 
signed)  that  the  President  signed  the  emergency  food  bill 
with  an  amendment  making  the  whole  country  dry  for  the 
period  of  the  war  and  demobilization. 

Here  again  the  President  used  his  influence  and  the 
power  of  his  official  position  to  defer  suspension  of  the 
traffic.  An  overwhelming  majority  in  Congress  wanted  the 
act  to  become  effective  at  the  end  of  1918  ;  President  Wilson, 
without  stating  any  sufficient  reason,  urged  postponement 
to  the  end  of  1919.  This  would  have  given  the  liquor  busi- 
ness another  extension  of  twelve  months.  It  was  finally 
agreed  that  the  time  limit  be  fixed  at  June  30,  1919.  This 
constant  favor  shown  the  business  by  the  President  led 
Homer  W.  Tope,  superintendent  of  the  Anti-Saloon  League 
of  Pennsylvania,  to  criticize  President  Wilson's  stand  as  ua 
discrimination  in  favor  of  the  liquor  interests  for  which 
the  Hearst  papers  and  the  German-American  Alliance  have 
been  fighting  for  years." 

While  the  important  measure  known  as  the  war-time 
prohibition  bill  was  but  a  rider  to  the  emergency  agricul- 
tural appropriation  bill,  it  became  the  chief  measure,  the 
agricultural  feature  being  wholly  forgotten.  In  the  con- 
troversy, the  two  forces,  those  representing  the  liquor  in- 


Liquor  and  Vice  179 

terests  and  those  against  them,  showed  the  old  "line-up  of 
booze  or  bread;  between  special  privilege  and  war  efficiency; 
between  waste  and  conservation;  between  instinctive  whole- 
hearted patriotism  and  alcoholic  patriotism,"  as  put  by  one 
leading  newspaper.  The  fact  is,  the  President  maneuvered 
until  he  succeeded  in  having  lodged  in  his  hands  all  power 
to  commandeer  all  stocks  of  distilled  liquors  and  to  control 
or  stop  the  production  of  beer.  From  that  time  on  the 
traffic  continued  only  by  his  permission.  And  a  large  propa- 
ganda was  put  forth  to  blindfold  the  people — a  customary 
practice  of  the  Administration  when  it  had  something  to 
bring  forth  that  would  not  bear  investigation.  It  was  on 
this  occasion  that  Mr.  Hoover  gave  out  his  statement  that 
the  diversion  of  a  mere  40,000,000  bushels  of  grain  an- 
nually to  the  brewers  was  negligible,  though  he  had  been 
sedulously  instructing  the  housewives  of  the  land  to  save 
every  ounce  of  flour  and  that  the  winning  of  the  war  de- 
pended upon  it.  These  wives  of  the  country  sat  up  and 
took  notice.  Mr.  Hoover  also  gave  out  the  opinion  that 
the  troops  might  be  debauched  with  whiskey  and  gin,  if  not 
allowed  beer,  though  that  matter  was  fully  in  the  hands  of 
the  President. 

So  insistent  was  the  Administration  head  to  have  liquor 
continued  that  it  was  declared  that  efficiency  in  shipbuilding 
required  it.  Bainbridge  Colby,  formerly  a  Progressive 
and  who  had  held  to  saner  views,  declared  for  liquid  effi- 
ciency in  shipbuilding;  he  had  only  opinion  to  offer,  but 
that  opinion  was  that  efficiency  might  be  expected  to  drop 
25  per  cent  without  the  stimulant.  But  this  was  good  ma- 
terial for  extensive  liquor  advertising  and  it  was  used  to 
the  utmost.  Postmaster-General  Burleson,  the  politician 
of  the  Administration  and  seemingly  the  direct  representa- 
tive thereof,  an  ardent  pro-liquor  advocate,  was  against 
prohibition  on  the  ground  that  it  would  "cause  a  fight  in 
every  congressional  district."  Samuel  Gompers,  president 
of  the  American  Federation  of  Labor,  found  in  the  union 


180    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

sixty  thousand  bartenders,  and  he  was  also  against  it.  And 
as  President  Wilson  had  declared  that  he  liked  "to  lay  his 
mind  along  side"  of  that  of  Mr.  Gompers,  it  was  not  diffi- 
cult for  the  two  Presidents  to  think  alike  on  this  matter. 
Mr.  Hurley,  of  the  Shipping  Board,  also  was  of  opinion 
that  efficiency  demanded  liquor.  But  these  were  chiefly 
opinions. 

On  the  other  hand,  Fuel  Administrator  Garfield  in- 
formed the  brewers  that  they  need  not  expect  to  be  allowed 
more  fuel  than  actually  required  to  "utilize  the  materials 
in  the  process  of  manufacture,  including  malt  already  manu- 
factured." This  was  taken  to  mean  the  end  of  the  brewing 
business  whether  Congress  acted  or  not.  And  while  the 
President  approved  it,  it  was  believed  he  did  so  in  order 
to  snatch  the  credit  from  Congress ;  it  was  in  great  contrast 
with  the  Administration's  opposition  to  the  House  rider  on 
the  ground  that  it  would  put  the  country  on  a  "whiskey 
basis."  In  his  order  of  July  3,  1918,  Fuel  Administrator 
Garfield  prohibited  the  use  of  fuel  by  brewers  in  excess  of 
fifty  per  cent  of  the  average  they  had  used  1915-1917. 

To  make  matters  hard  for  the  efficiency  plea  of  the  pro- 
liquor  members  of  the  Administration,  there  came,  on  July 
12,  1918,  the  declaration  of  the  National  Coal  Association 
to  the  fuel  administrator  that  "immediate  nation-wide  pro- 
hibition is  absolutely  necessary  if  the  extra  hundred-million 
tons  of  coal  a  year  needed  by  the  country  in  its  war  on  Ger- 
many is  to  be  mined."  This  association  represented  the 
bituminous  operators,  producing  400,000,000  tons  of  coal 
yearly. 

The  same  month  that  the  shipbuilders  were  seeking  to 
retain  the  liquor  traffic  for  efficiency's  sake,  an  inspector 
from  the  quartermaster's  department  of  the  federal  gov- 
ernment was  sent  to  Kenosha,  Wisconsin,  to  ascertain  the 
cause  of  failure  to  keep  up  with  the  war  contracts  with  the 
government.  He  reported  that  the  delay  was  due  to  the 
wide-open  and  law-breaking  saloons;  that  after  spending 


Liquor  and  Vice  181 

Sunday  in  carousing,  many  of  the  men  did  not  report  for 
duty  Monday.  Immediately  the  manufacturers,  local  au- 
thorities, and  saloonists  entered  into  an  agreement  whereby 
saloons  were  to  close  Saturday  evenings  and  not  open 
until  the  men  had  gone  to  work  Monday  morning,  rather 
than  lose  the  hundreds  of  thousands  of  dollars  in  con- 
tracts. 

It  was  an  open  secret  that  the  President's  action  upon 
matters  touching  the  liquor  traffic  reflected  the  fact  that 
his  three  trusted  advisers  in  political  affairs  were  three  men 
who  stood  well  with  the  liquor  forces  of  the  nation :  Post- 
master-General Burleson,  Samuel  Gompers,  and  Private 
Secretary  Tumulty.  However,  his  attitude  had  little  influ- 
ence with  Congress,  which  body  was  hearing  from  the  "folks 
back  home."  It  is  probable  that  there  was  never  a  presi- 
dential veto  handled  with  so  little  respect  for  the  vote  power 
as  was  President  Wilson's  veto  of  the  bill  to  enforce  con- 
stitutional prohibition.4  In  spite  of  the  efforts  of  the  liquor 
people,  it  required  the  House  a  scant  two  hours  to  pass 
it  over  his  veto  by  a  vote  of  176  to  55 ;  and  in  still  less  time 
for  the  Senate,  on  the  following  day,  to  pass  it  by  a  vote 
of  65  to  20. 

The  extraordinary  vacillation  of  the  Attorney-General 
in  the  execution  of  the  prohibition,  whether  the  war-time 
prohibition  act  or  the  constitutional  amendment,  was  in 
conformity  with  the  whole  procedure  of  the  Administra- 
tion in  dealing  with  the  liquor  problem.  One  day  the  policy 
announced  was  that  there  was  no  governmental  machinery 
for  enforcement;  directly  after,  the  country  was  served  with 
notice  that  stern  prosecutions  would  follow  violation  of  the 
law.  And  to  the  end  of  the  Wilson  Administration  there 

4  In  his  veto  message,  the  President  stated  that  the  measure  "has  to  do 
with  the  enforcement  of  an  act  which  was  passed  by  reason  of  the  emer- 
gency of  the  war  and  whose  objects  have  been  satisfied  by  the  demobilization 
of  the  army  and  navy."  Yet  in  his  message  to  the  coal  strikers  he  had  de- 
clared just  two  days  before:  "The  country  is  confronted  with  this  project 
at  a  time  when  the  war  is  still  a  fact,  when  the  world  is  still  in  suspense 
as  to  negotiations  for  peace."  (Message  of  October  25,  1919.) 


1 82    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

was  constant,  open,  and  notorious  violations  of  law,  so  com- 
mon, even  in  prohibition  states,  as  to  become  a  national 
scandal.5  And  it  is  a  remarkable  fact  that  at  the  time  when 
President  Wilson  was  taking  his  last  strong  stands  for  the 
traffic  and  his  Attorney-General  was  wobbling  on  the  mat- 
ter of  execution,  the  Senate's  investigations  had  already  dis- 
closed the  intimate  relations  between  the  brewery  interests 
which  the  President  was  seeking  to  save  and  the  thoroughly 
disloyal  German-American  Alliance.6 

The  outstanding  facts  of  President  Wilson's  relations 
with  the  liquor  traffic  during  the  war  are  summarized  as 
follows : 

1.  His  vigilant  opposition  prevented  adoption  by  Con- 
gress, but  a  few  months  after  America  entered  the  war, 
of  prohibition  when  the  country  was  eager  to  eliminate  the 
waste  of  fuel  and  grain  at  a  time  when  the  nation  was  gath- 
ering its  energies  for  the  final  struggle. 

2.  Regardless  of  party,  Congress  promptly  responded 
to  this  sentiment.     When  the  House  caucus  of  the  Presi- 
dent's party  voted  to  promote  war-time  prohibition,   the 
White  House  immediately  declared  that  no  legislation  was 

"When  President  Wilson  declared  his  purpose  to  take  the  ending  of 
war-time  prohibition  into  his  own  hands  in  1919,  his  action  led  the  head 
of  the  New  York  Anti-Saloon  League  to  declare:  "By  throwing  a  monkey- 
wrench  into  the  enforcement  machinery,  President  Wilson  is  running  true 
to  form  on  the  liquor  question.  In  1917  it  was  the  prohibition  forces 
and  not  the  brewers  that  he  asked  to  quit.  In  1918  he  suggested  that 
the  operation  of  war  prohibition  be  postponed  a  year.  Last  month  he  tried 
to  prevent  its  going  into  effect  at  all,  even  though  he  had  signed  it,  and 
he  now  gives  the  liquor  traffic  to  understand  that  he  will  come  to  its  rescue 
if  it  can  hold  on  in  the  meantime.  His  assurance  that  he  will  do  away 
with  the  law  entirely  at  the  earliest  possible  moment  will  be  taken  by  the 
brewers  as  an  implied  invitation  to  violate  the  law  in  the  interim.  His 
suggestion  will  tend  to  paralyze  the  enforcement  machinery;  no  official  can 
have  any  heart  in  enforcing  a  law  which  he  knows  may  be  wiped  out  at 
any  minute.  The  responsibility  for  any  disorder  or  confusion  due  to  viola- 
tion of  war  prohibition  is  now  located  with  the  President." 

8  As  early  as  December  n,  1918,  Major  E.  Lowry  Humes,  of  the  Judge 
Advocate's  office,  conducting  the  Senate  inquiry,  read  into  the  record  com- 
munications showing  the  relations  of  the  Alliance  and  the  Protective  Bu- 
reau of  the  National  Wholesale  Liquor  Dealers  Association.  His  records 
disclosed  that  this  Bureau  had  expended  $1,168,071,  which  had  been  deposited 
to  its  credit  in  two  Pittsburgh  banks;  and  he  charged  that  it  was  the  politi- 
cal agency  of  the  Association. 


Liquor  and  Vice  183 

to  be  considered  that  he  did  not  initiate.    The  caucus  action 
was  rescinded. 

3.  A  little  later  the  Senate  added  to  the  espionage  bill 
a  provision  forbidding  the  use  of  grain  in  making  liquor. 
The  President  objected  and  the  amendment  was  stricken 
out. 

4.  On  July  23,  1917,  by  a  vote  of  365  to  5,  the  House 
added  to  the  food-control  bill  an  amendment  that  no  food- 
stuffs should  be  used  in  the  manufacture  of  alcoholic  bever- 
ages.   Under  strict  orders  from  the  President  to  the  Senate 
leaders,  this  body  receded  from  its  clearly  defined  purpose 
to  accept  the  House  measure. 

5.  From  the  day  the  food-control  measure  passed,  in 
August,  1917,  the  President  had  in  his  hands  absolute  power 
over  the  liquor  traffic,  and  he  permitted  it  to  flourish  undis- 
turbed. 

6.  The  growing  insistence  of  the  people  for  conservation 
of  food,  fuel,  and  man-power  became  so  strong  that  it  could 
no  longer  be  ignored.     Then  the  President  served  notice 
that  there  must  be  no  prohibition  riders  to  appropriation 
bills,  though  he  well  knew  that  this  meant  no  action  at  all. 

7.  It  was  at  this  time  that  he  and  Mr.  Hoover  were  so 
in  accord  on  this  one  great  issue  that  Mr.  Hoover  inter- 
vened with  the  statement  that  40,000,000  bushels  of  grain 
were  a  negligible  item;  and  members  of  the  Shipping  Board 
declared  that  liquor  was  a  necessary  item  in  acquiring  effi- 
ciency in  building  ships. 

8.  But  the  answer  of  the  country  was  so  firm  and  pro- 
nounced that  the  measure  would  have  become  a  law  July  i, 
1918,  had  not  the  President  managed  to  delay  consideration 
until  the  end  of  August. 

9.  Then  Congress  and  the  country  were  so  overwhelm- 
ingly in  favor  of  the  law  taking  effect  January  i,  1919,  that 
that  would  have  been  the  result  had  not  the  President  in- 
sisted upon  a  year  later.    A  compromise  then  made  it  effec- 
tive July  i,  1919. 


1 84    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

10.  He  cabled  an  urgent  request  from  Paris  that  the 
law  be  repealed. 

11.  Failing  in  that,  he  sent  a  further  message  stating 
that  when  demobilization  should  be  completed  "my  power 
to  act  without  congressional  action  will  be  exercised." 

12.  This  was,  in  effect,  notice  by  the  President  that  en- 
forcement of  the  law  would  be  lax.    Liquor-selling  contineud 
with  virtual  paralysis  of  enforcement. 

13.  Every  Administration  influence  was  exerted  to  pre- 
vent legislation  looking  to  the  enforcement  of  the  act. 

14.  Congress,  yielding  to  the  overwhelming  demands 
of  the  country,  rather  than  to  White  House  dictation,  passed 
the  enforcement  measure  on  October  16  by  a  very  large 
majority,  becoming  operative  October   28,    1919,  with  a 
drastic  provision  defining  intoxicating  liquors  as  those  con- 
taining more  than  one-half  of  one  per  cent  alcohol.     The 
liquor  interests  had  already  announced  their  readiness  to 
obey  the  law,  when  the  entire  country  was  amazed  to  learn 
that  the  President  had  vetoed  the  bill  on  October  27.    The 
bill  had  been  withheld  from  him,  on  account  of  illness,  from 
October  16  to  October  27,  though  a  pro-liquor  organ,  a 
leading  newspaper  supporter  of  the  President,  stated  that 
uhe  inquired  about  it  almost  daily"  and  then  requested  that 
it  be  brought  to  him. 

15.  This  veto  constitutes  one  of  the  remarkable  state 
papers  of  the  President,  whether  considered  in  its  tone  or  its 
reasoning.    He  indicated  a  willingness  to  create  a  situation 
in  which  a  law  of  the  United  States,  with  its  violation  in- 
vited, would  become  a  mockery. 

1 6.  With  scant  courtesy  for  the  President's  reasons, 
this  enforcement  measure  became  law  over  his  veto,  admin- 
istering what  was,  up  to  that  time,  probably  the  most  de- 
cisive rebuke  ever  given  to  any  chief  executive  of  the  nation. 

17.  From  that  time  on,  President  Wilson  manifested 
no  interest  in  the  enforcement  of  that  law  up  to  the  time 


Liquor  and  Vice  185 

the  constitutional  prohibition  amendment  became  effective, 
January  16,  1920;  and  no  more  in  the  enforcement  of  this 
prohibition  by  the  basic  law  of  the  land  after  that  date. 

That  the  dealers  were  hoping  that  the  business  would 
be  revived  was  indicated  in  the  various  signs  posted,  many 
written  in  a  humorous  vein.  Everywhere  there  was  evidence 
of  the  confident  belief  that  prohibition  would  fail  because  of 
resentment.  One  complaint  of  the  dealers  was  that  the  vote 
had  been  taken  when  the  soldier  boys  were  absent  from  the 
country  and  had  no  opportunity  to  express  themselves. 
This,  however,  amounted  to  no  more  than  a  wrong  idea 
of  what  these  soldier  boys  wanted,  as  was  shown  in  their 
ready  acceptance  of  the  new  condition  upon  their  return 
from  abroad.  When  war-time  prohibition  went  into  effect, 
virtually  all  the  hotels  of  the  land  discontinued  the  sale  of 
liquors  at  their  bars  and  in  their  restaurants.  And  while 
the  saloons  generally  remained  open,  only  a  few  sold 
strongly  alcoholic  beverages ;  the  others  relied  on  soft  drinks 
or  else  "2.75  per  cent"  beer  to  keep  their  business  going. 
And  much  to  their  chagrin,  they  soon  discovered  that  the 
American  public  manifested  no  resentment  at  the  closing 
of  the  liquor  traffic. 

Many  notices  were  given  to  the  public  by  the  liquor 
craft  to  stock  up  before  July  i,  1919,  some  indicating  that 
all  hope  was  gone  of  ever  opening  again.  Said  one  notice 
by  one  of  the  largest  dealers  in  the  country,  in  an  expensive 
sign  placed  high  on  his  building  and  in  characters  large 
enough  to  be  readily  read  some  blocks  distant : 

"BONE  DRY  FOREVER.  STOCK 
UPNOW  FOR  THE  REST  OF  YOUR 
LIFE.  STOCK  UP  BEFORE  JULY  i." 

And  on  July  i,  could  be  read  these  notices  posted  on  saloon 
doors  as  one  walked  up  and  down  the  street:  "For  rent," 
or  "Closed";  while  another  advised  the  people,  "Closed 


1 86    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

until  further  notice";  and  yet  another,  "Closed;  we  have 
gone  fishing." 

This  was  six  months  before  constitutional  prohibition 
went  into  effect,  all  of  which  time  the  war-time  prohibition 
was  operative,  but  the  traffic  went  on  in  great  volume,  owing 
to  lax  enforcement  of  the  law.  While  in  most  places  the 
sale  was  surreptitious,  in  many  cities  it  was  open  and  un- 
hindered. Said  the  pro-liquor  and  pro-Administration 
World,  of  New  York,  on  Saturday,  January  17,  1920,  the 
first  day  of  constitutional  prohibition: 

Many  places  were  openly  selling  everything  from  wine  to  whisky 
at  sky-high  prices  yesterday  afternoon  and  up  to  midnight.  The  sub- 
ways were  full  of  men  and  women  heading  for  Broadway  with  suit- 
cases and  parcels  full  of  liquor.  Some  were  taking  the  stuff  home, 
some  taking  it  from  their  homes  to  hotels  and  restaurants.  In  the 
afternoon  many  bars  and  cafes  were  crowded.  .  .  .  Liquor  flowed 
freely  in  Broadway  places  .  .  .  till  midnight.  It  was  a  hard-drink- 
ing indoor  spree,  rather  than  an  outdoor  affair.  .  .  .  Besides  the 
oceans  of  liquor  sold  and  drunk  yesterday,  a  tremendous  amount  was 
unloaded  surreptitiously.  During  the  last  few  days,  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  dollars'  worth  of  wines  and  whiskies  have  been  sold  in 
New  York. 

National  prohibition,  under  an  amendment  to  the  United 
States  Constitution,  went  into  effect  at  midnight  at  the  end 
of  Friday,  January  16,  1920,  barring  manufacture,  sale,  or 
transportation  of  liquor  in  the  United  States. 

One  of  the  last  official  acts  of  Attorney-General  Palmer, 
just  as  the  Wilson  Administration  was  passing  out  of  exist- 
ence, was  a  ruling  that  beer  might  be  prescribed  as  a  medi- 
cine— using  his  official  position  to  nullify,  in  large  measure, 
the  clear  intent  of  the  fundamental  law  of  the  land.  This 
climaxed  the  Administration's  method  of  enforcing  the  law, 
in  many  instances  by  men  selected  from  lists  prepared  by 
Wilson  politicians,  men  who  had  been  engaged  in  the  liquor 
traffic  and  who  were  inveterate  enemies  of  prohibition.  In 
the  summer  of  IQ2I  Congress  remedied  this  defect  caused 


Liquor  and  Vice  187 

by  Mr.  Palmer's  ruling,  by  a  more  stringent  measure  than 
had  ever  previously  been  considered. 

The  nation  must  be  kept  clean  for  future  efficiency;  and 
no  liquor-pro-German  alliance  can  be  tolerated  if  the  nation 
is  to  be  kept  safe. 


CHAPTER  XI 

RUSSIA  AND  BOLSHEVISM 

Russia  is  the  land  Wonderful.  With  its  vast  area,  its 
variety  of  climate,  its  boundless  material  resources,  its  rivers 
and  lakes  and  seas,  the  appeal  to  the  imagination  is  irre- 
sistible. But  the  splendid  idealism  and  spiritual  aspirations 
of  its  people  make  it  most  wonderful. 

Then  why  did  not  Russia  stand  true  in  its  fight  by  the 
side  of  the  Allies  against  Prussian  autocracy?  Russia,  in 
her  rulers,  had  an  autocracy  of  her  own.  This  autocracy 
was  saturated  with  Prussianism  in  men  and  purposes.  The 
men  from  the  Russian  masses  fought  with  the  courage  of 
men  imbued  with  a  holy  idealism  and  were  slaughtered  like 
cattle  until  their  battle  front  became  a  shambles.  But 
treachery  lurked  in  the  ruling  powers  above,  and  the  fighting 
men  could  not  longer  endure  the  attacks  of  the  enemy  in 
front  and  a  worse  enemy  in  the  rear. 

Then  came  the  revolution  of  March,  1917,  overthrow- 
ing the  autocratic  government  of  the  czar.  This  was  the 
joint  product  of  all  political  parties  in  Russia,  whose  ulti- 
mate aims  differed  greatly.  On  March  n  the  revolution 
broke  out  spontaneously,  the  soldiers  joining  the  citizens, 
army  and  people  together  turning  on  the  government  which 
had  betrayed  them  and  sweeping  it  out  of  existence  in  a  five- 
days1  battle. 

Now  followed  a  race  between  the  Parliamentary  Party, 
warmly  pro-Ally  and  representing  the  great  middle  class, 
and  the  Revolutionary  Party,  leading  the  ignorant  and  in- 
flamed masses,  proclaiming  all  kinds  of  wild  social  theories 
and  openly  scorning  any  kind  of  international  obligation. 
The  popular  government  was  organized  with  Kerensky  at 

188 


Russia  and  Bolshevism  189 

its  head.  The  Duma,  the  representative  body  in  session, 
stood  its  ground  in  refusing  to  disperse  upon  the  czar's 
order. 

The  Anarchist  party  did  not  cease  its  efforts.  Germany, 
seizing  the  opportune  moment,  thrust  in  a  wedge  in  the 
astute  Lenine.  Throughout  the  summer  of  1917  the  strug- 
gle between  Kerensky  and  Lenine  seesawed  up  and  down, 
while  Russia  disintegrated  ever  more  rapidly  into  a  state 
of  anarchy.  In  October  the  Anarchists  successfully  directed 
a  counter-revolution  in  Petrograd,  sending  Kerensky  into 
exile.  This  ended  the  brief  period  of  the  only  representative 
free  government  Russia  experienced.  Directing  with  vigor 
the  situation  thus  developed,  Germany  succeeded  in  bring- 
ing about  at  Brest-Litovsk,  a  treaty  whereby  Russia  was 
betrayed  into  the  hands  of  Germany,  the  champions  of  the 
social  revolution  in  Russia  agreeing  with  military  autocracy 
in  signing  away  their  country's  birthright  of  freedom.  Len- 
ine stood  for  anarchy — the  destruction  of  the  existing  social 
order,  not  only  in  Russia  but  throughont  the  world,  as  a 
preliminary  to  the  construction  of  a  new  society.  He  was 
enthusiastically  supported  by  all  those  elements  ready  to 
enter  blindly  into  the  reaction  against  the  existing  order. 

History  can  scarcely  do  less  than  ask  the  American 
Administration  to  show  cause  why  it  should  not  be  charged 
with  the  defection  of  Russia  from  the  cause  of  the  Allies 
in  March,  1917,  because  too  slow  in  entering  the  Great  War, 
and  the  resulting  treachery  at  Brest-Litovsk  just  a  year 
later. 

While  invariably  declaring  that  the  social  revolution 
should  not  be  interfered  with,  it  is  a  fact  that  Lenine  called 
Colonel  Raymond  Robins,  then  active  in  Red  Cross  work 
in  Russia,  into  conference  in  the  expressed  hope  that  some 
assistance  might  be  obtained  from  the  United  States  that 
would  assure  Russia's  standing  with  the  Allies.  For  days, 
while  Colonel  Robins  awaited  reply  to  his  cablegrams  to 
Washington,  Lenine  held  the  diverse  elements  by  his  speech, 


190    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

meanwhile  meeting  Robins  repeatedly.  No  word  received, 
Lenine  and  the  forces  back  of  him  were  lost  to  the  cause 
of  the  Allies,  and  the  fatal  treaty  of  March  3,  1918,  at 
Brest-Litovsk,  resulted.  And  as  a  resulting  disaster  to  the 
world,  the  destructive  force  known  as  Bolshevism  was 
erected  on  the  wreck  of  incipient  free  government  in  Russia. 

When  the  Senate  committee  was  conducting  an  investi- 
gation of  this  new  phase  of  the  social  order,  David  R. 
Francis,  United  States  ambassador  to  Russia,  called  as 
a  witness,  testified  that  he  had  told  Raymond  Robins  to 
say  to  the  Bolshevists  that  he  would  recommend  a  modus 
vivendi  if  they  would  organize  an  opposition  to  Germany; 
and  he  stated  it  as  his  opinion  that  if  Russia  had  remained 
in  the  war  it  would  have  ended  a  year  earlier  than  it  did 
and  millions  of  lives  would  have  been  saved,  then  added: 
"Russia  lost  more  men  in  the  war  than  any  other  country 
although  she  quit  the  war  a  year  before  it  ended." 

It  was  strange  that  President  Wilson  repeatedly  called 
this  counter-revolution  the  revolution,  as  if  it  were  that 
which  had  overthrown  czarism.  Either  he  was  confused 
in  his  ideas  or  else  in  the  use  of  terms.  His  confusion  of 
purposes  seems  to  indicate  that  it  was  the  former.  Had  the 
democratic  governments  of  the  world  maintained  their  first 
attitude  in  standing  by  the  revolution  which  overthrew 
czarism  and  Germanism  in  Russia,  Europe  could  have  been 
saved  the  terrorism  that  reigned  after  the  end  of  the  Great 
War.  The  Allies,  regarding  the  menacing  rise  of  Bol- 
shevism as  a  temporary  phenomenon,  failed  to  see  in  it  a 
danger  to  the  peace  of  the  world.  They  thought  that  at 
worst  it  could  harm  only  Russia.  Though  the  warning  given 
by  clear-visioned  men  was  ample,  the  vision  of  the  states- 
men occupying  the  world's  stage  was  limited. 

Chief  among  these  was  President  Wilson,  who  went 
before  the  world  with  a  special  message  on  this  new  thing. 
As  early  as  May,  1917,  it  had  been  made  so  clear  to  keen 
observers  from  the  evidence  of  events  that  the  Bolsheviki 


Russia  and  Bolshevism  191 

were  atrociously  undemocratic  that  a  warning  was  sounded. 
This  warning  went  unheeded.  The  President,  when,  in 
November,  1917,  it  usurped  the  powers  of  government  in 
Russia,  hailed  this  new  autocracy  as  the  manifestation  of 
the  new  day.  He  had  ample  warning  that  it  was  no  democ- 
racy in  action  but  a  movement  of  "zealots  incapable  of 
patriotism  and  whose  conception  of  democracy  is  a  travesty 
upon  the  name."  Early  in  1918,  when  these  rulers  in  Rus- 
sia were  betraying  their  country  to  Germany  at  Brest-Li- 
tovsk,  he  declared  that  they  were  working  uin  the  true  spirit 
of  modern  democracy"  and  that  theirs  was  the  "voice  of 
the  Russian  people,"  which  was  giving  expression  to  their 
ideas  of  right  "with  a  largeness  of  view,  a  generosity  of 
spirit,  and  a  universal  human  sympathy  which  must  chal- 
lenge the  admiration  of  every  friend  of  mankind."  1  Just 
eight  days  after  the  Brest-Litovsk  infamy,  he  gave  to  the 
world  a  special  message  on  the  occasion  of  the  meeting 
of  the  Congress  of  the  Soviets,  in  which  he  assumed  that 
L/enine's  militaristic  government  in  Russia  would  "free 
themselves  forever  from  autocratic  government." 

With  the  evidence  before  the  world  at  the  time  he  was 
making  these  statements,  it  seems  incomprehensible  that 
President  Wilson,  with  his  opportunity  to  know  the  facts, 
could  believe  what  he  was  then  saying  to  civilization. 

In  September,  1918,  President  Wilson  declared  that  the 
rule  of  the  Bolshevists  was  a  "campaign  of  mass  terrorism," 
and  called  upon  all  civilized  nations  to  "register  an  abhor- 
rence of  such  barbarism."  Their  record  was  summarized  by 
Herman  Bernstein,  an  American  investigator  whose  sym- 
pathies were  with  the  supposed  ideals  of  the  Bolsheviki, 
when,  after  seeing  the  results  of  their  course,  he  stated: 

They  demoralized  the  Russian  army;  they  unchained  the  mob 
spirit;  they  incited  civil  war;  they  signed  the  treaty  which  dismem- 
bered Russia;  they  paralyzed  the  industries;  they  encouraged  looting, 
terror  and  murder ;  they  muzzled  the  press ;  they  abolished  the  courts 
Address  to  Congress,  January  8,  1918, 


192    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

of  justice;  they  dispersed  the  Constituent  Assembly  by  force  of  arms, 
and  set  up  a  brutal  dictatorship. 

This  new  power  rising  in  the  East  was  not  Russia,  nor 
was  it  the  voice  of  the  Russian  people.  The  first  principle 
of  its  creed  was  the  repudiation  of  nationality.  It  declared 
that  it  represented  a  class,  not  a  nation;  and  it  spoke  of  a 
class  in  France,  Britain,  and  the  United  States  as  well  as 
Russia.  Yet,  in  the  early  days  of  the  world's  Peace  Con- 
gress there  was  the  weakening  of  the  assembled  statesmen 
to  the  point  of  giving  it  representation  in  a  conference  called 
to  meet  on  one  of  the  Prince's  Islands  in  the  Sea  of  Mar- 
mora, which  became  known  as  the  Prinkipo  Conference. 
And  to  this  conference  President  Wilson  appointed  a  dele- 
gate who  had  written  of  him  in  these  glowing  words : 

Woodrow  Wilson  has  dared  to  believe  divinely ;  and  his  faith  that 
a  federate  world  is  possible,  and  the  challenge  of  that  faith  to  the  na- 
tions, is  the  most  creative  collective  act  since  the  French  Revolution. 
By  his  faith  he  has  set  a  goal  from  which  mankind  can  never  take 
its  eyes ;  he  has  sent  forth  the  word  that  can  never  return. 

This  delegate,  George  D.  Herron,  a  former  Congre- 
gational minister  of  the  gospel  and  teacher  in  an  Iowa 
college,  was  dismissed  from  both  positions  for  his  discredit- 
able personal  life.  Of  this  appointment  one  eminent  Ameri- 
can citizen  said: 

We  have  become  accustomed  during  these  past  six  years  to  the 
President's  fondness  for  surrounding  himself  with  intellectual  and 
political  midgets;  but  we  have  heretofore  been  spared  anything  so 
shocking  as  this  appointment.2 

And  in  his  official  capacity,  a  noted  American  prelate 
gave  utterance  to  these  words : 

The  case  of  George  D.  Herron,  under  appointment  of  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  as  representative  of  this  Christian  country 
to  Prince's  Islands  for  conference  with  the  Bolsheviks,  is  the  most 
disreputable  appointment  ever  made  in  the  United  States.  .  .  .  The 
3  Nicholas  Murray  Butler,  President  of  Columbia  University. 


Russia  and  Bolshevism  193 

attack  in  his  appointment  is  on  the  Christian  home,  which  is  the  core 
of  the  American  life.  Without  it,  America  might  be  Bolshevik. 
There  is  no  republic  possible  where  there  is  not  God  and  where  there 
is  no  Christian  home.3 

Of  the  many  things  done  by  President  Wilson  while  in 
his  high  office,  which  demanded  constant  explanation  by  his 
friends  and  apologies  by  those  who  would  like  to  be  his 
friends,  it  is  probable  that  his  course  with  the  Bolshevists 
was  the  strangest  and  the  character  of  his  appointments  as 
representatives  of  Americanism  was  most  strange  of  all. 
Accepting  the  fact  that  the  appointment  of  Mr.  Herron  had 
not  the  least  basis  for  even  an  excuse,  his  commissioners, 
Lincoln  Steffens  and  William  C.  Bullitt,  were  markedly 
strange  representatives  of  America  to  show  Bolshevist 
Russia  what  America  really  is.  They  were  probably  made 
upon  the  principle  that  "it  takes  a  thief  to  catch  a  thief" — 
in  this  instance,  a  Bolshevist  to  catch  a  Bolshevist.  The 
public  was  never  offered  any  other  reason.  It  was  apparent 
on  the  surface,  however,  that  numerous  of  the  President's 
like  appointments  were  of  men  who  had  been  fulsome  in 
speaking  the  President's  praises.  Notably  among  them  were 
William  Bayard  Hale  and  Norman  Hapgood.  And  it  is 
a  remarkable  fact  that  all  of  these  men,  to  the  list  of  whom 
should  be  added  George  Creel,  were  men  whose  large  aim 
was  to  overturn  American  tradition,  perhaps  pushing  to 
one  side  the  Constitution  itself. 

It  was  recognized  that  at  the  Prinkipo  Conference  there 
would  come  from  Russia's  180,000,000  people  representa- 
tives from  none  but  the  40,000,000  under  Bolshevik  domi- 
nation, and  that  none  but  that  "bloody  and  disorderly 
tyranny"  would  have  representation;  for  in  all  that  vast 
region  of  aspiring  peoples  democratic  expression  was  stifled 
by  violence.  And  this  was  the  people  in  whom  Wilson  saw 
the  rising  hope  of  the  world.  The  Philadelphia  Public 
Ledger,  in  large  measure  warm  toward  Bolshevist  doc- 

8  William  A.   Quayle,  Bishop  of  the  Methodist  Episcopal  Church. 


194    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

trines  both  in  Russia  and  the  United  States,  published  from 
its  Paris  correspondent,  a  recognized  authority  on  European 
affairs  at  the  time  of  the  armistice  and  a  particularly  well- 
informed  commentator  on  Russian  affairs,  these  words  re- 
ferring to  the  situation  as  it  developed  in  late  January,  1919, 
at  the  Paris  Conference  of  the  world's  statesmen: 

The  decision  has  definitely  extinguished  all  hope  of  settling  Rus- 
sian affairs  through  the  medium  of  the  peace  conference.  The  invita- 
tion was  a  fatal  mistake,  both  in  form  and  substance.  The  unkindest 
cut  of  all  is  to  abandon  the  stanch  friends  of  the  Allies  to  their  in- 
human butchers. 

And  in  the  same  public  journal,  Vladimir  Bourtzeff,  an  ar- 
dent revolutionist,  declared  in  unmistakable  terms : 

Premier  Lloyd  George  and  President  Wilson,  in  the  name  of 
England  and  America,  are  doing  much,  we  believe  unwittingly,  for 
the  development  of  the  Bolshevist  scourge  throughout  the  world,  and 
especially  in  Russia.  Their  responsibility  before  history  is  great. 

In  the  sinking  of  Hungary  into  the  Bolshevist  chaos 
was  witnessed  the  fulfillment  of  warnings  often  repeated. 
One  of  the  least  excitable  of  experienced  European  observers 
of  the  time  had  warned  the  whole  world  but  a  little  while 
before : 

The  spectacle  of  European  ruin  is  simply  appalling.  Nineteenth 
century  civilization  has  broken  down.  I  do  not  mean  merely  that 
famine  and  pestilence  are  creeping  over  Europe,  but  that  there  is  a 
collapse  of  human  moral  energy,  a  revival  of  the  primitive,  barbaric 
instincts,  and  the  fierce  endeavor  to  have  one's  little  private  will  by 
force.  .  .  .  Up  through  the  European  chaos  is  surely  creeping  the 
menace  of  Bolshevism — that  Bolshevism  which  is  the  revengeful 
shadow  of  reckless  modern  materialism. 

While  loyal  Americans  will  applaud  the  stern  indictment 
which  the  Administration  framed,  in  the  early  autumn  of 
1918  immediately  after  declaring  that  there  would  be  no 
negotiation  with  undefeated  Prussianism,  calling  upon  civil- 
ized nations  to  "register  their  abhorrence  of  the  organized 


Russia  and  Bolshevism  195 

official  massacres  in  Russia,"  history  will  not  forget  that  it 
was  but  a  few  months  before  that  these  creatures,  the  blood- 
stained persecutors  of  the  Russian  people,  were  reprd- 
sented  in  Washington  "as  high-minded  champions  of  peace 
and  justice,  whose  generous  idealism  was  a  reproach  to 
the  imperialism  of  the  Allies  and  a  summons  to  American 
recognition."  And  now,  in  the  Peace  Congress,  President 
Wilson-once  more  turns  to  dally  with  the  foul  thing,  in  send- 
ing representatives  to  meet  it  in  the  Prinkipo  Conference. 
Fortunately  there  was  a  collapse  of  the  planned  meeting 
and  America  was  spared  the  further  humiliation  of  negoti- 
ating with  this  insensate  brute  of  proletarian  autocracy.  It 
was  Clemenceau  who  had  the  vision  to  see  and  the  grit  to 
declare  the  move  to  be  a  "contract  with  crime."  It  was 
President  Wilson  who  was  looked  upon  by  the  Bolshevists 
as  their  advocate.  A  few  days  before  the  matter  came  up 
in  the  Peace  Congress,  the  former  Bolshevist  ambassador 
at  London  said:  "It  is  not  President  Wilson's  fault  that 
our  government  was  not  represented  at  the  Peace  Confer- 
ence." And  the  President's  declaration  that  the  democratic 
governments  "recognized  the  absolute  right  of  the  Russian 
people  to  direct  their  own  affairs  without  dictation  or  di- 
rection of  any  kind  from  outside"  recalled  his  former  fa- 
mous statement  that  "with  the  causes  and  issues  of  the  war 
we  have  no  concern." 

Outside  of  a  few  groups,  as  the  Bolshevists  in  Russia, 
the  socialist  and  pacifist  sympathizers  almost  everywhere, 
and  those  who  looked  upon  it  as  a  well-meant  device  that 
might  be  worth  trying  in  a  perilous  situation,  the  proposal 
was  unsparingly  denounced.  In  England  characteristic  com- 
ments were:  "hopelessly  weak,"  "politically  hazardous," 
"ethically  wrong."  In  France,  except  among  organs  of  so- 
cialism, stronger  terms  of  dissent  designated  it  as  "strange," 
"perilous,"  "insane,"  one  paper  charging  it  to  "ideology, 
ignorance,  and  electioneering  politics." 

In  his  determination  to  recognize  the  Lenine  govern- 


196    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

ment,  President  Wilson,  in  this  third  position  he  assumed 
toward  Bolshevism,  leaned  heavily  upon  men  of  pronounced 
Bolshevist  tendencies.  This  is  why  it  was  declared,  by  men 
in  responsible  positions,  that  if  it  would  be  known  where  the 
strength  of  the  Lenine  despotism  lay,  the  trail  to  the  Hotel 
Crillon  was  the  right  trail.  Nor  does  any  wonder  when  one 
of  the  President's  commissioners,  Mr.  Herron,  could  write 
these  ghastly  words  found  in  his  previously  published  works : 

I  have  no  expectation  that  the  present  kind  of  civilization  can 
be  amended — it  can  only  be  ended.  .  .  . 

It  is  already  too  late  to  reform  society  in  America.  It  is  no 
longer  a  question  whether  you  will  have  a  socialistic  revolution.  It 
is  only  left  to  you  to  decide  what  kind  of  a  revolution  you  will  have. 

The  teachings  of  this  personal  representative  of  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  conform  to  the  edicts,  and  his 
practices  no  less,  of  Lenine  and  Trotzky.  Discarding  one 
wife  and  seeking  another,  and  compelled  to  flee  the  country 
because  of  his  relations  with  the  fairer  sex,  he  was  also  a 
full-fledged  internationalist  and  a  budding  Bolshevik,  warm 
in  his  praises  of  President  Wilson's  internationalism,  and 
ready  to  treat,  in  the  name  of  America,  with  Russian  Bol- 
shevism, the  very  negation  of  democracy. 

That  history  may  be  kept  clear,  it  should  be  made  mat- 
ter of  record  that  it  was  January  22,  1919,  that  President 
Wilson  wrote  his  Prinkipo  memorandum.  When  presented 
to  the  fighting  factions  in  Russia,  one  after  another  declined 
to  accept,  contrary  to  the  President's  expectations,  his  pro- 
posals. Then  it  was  discovered  that  the  French  Foreign 
Office  had  been  in  communication  with  the  Ukrainian  and 
other  anti-Bolshevist  governments,  assuring  them  that  if 
they  refused  the  proposals  the  French  government  would 
support  them.4  It  was  thus  that  America  was  spared  the 
deeper  humiliation,  and  spared  through  the  efforts  of  France 

4  William  C.  Bullitt,  in  his  testimony  before  the  Foreign  Relations  Com- 
mittee of  the   United   States  Senate,  investigating  Bolshevism. 


Russia  and  Bolshevism  197 

and  in  spite  of  the  deadly  efforts  of  President  Wilson's  pur- 
poses. 

The  fourth  position  of  the  Administration  toward  the 
Bolshevist  regime  in  Russia  was  similar  to  the  second. 
There  is  ample  evidence  that  the  note  expressive  of  this 
attitude  was  the  production  of  Secretary  of  State  Colby, 
and  not  of  the  President.  But  it  expressed  the  views  of  the 
latter.  It  was  written  in  the  period  of  Poland's  gravest 
danger  from  Bolshevism's  fiercest  drive  of  armed  forces 
in  August,  1920.  It  emphatically  reversed  the  former  atti- 
tude of  the  Administration  and  gave  expression  to  America's 
judgment.  It  came  at  a  time  when  most  needed.  For 
England,  forced  by  the  radical  labor  element,  was  committed 
to  peace  at  any  price  with  the  Bolshevists;  and  it  strength- 
ened the  hand  of  France,  which,  in  spite  of  Great  Britain's 
position,  had  announced  her  intention  of  supporting  Gen- 
eral Wrangel  in  his  South  Russia  scheme  of  fighting  Bol- 
shevism at  home — France,  again  the  pioneer  in  democracy, 
to  which  the  American  Administration  was  a  good  second. 

In  this  new  and  fourth  position,  the  American  Admin- 
istration said: 

That  the  present  rulers  of  Russia  do  not  rule  by  the  will  or  con- 
sent of  any  considerable  proportion  of  the  Russian  people  is  an  incon- 
testable fact.  .  .  .  The  Bolsheviki,  although  in  number  an  incon- 
siderable proportion  of  the  people,  by  force  and  cunning  seized  the 
powers  and  machinery  of  government  and  have  continued  to  use  them 
with  savage  oppression  to  maintain  themselves  in  power. 

And  then  the  note  stated  further: 

In  the  view  of  this  government  there  cannot  be  any  common 
ground  upon  which  it  can  stand  with  a  Power  whose  conceptions  of 
international  relations  are  so  entirely  alien  to  its  own,  so  utterly 
repugnant  to  its  moral  sense.  .  .  .  We  cannot  recognize,  hold  official 
relations  with,  or  give  friendly  reception  to  the  agents  of  a  govern- 
ment which  is  determined  and  bound  to  conspire  against  our  institu- 
tions. 


198    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

This  looked  like  irrevocably  committing  the  Administra- 
tion, as  some  keen  American  journals  declared,  against  Bol- 
shevism. But  in  his  personal  appointment  of  George  D. 
Herron,  to  the  American  people  "so  utterly  repugnant  to 
its  moral  sense,"  the  President  was  not  deterred.  And  the 
language  is  so  like  that  used  by  the  Administration  toward 
Germany  in  the  Metropolitan  Opera  House  less  than  two 
years  previously,  and  then  almost  immediately  forgot  his 
own  words,  when  he  declared  that  Germany  and  the  United 
States  "do  not  speak  the  same  language  of  agreement." 

At  all  events,  in  this  fourth  position  the  Administra- 
tion was,  in  a  measure,  wiping  out  the  great  stain  of  the 
diplomatic  absurdity  and  the  moral  atrocity  of  its  attempt, 
in  the  early  days  of  the  World's  Peace  Congress,  to  admit 
to  the  Prinkipo  Conference  on  equal  terms  the  Moscow 
terrorists  and  their  victims;  and  which  abortive  attempt 
of  the  President  did  so  much  to  bring  about  the  Red  con- 
quest of  all  of  Russia.  And  it  was  of  the  utmost  importance 
for  the  influence  it  had  upon  the  sweep  of  events  at  the 
moment.  England  and  Italy  were  ready  to  recognize  the 
Russian  Soviet  Government.  France,  as  ever,  was  steel- 
faced  against  Bolshevism.  As  in  the  face  of  the  great  Ger- 
man drive  in  the  spring  of  1918,  so  now,  in  the  face  of  the 
great  Bolshevist  drive  at  Poland,  there  was  division  of 
counsel  among  the  Allies.  The  note  from  the  American 
government  had  a  steadying  effect.  That  in  the  Bolshevist 
plan  of  subjugation  Poland  is  but  a  way  station  is  evident. 
Germany  and  all  of  central  Europe  were  the  real  goal.  In 
the  fall  of  1917  Lenine  had  boldly  declared:  "Germany 
forms  the  most  important  link  in  the  revolutionary  chain; 
and  the  success  of  our  world  revolution  depends  to  the 
greatest  degree  upon  Germany."  This  was  the  plan  for 
conquering  France  and  reaching  England.  Already,  for 
nearly  a  year  before  this  American  note  of  August,  1920, 
Bolshevist  propaganda  was  active  in  Asia,  reaching  eagerly 
toward  India  to  stab  Eno-lnnd  in  the  back.  Next  to  be 


Russia  and  Bolshevism  199 

attacked  was  America.  For  Italy  had  already  succumbed 
in  mid-September,  1920,  later  partially  recovering. 

Indeed,  it  was  in  Milan,  the  hotbed  of  Socialism  in  Italy, 
where  President  Wilson  reached  the  pinnacle  of  his  popu- 
larity. His  friends  declare  that  it  was  there  that  he  was 
worshipped  as  a  god  by  those  who  set  his  picture  by  the  side 
of^the  crucifix.  There  he  declared: 

Here  in  Milan,  where  I  know  so  much  of  the  pulse  of  interna- 
tional sympathy  beats,  I  am  glad  to  stand  up  and  say  that  that  pulse 
beats  also  in  my  own  veins. 

He  had  just  stated  that  the  working  classes,  "by  their  con- 
sciousness of  community  of  interest  and  spirit,  have  done 
more,  perhaps,  than  an  other  influence  to  establish  a  world 
which  is  not  of  nations,  but  is  the  opinion,  one  might  say, 
of  mankind."  This  was  his  announced  internationalism  as 
against  nationalism.  It  is  a  foundation  doctrine  of  Bol- 
shevism that  there  must  be  no  nationalism,  no  nation.  It 
caught  in  Italy  while  the  President  was  there.  But  as  soon 
as  he  touched  Italian  pride  in  the  matter  of  nationality  over 
Fiume,  his  popularity  toppled  to  the  dust,  and  Orlando, 
their  premier,  fell  because  he  failed  to  measure  up  to  their 
demands  of  nationality,  not  because  of  his  disagreement  with 
President  Wilson,  as  writers  in  support  of  the  President  like 
to  say.5 

To  charge  that  President  Wilson  brought  Bolshevism  to 
America,  as  some  do  openly,  does  not  accord  with  the  facts. 
But  history  will  lay  a  severe  charge  to  his  account  in  this  one 
count.  Before  sitting  in  the  great  World's  Peace  Congress, 
he  went  up  and  down  Europe,  with  an  imposing  retinue, 
turning  loose  the  anarchistic  elements  against  orderly  organ- 
ized governments  at  the  very  time  when  stabilized  society 
was  the  first  demand.  Statesmen  should  have  sought  to 
show  uncertain,  restless  elements  a  better  way.  It  was  these 
same  radicals,  whether  in  Europe  or  America,  who  later  set 

'Particularly  Ray  Stannard  Baker  in  "What  Wilson  Did  at  Paris"  and 
George  Creel  in  "The  War,  the  World,  and  Wilson." 


2OO    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

the  pace  which  President  Wilson  was  compelled  to  meet. 
He  unchained  the  tiger  which  he  was  never  able  afterward 
to  restrain.  He  released  the  monster  which  later  showed 
its  ugly  head  in  America.  He  was  as  helpless  to  meet  the 
menacing  situation  in  America  as  he  was  to  meet  the  appall- 
ing disaster  which  he  had  invited  in  Europe.  Originating 
in  the  perversion  of  the  developing  revolution  in  Russia 
which  he  had  failed  to  recognize  in  its  real  character,  it 
swept  eastward  and  southward  into  farther  Russia  and 
Asia,  sank  Hungary  in  the  slough,  grasped  Italy  in  its  tenta- 
cles, struck  at  Poland,  sought  Germany,  aimed  at  France 
and  England,  and  reached  out  toward  America.  The  at- 
tempt to  starve  and  freeze  Winnipeg  to  its  knees;  the  at- 
tempt to  overthrow  civil  government  in  Seattle;  the  plan 
to  starve  the  people  of  the  United  States  in  the  "outlaw" 
railroad  strike  and  to  freeze  them  into  submission  in  the 
coal  strike;  the  steel  strike  directed  by  a  horse-shoer  who 
had  never  worked  at  a  steel  plant;  the  planned  dynamiting 
of  the  home  of  the  attorney-general  of  the  United  States 
and  many  others  in  nine  eastern  cities  at  one  time ;  the  con- 
stant demand  for  higher  wages  among  highly-paid  employes 
regardless  of  the  burden  it  placed  upon  the  shoulders  of 
those  outside  of  their  particular  class;  the  fostering  of  class 
spirit,  particularly  of  the  obstructionist  or  destructionist 
class — these  were  symptoms  manifested  during  President 
Wilson's  incumbency  that  had  never  been  seen  before  in  like 
manner  in  the  history  of  America.  Its  blow  was  aimed  at 
so-called  capitalism  and  at  the  very  foundations  of  civil 
government  itself. 

Nor  were  these  solely  outgrowths  of  the  Great  War. 
Indeed,  in  the  splendid  economic  condition  in  which  the 
country  found  itself  at  the  conclusion  of  the  war,  there  was 
no  reason  or  excuse  for  this  destructive  tendency.  People 
were  never  better  fed,  clothed,  or  cared  for  after  a  great 
war;  wages  were  exceptionally  good,  money  was  plentiful, 


Russia  and  Bolshevism  201 

there  was  no  unemployment.  America  was  unscathed  by 
the  Great  War.  Yet  the  President,  after  the  shifting  of 
responsibility  and  the  delays  characteristic  of  the  man,  be- 
came aroused  to  the  dangerous  situation  at  a  late  day,  and 
in  his  annual  message  to  Congress  in  December,  1919, 
stated  in  regard  to  Bolshevism: 

Let  us  be  frank  about  this  solemn  matter.  The  evidences  of  the 
world-wide  unrest  which  manifest  themselves  in  violence  throughout 
the  world  bid  us  pause  and  consider  the  means  to  be  found  to  stop 
the  spread  of  this  contagious  thing  before  it  saps  the  very  vitality  of 
the  nation  itself. 

It  was  the  poisonous  serpent  stretching  its  ugly  self  to 
America  out  of  the  noisomeness  of  the  European  pestilence 
created  by  the  delays  incident  to  a  wilful  persistence  in  seek- 
ing to  arrange  a  super-government  for  the  world  in  the 
Peace  Congress. 

"Let  us  be  frank  about  this  solemn  matter."  The  sin- 
ister symptoms  in  the  United  States  already  mentioned 
were  preceded  by  the  celebrated  Mooney  trial  in  Cali- 
fornia. Thomas  J.  Mooney,  a  Russian,  was  convicted  in 
the  California  courts  on  the  charge  of  a  most  atrocious 
crime — setting  a  bomb  on  July  22,  1916,  so  placed  and 
timed  as  to  inflict  the  greatest  degree  of  suffering  upon  the 
innocent.  The  occasion  was  the  preparedness  parade  in 
San  Francisco  when  the  streets  and  sidewalks  were  crowded 
with  people  and  other  thousands  were  in  the  parade.  Ten 
persons  were  killed  by  the  terrific  explosion  and  about  fifty 
others  were  mutilated  or  maimed.  Mooney  was  deeply  in- 
terested in  The  Blast,  a  newspaper  started  to  oppose  pre- 
paredness. 

The  trial  began  January  3,  1917,  and  he  was  convicted 
by  unanimous  vote  of  the  jury  on  the  first  ballot  on  Febru- 
ary 9,  and  on  February  24  was  sentenced  to  death.  Said  the 
attorney  for  Billings,  charged  with  the  same  crime : 


2O2     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

We  have  had  a  fair  trial.  .  .  .  This  jury  was  impanelled  by  a 
member  of  the  district  attorney's  staff  with  absolute  fairness  and  im- 
partiality. 

Mooney  himself  at  his  trial  was  represented  by  the  choice 
legal  talent  of  the  country,  including  W.  Bourke  Cochran, 
the  silver-tongued  orator  of  New  York  and  former  con- 
gressman. There  was  an  enormous  fund  of  money  at  his 
disposal.  On  the  other  hand,  the  prosecution  had  scarcely 
sufficient  to  pay  the  expenses  of  getting  essential  witnesses 
to  the  place  of  trial,  a  teacher  in  Hawaii  having  to  lose 
his  own  time  without  pay. 

After  every  recourse  known  to  civilized  legal  procedure 
was  exhausted,  including  appeal  to  the  Supreme  Court  of 
his  state,  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  and 
to  the  Governor  of  the  State,  an  appeal  was  made  to  Presi- 
dent Wilson  outside  the  course  of  legal  procedure.  Grave 
charges  were  set  up  against  the  courts  of  California,  par- 
ticularly against  the  county  attorney  of  San  Francisco  who 
conducted  the  trial,  perjured  evidence  was  submitted  against 
him;  and  by  means  of  the  most  persistent  and  widespread 
propaganda  of  falsehood  carried  on  by  the  International 
Workers7  Defense  League,  than  which  there  is  no  more 
radical  organization  in  the  world,  with  money  at  their  dis- 
posal running  to  upwards  of  $1,000,000,  the  people  were 
made  to  believe  that  the  courts  of  California  were  corrupt 
and  that,  perhaps,  Mooney  had  not  had  a  square  deal. 
This  propaganda  was  carried  on,  chiefly  in  the  important 
industrial  centers  of  the  East,  by  Alexander  Berkman,  since 
deported  as  an  anti-American  and  whose  very  name  is  a 
stench  in  the  nostrils  of  decency  in  his  relations  with  Emma 
Goldman,  deported  with  him.  In  conducting  his  propa- 
ganda, he  always  applied  this  rule:  "No  importance  is  to 
be  attached  to  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  accused."  The 
country  was  plastered  from  center  to  circumference  with 
the  little  stickers  printed  in  red:  "Remember  Mooney." 
The  vigor  of  the  propaganda,  backed  by  such  men  as  W. 


Russia  and  Bolshevism  203 

Bourke  Cochran  and  Felix  Frankfurter,  gave  it  momentum 
and  standing;  and  some  sections  of  organized  labor  were 
led  to  believe  that  an  attack  was  being  made  upon  labor 
by  the  California  courts.  That  was  the  purpose  of  this 
million-dollar  propaganda  put  out  by  American  Bolshevism. 

President  Wilson  had  appointed  a  Mediation  Commis- 
sion to  settle  labor  disputes  during  the  war.  Directed  by  its 
chairman,  Secretary  of  Labor  Wilson,  to  inquire  into  the 
Mooney  case,  it  took  quarters  at  a  prominent  San  Fran- 
cisco hotel,  where  it  heard  the  Mooney  side  of  the  case. 
But  no  one  was  called  to  give  the  people's  side,  and  its  re- 
port was  made  up  wholly  from  material  offered  by  the  de- 
fense, was  written  by  Stanley  Arnold,  a  San  Francisco  at- 
torney, and  with  date  of  January  16,  was  published  in  full 
in  the  Official  Bulletin,  a  government  publication,  in  its  issue 
of  January  28,  1918.  This  report,  giving  only  the  side  of 
the  man  convicted  as  indicated  above  of  the  most  atrocious 
of  crimes,  stated  that  "from  Russia  and  the  Western  States 
protest  spread  to  all  the  country  until  it  has  gathered 
momentum  from  many  sources";  that  uthe  liberal  (Bol- 
shevik) sentiment  of  Russia  was  aroused";  that  "the  liberal 
sentiment  of  the  United  States  was  aroused  because  the 
circumstances  of  Mooney's  prosecution,  in  the  light  of  his 
history,  led  to  the  belief  that  the  terrible  and  sacred  instru- 
ments of  criminal  justice  were  consciously  or  unconsciously 
made  use  of  against  labor  by  its  enemies  in  an  industrial 
conflict."  About  the  same  time  that  this  report  was  put 
out,  another  member  of  the  Commission  and  its  attorney, 
Felix  Frankfurter,  issued  statements  that  were  widely  cir- 
culated through  the  public  press  "that  a  desire  to  appease 
the  liberal  element  in  Russia  was  paramount  in  the  minds 
of  the  Commission." 

This  action  on  the  part  of  United  States  officials,  who 
appeared  to  be  anxious  to  save  the  neck  of  a  vile  criminal 
who  was  willing  to  kill  many  and  mutilate  and  maim  for 
life  many  more  innocent  people  who  were  interested  in  a 


204    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

patriotic  parade,  led  the  attorney  who  tried  the  case  to 
comment  upon  the  Commission's  report  in  these  withering 
words : 

The  Commission  in  their  conclusion  moralize  upon  the  duties  we 
all  owe  to  the  cause  of  democracy.  We  venture  to  suggest  in  this 
regard,  however,  that  democracy  has  no  worse  enemy  than  the  man 
or  set  of  men  who,  upon  the  unsworn  statements  of  interested  persons 
and  without  considering  both  sides  of  the  case,  undertake  to  set  aside 
the  verdict  of  two  juries,  which  said  verdicts  have  been  sustained  hy 
the  trial  and  appellate  tribunals,  in  order  to  satisfy  the  demands  of 
anarchists  on  a  different  continent  whose  views  are  entirely  out  of 
harmony  with  democracy  as  well  as  with  any  other  kind  of  organized 
government.  Anarchy  and  murder  will  never  assist  the  cause  of 
democracy,  nor  will  an  effort  to  overturn  the  Constitution  and  laws 
of  our  country  to  save  murderers  and  anarchists  increase  the  regard 
for  democracy  entertained  by  honest  and  patriotic  citizens.  .  .  . 
Making  the  world  safe  for  Mooney  and  his  ilk  will  not  make  it  safer 
for  democracy ;  neither  will  it  stimulate  patriotism  nor  inspire  respect 
for  our  institutions.6 

Prior,  however,  to  the  report  of  this  Commission  and 
prior  to  Mooney's  trial,  while  anarchist  Berkman  was  con- 
ducting his  propaganda  in  the  East,  deceiving  the  labor 
unions  and  the  uninformed  public,  he  hired  George  P.  West, 
who  had  deceived  the  public  by  his  propaganda  in  the  Mc- 
Namara  cases,  to  prepare  a  report  in  behalf  of  Mooney, 
the  purpose  being  to  set  out  to  the  public  that  the  Mooney 
case  was  a  labor  case  pure  and  simple.  West  was  employed 
as  an  investigator  by  the  Industrial  Relations  Committee,  of 
which  Frank  P.  Walsh  was  chairman,  later  joint  chairman 
of  the  federal  War  Labor  Board.  And  West's  report  was 
put  out  in  the  name  of  the  federal  committee,  though  its 
author  received  $300  for  it  from  Mooney's  most  intimate 
associate  in  his  anarchistic  activities,  including  publication  of 

'"Review  of  the  Mooney  Case,"  page  65,  by  John  M.  Olin,  Madison, 
Wis.,  1919 — a  most  thorough  study  and  faithful  digest  of  this  whole  matter 
by  a  trained  mind. 


Russia  and  Bolshevism  205 

the  destructionist  paper,  The  Blast.7  It  was  because  of  the 
fact  that  the  public  kept  the  Industrial  Relations  Committee 
in  mincj  as  a  federal  body  that  its  name  was  used  by  the  prop- 
agandists to  influence  public  sentiment. 

Theodore  Roosevelt,  writing  to  Felix  Frankfurter  rela- 
tive to  the  matter,  as  brought  out  in  the  Commission's  re- 
port, said: 

I  answer  it  (his  letter)  at  length  because  you  have  taken,  and  are 
taking,  on  behalf  of  the  Administration  an  attitude  which  seems  to 
me  to  be  fundamentally  that  of  Trotzky  and  the  other  Bolsheviki 
leaders  in  Russia — an  attitude  which  may  be  fraught  with  mischief 
to  this  country.  .  .  . 

The  reactionaries  have  in  the  past  been  a  great  menace  to  this 
republic ;  but  at  this  moment  it  is  the  I.  W.  W.,  the  Germanized  So- 
cialists, the  anarchists,  the  foolish  creatures  who  always  protest 
against  the  suppression  of  crime,  the  pacifists  and  the  like  under  the 
lead  ...  of  the  Bergers,  and  Hillquits,  the  Fremont  Olders,  and 
Amos  Pinchots  and  Rudolph  Spreckels  who  are  the  really  grave 
danger.  These  are  the  Bolsheviki  of  America,  and  the  Bolsheviki  are 
just  as  bad  as  the  Romanoffs,  and  are  at  the  moment  a  greater  menace 
to  orderly  freedom.  .  .  .  When  you,  as  representing  President 
Wilson,  find  yourself  obliged  to  champion  men  of  this  stamp,  you 
ought,  by  unequivocal  affirmative  action,  to  make  it  evident  that  you 
are  sternly  against  their  general  and  habitual  line  of  conduct. 

After  the  report  of  the  Mediation  Commission,  John  B. 
Densmore,  nephew  of  Secretary  of  Labor  Wilson,  was  ap- 
pointed by  this  cabinet  official  to  make  further  investiga- 
tion. After  six  months,  during  which  he  received  instruc- 
tions from  time  to  time,  he  submitted  a  report  in  which  he 
stated  that  he  had  "continued  a  secret  and  altogether  in- 
formal inquiry  into  the  Mooney  case,"  a  report  submitted 
as  Director  General  of  Employment  under  the  Department 
of  Labor.  And  prior  to  his  connection  therewith,  he  was 
an  agitator  in  behalf  of  the  noted  McNamara  case,  in  which 
the  accused  admitted  their  guilt  of  the  atrocious  crime 
7  id,  p.  69. 


206    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

charged  against  them,  when  real  labor  awoke  to  the  fact 
that  it  had  been  hoodwinked  by  men  of  the  stamp  of  Dens- 
more,  West,  and  Arnold.  Thus,  there  was  submitted  a 
second  secret  report  by  Administration  officials  in  which  the 
people  were  not  permitted  to  be  heard,  though  it  cannot  be 
conceived  how  anarchists,  criminals,  traitors  in  time  of  war 
or  any  other  time,  such  as  Berkman,  Mooney,  and  their 
kind  could  have  any  more  right  to  be  heard  than  the  people 
who  were  innocent.  Only  those  who  were  enemies  of  the 
people  and  whom  the  people  had  convicted  in  the  regular 
process  of  court  procedure  were  permitted  to  know  what 
was  being  done.  The  methods  of  Catiline  were  not  ex- 
hausted in  the  days  of  Rome's  beginning  decline.  The 
notorious  International  Workers'  Defense  League  knew  the 
contents  of  the  report  and  had  made  arrangements  with 
the  editor  of  the  San  Francisco  Call,  edited  by  Fremont 
Older,  to  print  25,000  extra  copies  containing  this  report, 
for  which  $750  was  paid,  before  the  report  had  reached  the 
Department  in  Washington.  But  the  reviewer  of  the 
Mooney  case  was  never  able  to  obtain  an  official  copy  of  this 
report,  even  for  the  purpose  of  setting  out  before  the  peo- 
ple the  true  state  of  facts;  and  to-day  this  report  remains 
an  unconfirmed,  unsubstantiated  government  document 
based  upon  the  utmost  perversion  of  fact.  A  writer  who 
has  gone  thoroughly  into  the  substance  of  the  Densmore 
report  and  what  was  back  of  it,  sums  up  his  views  thus : 

Densmore  was  in  former  years  a  supporter  of  the  McNamara 
murderers  and  agitator  in  their  behalf.  His  relations  with  various 
reds  was  close.  He  went  out  at  the  expense  of  the  United '  States 
and  is  said  to  have  had  in  his  employ  some  thirty  detectives,  including 
some  of  the  men  employed  by  the  friends  of  anarchist  Mooney.  .  .  . 
He  and  his  gang  tapped  the  wires  between  the  district  attorney's 
office  and  the  United  States  Naval  Intelligence  office,  the  Army  In- 
telligence office  and  United  States  Marshal's  office  and  stole  various 
documents  and  gave  the  information  so  obtained  to  reds  and  disloyal- 
ists who  were  subjects  of  investigation  and  prosecution  by  United 


Russia  and  Bolshevism  207 

States  and  state  authorities.  Then  choosing  a  ...  paper,  ...  ed- 
ited by'.  .  *  Fremont  Older,  who  is  a  friend  of  the  reds  and  had 
publicly  entertained  Alexander  Berkman  and  Emma  Goldman,  he 
published  a  scurrilous  attack  upon  District  Attorney  Fickert.  .  .  . 
Then  after  Densmore  was  subpoenaed  as  a  witness  in  the  United 
States  Court  and  was  wanted  by  the  grand  jury,  he  fled  the  state  and 
in  spite  of  all  efforts  on  the  part  of  the  Governor  and  the  district 
attorney  to  get  him  back,  he  is  still  a  fugitive  from  justice.8 

But  it  remained  for  the  grand  jury,  which  went  into  the 
matter  with  conspicuous  thoroughness  under  the  personal 
direction  of  the  attorney  general  of  the  state  to  make  the 
most  complete  and  overwhelming  reply  to  the  padded  Dens- 
more  report: 

It  was  expected  that  as  these  charges  had  been  made  in  a  pub- 
lished report  by  an  official  of  the  United  States  Government,  the 
grand  jury  would  be  assisted  in  its  investigation  by  such  official  and 
those  of  his  subordinates  who  might  have  been  employed  in  procuring 
the  evidence  upon  which  the  report  was  based.  ...  Mr.  Densmore 
departed  and  refused  to  answer  the  subpoena  of  the  grand  jury. 

And  all  appeals  to  William  B.  Wilson,  head  of  the  Depart- 
ment, by  the  Governor  of  California,  by  the  mayor  of  San 
Francisco,  by  the  presiding  judge  of  the  superior  court,  and 
by  the  foreman  of  the  special  grand  jury  were  equally  un- 
availing, although  Secretary  of  Labor  Wilson,  under  date 
of  November  27,  1918,  wired  the  Governor:  "I  am  in- 
structing Mr.  Densmore  to  put  into  your  hands  a  complete 
copy  of  his  report  to  me  and  I  am  also  instructing  him  to 
place  himself  entirely  at  your  disposal."  A  few  days  later 
the  Governor  replied  that  it  was  desired  that  Mr.  Densmore 
report  to  the  attorney  general  of  the  state.  He  did  not  re- 
port. Secretary  Wilson  then  appointed  William  Denman, 
the  man  who  came  in  conflict  with  General  Goethals  over 
ships,  and  he  declined  to  represent  him.  And  after  then 
appointing  G.  Stanley  Arnold  for  the  same  purpose,  Mr. 

8  Id.,    p.    92,    quoting   "America's    Greatest    Peril — The    Bolsheviki    and 
the  Mooney  Case,"  by  Francis  R.  Welsh,  Philadelphia. 


208     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

Arnold  informed  Governor  Stephens,  on  December  23,  that 
he  was  directed  by  the  Secretary  of  Labor  "to  state  that  he 
will  not  at  this  time  direct  either  Mr.  Densmore  or  his 
assistants,  Messrs.  McCarthy  and  Parsons,  to  return  to  San 
Francisco."  And  William  Armstrong,  another  of  Dens- 
more's  assistants,  declined  to  testify  before  the  grand  jury 
on  the  ground  that  he  might  incriminate  himself.  For  over 
a  month  this  grand  jury  had  been  led  to  believe  that  the 
author  of  the  unfounded  official  government  report  or  some 
one  else  representing  the  Department  of  Labor  would  ap- 
pear before  it  to  get  at  the  facts  in  the  case;  but  no  one 
appeared.  It  was  evident  that  Densmore  did  not  dare  to 
face  a  grand  jury  under  oath. 

The  International  Workers'  Defense  League,  within  two 
weeks  after  Mooney's  arrest  and  even  before  the  defense 
had  decided  upon  its  counsel,  began  its  propaganda  work. 
Men,  like  West  and  Densmore,  who  had  poisoned  the  pub- 
lic mind  in  the  case  of  the  McNamaras,  brutal  murderers 
who  afterward  admitted  their  guilt  in  blowing  up  the  Los 
Angeles  Times  Building,  resulting  in  the  death  of  twenty 
three  persons,  were  engaged  to  carry  through  the  same 
methods  in  the  Mooney  case,  in  utter  disregard  of  courts 
and  the  methods  of  procedure  of  orderly  society. 

Also  came  the  President  of  the  United  States  disre- 
garding the  efficacy  of  courts,  even  courts  of  the  last  resort 
and  the  power  of  executive  review.  In  January,  1918,  the 
Governor  of  California  received  from  President  Wilson 
"the  urgent  appeal,"  asking  whether  it  would  not  be  possible 
"to  postpone  the  execution  of  Mooney  until  he  could  be 
tried  upon  one  of  the  other  indictments  against  him."  The 
very  suggestion  seems  almost  too  preposterous  to  be  credi- 
ble. On  March  27,  the  President  wired  the  Governor,  "if 
you  could  see  your  way  to  commute  the  sentence  of  Mooney, 
it  would  have  a  most  heartfelt  effect  upon  certain  interna- 
tional affairs  which  his  execution  would  greatly  complicate." 
Again  on  June  4  he  wired  the  State  executive :  "I  would  not 


Russia  and  Bolshevism  209 

venture  again  to  call  your  attention  to  the  case  did  I  not 
know  the  international  significance  which  attaches  to  it." 
Very  properly  Governor  Stephens  refused  to  take  action 
while  the  case  was  pending  in  the  State  Supreme  Court, 
which  disposed  of  it  August  23.  And  an  appeal  to  the 
United  States  Supreme  Court  was  disposed  of  November 
1 8,  1918.  For  the  Governor  of  the  State  to  take  the  case 
out  of  the  court  would  have  been  an  unwarranted  inter- 
ference with  the  course  of  justice  in  any  case  and  would  have 
shown  him  fitted  to  be  a  tyrant.  If  he  made  a  mistake,  it 
was  in  yielding  to  the  importunities  of  President  Wilson, 
to  whom  Samuel  Gompers,  president  of  the  American  Fed- 
eration of  Labor,  had  been  urged  by  many  resolutions  en- 
gineered through  labor  organizations  by  radicals  in  sympa- 
thy with  Mooney  and  his  fellow  anarchists,  to  make  an 
appeal. 

Said  a  careful  and  fair  reviewer  of  the  Mooney  case : 

This  is  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  this  country  that  an  organ- 
ized movement  has  been  made  to  prevent  the  enforcement  of  deci- 
sions of  our  courts.  If  this  movement  should  be  successful,  then  the 
days  of  this  Republic  are  numbered.  So  long  as  laws  regularly 
enacted  by  the  people  are  fairly  and  honestly  enforced  through  the 
decisions  of  the  courts  honestly  rendered,  this  country  will  be  safe 
from  any  attack  within  our  borders.9 

The  national  Administration,  as  a  result  of  the  efforts 
of  radicals  working  through  Samuel  Gompers  and  the  De- 
partment of  Labor,  was  constantly  interfering  with  the 
operations  of  the  courts  in  the  Mooney  case,  many  radicals 
being  then  employes  of  the  Government.  Just  why  Presi- 
dent Wilson  was  so  bent  upon  saving  the  life  of  this  desper- 
ado, destructionist,  traitor,  was  never  revealed.  But  it  was 
not  the  only  instance.  He  besought  Governor  Spry  of  Utah 
to  spare  the  life  of  another  duly  convicted  anarchist,  Joe 
Hillstrom,  who,  in  cold  blood,  had  murdered  a  seventeen- 
•id.,  P.  4. 


2io    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

year-old  boy  and  his  father.  In  that  case  Mooney,  as  secre- 
tary and  treasurer  of  the  International  Workers'  Defense 
League,  wrote  Governor  Spry  a  threatening  letter.  Reply- 
ing to  President  Wilson's  second  appeal,  in  the  Hillstrom 
case,  Governor  Spry  made  this  manly,  straightforward 
reply : 

I  feel  that  a  further  postponement  at  this  time  would  be  an  un- 
warranted interference  with  the  course  of  justice.  Mindful  of  the 
obligations  of  my  oath  of  office  to  see  to  it  that  the  laws  are  enforced, 
I  cannot,  and  will  not  lend  myself,  nor  my  office,  to  such  interference. 
Tangible  facts  must  be  presented  before  I  will  further  interfere  in 
this  case. 

Hillstrom  was  executed  in  accordance  with  the  law.  The 
attempt  to  blow  up  the  home  of  Governor  Spry  was  dis- 
covered in  time  to  avert  the  disaster. 

Mooney  was  interested  in  other  cases,  notably  those  of 
Suhr  and  of  Ford,  anarchistic  murderers,  to  the  extent  of 
threatening  the  life  of  Hiram  Johnson,  then  Governor  of 
California,  unless  he  interfered  to  spare  them. 

These  cases  are  cited  to  illustrate  the  general  scheme 
resorted  to  by  the  International  Workers'  Defense  League, 
which  is  made  up  entirely  of  the  extreme  radicals  from  the 
Socialist  Labor  party,  the  anarchists,  the  I.  W.  W.'s,  the 
International  Radical  Club,  the  Free  Discussion  League, 
and  some  extreme  radical  members  of  labor  unions.  They 
are  cited  for  the  further  purpose  of  indicating  still  further 
how  the  Administration  was  as  intimately  interwoven  with 
radical  internationalists  and  anti-nationalists  as  it  believed 
the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  to  be  with  the 
Paris  Peace  Treaty. 

And  this  would  not  be  complete  without  referring  to  the 
relations  of  the  Administration  to  Robert  A.  Minor.  If 
the  Department  of  Labor,  with  William  B.  Wilson  at  its 
head,  was  responsible  for  Johannsen,  a  well-known  anar- 
chist and  I.  W.  W.,  friend  of  anarchists  and  dynamiters 


Russia  and  Bolshevism  21 1 

Caplan  and  Schmidt  who  stopped  at  his  home  when  making 
their  purchases  of  dynamite  with  which  to  commit  their 
dastardly  deeds  for  which  they  were  convicted  with  the 
McNamaras — if  he  received  his  appointment  as  federal 
Mediator  of  Munitions  Strikes  by  the  Department  of 
Labor  over  the  protest  of  federal  officials,  while  un- 
der indictment  in  the  United  States  courts  for  com- 
plicity with  the  McNamaras  in  blowing  up  the  Times 
Building,  Los  Angeles,  and  while  attending  the  Hay- 
wood  trial  as  an  I.  W.  W.  delegate,  yet  some  one 
else  or  some  other  Department  was  responsible  for  Robert 
A.  Minor,  son  of  a  Texas  federal  judge.  Minor  was  editor 
of  two  anarchist  papers,  The  Blast  and  The  Masses,  con- 
tributed to  others,  was  an  associate  of  Berkman,  Emma 
Goldman,  Johannsen,  and  other  notorious  Reds;  testified 
that  he  wished  to  overthrow  the  American  government  and 
institutions,  and  in  his  public  addresses  and  his  writings 
advocated  violence  to  that  end;  was  the  author  of  much 
inflammatory  and  infamously  untruthful  literature  that  did 
much  to  incite  the  Bolsheviki  in  Russia  against  the  United 
States;  was  denied  passport  by  the  State  Department  upon 
the  recommendation  of  the  Department  of  Justice ;  and  yet, 
through  some  mysterious  processes  of  the  powers  at  work 
at  Washington,  was  sent  to  Russia  as  a  representative  of 
George  Creel,  though  all  of  these  facts  had  been  called  to 
the  attention  of  the  appointing  power.  There  he  served 
well  in  the  cause  of  Lenine  and  Trotzky,  head  of  the  Bol- 
shevist autocracy.  He  was  the  successor  of  Mooney  as 
secretary  and  treasurer  of  the  International  Workers'  De- 
fense League,  when  Mooney  was  arrested  for  the  San 
Francisco  bomb  explosion.  It  was  under  his  leadership  that 
the  nation-wide  propaganda  campaign  was  begun  that  mis- 
led the  public,  immediately  Mooney  was  arrested.  And  it 
was  while  the  Reds  were  marching  in  New  York  in  the 
interest  of  this  campaign  of  falsehood,  on  November  12, 
carrying  red  flags  above  the  United  States  flag,  that  some 


212    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

of  the  loyal  boys  who  had  returned  from  overseas  handled 
one  of  these  anarchists,  J.  Edward  Morgan,  roughly, — the 
same  Morgan  who,  when  arrested  in  California,  was  found 
in  possession  of  a  letter  from  President  Wilson's  private 
secretary,  Tumulty,  authorizing  him  to  travel  over  the  coun- 
try as  a  Mooney  propagandist.10  As  the  loyal  soldiers  and 
sailors  did  not  see  it  from  Secretary  Tumulty's  viewpoint, 
carrying  red  flags  on  New  York's  streets  was  forbidden 
thereafter. 

There  is  a  yet  more  serious  connection  between  this  anar- 
chist Minor  and  the  Administration.  It  was  on  June  8, 
1919,  in  a  Paris  cafe,  while  chatting  with  Lincoln  Steffens, 
friend,  confidant,  and  Russian  adviser  of  President  Wilson, 
that  Minor  was  asked  by  a  French  secret  service  agent  to 
accompany  him  to  police  headquarters.  There  he  was 
promptly  placed  under  arrest  by  waiting  members  of  the 
American  Military  Intelligence  and  taken  to  Coblenz  to  the 
commanding  officer  of  the  Third  American  Army.  Steffens 
went  to  the  Hotel  Crillon,  which  was  President  Wilson's 
headquarters,  and  informed  friends  that  this  time  Minor 
would  certainly  face  the  firing  squad. 

Ten  days  after  the  arrest,  the  Military  Intelligence  of 
the  Third  Army  presented  to  the  Judge  Advocate  at  Cob- 
lenz evidence  to  establish  against  Minor  charges  that  he 
had  been  employed  at  Petrograd  by  Lenine  and  Trotzky  to 
publish  an  English-language  paper  to  be  circulated  in  the 
American  and  British  armies  for  the  purpose  of  creating 
mutiny  through  the  dissemination  of  Bolshevistic  doctrines ; 
that  this  plan  failing  because  of  the  armistice,  he  moved  to 
Berlin  where  he  was  associated  with  the  Sparticides,  the 
German  Bolshevists;  that  yet  later,  he  moved  to  Coblenz, 
shortly  after  the  American  army  crossed  the  Rhine,  where 
he  was  caught  publishing  and  seeking  to  circulate  a  Bol- 
shevist pamphlet  designed  to  foment  mutiny  in  the  Ameri- 

10  "America's  Greatest  Peril,"  pp.  11-12. 


Russia  and  Bolshevism  213 

can  ranks.  But  he  could  not  be  arrested  within  the  German 
lines. 

Two  days  later  a  commission  was  set  to  try  him  on  these 
grave  charges,  which  he  made  no  attempt  to  deny.  The 
officers  in  charge  of  the  case  were  confident  of  a  speedy 
verdict,  when,  on  the  eve  of  the  trial,  a  peremptory  order 
was  received  from  General  Pershing's  Chief  of  Staff  that  no 
further  action  be  taken  pending  a  report  upon  an  investi- 
gation by  the  Judge  Advocate  General  of  the  Expedition- 
ary Forces.  It  is  readily  understood  that  General  Persh- 
ing's  only  interest  in  a  notorious  military  criminal  would  be 
to  administer  certain  and  severe  punishment.  After  an  in- 
vestigation, however,  the  Judge  Advocate  reported  that 
Minor  was  "charged  with  as  serious  an  offense  as  a  man 
can  commit"  and  that  he  "thoroughly  believed  him  to  be 
guilty"  but  that  because  of  the  great  desirability  of  secur- 
ing a  conviction,  the  trial  should  await  the  arrival  of  wit- 
nesses in  the  hands  of  the  French  and  British.  The  Ameri- 
can, British,  and  French  were  working  together  on  the  case, 
and  witnesses  were  en  route  to  Coblenz,  when  Minor  was  re- 
leased on  General  Pershing's  order. 

Minor  was  hurried  to  Paris  when  permitted  to  go,  and 
he  proceeded  to  America  where  he  next  appears  at  the  head 
of  a  mob  of  Reds  seeking  to  make  a  demonstration  on  Fifth 
Avenue,  New  York,  until  dispersed  by  the  police.  And  next 
he  is  found  back  in  his  old  haunts  with  the  radical  agitators 
on  the  Pacific  Coast. 

When  Minor  was  arrested,  his  father  hurried  to  Wash- 
ington. Whom  he  saw  there  the  records  fail  to  disclose. 
But  anarchist  Minor  was  a  friend  of  Secretary  of  War 
Baker  and  of  George  Creel,  both  members  of  the  federal 
Committee  on  Publicity  during  the  war,  the  latter  editor 
of  the  Official  Bulletin.  Evidently  Lincoln  Steffens  saw 
some  one  high  in  authority  at  the  Hotel  Crillon;  and 
Minor's  father  saw  some  one  high  in  authority  in  Washing- 


214    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

ton.  And  when  Secretary  Baker  was  asked  to  reopen  the 
case,  he  refused  on  the  ground  that  it  was  a  matter  of  the 
Department  of  Justice — a  statement  which  he  knew  was  not 
true,  since  the  country  was  still  at  war  with  Germany,  and 
Minor  could  have  been  sent  back  for  trial.11 

It  is  doubtful  whether  any  investigation  could  ever  re- 
veal the  devious  ways  of  the  Wilson  Administration  in  deal- 
ing with  slackers,  disloyalists,  and  destructionists. 

Nor  did  it  appear  to  be  necessary.  For  Ludwig  C.  A. 
K.  Martens  issued  a  statement  on  March  19,  1919,  in  New 
York,  to  the  effect  that  he  was  the  official  representative  in 
the  United  States  of  the  Lenine-Trotzky  government,  his 
credentials  being  signed  by  George  Tchicherin,  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  and  bearing  the  seal  of  the  Russian  Com- 
missariat of  Foreign  Affairs.  He  was  not  recognized  by 
the  State  Department,  when  he  demanded  recognition;  but 
he  opened  offices  in  New  York  as  the  official  envoy  of  the 
Soviet  Government,  with  various  departments  and  an  official 
staff,  including  a  Bolshevist  disseminator  of  Soviet  infor- 
mation, and  prepared  to  open  trade  relations  with  the 
United  States  on  behalf  of  his  Government,  with  a  guar- 
anteed deposit  of  $200,000,000  in  gold.  On  April  2,  he 
preached  Bolshevism  at  Hunt's  Point  Palace  to  an  audi- 
ence of  3,000  people.  This  brought  a  protest  from  the  cur- 
ator of  the  New  York  Zoological  Park  addressed  to  the 
Attorney  General  of  the  United  States.  Six  days  later  the 
Union  League  Club  of  New  York  City  unanimously  adopted 
a  resolution  calling  upon  the  Government  to  take  immedi- 
ate action  to  put  an  end  to  the  activities  of  Martens  as 
Soviet  representative.  But  these  activities  continued  unin- 
terruptedly. Large  quantities  of  Bolshevist  literature  were 
distributed,  a  great  mass  of  which  came  through  the  office 
of  Martens  in  New  York.  His  declared  purpose  to  open 
trade  relations  between  this  country  and  his  had  a  two-fold 
object:  To  appeal  to  the  assumed  cupidity  of  America  and 

"Harvey's  Weekly,  New  York,  May  i,  1920. 


Russia  and  Bolshevism  215 

blind  the  people  to  the  deeper  design  of  propagandizing 
America.  Whether  the  I.  W.  W.  boast  is  true  or  not  that 
the  Russian  counter-revolution,  which  sent  the  real  revolu- 
tion under  Kerensky  to  its  death  when  the  Constituent 
Assembly  was  dispersed  by  armed  forces,  was  planned  in 
Seattle  at  the  time  that  Lenine  and  Trotzky  were  in  that 
city  on  their  way  to  Russia,  it  is  yet  true  that  tons  of  Bol- 
shevist literature  were  distributed  containing  the  most  in- 
cendiary appeals.  And  in  October,  1919,  the  Attorney- 
General  of  the  State  of  New  York,  after  a  careful  survey 
of  radical  publications  in  New  York  City,  made  a  report  in 
which  he  stated  that  these  reports  were,  in  large  measure, 
subsidized  by  the  New  York  parlor  radicals,  and  declared 
that  they 

are,  in  general,  the  same  people  who  subsidized  the  pro-German 
propaganda  and  furnished  the  money  for  the  pacifist,  peace-at-any- 
price  campaigns,  and  contributed  to  the  cause  of  the  conscientious 
objectors; 

the  central  idea  advocated  being  "the  overthrow  of  the 
present  system  of  Government,  the  abolition  of  the  wage 
system,  and  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat." 

And  this  system  of  propaganda  was  in  operation  on 
American  soil  from  the  time  Lenine  and  Trotzky  took  over 
the  Soviet  Government  in  Russia.  Even  while  this  nation 
was  engaging  all  of  its  energies  in  preparing  for  and  pros- 
ecuting the  Great  War,  Bolshevism  had  a  far-reaching  or- 
ganization at  work  directed  by  the  trained  agents  of  Lenine 
and  Trotzky.  Even  as  early  as  the  middle  of  1918  the 
national  headquarters  of  the  propaganda  were  made  known 
to  the  United  States  Secret  Service,  which  then  obtained 
the  names  and  addresses  of  1,200  members  of  the  Phila- 
delphia branch,  these  latter  embracing  15  Soviets  operating 
under  the  direction  of  the  All-Russia  Soviets  of  America  in 
New  York.  The  movement  and  its  propaganda  were  not 
haphazard,  but  were  conducted  by  experienced  revolution- 


2i6    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

aries  to  whom  democracy  is  as  hateful  as  czarism  or  Prus- 
sian autocracy.  Destruction  in  America  is  as  much  a  part 
of  their  plan  as  it  is  elsewhere.  Said  the  noted  Socialist 
writer,  William  English  Walling: 

Nothing  could  be  more  untrue  than  to  exonerate  the  Bolsheviki 
of  the  anarchistic  taint.  Their  doctrine  is  rather  a  socialistic  anar- 
chism than  an  anarchistic  socialism. 

When  this  propaganda  had  been  operating  for  some 
time,  it  was  recognized  that  the  leaders  must  strike,  lest 
the  psychological  hour  pass.  The  Winnipeg  strike,  the 
Seattle  attempt  upon  the  life  of  that  city's  government,  the 
great  steel  strike,  the  coal  strike,  the  attempt  to  force  the 
Plumb  plan  upon  the  country  by  the  organized  railroad 
men,  the  "outlaw"  railroad  strike,  the  dynamiting  outrages 
in  nine  large  eastern  cities  and  upon  the  lives  of  prominent 
men  and  government  officials — these  are  some  of  the  re- 
sults of  the  previous  propaganda.  And  an  eastern  news- 
paper of  wide  influence  declared: 

The  Fitzpatricks  and  Fosters,  the  Plumbs  and  the  Lewises — sup- 
ported to  some  extent  even  by  the  Gompers  group — are  really  en- 
gaged in  a  movement  whose  aim  is  to  establish  in  this  country  the 
philosophy  of  Lenine  and  Trotzky  instead  of  the  principles  of  Lincoln 
and  Roosevelt,  to  substitute  classism  for  democracy  and  American- 
ism.12 

How  this  was  worked  out,  at  least  in  part,  by  writers 
who  received  their  inspiration  from  the  Bolshevism  of  Rus- 
sia was  told  by  G.  A.  Simonds  in  his  testimony  before  the 
Senate  committee  on  February  12,  1919,  as  it  was  investi- 
gating Bolshevism.  For  many  years  and  until  compelled  to 
leave  in  October,  1918,  he  was  head  of  the  Methodist 
church  in  Russia.  He  informed  the  committee  that  Bol- 
shevism was  being  proclaimed  in  the  United  States  by  means 
of  speakers,  pamphlets,  and  articles  in  newspapers  and 
magazines;  and  he  named  writers  who  had  been  closely 

"The  Philadelphia  North  American,  October,  30,   1919. 


Russia  and  Bolshevism  217 

affiliated  with  the  Bolshevik  government  in  Russia,  and 
pointed  out  publishers  of  Bolshevik  literature  in  the  United 
States. 

Indeed,  in  the  very  month  that  he  was  giving  his  testi- 
mony to  the  Senate  committee,  there  was  held  in  the  na- 
tional capital,  and  almost  within  the  shadows  of  the  place 
where  Congress  meets  and  of  the  White  House,  a  largely 
attended  meeting  at  which  the  soviet  government  in  Russia 
was  enthusiastically  defended. 

Trotzky  knew  whereof  he  spoke  when  he  said  to  Colonel 
Raymond  Robins: 

Listen  to  me  carefully.  Follow  me  step  by  step.  We  have  started 
our  peace  negotiations  with  the  Germans.  We  have  asked  the  Allies 
to  join  us  in  starting  peace  negotiations  for  the  whole  world  on  a 
democratic  basis — no  forcible  annexations,  no  punitive  indemnities, 
and  a  full  acceptance  of  the  principle  of  the  self-determination  of  all 
peoples.  The  Allies  have  refused  to  accept  our  invitation.  We  still 
hope,  of  course,  to  compel  them. 

Surprised,  Colonel  Robins  was  desirous  of  knowing  more 
and  asked,  in  simple  monosyllable,  How?  Trotzky  re- 
plied: 

By  stirring  up  the  comrades  in  France  and  in  England  and  in 
America  to  upset  the  policy  of  their  governments  by  asserting  their 
own  revolutionary  socialist  will. 

An  official  order  of  Lenine  dated  December  13,  1917, 
showed  an  appropriation  of  2,000,000  rubles,  slightly  over 
$1,000,000,  for  the  spread  of  Bolshevik  propaganda.  And 
Roger  Simmons,  representing  the  United  States  Depart- 
ment of  Commerce  in  Russia,  in  his  testimony  before  the 
Senate  committee,  which  began  its  investigations  of  the  at- 
tempts of  Russian  Bolshevism  upon  the  United  States  in 
February,  1919,  stated  that  Lenine  had  declared  that  "the 
power  that  had  crushed  Germany  is  also  the  power  that,  in 
the  end,  will  crush  England  and  the  United  States." 

And  this  was  the  power  at  first  insidiously,  then  more 


218    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

openly,  that  was  threatening  just  as  surely,  if  in  less  tangi- 
ble form,  the  integrity  of  the  United  States  as  was  Germany. 
It  did  it  through  Berkman  and  Johannsen  and  West  and 
Arnold  and  Densmore  and  Mooney  and  Minor  and  thou- 
sands of  others,  many  of  them  in  official  positions,  and 
others,  to  the  end  under  the  protecting  care  of  men  very 
high  in  authority  under  the  Wilson  Administration.  And 
whenever  President  Wilson  lifted  his  voice  or  used  the 
influence  of  his  high  office  to  shield  anarchists,  Bolshevists, 
traitors  to  the  country  of  the  stamp  of  Mooney,  Hillstrom, 
and  Minor,  he  was  unworthy  any  more  favorable  considera- 
tion than  any  other  man  who  did  the  same.  And  some 
departments  of  the  government  under  his  Administration 
were  abundantly  loaded  with  men  of  Bolshevist  taint.  To 
quote  him  again,  "Let  us  be  frank  about  this  solemn  mat- 
ter." It  was  not  President  Wilson  who  saw  the  danger 
and  warned  the  country.  As  usual,  he  trailed. 

Said  Lieutenant  D.  C.  Van  Buren,  of  the  Army  Intelli- 
gence Service,  in  October,  1919,  in  his  testimony  before  the 
Senate  committee  investigating  the  steel  strike,  that  during 
the  summer  of  that  year  the  Russians  in  Gary,  Indiana, 
started  a  movement  to  organize  a  Red  Guard  in  prepara- 
tion for  the  revolution  which  they  then  saw  for  this  country. 
They  sought  to  get  all  of  the  former  soldiers  in  Gary 
together  and  drill  and  equip  them;  at  the  same  time  agi- 
tators were  telling  the  people  to  prepare  to  manage  and 
operate  their  industries — just  the  thing  that  happened  a 
year  later  in  Italy.  The  witness  stated  further  that  the 
situation  had  become  such  that  it  was  necessary  to  find  a 
man  with  a  bomb  in  his  hands  before  the  immigration 
officers  would  act. 

By  this  disclosure  the  Administration  officials  were 
stirred  to  unwonted  activity;  and  on  the  morning  of  No- 
vember 8,  newspaper  readers  were  met  with  large  headlines 
telling  that  there  had  been  a  general  round-up  of  destruc- 
tionists  in  various  industrial  centers  of  the  country:  200  in 


Russia  and  Bolshevism  219 

New  York,  175  in  Chicago,  and  smaller  numbers  in  other 
cities,  and  that  50  would  be  deported.  The  officials  has- 
tened to  say  that  this  action  had  been  in  contemplation  for 
several  weeks. 

A  man  who  was  American  to  the  core  and  who  had  been 
through  the  thick  of  the  fight  with  Bolshevism  in  its  most 
glaring  form  stated  the  Administration's  policy  very  aptly 
in  these  words: 

Many  of  the  I.  W.  W.'s  were  arrested  during  the  war  and  some 
were  punished.  The  Government  started,  stopped,  started  again, 
conciliated,  pandered,  and  generally  pursued  a  skimmed-milk  policy. 
Argument  was  tried,  kindness,  public  statements  appealing  to  patrio- 
tism, and  this  to  a  class  of  men  who  know  but  one  argument,  force; 
who  think  kindness  is  weakness,  and  who  have  no  patriotism."  13 

This  was  but  a  manifestation  of  a  pronounced  character- 
istic of  the  Wilson  Administration:  ''Watchful  waiting" 
— shirking  a  responsibility  until  the  urgency  became  so  great 
that  it  could  not  longer  be  ignored  and  in  some  instances  un- 
til great  damage  had  resulted.  In  this  instance,  forced  by  the 
situation  which  developed  as  a  result  of  the  Administration's 
coddling  this  monster  within  the  nation's  fold,  aroused  at 
last  by  a  public  sentiment  which  it  felt  no  longer  able  to 
resist  and  by  open  manifestations  of  hostility  to  the  Gov- 
ernment, Secretary  Baker,  in  a  public  address  at  Cleveland 
a  year  after  the  end  of  the  Great  War  took  a  position  that 
heartened  real  Americans  and  that  dampened  the  ardor  of 
the  destructionists  at  whose  machinations  the  Administra- 
tion had  been  conniving.  He  said: 

Our  newspapers  are  daily  filled  with  accounts  of  violent  agita- 
tion by  so-called  Bolsheviki  and  radicals,  counseling  violence  and 
urging  action  in  behalf  of  what  they  call  "social  revolution."  The 
American  people  will  not  exchange  the  solid  foundations  of  their  so- 
cial order  for  any  of  these  fantastic  programs. 

13  "Americanism  versus  Bolshevism,"  by  Ole  Hanson,  published  1919-1920, 
by  Doubleday,  Page  &  Co.,  New  York, 


22O    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

This  time  it  was  more  than  words.  When  Ole  Hanson, 
mayor  of  Seattle,  asked  for  United  States  troops  to  save 
the  overthrow  of  that  city's  government,  they  were 
promptly  sent.  Secretary  Baker  notified  the  Governors  of 
all  states  in  which  disorder  threatened  to  get  beyond  local 
control  to  call  upon  the  armed  forces  of  the  United  States 
for  assistance;  at  the  same  time  telegraphing  each  army 
department  commander  to  respond  instantly  to  any  call 
from  any  Governor  who  found  himself  unable  to  cope  with 
disorders  and  to  enforce  the  laws. 

In  marked  contrast  with  the  faltering  and  paltering 
course  of  President  Wilson  and  those  directly  under  his 
authority  were  the  inspiring  words  of  Vice  President  Mar- 
shall: 

I  believe  that  America  belongs  to  American  citizens,  native  and 
naturalized,  who  are  willing  to  seek  redress  for  their  grievances  in 
orderly  and  constitutional  ways;  and  I  believe  that  all  others  should 
be  taught,  peacefully  if  we  can  and  forcefully  if  we  must,  that  our 
country  is  not  an  international  boarding  house  nor  an  anarchistic  cafe. 

NOTE. — The  treaty  between  Germany  and  Soviet  Russia,  signed  at 
Rapallo,  April  16,  1922,  substantially  abrogated  the  treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk 
of  March  3,  1918.  Coming  at  the  end  of  the  first  week  of  the  Genoa  Con- 
ference, to  which  Germany  and  Soviet  Russia  were  admitted,  called  to  re- 
establish Europe  economically,  this  agreement,  with  the  apparent  intent  of 
combating,  in  large  measure,  the  terms  of  the  Paris  Peace  Treaty  and  of 
challenging  Western  Europe,  caused  deep  resentment  among  the  leading 
nations,  which  felt  themselves  tricked,  and  severely  strained  the  integrity 
of  the  Conference. 


CHAPTER  XII 

DISLOYALTY 

At  the  beginning  of  this  chapter  it  is  but  fair  that  the 
reader  be  permitted  to  ask  whether  any  acts  can  be  more 
disloyal  than  those  indicated  in  the  chapter  dealing  with 
Bolshevism.  That  Bolshevism,  meaning  "the  most,"  as 
practiced  in  the  Soviet  Government  of  Lenine  and  Trotzky 
and  as  transplanted  in  America  by  their  adherents,  Mooney 
and  Minor  and  Johannsen,  Foster  and  Fitzpatrick  and 
Lewis,  to  say  nothing  of  Herron  and  Steffens  and  Creel,  be- 
sides the  large  number  of  parlor  Bolshevists  seeking  to 
undermine  constitutional  government  in  the  United  States, 
leads  directly  to  disloyalty  to  civil  government,  and  chiefly 
to  the  American  form  of  government,  there  can  scarcely  be 
a  shadow  of  doubt.  And  that  chapter  discloses  the  organ- 
ized attempt  to  overturn  civil  government  in  America.  The 
present  chapter  will  attempt  to  disclose  the  disloyalty  of 
those  who  do  or  do  not  profess  to  suport  Bolshevism, 
though  men  of  the  stamp  of  Victor  L.  Berger  admit  openly 
that  they  train  with  Bolshevists. 

Through  all  the  ages  of  human  relationships,  dis- 
loyalty to  one's  country  has  been  recognized  as  one  of  the 
most  despicable  acts;  the  disloyalist  as  one  of  the  most 
despised  of  human  kind.  Whatever  dereliction  may  be 
found  in  President  Wilson's  Administration  in  this  matter 
must  be  assigned  to  other  cause  than  ignorance  on  the  part 
of  the  nation's  chief  executive  touching  this  simple  phase 
of  human  history.  Among  his  utterances  are  to  be  found 
some  of  the  noblest  sentiments  in  extant  literature.  Among 
the  acts  of  his  administration  some  of  the  most  questionable 
in  all  history,  the  more's  the  pity. 

221 


222     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

During  the  pre-war  period,  the  Administration's  atti- 
tude toward  the  European  struggle  gave  encouragement  to 
all  the  disloyal  elements  in  the  country  to  carry  on,  in 
clandestine  or  open  fashion,  their  nefarious  schemes  to 
build  upon  a  strong  foundation  any  kind  of  structure  they 
chose.  With  a  foresight  surpassing  that  of  the  Administra- 
tion, they  prepared  America  for  the  conflict  in  which  they 
knew  she  must  become  a  mighty  factor.  With  the  aid  of  the 
German  and  Austrian  ambassadors,  plans  were  devised  and 
put  into  operation  for  creating  a  powerful  sentiment 
against  the  Allies  and  favorable  to  Germany;  for  crippling 
the  war  industries  of  the  nation  as  soon  as  it  should  become 
a  participant  in  the  conflict;  even  for  an  attack  upon  the 
nation's  physical  integrity  by  dismemberment  through  a 
stab  in  the  back  by  Mexico  and  Japan. 

But  much  of  the  beauty  of  his  patriotism  as  expressed 
in  words  was  lost  in  his  subsequent  wavering  in  action. 
What  influence  caused  this  unsteadiness  of  purpose  was 
never  determined.  True,  it  was  not  new  in  the  President's 
official  career  that  he  should  veer  from  a  previously-stated 
clear  course.  That  he  could  stand  through  thick  and  thin 
was  shown  in  his  position  on  the  League  Covenant.  But  his 
swerving  toward  internationalism  must  be  regarded  as  a 
factor  in  his  uncertain  later  position  on  Americanism.  When 
he  declared  in  his  September,  1919,  address  that  the 
internationalism  represented  in  the  League  of  Nations  was 
greater  than  the  Government,  it  appears  that  he  was  willing 
to  subordinate  the  free  office  of  the  American  nation  to 
something  outside  and  beyond  that  free  office;  that  it  was 
satisfactory  to  him  that  America  should  not  longer  be  the 
free  agent  for  service  to  the  world  that  she  had  been  from 
the  very  foundation  of  her  markedly  aggressive  and  pro- 
gressive system  of  constitutional  government. 

With  this  as  the  Administration's  ideal  and  attitude  of 
subordinating  this  government  to  some  over-government 
whose  seat  should  be  beyond  the  confines  of  America,  it  was 


Disloyalty  223 

not  difficult  for  those  having  similar  or  more  radical  views 
of  internationalism's  mission  to  seek  to  weaken  the  hold 
which  the  American  system  had  always  had  upon  the  affec- 
tion of  the  people ;  to  undermine  that  affection  by  declaring 
something  else  better  for  the  individual  and  for  the  world; 
to  hold  up  to  ridicule  the  government  which  Mr.  Wilson 
said  was  not  the  greatest,  while  seeking  to  emasculate  its 
very  vitality.  It  will  be  difficult  for  history  not  to  lay  a 
heavy  responsibility  upon  the  Wilson  Administration  at 
this  point. 

With  the  unaccountable  characteristic  of  President  Wil- 
son of  leaning  toward  the  side  which  he  should  have  been 
combating,  he  gave  ample  room  for  Bernhard  Dernberg, 
representing  the  German  government,  to  make  a  large  sow- 
ing of  seeds  that  was  certain  to  produce  a  large  crop  of* 
weeds  that  must  later  be  eradicated  before  this  soil  could 
be  in  fit  condition  for  sowing  the  good  seed.  Co-operating 
with  Ambassador  Bernstorff  in  Washington,  the  mischief 
was  done  while  the  pacifist  Administration  sat  idly  by. 
While  the  husbandman  slept,  the  enemy  sowed  tares  in  his 
field.  Bernstorff  knew  every  avenue  of  approach;  he  knew 
every  channel  of  information.  He  cultivated  pro-German 
newspapers,  knowing  well  upon  whom  he  could  rely.  He 
knew  those  that  had  a  price  and  what  the  price  was.  He 
knew  the  entire  congressional  personnel,  and  had  them 
classified  as  pro-German,  pacifist,  and  demagogues  with 
German  constituencies.  But  he  misjudged  in  believing  that 
German  money  would  settle  with  American  indignation. 
Though  on  a  modified  plan,  the  methods  that  had  proved 
effective  in  Russia  were  in  operation  in  America.  To  the 
middle  of  1918,  many  a  hand  that  treacherously  waved  the 
United  States  flag  to  conceal  villainy,  would  not  have  hesi- 
tated, had  occasion  offered,  to  seize  the  dirk  in  the  disloyal 
bosom  to  plunge  it  into  the  true-hearted  American.  Later 
the  American  people  had  open  demonstration  of  this  atti- 
tude in  the  slaughter  of  the  American  Legion  boys  in  Cen- 


224    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

tralia  while  celebrating  the  first  anniversary  of  the  armis- 
tice. 

When  these  plottings  of  Bernstorff  and  Dernberg  were 
laid  before  the  American  public,  after  the  nation  was  at 
war,  it  was  let  out  in  such  manner  as  to  lead  the  people  to 
believe,  indeed  it  was  openly  stated,  that  the  country  never 
had  so  efficient  a  secret  service  as  was  shown  in  the  plottings 
at  the  German  embassy  in  Washington  to  dismember  the 
nation  and  to  "sink  without  a  trace"  in  the  South  American 
waters.  The  secret  service  should  have  all  the  credit  be- 
longing to  it,  but  it  should  be  known  that  we  were  greatly 
indebted  to  the  efficiency  of  the  British  Secret  Service  for 
the  disclosures  made. 

Nor  was  all  of  the  wickedness  and  insidiousness  of  the 
disloyalty  found  in  the  open  enemies  of  the  nation.  It  was 
found  in  men  holding  close  relationships  with  the  President. 
In  his  book  "The  War,  the  World,  and  Wilson,"  George 
Creel  tells  openly  of  his  close  contact  with  Mr.  Wilson,  who 
had  appointed  him  to  the  important  position  of  chairman 
of  the  federal  Committee  on  Publicity  during  the  war. 
Yet,  early  in  the  autumn  of  1918,  the  military  censorship 
found  it  necessary  to  exclude  from  libraries  for  use  of  the 
soldiers  a  book  containing  an  introduction  by  Mr.  Creel, 
because  of  its  distinctly  pro-German  utterances,  "Two 
Thousand  Questions  and  Answers  About  the  War" — a 
book  probably  surpassing  in  German  propaganda  qualities 
the  distinctly  propaganda  book  of  Dernberg  entitled  "Ger- 
many and  the  War."  It  was  the  more  dangerous  because 
it  came  so  close  to  the  Administration's  approval.  Mr. 
Creel  recommended  it  as  giving  "the  background  of  diffi- 
culties out  of  which  the  war  rose,"  and  in  his  warm  indorse- 
ment stated  that  it  "constitutes  a  vital  part  of  the  national 
defense."  On  the  other  hand,  the  National  Security 
League,  a  patriotic  organization,  pronounced  it  "  a  mas- 
terpiece of  Hun  propaganda"  and  declared  that  the  Ger- 
man government  itself  "could  not  have  devised  anything 


Disloyalty  225 

more  insidious,  more  calculated  to  destroy  our  faith  in  our 
Allies,  and  to  insinuate  into  the  American  mind  excuses  for 
Germany."  In  the  Senate  there  wa£  vigorous  protest 
against  its  sale,  and  it  was  openly  declared  that  probably  no 
single  man  in  the  United  States  was  doing  more  to  aid  the 
cause  of  the  country's  enemies  than  George  Creel. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Department  of  Justice  acting 
promptly  probably  averted  the  necessity  of  resorting  to  the 
lamp-post  method,  our  Ambassador  had  suggested  to  the 
German  Emperor,  by  seizing  enemy  subjects  on  the  eve  of 
the  declaration  of  war,  rather  than  waiting  until  they  had 
done  something  for  which  they  could  be  shot.  And  the 
ringleaders  of  whatever  conspiracies  they  had  planned  were 
in  irons  before  any  of  their  plans  could  be  carried  out. 

The  methods  of  accomplishing  their  nefarious  purposes, 
in  addition  to  those  indicated  elsewhere,  were  various. 
Lives,  property,  or  families  of  loyal  citizens  were  threat- 
ened; 1  loyal  citizens  were  defeated  for  office  because  of 
their  loyalty;  munition  plants  were  destroyed;  ships  were 
sunk  and  many  other  attempts  were  made  to  sink  them;  there 
was  interference  with  the  patriotic,  orderly  operation  of  the 
school;2  burning  the  grain-fields  just  before  harvest  time. 
In  some  sections  of  the  country,  these  tactics  were  employed 
with  so  great  vigor  as  to  create  a  veritable  reign  of  terror. 
And  in  numerous  instances  it  was  carried  on  under  the  guise 
of  a  labor  problem,  when,  in  fact,  no  problem  of  labor  was 
involved  in  any  manner. 

Perhaps  the  most  powerful  single  organization  backing 
up  disloyalty  to  the  nation  was  the  German-American  Alli- 
ance with  its  roots  deeply  imbedded  in  Germany  and  in 
Germanism.  Theodore  Roosevelt,  the  great  American 
voice  that  spoke  Americanism  when  the  Administration  was 

*In  some  instances,  as  Norwood,  Minnesota,  bank  deposits  had  to  be 
removed  to  other  places  for  safety. 

*In  some  instances,  the  local  authorities  attempting  to  prevent  the 
teacher's  effort  to  show  the  pupils  how  to  do  Red  Cross  work,  the  authorities 
from  the  state  capital  had  to  step  in  to  back  the  teacher. 


226    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

pandering  to  disloyalty,  raised  an  outcry  against  this  unholy 
Alliance  that  stirred  the  country  from  center  to  circum- 
ference, and  caused  its  charter  to  be  revoked.  Its  leaders 
were  men  of  local  prominence  and  often  in  positions  of  pub- 
lic trust.  In  public  matters  they  stood  together,  thus  gain- 
ing strength  in  the  control  of  local  public  affairs,  so  that  no 
ordinary  man  could  withstand  their  opposition.  Almost 
wholly  identified  with  the  liquor  interests,  they  were  not 
properly  assessed  in  the  mind  of  the  public  until  an  in- 
vestigation by  the  Senate  disclosed  the  relations  of  the  brew- 
ing interests  with  the  pro-German  propaganda.  This  dis- 
loyal organization  was  the  backbone  of  what  the  kaiser 
termed  his  three  million  men  in  America  upon  whom  he 
could  rely  in  case  of  war  with  the  United  States,  the  real 
force  which  Theodore  Roosevelt  designated  as  "the  Hun 
within  our  gates."  It  attacked  in  every  way  possible  the 
Allies  while  encouraging  disloyalty  in  the  United  States  and 
prostituting  our  politics  to  Germany's  needs.  It  deliber- 
ately and  confessedly  sought  to  prevent  Americanization, 
aiming  to  perpetuate  the  use  of  the  German  language,  man- 
ners and  customs,  and  their  children's  attachment  to  the 
foreign  land,  and  inculcated  the  principle  of  remaining  Ger- 
man at  heart.  It  enabled  the  kaiser  to  boast  that  no  Ameri- 
can administration  could  remain  in  power  against  his  will. 
Documentary  evidence  produced  by  its  treasurer  showed 
that  it  put  at  least  $313,000  into  the  hands  of  Bernhard 
Dernberg  and  Mayer  Gerhardt,  men  whom  the  Administra- 
tion permitted  to  sow  seeds  of  dissension  in  this  country,  to 
foment  strikes,  organize  sedition,  and  commit  sabotage, 
arson,  and  murder,  Gerhardt  being  Zimmerman's  right-hand 
man  in  the  effort  to  get  Mexico  and  Japan  to  seize  New 
Mexico,  Arizona,  and  California. 

The  Nonpartisan  League,  which  originated  in  North 
Dakota,  the  home  of  Senator  Gronna,  one  of  the  "wilful 
twelve"  who  voted  against  the  war,  became  a  kind  of  ap- 
pendage of  the  German-American  Alliance.  It  was  in  that 


Disloyalty  227 

state  that  Kate  O'Hare  was  entertained  by  United  States 
officials,  she  who  declared  that  mothers  who  raised  sons 
who  would  become  soldiers  were  no  better  than  brood  sows, 
who  was  convicted  for  her  disloyalty,  sent  to  the  peniten- 
tiary, then  pardoned  by  President  Wilson.  It  was  under  the 
auspices  of  this  League  that  Senator  La  Follette,  address- 
ing a  mass-meeting  in  St.  Paul,  gave  utterance  to  sentiments 
regarded  as  so  mischievous  in  their  effects  that  it  became 
necessary  to  send  Theodore  Roosevelt  to  speak  from  the 
same  platform  to  overcome  their  viciousness.  So  disloyal 
to  the  country  was  this  League  regarded  all  through  the  war 
that  every  meeting  it  announced  was  watched  either  by 
United  States  secret-service  men  or  by  local  loyal  men  and 
women.  And  in  many  sections  the  loyal  sentiment  would 
not  permit  it  to  hold  meetings,  after  Senator  La  Follette's 
St.  Paul  address.  It  also  became  known  that  where  the 
pro-German  sentiment  was  the  strongest,  there  the  League 
was  the  strongest.  Later  its  president  and  chief  organizer, 
Arthur  C.  Townley  and  Joseph  Gilbert,  were  both  con- 
victed for  their  disloyal  acts  during  the  war.  After  the 
visit  of  Townley  to  New  York,  in  the  autumn  of  1917,  the 
notoriously  pro-German  paper,  the  New  York  Evening  Mail 
became  an  enthusiastic  supporter  of  this  League;  and  its 
publisher,  Edward  A.  Rumely,  gave  a  series  of  articles  and 
editorials  backing  its  operations.  In  sections  where  it  was 
vigorous,  in  the  vote  for  United  States  senator,  Peterson, 
convicted  in  the  federal  court  for  disloyalty,  received  three 
votes  to  one  for  the  veteran  loyalist,  Senator  Nelson.  The 
official  newspaper  of  this  organization,  under  the  direction 
of  Townley,  in  January,  1920,  rose  to  the  defense  of  Berk- 
man  and  Goldman,  declaring  that  their  preaching  of  an- 
archy for  twenty  years  was  no  wrong  and  that  "they  did  no 
harm  whatever."  The  Nonpartisan  League  rendered  just 
such  service  as  William  of  Hohenzollern  would  have  it 
render  during  the  Great  War.  And  George  Creel  zealously 
supported  it  with  every  ounce  of  the  power  of  the  Adminis- 


228     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

tration  he  could  command,  and  after  the  war  gave  it  highest 
praise  and  commendation  for  its  loyal  service  during  the 
war.3 

The  Hearst  newspapers,  of  which  there  are  a  dozen  in 
the  United  States,  were  strongly  pro-German.  The  revela- 
tions made  by  the  Senate  investigation  of  the  pro-German 
and  liquor  propaganda  amazed  the  country  almost  to  stupe- 
faction. The  disclosure  of  Mr.  Hearst's  name  with  the 
Zimmerman  intrigue  was  hideous,  and  when  the  intrigue 
was  first  revealed  these  papers  went  so  far  as  to  declare  it 
a  probable  forgery  designed  by  the  United  States  Attorney- 
General.  It  was  further  shown  in  the  investigation  that 
just  before  we  entered  the  war,  William  Bayard  Hale,  on 
the  Hearst  pay-roll  at  $300  per  week,  was  also  receiving 
a  salary  of  $15,000  by  a  publicity  organization  formed  in 
the  United  States  by  the  notorious  Dernberg  to  poison  pub- 
lic opinion.  So  notoriously  disloyal  were  these  newspapers 
considered  by  the  public  safety  commission  of  the  Hawaiian 
Islands  that  their  sale  was  prohibited  there.4  In  this  con- 
nection, the  fact  should  not  be  lost  sight  of  that  it  was  this 
same  Mr.  Hale  who  wrote  most  glowingly  of  President 
Wilson,  and  whom  President  Wilson  appointed  on  an  im- 
portant mission. 

Individual  communities  were  markedly  Germanized  and 
in  the  Great  War  held  to  Germany  rather  than  to  America. 
This  was  especially  true  where  foreign  languages  were  tol- 
erated and  cultivated.  New  Ulm,  in  the  state  of  Minnesota, 
is  practically  a  community  picked  up  bodily  out  of  Germany 
and  set  down  in  the  United  States.  Its  people  cultivate 
things  German,  not  things  American.  It  bears  the  distinc- 
tion of  being  the  first  city  in  the  country  to  oppose  openly 
the  government  in  its  war  efforts,  when,  to  its  amazement, 

3  The  American  Magazine,  March,  1919,  an  article  roundly  condemned 
by  the  loyalist  Governor  Burnquist  for  its  brazen  falsehoods. 

*  When  this  decision  was  reached,  the  largest  news  dealer  in  the  city 
of  Hilo  declared  that  a  newspaper  so  disloyal  should  be  excluded  from  the 
United  States  mails. 


Disloyalty  229 

it  found  an  avalanche  of  loyal  sentiment  heaped  upon  it  in 
condemnation.  The  Nebraska  branch  of  the  National  De- 
fense League  investigations  disclosed  the  fact  that  there 
were  communities  in  which  were  schools  where  the  pupils 
were  punished  for  using  the  English  language ;  that  in  some 
sections  of  that  state  the  encroachments  of  the  German 
schools  were  so  great  that  the  English-speaking  schools  had 
to  close  their  doors  for  want  of  attendance  or  because  of  so 
small  an  attendance  as  to  become  farcical;  and  that  many  of 
the  teachers  in  these  German  schools  had  never  been  natur- 
alized.5 

Some  courts  stood  unequivocally  for  Americanism  in 
cases  coming 'before  them  under  the  Espionage  Act  which 
became  a  law  May  21,  1917,  giving  the  Administration 
sweeping  powers  in  dealing  with  disloyalty.  Had  the  Ad- 
ministration acted  as  unequivocally  and  as  certainly,  there 
could  have  been  nothing  of  which  to  complain  by  loyalists. 
Some  federal  judges  cancelled  citizenship  papers,  thus  mak- 
ing the  adopted  citizen  of  the  United  States  again  an  alien 
enemy.  This  was  action  which  the  person  affected  could 
understand  in  any  language.  One  judge  declared  that  "If 
necessary,  we  will  cancel  every  certificate  of  citizenship  in 
the  United  States";  and  in  sentencing  a  disloyal  minister 
who  was  educated  in  Germany  until  aged  16  years,  when  he 

6  Harvey's  War  Weekly,  August  31,  1918.  So  incredible  seemed  this 
statement  that  I  wrote  to  Harvey  W.  Morrow,  Omaha,  member  of  the  war 
Activities  Committee,  and  he  informed  me  that  the  War  Weekly  is  correct. 
And  he  adds  that  there  is  a  large  stretch  of  territory  "where  I  used  to 
have  to  use  an  interpreter  to  talk  to  men  who  had  lived  there  for  forty 
or  fifty  years.  They  did  not  know  the  English  language,  did  not  want 
to  know  it,  or  to  have  their  children  know  it,"  and  then  describes  them 
as  he  knew  the  Germans  in  Ohio,  a  wealthy,  slovenly,  unprogressive  group 
of  German  farmers,  who,  when  they  want  to  purchase  the  farm  of  an 
English-speaking  neighbor  who  does  not  want  to  sell,  make  it  so  uncom- 
fortable for  him  that  he  is  glad  to  sell  and  get  away,  and  thus  they  get 
a  hold  on  the  land,  on  the  schools,  on  the  churches  of  the  more  bigoted 
character,  and  discourage  their  children  from  learning  the  English  language. 
"The  Council  of  Defense  found  a  good  many  similar  communities,"  he  adds. 
"We  had  laws  which  compelled  County  Boards  to  publish  their  proceed- 
ings in  German  and  Bohemian,  as  well  as  English,  .  .  .  and  in  various 
ways  tended  to  perpetuate  just  what  we  are  supposed  to  be  trying  to 
eliminate.  .  .  .  They  have  all  since  been  repealed." — The  Author. 


230    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

came  to  the  United  States  where  he  graduated  from  a  sem- 
inary in  1893  and  was  admitted  to  citizenship  in  1898,  after 
declaring  that  his  oath  of  allegience  meant  that  he  would 
"set  about  earnestly  growing  an  American  soul,  and  put 
away  your  German  soul,"  added : 

Have  you  done  that?  .  .  .  You  have  cherished  everything  Ger- 
man, and  stifled  everything  American.  You  have  preached  German, 
prayed  German,  read  German,  sung  German.  Every  thought  of  your 
mind,  and  every  emotion  of  your  heart  through  all  these  years  has 
been  German.  Your  body  has  been  in  America,  but  your  life  has 
been  in  Germany.  If  you  were  set  down  in  Prussia  to-day  you 
would  be  in  harmony  with  your  environment.  .  .  .  There  have  been 
a  good  many  Germans  before  me  in  the  last  month.  They  have 
lived  in  this  country,  like  yourself,  10,  20,  30,  40  years,  and  they 
had  to  give  their  evidence  through  an  interpreter.  As  I  looked  at 
them  and  tried,  as  best  I  could,  to  understand  them,  there  was  written 
all  over  every  one  of  them,  "Made  in  Germany."  6 

Every  section  of  the  land  had  this  kind  of  disloyalty  to 
meet.  The  Administration  dealt  very  leniently  with  the 
offenders,  and  particularly  with  the  so-called  conscientious 
objectors.  Indeed,  in  its  dealing  with  this  class  of  offen- 
ders, the  course  of  the  Administration  bordered  upon  a 
national  scandal.  It  ran  every  stage  of  possibility  from 
President  Wilson's  direct  intervention  to  save  from  the 
clutches  of  the  law  murderers,  anarchists,  and  traitors,  to 
the  "kindly  consideration"  extended  by  Secretary  Baker  to 
conscientious  objectors,  but  which  he  forbade  coming  to  the 
knowledge  of  the  public  as  he  knew  the  Administration  had 
gone  as  far  in  that  matter  as  the  public  would  bear,  and  so 
stated  in  his  official  capacity.  The  investigation  of  the 
Senate  committee  developed,  in  December,  1918,  that  Wil- 
liam Bayard  Hale,  a  Hearst  newspaper  writer  and  former 
confidential  representative  of  President  Wilson  in  Mexico, 

"Federal  Judge  Charles  F.  Amidon  in  pronouncing  sentence  of  three 
years  to  the  Leavenworth  penitentiary  upon  Rev.  John  Fontana  of  New 
Salem,  North  Dakota. 


Disloyalty  231 

became  the  head  of  the  German  propaganda  forces  in  the 
United  States,  and  that  within  two  weeks  after  the  begin- 
ning of  hostilities  in  1914,  there  were  landed  in  this  coun- 
try 31  German  agents,  who  became  the  nucleus  of  an  or- 
ganized force  of  between  200,000  and  300,00  volunteers, 
mainly  German-Americans.  And  it  was  with  this  force 
back  of  them  that  the  "conscientious"  objectors  made  bold 
to  make  their  demands  and  defy  authority,  even  refusing  to 
cook  their  own  food.  And  in  one  of  his  official  communica- 
tions with  his  government,  Ambassador  Bernstorff  de- 
clared that  Hale,  who  had  been  a  confidential  agent  of  the 
Embassy  since  the  beginning  of  the  war,  was  the  man  se- 
lected when  the  time  had  arrived  uto  get  Hearst  to  send 
a  first-rate  journalist  to  Berlin."  7  This  witness  also  told 
the  Senate  committee  that  the  Hearst  papers  were  the  most 
pronouncedly  pro-German  of  all  the  newspapers  in  the 
United  States.  It  was  not  until  these  disclosures  were  made 
through  the  Senate  investigation  that  the  State  Department 
revealed  to  the  public,  what  it  had  evidently  known  all  the 
time.  Accordingly,  on  December  7,  1918,  this  Depart- 
ment issued  copies  of  telegrams  showing  Ambassador 
Bernstorff's  activity  in  the  pro-German  propaganda  in  this 
country. 

With  this  distinctively  pro-German  powerful  backing, 
together  with  their  own  organized  efforts,  chief  of  which 
was  the  Civil  Liberty  League  of  New  York,  and  the 
friendly  attitude  of  Secretary  of  War,  Newton  D.  Baker, 
they  had  little  to  fear,  and  the  slacker  became  a  favored 
group  of  the  Administration  and  a  stench  on  the  nostrils  of 
real  Americans.  That  Mr.  Baker  secretly  aided  their  pro- 
gram is  indicated  in  an  order  which  was  not  permitted  to 
reach  the  public  until  after  the  conclusion  of  hostilities.  A 
sample  is  this: 

T  Dispatch  of  June  2,  1916,  as  submitted  to  the  Senate  committee  inves- 
tigating German  propaganda,  in  December,  1918,  by  A.  Bruce  Bielaski, 
Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Investigation  of  the  Department  of  Justice. 


232     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

With  reference  to  the  attitude  objecting  to  military  service,  these 
men  are  not  to  be  treated  as  violating  military  laws,  thereby  sub- 
jecting themselves  to  the  penalties  of  the  Articles  of  War,  but  their 
attitude  in  this  respect  will  be  quietly  ignored  and  they  will  be 
treated  with  kindly  consideration. 

Under  no  circumstances  are  the  instructions  contained  in  the  fore- 
going to  be  given  to  the  newspapers.8 

Though  an  insignificant  sheet  like  Tom  Watson's  of 
Georgia,  and  the  Christian  Science  Monitor  of  Boston  were 
made  to  feel  the  weight  of  the  Administration  wrath,  the 
all-powerful  and  pro-German  and  pro-liquor  papers  were 
fawned  upon  by  the  Administration.  Its  chief  effect  was  to 
develop  disloyalty  under  Administration  influence.  But  a 
more  insidious  scheme  ran  all  through  the  Administration's 
conduct  during  the  war.  When  Charles  A.  Lindberg,  can- 
didate of  the  disloyal  Nonpartisan  League  for  the  nomina- 
tion for  Governor  of  Minnesota  was  defeated  by  the  loyal 
Burnquist,  in  the  summer  of  1918,  he  was  immediately 
offered  an  appointment  by  the  Administration  to  an  impor- 
tant office,  though  he  had  opposed  war  loans  to  such  an 
extent  that  it  was  known  that  no  headway  could  be  made 
with  the  Fourth  Liberty  Loan  drive,  then  about  to  begin, 
should  he  be  appointed.  His  book,  "Why  is  Your  Country 
at  War?"  was  looked  upon  as  so  disloyal  a  production  that 
the  opinion  was  freely  expressed  that  he  should  have  been 
vigorously  prosecuted  for  his  utterances  rather  than  ap- 
pointed to  a  post  on  the  War  Industries  Board.  And  when 
the  secretary  of  the  America  First  Association,  a  loyal 
organization  of  100,000  membership  in  Minnesota,  went 
to  see  President  Wilson  to  secure  the  right  kind  of  speaker 
to  offset  the  propaganda  work  of  the  disloyal  Nonpartisan 
League,  he  was  referred  to  A.  C.  Townley,  president  of 
the  Nonpartisan  League  and  later  convicted  for  disloyalty. 

But  there  was  ever  a  brighter  side.    Large  numbers  of 

'Order  dated  October  10,  1917. 


Disloyalty  233 

Germans  who  had  accepted  citizenship  in  their  adopted 
country  as  a  matter  of  pride  and  real  opportunity,  were  more 
than  a  match  for  their  disloyal  kindred  by  nationality;  they 
served  well  the  adopted  country  which  they  revered.  And 
in  their  action  they  were  as  brave  as  the  others  were  cow- 
ardly. They  showed  the  genuine  American  spirit. 

There  came  a  time  when  America  became  impatient  with 
the  Administration's  trifling  with  disloyalty.  At  first 
trusted,  the  Administration  showed  such  a  wobbling  course 
as  to  excite  suspicion  on  the  part  of  those  who  had  the 
nation's  welfare  at  heart.  And  in  view  of  the  ruin,  whether 
social  or  material,  left  in  the  wake  of  the  Administration's 
war  policy;  and  in  view  of  the  profuseness  of  its  apologists, 
from  Creel  to  Hale  and  Herron,  for  its  demonstrated  en- 
tanglements with  Hearst's  pro-Germanism,  Henry  Ford's 
pacifism  and  red-flagism,  Townley's  Nonpartisan  German- 
ism, the  Alliance-brewers'  liquorism  and  the  Mooney  and 
Minor  disloyal  anarchism,  perhaps  the  American  public  has 
some  ground  for  believing  that  they  were  all  part  of  the 
scheme  of  President  Wilson,  culminating  in  his  political 
appeal  of  October,  1918,  for  continuance  of  power,  to  at- 
tain some  ulterior  end  of  personal  power  and  aggrandize- 
ment. Else  why  all  these  close  affiliations  with  disloyalty 
utter  and  absolute? 

Blazoned  high  and  forever  ringing  in  the  ears  of  the 
people,  let  the  immortal  words  of  Theodore  Roosevelt, 
uttered  the  night  before  he  died,  be  the  motto  of  America : 
WE  HAVE  ROOM  FOR  BUT  ONE  FLAG,  THE 
AMERICAN  FLAG— WE  HAVE  ROOM  FOR  BUT 
ONE  LOYALTY,  AND  THAT  IS  LOYALTY  TO  THE 
AMERICAN  PEOPLE. 


CHAPTER   XIII 

LOOKING  TOWARD  PEACE 

People  in  touch  with  the  activities  of  that  day  will  not 
readily  forget  the  easy  phrase  of  President  Wilson's  cam- 
paign managers  in  the  autumn  of  1916,  when  he  was  seek- 
ing re-election:  "He  kept  us  out  of  war";  also,  that  twin 
phrase:  "You  are  not  at  war,  you  are  at  work."  They 
answered  their  immediate  purpose — that  of  the  political 
campaign.  But  it  soon  became  a  bitter  reflection  for  some 
of  the  Administration  supporters;  for  even  then  it  was 
known  that  no  human  power  could  keep  America  neutral 
when  civilization  was  at  stake,  and  even  America's  liberty 
itself. 

But  the  spirit  back  of  the  phrase  misled  many  Americans 
of  the  highest  type  of  patriotic  citizenship.  Even  so  keen 
and  lofty-minded  an  American  as  Theodore  Roosevelt 
admitted  that  he  had  been  betrayed  into  trusting  the  Ad- 
ministration in  the  early  period  of  the  European  conflict. 
When  a  school  book  quoted  him  as  at  first  supporting  the 
President's  neutrality  policy,  he  demanded  that  the  mis- 
leading statement  be  eliminated,  unless  his  later  position 
on  the  war  be  stated.  And  he  issued  this  statement : 

I  notified  the  school  superintendent  that  it  was  sheer  suppression 
of  the  truth  to  make  such  a  quotation  without  giving  what  I  had 
said  and  done  during  the  next  four  years.  During  the  first  sixty  days 
I  followed  Mr.  Wilson's  lead,  believing  him  to  have  special  infor- 
mation. .  .  .  Then  I  saw  the  Belgian  Commission  and  I  became 
convinced  that  President  Wilson's  attitude  was  wholly  unjustified  by 
the  facts,  and  immediately  thereupon  I  took  the  attitude  which  I  have 
ever  since  held.1 

1  See  chapter   on   "The   Spirit  of  America"   for   quotation   to   which   ex- 
ception was  taken. 

234 


Looking  Toward  Peace  235 

While  the  United  States  was  yet  a  neutral,  President 
Wilson  had  suggested  to  the  belligerent  powers  that  a  state- 
ment of  acceptable  terms  of  peace  was  considered  desirable 
by  this  government.  The  following  day,  Lloyd  George,, 
speaking  for  Great  Britain,  referred  to  "restitution,  liber- 
ation, and  guarantees  against  repetition."  This  was  made 
the  basis  of  the  Allies'  formal  and  detailed  reply  to  Wilson's 
request  the  following  month,  on  January  10,  1917 — a  year 
before  the  promulgation  of  the  Fourteen  Points.  In  this 
reply,  the  essential  terms  of  peace  were  named.  But  Mr. 
Wilson  had  also  before  him  the  statements  of  the  Special 
National  Labor  Conference  in  London  published  less,  than 
two  weeks  before  announcing  his  Fourteen  Points,  as  well 
as  the  speech  of  Lloyd  George  delivered  at  the  Trade 
Union  Conference  on  man-power  three  days  before  the 
President  stated  his  Points.  As  Mr.  Wilson  declared  at 
the  time,  these  were  both  fresh  in  his  mind  on  January  8, 
1918.  And  Lloyd  George,  in  an  address  to  Parliament, 
stated:  "Before  the  war  was  over  we  stated  our  peace 
terms.  ...  A  few  days  later  President  Wilson  proposed 
his  famous  Fourteen  Points  which  practically  embodied 
my  statement." 

In  his  address  before  Congress,  January  8,  1918,  Presi- 
dent Wilson  declared  his  distrust  of  the  German  rulers 
and  demanded  to  know  for  whom  the  negotiators  at  Brest- 
Litovsk  spoke.  It  was  on  that  occasion  that  he  enunciated 
the  Fourteen  Points  which  are  substantially  these : 

i.  Open  diplomacy.  2.  Freedom  of  navigation  in 
peace  and  in  war.  3.  Removal  of  international  economic 
barriers.  4.  Reduction  of  armaments.  5.  Impartial  ad- 
justment of  colonial  claims,  the  interests  of  the  populations 
concerned  having  equal  weight  with  governmental  claims. 

6.  Evacuation  of  all  Russian  territory,  and  such  settlement 
of  questions  affecting  Russia  as  to  give  her  opportunity  for 
determining  her  political  development  and  national  policy. 

7.  Belgium  to  be  evacuated  and  restored.     8.  Alsace-Lor- 


236    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

raine  restored  to  France.  9.  Adjustment  of  Italian  fron- 
tiers. 10.  Peoples  of  Austria-Hungary  accorded  freest  op- 
portunity for  own  development,  n.  Roumania,  Serbia, 
and  Montenegro  evacuated  and  restored,  Serbia  to  have 
access  to  the  sea,  and  the  political  and  economic  independ- 
ence of  the  Balkan  states  to  be  guaranteed  internationally. 

12.  Turkey  to  be  assured  sovereignty  of  Turkish  portion 
of  Ottoman  Empire,  but  those  of  other  nationalities  under 
Turkish  rule  to  have  autonomous  development,  Dardanelles 
to  be  free  for  all  nations  under  international  guarantees. 

13.  Independent  Polish  state.     14.  A  league  of  nations. 
One  writer  upon  the  League  of  Nations  pointed  out  that 

a  day  or  two  after  President  Wilson  had  stated  his  Four- 
teen Points,  Lloyd  George,  in  answering  the  same  call  as 
to  the  terms  of  peace,  umade  a  statement  which  was  prac- 
tically an  Anglo-French  declaration.  It  was,  in  substance, 
identical  with  President  Wilson's."  2  The  inference  might 
well  be  that  Lloyd  George  was  following  President  Wil- 
son's lead;  when,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  reverse  was  true. 
And,  as  pointed  out  by  George  Harvey  in  an  analysis  of 
the  genesis  of  Mr.  Wilson's  fourteen  principles,  not  more 
than  one  originated  with  him.3 

But  they  were  thrown  into  his  phraseology  and  the  peo- 
ple generally  came  to  regard  them  as  the  product  of  his> 
intellect.  All  forgotten  by  a  busy  world,  they  then  sprang 
suddenly  into  prominence  when  the  President  himself  re- 
vived them  in  his  conversations  during  the  German  peace 
drive  in  the  autumn  of  1918. 

An  unfortunate  feature  about  them  was  that  they  were 
no  sure  guide  to  peace.  After  declaring  them  to  be  "the 

aKallen,  "The  League  of  Nations  Today  and  Tomorrow,"  pp.  XIV-XV. 

3  The  North  American  Review,  February,  1919. 

And  for  a  marked  similarity  between  the  Russian  Soviet's  peace  terms 
and  President  Wilson's  Fourteen  Points,  the  former  announced  nearly 
three  months  earlier  than  the  latter,  see  pages  260-263  of  Edward  A.  Ross' 
"The  Russian  Bolshevik  Revolution,"  The  Century  Company,  New  York, 
1921. 


Looking  Toward  Peace  237 

only  possible  program  of  peace,"  he  dismissed  them  as 
"only  a  provisional  sketch."  And  the  next  month  after 
formulating  them  for  the  nations,  he  offered  to  negotiate 
upon  four  abstract  principles.4  And  though  given  very 
great  publicity,  as  a  set  of  principles  they  scarcely  survived 
the  armistice,  and  in  the  peace  treaty  were  practically  ig- 
nored; while  the  thirteen  principles  submitted  by  Lord 
Northcliffe,  eminent  English  journalist  and  shaper  of  pub- 
lic opinion,  as  indispensable  to  peace,  received  little  publicity 
and  were  accepted  by  the  peace  congress,  substantially  in 
full. 

When  President  Wilson  proposed  his  terms  of  peace, 
including  the  Fourteen  Points  as  the  condition  of  an  armis- 
tice, there  was  an  outburst  of  protest  in  the  United  States 
and  there  arose  a  loud  cry  for  unconditional  surrender  as 
the  only  acceptable  preliminary  of  peace.  Americans  and 
Allies  alike  were  startled  when  the  President  insisted  that 
it  must  be  accepted  by  the  democratic  nations  without 
amendment.  The  first  complete  acceptance  of  his  peace 
program  came  from  Germany.  On  January  24,  1918, 
Count  Hertling,  speaking  before  the  Reichstag  for  Ger- 
many, and  Count  Czernin,  speaking  before  the  Reichsrath 
for  Austria,  replied  to  the  addresses  of  Lloyd  George  and 
President  Wilson. 

Between  the  time  of  these  early  statements  of  peace 
terms  and  the  autumn  enemy  peace  drive,  there  was  issued 
a  statement  that  is  worthy  of  being  writ  in  gold.  It  is  that 
of  the  committee  of  British  workingmen  in  charge  of  the 
Labor  and  Socialist  demonstration  held  in  London,  July 
14,  1918,  containing  these  notable  words: 

Let  it  be  known  to  the  democracy  of  America  that,  come  what 
may,  even  if  Paris  should  fall  and  the  channel  ports  be  taken,  the 
people  of  Great  Britain  are  resolved  to  support  the  Allied  Nations 
to  the  fullest  extent  of  their  energy  and  power, 
4  Address  to  Congress,  February  n,  1918. 


238    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

This  meant  that  the  British  workingmen  purposed  to 
fight  the  war  to  a  victorious  finish  and  to  crush  Prussian- 
ism  before  there  could  be  so  much  even  as  consideration 
of  peace.  And  the  resolutions  add:  "What  would  follow 
peace  negotiations  with  the  Central  Powers  victorious  can 
be  judged  by  the  treaties  of  Brest-Litovsk  and  Bucharest." 
It  gave  a  bracing  to  America's  workingmen;  and,  perhaps 
chiefly,  served  as  a  warning  to  her  statesman  who  had  de- 
clared for  making  the  world  safe  for  democracy.  It  was 
a  strange  irony  that  should  bring  this  warning  from  a 
European  monarchy  to  the  America  which  had  always  been 
the  outstanding  democracy  of  the  world. 

There  is  of  record,  however,  at  an  earlier  date,  an 
American  contrast  with  the  President's  uncertain  course 
during  these  crucial  months,  that  is  refreshing.  It  was 
the  certain  and  wholesome  notes,  in  May,  1918,  that  came 
from  the  Philadelphia  convention  of  the  League  to  Enforce 
Peace.  It  was  determined  upon  winning  the  war  for  per- 
manent peace.  In  this  convention  were  two  dominant  notes : 
One,  that  in  the  struggle  then  on  we  were  in  opposition 
to  a  nation  conclusively  proved  to  be  a  criminal  at  the 
bar  of  history  and  humanity;  the  other,  that  in  the  contest 
with  this  guilty  and  vicious  enemy  the  war  must  be  fought  to 
an  overwhelming  finish.  At  that  time  President  Lowell 
of  Harvard  University  said  we  must  be  on  our  guard  against 
an  inconclusive  peace  to  which  we  were  likely  to  be  tempted 
any  day;  and  Senator  Williams  of  Mississippi  declared  that 
we  could  not  even  talk  peace  with  Germany;  and  former 
President  Taft  told  the  audience,  in  words  that  expressed 
the  sentiment  of  the  gathering,  that  since  Germany's  char- 
acter was  at  that  time  fully  revealed,  the  slogan  must  be 
stern,  implacable  war,  and  exclaimed:  "Shall  we  not  be 
open  to  the  shame  of  history  if  we  do  not  carry  this  thing 
through  to  the  limit?" 

The  developments  of  the  next  few  months  showed  that 
the  basis  of  President  Lowell's  warning  was  substantial. 


Looking  Toward  Peace  239 

When  President  Wilson,  without  consulting  the  nations 
with  which  America  was  allied  in  the  Great  War,  under- 
took his  conversations  with  the  enemies  of  the  country 
for  peace  proposals  within  two  months  after  the  warning 
from  the  British  workingmen  and  in  less  than  four  months 
after  the  warnings  from  the  Philadelphia  convention,  the 
better  thought  of  the  nation  was  led  by  such  men  as  James 
M.  Beck,  who  declared  that  the  President's  peace  proposals, 
at  the  very  time  when  he  was  using  all  the  prestige  of  his  high 
office  to  control,  for  partisan  purposes,  the  state  election 
in  Wisconsin  on  the  ground  of  loyalty,  were  paralyzing  the 
will  of  the  American  people.  And  his  wavering  raised  a 
question  as  to  what  kind  of  Americanism  he  represented. 

The  President's  idea  of  peace  appeared  to  be  different 
from  that  of  the  nations  with  which  we  were  allied  in 
carrying  on  the  Great  War.  They  had  been  through  the 
death  struggle  from  the  beginning;  and  their  idea  of  peace 
was  a  cessation  of  hostilities  after  complete  defeat  of  the 
enemy.  President  Wilson's  idea  appeared  to  be  to  take  the 
Germans  in  to  aid  in  fixing  the  terms  of  peace — a  negotiated 
peace  instead  of  a  dictated  peace.  He  entered  the  danger 
zone  of  diplomacy  when  he  opened  the  doors  of  conversa- 
tion with  the  enemy  in  the  great  peace  drive  directed  by 
Germany. 

His  minister  to  The  Netherlands  had  a  distinctly  differ- 
ent view  when  he  stated : 

The  duty  of  the  present  is  to  fight  on  beside  France,  Great  Brit- 
ain, Italy,  Belgium,  Servia,  Roumania,  and,  we  hope,  Russia,  "to 
bring  the  Government  of  the  German  Empire  to  terms  and  end  the 
war." 

To  talk  of  any  other  course  is  treason,  not  only  to  our  country 
but  to  the  cause  of  true  peace.5 

The  President's  supporters  declared  that  he  stood  for 
unconditional  surrender.  But  there  was  the  avowed  peace 

5  Henry  Van  Dyke  in  "Fighting  for  Peace,"  p.  212,  Charles  Scribners 
Sons,  New  York,  1917. 


240    The  Wilson* Administration  and  the  Great  War 

program  of  the  first  serious  effort  at  the  peace  drive,  begun 
by  Baron  Burian,  the  Austro-Hungarian  foreign  minister. 
It  was  what  became  known  as  the  September  "peace  of- 
fensive." Beginning  early  in  the  month  with  vague  and  un- 
official statements  to  newspaper  men,  it  continued  until  the 
fourteenth,  when  an  official  invitation  was  extended  to  the 
Allies  to  send  delegates  to  a  secret  conference  for  an  ex- 
change of  terms  to  be  binding  on  none.  That  refused,  the 
effort  culminated  on  October  5  in  a  note  proposing,  through 
President  Wilson,  to  conclude  with  him  and  his  Allies  a  gen- 
eral armistice  on  land,  on  sea,  and  in  air;  and  to  begin,  with- 
out delay,  negotiations  for  peace,  these  negotiations  to  be 
based  upon  the  President's  address  of  January  8,  including 
the  Fourteen  Points,  and  his  subsequent  addresses  of  Febru- 
ary 12  and  September  27.  This  was  generally  understood  to 
be  merely  a  "feeler"  put  forward  by  Germany.  The  next 
day  brought  to  the  newspapers  the  text  of  a  note  from  Ger- 
many, asking  President  Wilson  to  take  in  hand  the  restora- 
tion of  peace,  inviting  the  Allies  to  send  plenipotentiaries 
"for  the  purpose  of  opening  negotiations."  Thus  the  issue 
of  peace  or  continued  war  was  presented  to  the  nations. 

Whatever  the  real  reason  for  this  action  of  the  enemy, 
it  is  not  flattering  to  the  greatest  world  democracy  that  its 
President  was  so  much  more  in  sympathy  with  the  brutal- 
izing forces  of  autocracy  and  with  the  game  to  slaughter 
civilization  than  were  statesmen  of  other  nations,  as  to  be 
selected  by  Germany  in  carrying  forward  her  peace  cam- 
paign. It  created  unpleasant,  something  of  uncanny,  feel- 
ings in  the  American  bosom  to  have  this  country  made  the 
mark  by  the  arch  enemy  of  civilization  for  this  distinction. 

Nor  was  this  feeling  mollified  by  what  became  known 
as  the  general  German  plan  and  attitude,  whether  before 
or  after  the  armistice  was  declared,  an  attitude  indicated 
by  a  series  of  resolutions  adopted,  after  the  signing  of  the 
armistice,  by  the  chamber  of  commerce  of  Cologne,  one  of 
the  Rhine  cities  held  at  the  time  by  the  Allied  armies  of 


Looking  Toward  Peace  241 

occupation;  resolutions  embodying  the  hope  that  uthe  de- 
struction of  French  and  Belgian  industries  would  allow  a 
rapid  recovery  of  German  commercial  power."  These 
brutal  calculations  sought  a  peace,  using  the  United  States 
as  a  medium,  that  would  give  the  unsubdued  enemy  the  ad- 
vantage of  a  long  start  over  the  victims  of  her  crimes.  They 
were  seeking  to  bring  their  diabolical  plan  of  wholesale  de- 
struction of  these  industries  and  the  equally  wholesale  mur- 
ders of  the  civilian  population  of  invaded  territories  to 
bear  upon  the  United  States  in  order  to  have  its  President 
intervene  in  their  behalf,  that  their  own  country  might  be 
spared  invasion  and  destruction  of  its  industries. 

The  persistent  assumption  that  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  a  member  of  the  court  writing  the  judg- 
ment upon  Germany's  crimes,  should  descend  from  his  place 
and  appear  before  that  tribunal  as  her  counsel  probably 
seemed  to  the  German  a  subtle  form  of  flattery;  and  the 
President's  course,  it  was  generally  admitted,  invited  the 
doubtful  compliment. 

In  all,  it  was  very  promptly  recognized  that  the  main- 
spring of  the  German  peace  policy  was  to  separate  the 
United  States  from  its  Allies  in  the  settlement.  Autocracy 
had  lost  the  war;  its  only  hope  was  to  save  itself  and  some 
of  its  power  by  skilful  negotiation.  The  most  obvious  de- 
vice was  to  make  all  possible  out  of  the  fact  that  President 
Wilson's  policy  was  ostentatiously  independent;  that  he  had 
criticized  and  rebuked  the  Allies  for  their  alleged  failure 
to  serve  the  ends  of  justice;  and  that  he  had  declared  a 
peace  program  to  which  he  demanded  allegiance  from  all 
belligerents.  Prussianism  accepted  his  terms,  thereby  bind- 
ing him  to  seek  a  like  acceptance  from  the  Allies. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  note  of  September  14  was  de- 
livered to  the  State  Department  in  Washington  at  6  :2O  in 
the  evening  of  the  1 6th.  President  Wilson  had  prepared  his 
reply  upon  the  newspaper  text  that  had  been  available  all 
day.  As  soon  as  the  official  note  arrived  and  was  com- 


242    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

pared  with  the  newspaper  account,  his  reply  was  made  pub- 
lic— within  a  half-hour  after  the  invitation  was  formally 
received.  The  reply  stated : 

The  government  of  the  United  States  feels  that  there  is  only  one 
reply  which  it  can  make  to  the  suggestion  of  the  Imperial  Austro- 
Hungarian  government.  It  has  repeatedly  and  with  entire  candor 
stated  the  terms  upon  which  the  United  States  would  consider  peace, 
and  can  and  will  entertain  no  proposal  for  a  conference  upon  a  matter 
concerning  which  it  has  made  its  position  and  purpose  so  plain. 

This  was  perhaps  the  shortest  and  least  rhetorical  of 
all  of  the  state  papers  of  President  Wilson  during  the 
war  period,  as  well  as  one  of  the  most  momentous.  It 
thrilled  the  nation.  It  struck  a  very  responsive  chord 
throughout  the  civilized  world  outside  of  the  enemy  coun- 
tries. If  the  fine  and  lofty  idealism  of  some  of  his  other 
declarations  were  inspiring  to  the  world,  this  terse  repudi- 
ation of  the  German  plan  was  electrifying.  And  in  this 
famous  reply  there  was  no  delay,  no  hushed  speculation  as 
to  what  policy  was  to  be  imposed  upon  the  nation.  It  looked 
as  though,  at  last,  the  President  had  taken  his  stand  with 
the  people. 

It  was  what  the  people  had  desired.  It  seemed  at  last 
the  long-looked-for  leader  had  appeared  and  was  fully 
equipped  to  lead  them  from  the  morass  of  doubt  into  which 
he  had  permitted  them  to  wander.  The  devastating  swift- 
ness of  it  all  almost  took  the  people's  breath,  while  it 
crushed  with  astounding  force  the  elaborately-built  struc- 
ture of  the  Prussian  peace  plan,  its  stern  brevity  leaving  no 
chance  for  misunderstanding  or  rejoinder.  It  cut  the  ground 
completely  from  under  autocracy's  feet,  threatening  its  utter 
confusion  and  destruction.  The  swiftness  and  bluntness  of 
the  reply  are  said  to  be  without  precedent  in  the  annals 
of  diplomacy.  Never  was  government  given  more  con- 
vincing proof  of  its  strength  and  decision,  and  never  did 
President  Wilson  display  higher  qualities  of  leadership  than 


Looking  Toward  Peace  243 

in  thus  expressing  the  unalterable  judgment  of  the  nation 
fighting  in  a  righteous  cause. 

On  the  same  day  Mr.  Balfour,  British  Foreign  Secre- 
tary, said:  "I  cannot  see  the  slightest  hope  in  these  pro- 
posals that  the  goal  we  all  desire,  a  peace  which  is  some- 
thing more  than  a  truce,  can  be  obtained. "  And  Premier 
Clemenceau  of  France  said:  uWe  shall  fight  until  the  en- 
emy comes  to  understand  that  bargaining  between  crime 
and  right  is  no  longer  possible/* 

Eleven  days  after  his  swift  and  certain  reply  to  the 
Austrian  note  of  September  16,  President  Wilson  continued 
the  enthusiasm  which  it  created  by  making  in  the  New  York 
Metropolitan  Opera  House  an  address  that  expressed  ideas 
wholly  in  harmony  with  his  reply,  irrevocably  confirming 
the  outlawry  of  autocracy.  This  address  contains  a  pas- 
sage worthy  of  a  place  with  the  finest  of  American  tradi- 
tion. Speaking  of  the  perfidy  of  the  Central  Powers  he 
said: 

They  have  convinced  us  that  they  are  without  honor  and  do  not 
intend  justice.  They  observe  no  covenants,  accept  no  principle  but 
force  and  their  own  interest.  We  cannot  come  to  terms  with  them. 
They  have  made  it  impossible.  The  German  people  must  by  this 
time  be  fully  aware  that  we  cannot  accept  the  word  of  those  who 
forced  this  war  upon  us.  We  do  not  think  the  same  thoughts  or 
speak  the  same  language  of  agreement. 

The  address  was  somewhat  confusing  in  its  effort  to 
harmonize  its  author's  previous  stand  with  his  new  position. 
As  to  the  supreme  issues  of  the  day  he  stated :  uThey  per- 
haps were  not  clear  at  the  outset  but  they  are  clear  now." 
Possibly  this  is  as  near  to  confession  as  one  may  expect; 
yet  the  one  incontrovertible  fact  respecting  the  war  is  that 
the  basic  issues  stood  clearly  defined  in  its  first  month.  He 
also  stated  concerning  the  war:  "We  came  into  it  when 
its  character  had  become  fully  defined  and  it  was  plain  that 
no  nation  could  stand  apart  or  be  indifferent  to  its  out- 
come." Upon  this  statement  it  was  April,  1917,  that  the 


244    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

meaning  of  the  war  became  so  plain  that  America's  partici- 
pation was  necessary;  yet  only  a  few  weeks  before,  Mr. 
Wilson  was  insisting  upon  a  compromise  between  right  and 
wrong  in  his  declaration  for  a  "peace  without  victory." 

No  higher  tribute  could  be  paid  to  the  utterance  of  the 
President  in  that  notable  address  than  the  universal  recog- 
nition that  it  was  worthy  of  the  occasion.  No  statesman 
ever  had  a  greater  audience  or  a  more  inspiring  subject 
than  he  in  addressing  the  nation  upon  the  essential  terms 
of  peace.  It  was  now  the  voice  of  American  democracy 
that  spoke  the  soul  of  the  nation;  not  the  weak  and  craven 
voice  which  said  America  was  utoo  proud  to  fight,"  when 
might  was  trampling  upon  right.  It  was  not  now  the  voice 
that  viewed  the  war  against  law  and  liberty  as  "none  of  our 
concern."  Speaking  with  the  serene  sureness  which  came 
from  conviction  established  in  demonstrated  facts,  he  spoke 
also  with  the  authority  derived  from  the  will  of  the  great 
nation  which  he  represented. 

No  one  should  have  known  better  than  he  why,  in  his 
phrase,  "the  air  every  now  and  again  gets  darkened  by 
mists  and  groundless  doubts  and  mischievous  perversions  of 
counsel";  and  it  was  through  his  own  vague  quest  that  the 
country  was  brought  to  the  point  of  dividing  on  the  issue 
which  he  himself  raised  in  response  to  Germany's  peace 
drive. 

In  this  connection,  it  is  worthy  of  note  that  on  the 
same  day  that  President  Wilson  obscurely  hinted  that  the 
issues  of  the  war  were  not  clear  to  him  at  first,  another 
member  of  the  Administration  was  uttering  a  robust  avowal 
of  error.  This  was  Vice-President  Marshall,  who,  in  a 
public  address  in  the  same  city,  boldly  declared: 

I  come  here  partly  to  make  an  apology,  an  apology  for  my  attitude 
during  almost  two  years  and  a  half  of  that  fateful  conflict ;  an  apology 
that  a  God-fearing  man  in  the  twentieth-century  civilization  could 
have  dreamed  that  any  nation,  any  people,  or  any  man  could  be 
neutral  when  right  was  fighting  with  wrong. 


Looking  Toward  Peace  245 

When  Germany  saw  that  her  overwhelming  military 
defeat  was  certain  and  sought  a  way  to  avoid  the  inevitable 
consequences,  she  directed  her  peace  offensives  toward 
Washington.  This  course  was  logical:  First,  President 
Wilson  had  undertaken  to  dominate  the  peace  settlement; 
second,  This  government  was  the  only  one  of  her  opponents 
not  pledged  against  making  a  separate  peace;  third,  Presi- 
dent Wilson  had  proposed  a  set  of  terms,  every  item  of 
which  was  open  to  various  interpretations  and  to  contro- 
versy, and  Germany's  acceptance  of  them  would  bring  her 
into  closer  association  with  him  and  might  impel  him  to 
demand  like  acceptance  from  the  Allies.  The  correspond- 
ence into  which  they  drew  the  President  went  far  toward 
accomplishing  these  ends.  In  every  note  issued  from  Berlin 
and  Washington,  the  Fourteen  Points  were  emphasized, 
and  were  linked  inseparably  with  the  suggestion  for  an 
armistice. 

It  was  just  eleven  days  after  his  notable  New  York 
address  of  September  27  that  President  Wilson  made  his 
faltering  reply  to  Germany's  request  for  peace  terms,  con- 
sisting of  a  statement  and  two  questions.  In  this  note  of 
October  8,  he  stated  that,  owing  to  the  "momentous  in- 
terests involved,"  he  deemed  it  proper  to  make  some  in- 
quiries as  to  the  intent  of  Germany  in  seeking  his  assistance. 
This  is  the  famous  note: 

Before  making  reply  to  the  request  of  the  Imperial  German  Gov- 
ernment, and  in  order  that  that  reply  shall  be  as  candid  and  straight- 
forward as  the  momentous  interests  involved  require,  the  President  of 
the  United  States  deems  it  necessary  to  assure  himself  of  the  exact 
meaning  of  the  note  of  the  Imperial  Chancellor.  Does  the  Imperial 
Chancellor  mean  that  the  Imperial  German  Government  accepts  the 
terms  laid  down  by  the  President  in  his  address  to  the  Congress  of 
the  United  States  on  the  8th  of  January  last  and  in  subsequent  ad- 
dresses, and  that  its  object  in  entering  into  discussions  would  be  only 
to  agree  upon  the  practical  details  of  their  application  ? 

The  President  feels  bound  to  say  with  regard  to  the  suggestion  of 


246    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

an  armistice  that  he  would  not  feel  at  liberty  to  propose  a  cessation  of 
arms  to  the  Governments  with  which  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  is  associated  against  the  Central  Powers  so  long  as  the  armies 
of  those  Powers  are  upon  their  soil.  The  good  faith  of  any  discus- 
sion would  manifestly  depend  upon  the  consent  of  the  Central  Powers 
immediately  to  withdraw  their  forces  everywhere  from  invaded  ter- 
ritory. 

The  President  also  feels  that  he  is  justified  in  asking  whether  the 
Imperial  Chancellor  is  speaking  merely  for  the  constituted  authorities 
of  the  Empire  who  have  so  far  conducted  the  war.  He  deems  the 
answer  to  these  questions  vital  from  every  point  of  view. 

It  was  with  mingled  astonishment,  rage,  and  dismay 
that  the  souls  of  men  were  possessed  when  the  news  of  his 
reply  was  published  after  what  he  had  led  the  nation  to 
expect  as  results  of  his  address  of  September  27.  This 
was  evidenced  by  unvarying  murmurs  of  "It  is  what  we  have 
feared  all  along."  The  German  Government,  knowing  that 
a  war  was  never  won  by  talking  peace,  engaged  the  Ameri- 
can Government  in  talking  peace.  The  division  of  senti- 
ment was  instant,  whereas  it  had  been  solidly  back  of  the 
President  the  day  before.  It  led  to  James  M.  Beck's  dec- 
laration that  the  President's  wavering  course  was  "paralyz- 
ing the  will  of  the  American  people."  The  day  before  the 
President's  reply,  Senator  Lodge  had  pledged  his  unequivo- 
cal support  to  the  President's  declared  policy  of  refusing 
to  have  anything  to  do  with  German  peace  except  through 
victory.  The  country  was  united.  The  leaders  of  the  two 
great  political  parties  were  in  hearty  accord  on  Monday, 
while  on  Wednesday  they  were  as  far  apart  as  the  antipo- 
des. The  President  had  changed  and  the  people  were 
disappointed. 

This  division  in  public  sentiment  was  shown  in  the 
two  resolutions  offered  in  the  senate.  That  by  Senator 
Lodge: 

Resolved,  That  it  is  the  sense  of  the  Senate  that  there  should  be 
no  further  communication  with  the  German  Government  upon  the 


Looking  Toward  Peace  247 

subject  of  an  armistice  or  conditions  of  peace,  except  a  demand  for 
unconditional  surrender. 

That  by  Senator  Lewis  of  Illinois  was  in  these  words: 

Resolved,  That  the  United  States  Senate  approves  whatever 
course  may  be  taken  by  the  President  of  the  United  States  in  the 
matter  of  his  replies  and  in  his  dealings  with  the  German  Imperial 
Government  and  the  Austrian  Imperial  Government  and  the  allies 
of  either  or  both,  in  response  to  the  demand  of  either  for  peace  or 
armistice. 

Smarting  under  the  criticisms  of  his  first  temporizing 
note  to  Germany,  he  essayed  to  issue,  through  Senator 
Pittman  of  Nevada,  a  direct  challenge  to  his  opponents, 
in  this  language :  uThe  test  in  the  coming  election  is  inevita- 
ble between  the  policies  of  Woodrow  Wilson  and  the 
policies  of  Henry  Cabot  Lodge."  He  uttered  a  great  truth. 

Notwithstanding  Mr.  Wilson's  capacity  for  fine  phras- 
ing, some  of  his  state  papers,  which  should  have  left  no 
possible  scope  for  difference  of  opinion,  were  obscure  in 
the  extreme.  And  this  first  reply  to  Germany,  containing 
fewer  than  250  words,  was  so  susceptible  of  differing  con- 
structions that  the  various  interpretations  given  to  it  filled 
many  columns,  some  of  them  wholly  in  conflict  with  others. 
A  thoroughgoing  American  newspaper  stated:  "Once 
more  the  American  nation,  eager  for  leadership,  found 
itself  confronting,  instead,  a  question-mark."  And  when 
the  outcry  against  the  President's  reply  became  too  loud, 
Secretary  of  State  Lansing  explained  to  the  public  that  the 
President's  note  was  only  a  preliminary  inquiry.  That  this 
was  mere  pretense  was  shown  by  the  inspired  interpretations 
issued  from  Washington  describing  it  as  the  most  powerful 
and  decisive  document  of  the  war,  and  which  declared  it 
to  exhibit  "subtle  dialectic  skill,"  "majestic  simplicity,"  and 
"  the  force  of  an  ultimatum."  But  when  the  President,  yield- 
ing to  the  enraged  protest,  changed  his  position  and  re- 
ferred the  entire  matter  to  the  Allies,  where  it  belonged, 


248    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

in  his  next  note  to  Germany,  the  nation  was  delivered  from 
a  grave  menace. 

In  his  reply  of  October  8,  he  was  led  into  what  the 
Germans  desired — conversations  by  an  individual  nation  in 
the  hope  of  winning  that  nation  from  its  Allies.  And  had 
it  not  been  for  the  sound  American  sentiments  which 
sounded  the  alarm  with  an  outcry  that  was  exceeded  by 
none  during  the  war  except  that  in  the  airplane  scandal  and 
the  failure  of  the  war  department  to  function  after  the 
years  of  the  do-nothing  spirit,  there  was  a  fine  prospect 
of  its  success. 

The  German  government  seizing  the  opportunity,  with 
swift  and  deadly  precision  on  October  12  answered  fully 
the  President's  two  questions  and  in  almost  his  exact  words. 
Forced  by  the  articulate  rage  on  the  part  of  America,  to  say 
nothing  of  the  courteous  protest  of  the  European  Allied 
statesmen,  he  then,  on  October  14,  informed  Germany  that, 
"The  unqualified  acceptance  by  the  present  German  Gov- 
ernment and  by  a  large  majority  of  the  German  Reichstag 
of  the  terms  laid  down  by  the  President  of  the  United  States 
of  America  .  .  .  justifies  the  President  in  making  a  frank 
and  direct  statement  of  his  decision  with  regard  to  the  com- 
munications of  the  German  Government  of  the  8th  and  I2th 
of  October,  1918."  And  he  further  stated  that  "it  must  be 
understood  that  the  process  of  evacuation  and  the  condi- 
tions of  an  armistice  are  matters  which  must  be  left  to 
the  judgment  and  advice  of  the  military  advisers  of  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  and  the  Allied  Govern- 
ments." 

Germany  acceding  to  these  conditions  and  asking  for 
an  armistice  in  its  reply  of  October  20,  the  President  re- 
plied by  stating  that  he  had  referred  all  to  the  Allied  na- 
tions. 

The  peace  conversations  between  President  Wilson  and 
the  enemy  powers  are  well  summed  up  by  a  leading  eastern 
newspaper  as  follows : 


Looking  Toward  Peace  249 

1.  Germany  to  President  Wilson — We  request  you   to  bring 
about  an  immediate  armistice,  and  a  peace  conference  with  your  terms 
as  a  basis  of  negotiations. 

2.  President  Wilson  to  Germany — I  will  not  propose  an  armis- 
tice so  long  as  your  armies  are  on  invaded  soil.     Do  you  mean  that 
you  accept  my  terms,  and  wish  to  discuss  merely  the  details  of  their 
application?    Is  your  government  still  an  autocracy? 

3.  Germany    to    President    Wilson — We   have    accepted    your 
terms  and  principles  and  wish  merely  to  discuss  their  application.    We 
are  ready  to  evacuate  invaded  territory,  under  an  armistice  arranged 
by  a  mixed  commission.    We  speak  in  the  name  of  the  German  gov- 
ernment and  the  German  people. 

4.  President  Wilson  to  Germany — Conditions  of  an  armistice 
must  be  decided  by  the  military  advisers  of  your  opponents  jointly,  and 
must  safeguard  the  military  supremacy  attained  over  you.     Cessation 
of  illegal  and  inhumane  practices  is  first  required.    Your  government 
is  still  arbitrary  and  autocratic,  and  it  is  within  the  choice  of  the 
German  people  to  alter  it.     We  must  know  with  whom  we  are 
speaking. 

5.  Germany  to  President  Wilson — We  again  request  an  armis- 
tice, the  terms  based  upon  the  actual  standard  of  power  on  both  sides 
in  the  field.     We  trust  you  will  resist  any  demand  injurious  to  the 
honor  of  the  German  people.     Charges  of  illegal  war  practices  are 
denied,  but  those  guilty  of  such  acts  are  being  punished.     You  are 
dealing  with  a  government  free  from  any  arbitrary  and  irresponsible 
influence  and  supported  by  the  German  people. 

6.  President   Wilson   to   Germany — Upon   your    assurances,    I 
have  transmitted  to  the  Allies  your  request  for  an  armistice,  the 
understanding  being  that  the  terms  would  prevent  your  renewing 
hostilities  and  enable  your  opponents  to  enforce  the  details  of  the 
peace  to  which  you  have  agreed.     Extraordinary  guarantees  are  re- 
quired because  your  government  is  not  yet  satisfactorily  made  re- 
sponsible to  the  German  people.     With  veritable  representatives  of 
the  people  a  negotiated  peace  is  possible;  if  we  must  deal  with  mili- 
tarists and  monarchical  autocrats,  our  demand  must  be  for  surrender. 

7.  Germany  to  President  Wilson — This  is  a  government  of  the 
people,  and  it  controls  the  military  authorities.     It  awaits  proposals 
for  an  armistice,  as  a  step  toward  peace  on  the  Wilson  terms.6 

"The  Philadelphia  North  American. 


250    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

That  is  the  documentary  record,  including  an  ultimatum 
to  the  Allies  in  number  6. 

In  the  Allied  countries,  the  President's  note  of  October 
8  to  Germany  was  praised;  but  the  indorsements  were  cau- 
tious and  they  soon  gave  way  to  frank  dissent.  An  official 
representative  of  Great  Britain  in  Washington  declared: 
"We  cannot  win  this  war  by  talking  peace."  The  London 
Chronicle  said:  "It  is  expected  here  that  President  Wilson 
will  stipulate,  instead  of  asking  rhetorical  questions."  For 
four  years  Lord  Northcliffe's  positive  instructions  to  his 
English  newspapers  were  that  there  was  to  be  no  criticism 
whatever  of  President  Wilson  in  his  newspapers.  But  under 
the  stress  of  the  President's  reply  to  Germany  his  patience 
yielded  and  his  London  Times,  chief  of  the  papers,  said  : 

We  all  have  the  greatest  confidence  in  President  Wilson,  but  we 
think  it  would  have  been  better  if,  instead  of  attempting  any  negotia- 
tions, he  had  stated  straight  out  that  any  peace  offer  from  the  Central 
Powers  must  be  presented  to  the  Allies  as  a  whole. 

And  another  dispatch  said:  "It  was  hoped  in  Britain 
that  he  would  not  be  actuated  by  any  desire  to  appropri- 
ate an  undue  share  of  responsibility  in  answering  Ger- 
many." There  was  no  word  of  approval  from  the  great 
English  journals. 

The  only  prominent  man  of  the  Allies  in  approval  was 
the  English  pacifist  Lansdowne.  It  was  all  deep  silence 
from  every  European  statesman  from  the  democratic  na- 
tions. Propaganda  given  out  from  Washington  undertook 
to  show  Sir  Eric  Geddes,  of  the  British  admiralty,  as 
giving  "unqualified  approval"  of  the  President's  course. 
But  what  he  said  was  this:  "We  cannot  win  by  talking 
peace.  To  get  us  talking  of  peace  is  just  what  Germany 
wants.  Let  the  Kaiser  talk  while  Foch  shoots."  And 
Premier  Lloyd  George  would  speak  only  of  the  brilliant 
success  of  the  Allied  arms  against  the  common  enemy. 

Immediately  after  President  Wilson's  alarming  reply 


Looking  Toward  Peace  251 

to  the  German  note  requesting  an  armistice,  Mr.  Bonar 
Law,  government  spokesman  in  the  British  House  of  Com- 
mons, made  an  announcement  in  Parliament  sounding  the 
alarm  and  giving  warning  to  the  civilized  world  that  it 
would  be  very  unwise  for  any  of  the  Allied  governments  to 
make  any  statement  as  to  the  terms  likely  to  be  imposed 
upon  Germany,  before  an  armistice  should  be  granted. 

In  France  the  sentiment  concerning  President  Wilson's 
move  was  that  there  was  developed  among  statesmen  an 
influential  body  of  opinion  which  would  be  more  practica- 
ble if  Mr.  Wilson  had  said  less.  Le  Temps,  a  semi-official 
newspaper  and  the  most  powerful  in  France,  said:  "Ger- 
many appears  to  believe  that  President  Wilson  intervenes 
as  an  arbiter  to  put  everybody  right."  On  the  same  day 
that  the  New  York  World  was  presenting  on  its  first  page 
the  evidence  of  the  enthusiasm  of  the  Allies  over  Mr.  Wil- 
son's move,  there  came  from  Paris  this  news: 

Paris,  October  9. — While  Paris  waited  for  President  Wilson's 
reply  to  Germany,  the  French  press  contented  itself  with  printing 
long  accounts  of  anti-armistice  speeches  in  the  United  States  Senate 
and  a  full  symposium  of  American  newspaper  opinion,  which,  as  it 
appears  here,  was  unanimous  against  an  interruption  in  the  fighting. 
In  fact,  the  reports  of  the  debates  in  the  American  Senate  share  first 
pages  with  the  news  of  the  great  military  victories  on  the  west  front. 
Senators  McCumber,  Nelson,  and  Lodge  are  as  highly  thought  of  in 
France  today  as  are  the  American  generals.  No  news  of  the  outcome 
of  any  battle  was  ever  awaited  with  more  eagerness  than  was  the 
reply  of  the  American  President  to  the  German  Chancellor. 

While  there  was  among  the  Allied  nations,  as  among 
Americans,  a  disposition  to  accord  to  President  Wilson  the 
fullest  measure  of  recognition  in  his  effort  to  bring  about 
a  just  peace,  they  were  resolved  that  the  Fate  of  autocracy 
should  not  be  committed  exclusively  to  the  judgment  of  one 
arbitrary  wavering  will. 

German  newspapers,  on  the  other  hand,  were  rather  par- 
tial toward  President  Wilson's  attitude.  The  first  impres- 


252    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

sion  was  a  feeling  of  dismay,  due  to  a  misapprehension  of 
the  President's  position.  The  Tageblatt  stated  that  a 
rumor  spread  like  lightning  through  Berlin  that  he  had 
rejected  the  German  offer.  It  said:  "The  emotion  which 
followed  was  indescribable.  It  seemed  as  if  a  terrible 
catastrophe  had  descended  on  the  city.  Gloom  and  sulkiness 
prevailed";  and  that  when  a  correction  of  the  erroneous 
report  lifted  the  pall,  unconfined  joy  supplanted  it.  In  Stras- 
burg  the  first  report  was  that  "the  President  had  replied 
favorably"  and  "at  once  glaring  posters  were  put  up  an- 
nouncing the  glad  news,  and  thousands  gathered  in  the 
streets  to  give  wild  expression  to  their  joy."  While  the  Post 
of  that  city  asked  the  people  to  "await  the  reply  of  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  with  dignity  and  calmness.  The 
only  hope  lies  in  the  fact  that  our  Note  was  not  entirely  re- 
jected." 

There  were  those  who  believed  that  President  Wilson's 
question  addressed  to  the  German  Chancellor,  asking 
whether  it  was  the  German  Government  or  the  German  peo- 
ple who  spoke,  was  a  master  stroke.  But  sight  was  not 
lost  of  the  fact  that  his  inquiry  was  directed  to  a  source 
which  everybody  knew  and  which  he  had  then  but  recently 
declared  was  an  autocracy,  "without  the  capacity  for  coven- 
anted peace."  Yet  he  invited  it  to  write  its  own  certificate 
of  character,  enabling  it  to  write  into  the  record  a  declara- 
tion that  the  German  Imperial  Government  was  a  demo- 
cratic and  responsible  institution — a  declaration  completely 
responsive  to  Mr.  Wilson's  challenge.  It  extracted  all 
efficacy  from  his  repeated  declarations  that  "we  cannot  take 
the  word  of  the  present  German  government"  and  "we  do 
not  think  the  same  thoughts  or  speak  the  same  language 
of  agreement." 

Amidst  all  the  fluctuations  of  public  opinion  during  the 
Great  War,  one  thought  remained  permanent  with  the  peo- 
ple :  That  President  Wilson's  pre-war  pacifism  would  gain 
the  upper  hand  and  lead  him  into  an  inconclusive  peace,  into 


Looking  Toward  Peace  253 

peace  at  an  inopportune  moment.  It  was  a  deadly  fear. 
There  was  no  fear  on  the  part  of  our  soldiers  and  sailors 
of  the  most  destructive  guns  or  the  pirate  submarine  or  the 
sharp  bayonet  or  the  poisonous  gas;  no  fear  in  the  heart 
of  the  red-blooded  American  father  that  his  son  would  come 
home  to  him  a  helpless  cripple  for  the  rest  of  his  life  or 
that  a  grave  in  France  might  claim  him.  Clearly  and  with- 
out hesitation  the  newly-married  wife  declared  that  she  did 
not  fear  the  worst  that  German  bullets  could  do;  she  de- 
manded that  the  war  be  fought  to  a  conclusion,  that  future 
generations  be  safe.  His  program  was  declared  acceptable 
to  Germany,  and  it  was  not  wholly  acceptable  to  the  Allies. 
"Force,  force  to  the  utmost,  force  without  stint  or  limit" 
were  the  words  of  our  President  in  April,  when  he  was  re- 
flecting American  advanced  thought;  they  should  never 
have  been  forgotten,  never  repudiated,  never  discounted  or 
modified  in  October. 

Had  the  President  been  a  man  whose  mind  was  open 
to  suggestion,  he  would  have  been  glad  to  consider  the 
warning  of  his  minister  to  The  Netherlands  as  quoted  above. 
But  warnings  of  the  impending  danger  could  not  affect 
Mr.  Wilson's  mind.  They  were,  therefore,  directed  more 
to  the  enlightening  and  shaping  of  public  opinion  to  be 
applied  when  the  supreme  test  should  come,  and  they  came 
from  the  most  diverse  sources. 

When,  as  early  as  August,  1918,  Senator  Lodge  declared 
unequivocally  on  the  floor  of  the  Senate  that  this  nation 
would  never  agree  to  a  negotiated  peace,  he  voiced  the  senti- 
ment of  the  American  people.  The  same  warning  came  to 
the  nation  from  other  sources.  In  the  early  part  of  the 
September  drive,  a  prominent  American  prelate  stated  the 
American  point  of  view  in  this  fashion: 

Germany  has  ravished  the  women  of  Belgium,  Servia,  Roumania, 
Poland,  Armenia;  Germany  murdered  the  passengers  of  the  "Lusi- 
tania"  and  struck  a  medal  to  celebrate  that  German  triumph,  dating 
it  two  days  before  the  horrible  occurrence;  Germany  has  ruined 


254    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

cathedrals  and  cities  in  sheer  wanton  fury  in  such  fashion  as  has  not 
been  done  in  all  the  wars  waged  in  Europe  since  the  days  of  the 
building  of  cathedrals;  Germany  has  poisoned  wells,  crucified  in- 
habitants and  soldiers,  burned  people  in  their  houses,  and  this  by  sys- 
tem; Germany  has  denatured  men  and  boys,  has  wantonly  defaced 
the  living  and  the  dying  and  the  dead.  An  eye-witness  tells  of  seeing 
women  dead  at  a  table  with  tongues  nailed  to  the  table  and  left  to  die. 
Germany  has  stolen  things  little  and  big;  playthings  from  children, 
finery  from  women,  pictures  of  incalculable  worth,  bank  deposits,  rail- 
roads, factories;  Germany  has  sunk  hospital-ships,  has  bombed  hos- 
pitals and  Red  Cross  camps;  Germany  has  disclosed  neither  decency 
nor  honor  from  the  day  they  started  war,  nor  has  a  single  voice  in 
Germany  to  date  been  lifted  against  the  orgies  of  ruthlessness  which 
turn  the  soul  sick  and  which  constitute  the  chiefest  barbarity  of  his- 
tory; Germany  remains  unblushing  and  unconscious  of  its  indecency; 
Germany's  egotist  still  struts  like  a  kaiser;  and  to  climax  its  horrid 
crimes,  Germany  has  inflicted  compulsory  polygamy  on  the  virgins  of 
its  own  land.  What  must  decency  say  to  this?  That  is  not  war;  that 
is  murder.  Germany  has  slain  and  debauched  more  people  in  this 
war  than  all  the  heathen  hordes  have  since  Nero. 

Stern  justice  is  what  should  be  meted  out;  and  unless  it  is,  there 
will  be  shameful  injustice  meted  out  to  a  world  of  ruined  bodies  and 
befouled  souls  and  bodies.7 

The  peace  leadership,  loyally  recognized  and  gladly 
confirmed  to  the  President  by  reason  of  his  office,  was  can- 
celled from  the  day  he  opened  alone  his  peace  conversations 
with  the  common  enemy.  The  nation's  instant  and  stern 
repudiation  of  Germany's  attempt  to  make  its  chief  execu- 
tive her  attorney  to  plead  her  cause  with  the  other  nations 
and  of  his  apparent  acceptance  of  this  new  function,  signal- 
izing the  nation's  reply  to  his  device  of  making  what  he 
called  an  inquiry,  was  swift,  clear,  and  determined;  and  the 
outcry  was  so  loud  and  spontaneous  that  it  stood  condemned 
from  the  first  publication. 

While  he  excelled  in  stating  the  fundamental  issues  of 

1  Bishop  William  A.  Quayle  in  Northwestern  Christian  Advocate,  Chi- 
cago, September  18,   1918. 


Looking  Toward  Peace  255 

the  conflict,  he  so  egregiously  and  so  often  misrepresented 
the  American  spirit  that  he  was  repudiated  at  home.  The 
Associated  Press  was  asked  to  say  from  Washington  on 
Sunday,  the  day  after  the  receipt  of  the  German  note,  that 
"the  Government  asks  the  American  people  to  withhold 
their  judgment  of  Germany's  note  until  President  Wilson 
has  had  opportunity  to  consider  it."  It  was  similar  to  a 
later  request,  when  he  was  returning  from  Europe,  that 
the  Senate  withhold  discussion  of  the  League  of  Nations 
Covenant  until  he  should  present  it  to  that  body  in  his  own 
way.  Refraining  from  the  discussion  of  the  German  note 
was  not  what  the  American  people  would  do  at  that  time. 
They  discussed. 

It  seemed  that  his  peace  efforts  would  prove  disastrous 
to  the  loan  then  being  asked  of  the  nation.  He  felt  im- 
pelled to  go  to  the  people  to  help  save  the  new  loan.  On 
that  occasion  he  said: 

Recent  events  have  enhanced,  not  lessened  the  importance  of  this 
loan,  and  I  hope  that  my  fellow-countrymen  will  let  me  say  this  to 
them  very  frankly.  .  .  .  Nothing  has  happened  which  makes  it  safe 
or  possible  to  do  anything  but  push  our  effort  to  the  utmost.  The 
time  is  critical  and  the  response  must  be  complete. 

Other  inspired  statements  were  given  out  to  ease  the 
desperate  situation  into  which  the  Administration  had 
plunged  itself  and  the  country  in  its  peace  move.  Secretary 
Baker  stated  that  the  war  department  was  pushing  forward 
as  rapidly  as  possible.  The  President's  Private  Secretary 
Tumulty  gave  out  this  statement  at  the  White  House: 
"The  Government  will  continue  to  send  over  250,000  men, 
with  their  supplies,  every  month  and  there  will  be  no  re- 
laxation." 

Said  one  paper  in  the  central  northwest,  the  Duluth 
News-Tribune  i 

It  might  seem  too  much  even  to  hope  that  the  President  would 
ever  decline  to  debate  with  Germany;  that  he  would  ever  discover 


256    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

that  the  Great  War  was  not  merelv  with  the  German  Government, 
but  was  with  the  German  people. 

With  characteristic  ingenuity,  Berlin  sent  by  wireless, 
in  advance  of  its  official  transmission  to  the  President,  its 
reply.  Thus  blazoned  from  unnumbered  millions  of  news- 
paper pages  the  whole  world  read: 

"GERMANY  ACCEPTS  PRESIDENT  WILSON'S  TERMS"; 
"GERMANY  MAKES  UNCONDITIONAL  SURRENDER"; 
"GERMANY  BEGS  FOR  ARMISTICE." 

But  the  suppression  of  Germany's  reply  by  the  Admin- 
istration in  Washington,  with  the  explanation  that  it  was 
in  the  nature  of  propaganda  which  might  have  an  ill  effect 
upon  the  people,  was  so  like  the  suppression  of  the  Senate's 
report  on  the  aircraft  investigation,  when  all  the  world 
knew  it,  that  it  was  placed  in  the  same  category — that  the 
Administration  thought  itself  more  nearly  proof  against  the 
wiles  of  the  enemy  than  the  American  people  had  proved 
themselves  to  be. 

Dr.  Henry  van  Dyke,  who  rendered  such  excellent  serv- 
ice to  the  cause  of  freedom,  writing  upon  peace  more  than 
a  year  before  the  armed  conflict  closed,  gave  further  advice 
which  might  profitably  have  been  heeded  by  the  President. 
Referring  to  the  German  Government,  he  stated: 

Until  that  government  is  disabused  of  the  delusion  that  it  has 
won,  is  winning,  or  will  win  a  substantial  victory  in  this  war,  it  is  not 
likely  to  say  anything  sane  or  reasonable  about  peace.  A  pax  Ger- 
manica  is  what  it  is  willing  to  discuss. 

But  that  is  just  what  we  do  not  want.  To  enter  into  such  a 
discussion  now  would  be  both  futile  and  perilous.8 

When  President  Wilson  was  furthering  Germany's  in- 
terests by  writing  notes,  in  the  summer  of  1918,  the  wag's 
toast,  proposed  in  a  cloak-room  in  the  capitol  in  Washing- 
ton carrying  a  savage  significance,  was  not  illy  expressive 

8  Henry  van  Dyke,  "Fighting  for  Peace,"  p.  235. 


Looking  Toward  Peace  257 

of  the  American  view  of  the  President's  leadership :  "Here's 
to  the  Czar,  last  in  war,  first  in  peace,  long  may  he  waver!" 

Mr.  Wilson  had  been  seeking  to  drive  a  wedge  between 
Austria  and  Germany.  Whether  he  succeeeded  will  depend 
upon  the  point  of  view  from  which  the  matter  is  examined. 
That  Austria,  acting  upon  the  initiative  of  Germany,  opened 
the  September  peace  offensive  is  hardly  open  to  question. 
Germany  immediately  followed.  From  that  time,  the  two 
nations  apparently  operated  in  full  harmony. 

Thus,  when,  on  October  28,  1918,  Austria  asked  an 
immediate  armistice  it  is  probable  that  she  did  so  with 
Germany's  full  knowledge  and  consent.  On  that  date, 
the  Austro-Hungarian  foreign  minister  instructed  that  a 
note  be  sent  to  Washington,  of  which  a  part  is  in  these 
words : 

Austria-Hungary  accepting  all  the  conditions  the  President  has 
laid  down,  for  the  entry  into  negotiations  for  an  armistice  and  peace, 
no  obstacle  exists,  according  to  judgment  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
government,  to  the  beginning  of  these  negotiations. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  government  declares  itself  ready,  in  con- 
sequence, without  awaiting  the  result  of  other  negotiations,  to  enter 
into  negotiations  upon  peace  between  Austria-Hungary  and  the  states 
in  the  opposing  group  and  for  an  immediate  armistice  upon  all  Aus- 
tro-Hungarian fronts. 

It  asks  President  Wilson  to  be  so  kind  as  to  begin  overtures  oni 
this  subject. 

This  was  the  beginning  of  the  end  of  the  great  struggle. 
From  this  on  Germany's  only  effort  was  to  be  directed  to 
securing  the  best  possible  terms  with  her  superior  enemies. 

November  5  the  German  Government  was  advised 
through  the  Swiss  minister  in  charge  of  German  affairs  in 
this  country  that  the  President  had  the  Allied  reply,  namely : 

The  Allied  Governments  have  given  careful  consideration  to  the 
correspondence  which  has  passed  between  the  President  of  the  United 
States  and  the  German  Government.  Subject  to  the  qualifications 


258    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

which  follow,  they  declare  their  willingness  to  make  peace  with  the 
Government  of  Germany  on  the  terms  of  peace  laid  down  in  the 
President's  address  to  Congress  of  January,  1918,  and  the  principles 
of  settlement  enunciated  in  his  subsequent  address. 

The  Allied  governments  then  made  exception  to  the 
condition  relative  to  freedom  of  the  seas,  until  it  was  clearly 
defined.  And  then  this  other  exception,  which  was  of  far- 
reaching  importance,  as  later  developments  showed: 

Further,  in  the  conditions  of  peace  laid  down  in  his  address  to 
Congress  of  January  8,  1918,  the  President  declared  that  invaded  ter- 
ritories must  be  restored  as  well  as  evacuated  and  freed,  the  Allied 
Governments  feel  that  no  doubt  ought  to  be  allowed  to  exist  as  to 
what  this  provision  implies.  By  it  they  understand  that  compensa- 
tion will  be  made  by  Germany  for  all  damages  done  to  the  civilian 
population  of  the  Allies  and  their  property  by  the  aggression  of  Ger- 
many by  land,  by  sea,  and  from  the  air. 

The  President  then  stated  that  he  was  "in  agreement 
with  the  interpretations  set  forth  in  the  last  paragraph  in 
the  memorandum  above  quoted.7'  And  then  the  formal 
closing  that  the  President  requests  the  Swiss  minister  to 
notify  the  German  Government  that  Marshal  Foch  had 
been  authorized  by  the  government  of  the  United  States 
and  the  Allied  Governments  to  receive  properly  accredited 
representatives  of  the  German  Government  and  to  communi- 
cate to  them  the  terms  of  the  armistice. 

Sometimes  the  question  was  asked,  who  surrendered? 
Who  was  the  German  party  to  the  armistice?  We  entered 
into  no  terms  and  no  compact  with  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment of  Germany.  The  President  himself  had  so  declared. 
It  was  true.  The  armistice  was  in  fact  not  a  treaty  or  a 
compact,  but  a  surrender.  The  word  of  no  German  au- 
thority was  taken  in  anything,  nor  was  faith  placed  in  any- 
thing of  German  authority.  We  simply  gave  Germany  a 
certain  number  of  days  in  which  to  deliver  over  her  military 
power  and  to  make  a  partial  restoration  of  stolen  goods  to 


Looking  Toward  Peace  259 

her  victims.  The  correspondence  was  carried  on  with  uthe 
German  Government,"  and  was  so  concluded  in  the  armis- 
tice of  November  n,  1918. 

The  greatness  of  the  event  probably  warranted  two 
seasons  of  rejoicing  over  the  conclusion  of  the  armistice. 
These  the  country  enjoyed. 

On  the  afternoon  of  November  7,  1918,  news  dispatches 
from  France  were  received  in  New  York  erroneously  re- 
porting that  the  armistice  had  been  signed.  All  over  the 
United  States  the  people  received  the  news  with  spontaneous 
outbursts  of  joy,  and  the  supposed  end  of  the  war  was  de- 
liriously celebrated  for  several  hours  before  official  denials 
from  Washington  checked  the  popular  enthusiasm. 

After  the  country  had  been  notified  and  convinced  that 
the  armistice  had  not  actually  been  signed  when  the  first 
false  reports  spread  throughout  the  land,  it  settled  down 
to  await  the  news  that  signing  had  actually  taken  place. 
When  the  news  did  reach  this  country  and  was  telegraphed 
to  every  village  and  city,  it  reached  every  cross-roads  in 
mountain  and  valley,  on  prairie  and  in  the  deep  forests; 
it  penetrated  every  nook  and  corner  of  the  land.  But  it 
was  in  the  cities  and  larger  towns  that  the  wild  delirium 
of  joy  broke  forth  in  such  an  uproar  of  enthusiasm  mingled 
with  confusion  that  would  have  set  in  wild-eyed  wonder  an 
individual  who  might  have  dropped  into  its  midst  without 
previous  notice. 

Trucks  carrying  young  men  and  maidens  beating  upon 
drums  improvised  from  large  tin  cans,  old  tin  stoves,  water 
tanks,  or  what  not,  yelling  and  shouting  themselves  hoarse 
over  the  general  expressions  of  joy;  offices  deserted  without 
any  order  or  communication  from  heads  of  the  concern; 
factories  evacuated  by  their  employes  without  any  formality 
or  notice ;  streets  crowded  and  jammed  with  men  and  women 
who  seemed  to  vie  with  each  other  and  with  the  younger 
portion  of  the  population  in  keeping  up  the  interminable 
racket;  automobiles  of  dignified  business  and  official  men 


260    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

with  parts  of  stoves  and  tin  cans  chained  to  them  rushed 
up  and  down  the  streets  hither  and  thither  to  add  to  the 
clangor  and  uproar — these  were  but  some  of  the  features 
indicating  the  noisy  demonstrations  of  the  celebration  in 
America  of  the  signing  of  the  armistice.  On  many  street 
corners  the  Kaiser  was  hanged  in  effigy  to  the  lamp-posts; 
this  same  effigy  was  noticed  in  some  business  places  or  was 
hanging  out  over  balcony,  and  was  given  a  place  of  promi- 
nence wherever  prominence  would  attract  public  attention. 
In  fact,  in  this  form  the  Kaiser  was  honored  by  joy-rides 
on  automobile  trucks,  in  fashionable  automobiles,  on  drays 
drawn  by  old  horses  or  mules  or  oxen.  It  is  probable  that 
never  in  the  nation's  history  was  there  so  spontaneous  and 
so  complete  an  abandon  on  the  part  of  the  populace  in  gen- 
eral to  an  exhibition  of  unqualified  outbursts  of  delirium 
as  was  witnessed  in  the  United  States  November  n,  1918. 

When  President  Wilson  announced  his  intention  of 
going  to  the  Peace  Congress,  the  announcement  was  met 
with  a  storm  of  protest  throughout  the  country,  in  which  his 
most  ardent  supporters  joined. 

The  wisdom  of  one  man  never  equalled  the  combined 
counsels  of  many;  and  "in  the  multitude  of  counselors  there 
is  safety."  America  must  be  kept  free  from  the  power  of 
one  willful  President  to  misguide  and  bind. 


CHAPTER   XIV 

THE  WORLD'S  PEACE  CONGRESS 

Up  to  the  time  of  the  President's  personal  appeal,  on 
October  24,  1918,  for  the  country's  support  of  his  party, 
the  sole  issue  was  support  of  the  Government  in  the  prosecu- 
tion of  the  war.  At  that  point  the  President  changed  it. 
He  made  the  issue:  The  American  people  to  declare 
whether  they  would  leave  wholly  in  his  hands  the  policy 
of  peace,  would  give  him  authority  to  demand  acceptance 
by  the  democratic  nations  of  his  official  program,  until  then 
never  passed  upon  by  the  country.  If  that  judgment  should 
be  adverse,  he  said  he  would  abide  by  it.  The  judgment,  as 
expressed  at  the  election,  was  decisively  against  him.  He 
then  overrode  an  expression  of  public  opinion  which  he  had 
himself  requested  and  which  he  pledged  himself  to  obey, 
in  going  to  Europe.  Upon  this,  the  New  York  Tribune  re- 
marked :  "He  goes  abroad  a  rebuked  and  discredited  leader 
in  his  own  nation." 

It  was  immediately  after  the  signing  of  the  armistice 
that  reports  from  Washington  were  creeping  into  the  news- 
papers that  President  Wilson  was  planning  to  attend  the 
Peace  Conference  as  one  of  the  American  delegates.  When 
the  first  studied  hints  went  out  from  the  White  House,  the 
general  attitude  was  an  amused  incredulity. 

On  November  18,  however,  formal  announcement  was 
made  that  the  President  would  sail  for  France  immediately 
after  addressing  Congress  at  the  opening  of  its  regular 
session  on  December  2.  It  was  said  that  he  did  not  intend 
to  remain  long  at  the  conference  but  "his  presence  at  the 
outset  is  necessary  in  order  to  obviate  the  manifest  disad- 
vantages of  discussion  by  cable  in  determining  the  greater 

261 


262    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

outlines  of  the  treaty  about  which  he  must  necessarily  be 
consulted."  This  announcement  produced  a  ferment  of  dis- 
cussion throughout  the  United  States,  and  much  opposition 
developed.  Some  details  of  the  subsidiary  organization  of 
the  peace  delegation  were  made  public,  and  on  November 
29,  it  was  announced  that  the  delegation  would  consist  of 
the  President  himself,  Secretary  of  State  Robert  Lansing, 
Colonel  Edward  M.  House,  a  Texas  politician,  former  Am- 
bassador to  France,  Henry  White,  and  General  Tasker  H. 
Bliss,  formerly  chief  of  staff  of  the  army,  who  had  been  in 
Paris  as  a  representative  of  the  United  States  since  he  re- 
tired as  chief  of  staff. 

He  had  been  very  reticent  as  to  his  trip  to  Europe,  and 
there  was  notorious  propaganda  from  Washington  to  pre- 
pare the  people  for  what  he  had  in  view  for  a  full  year 
previous. 

A  political  writer,  in  a  series  of  criticisms  in  the  New 
York  Sun,  referred  to  the  propaganda  as  issued  from  the 
White  House  as  "resolving  themselves  into  a  polite  imputa- 
tion of  growing  megalomania  and  selfishness  of  motive.'1 

After  the  news  was  let  out  in  a  definite  way  that  the 
President  had  determined  upon  going  as  a  member  of  the 
peace  commission,  the  distrust  of  the  plan  throughout  the 
country  was  shown  in  the  protest  of  public  opinion.  As  an 
answer  to  this  criticism  the  President  went  before  Congress 
and  the  country  with  a  statement  of  his  purpose  in  going 
to  Europe.  This  was  a  direct  concession  to  the  storm  of 
public  opinion  which  voiced  itself  against  the  movement,  in 
the  greatest  diplomatic  action  of  the  country's  history,  by 
one  man  with  silence  on  his  lips  and  his  plans  under  his  hat. 

Upon  the  all-important  subject  of  the  coming  Peace 
Conference,  there  was  no  word  of  information  in  his  an- 
nual address  to  Congress.  He  merely  declared  that  he 
considered  that  his  personal  attendance  in  the  Conference 
was  a  transcendent  duty,  that  he  went  to  interpret,  and  to 
press  the  adoption  of,  the  terms  and  principles  stated  by 


The     World's  Peace  Congress  263 

him  in  public  addresses,  to  see  that  "no  false  or  mistaken 
interpretation"  was  placed  upon  his  ideals  as  announced, 
and  "no  possible  effort  omitted  to  realize  them."  The  status 
of  his  program  was  admittedly  obscure.  When  he  sought 
authority  to  interpret  and  enforce  it  according  to  his  own 
judgment,  the  people  rejected  his  plea  with  an  overwhelming 
answer. 

He  said  to  Congress:  "I  shall  be  in  close  touch  with 
you,  and  you  will  know  all  that  I  do.  .  .  .  I  am  servant  of 
the  nation.  I  can  have  no  private  thought  or  purpose  of 
my  own.  ...  I  shall  count  upon  your  friendly  counsel  and 
encouragement.  I  shall  not  be  inaccessible,  but  available 
for  any  counsel  or  service  you  may  desire  of  me." 

In  every  account  of  what  occurred  while  he  was  deliv- 
ering that  message  to  Congress  one  could  read  such  words 
as  "sternly  set  faces,"  the  "coldly  disapproving  looks,"  the 
"unconcealed  resentment,"  the  "ominous  silence"  in  which 
these  statement  were  heard. 

Apologists  for  the  President's  enterprise  attempted  to 
dismiss  the  antagonism,  which  he  had  created,  as  a  discredit- 
able exhibition  of  partisanship.  The  explanation  did  not 
stand  scrutiny.  Said  an  Administration  organ:  "The 
whole  atmosphere  of  the  capital  was  redolent  of  estrange- 
ment between  Congress  and  the  President."  Another 
friendly  paper  reported  that  "nearly  every  Democratic  sen- 
ator kept  his  seat  during  the  brief  period  that  the  demon- 
stration of  approval  was  in  progress."  Said  a  third  account : 
"President  Wilson  met  the  strongest  rebuff  it  is  in  power 
of  Congress  to  give." 

The  statement,  "You  will  know  all  that  I  do,"  was  an 
assurance  which  he  studiously  and  completely  ignored,  not 
only  throughout  all  the  negotiations  at  Paris,  but  after  his 
return  to  America  with  the  Treaty  in  his  hands. 

The  most  imposing  corps  of  experts  ever  gathered  to- 
gether for  such  a  purpose  as  the  President  had  in  view 
in  going  to  Europe  had  been  quietly  at  work  at  Washington 


264    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

for  more  than  year  in  advance  charting  every  village,  every 
mile  of  ground  in  the  belligerent  countries  of  Europe  and 
western  Asia,  digesting  every  phase  of  history  and  tracing 
the  nationality  of  every  affected  community  since  the  begin- 
ning of  recorded  time.  The  material  thus  gathered  was  so 
indexed  as  to  be  available  at  a  moment's  notice.  One 
hundred  and  fifty  experts  were  at  work  quietly  digging  on 
the  task  from  November,  1917,  all  unknown  to  the  world. 
Tons  of  maps  and  documents  were  to  tell  the  truth  about 
every  hamlet  and  hillside  from  Havre  to  Teheran.  Be- 
sides, the  American  delegation  at  the  Peace  Conference  had 
a  retinue  of  three  hundred  specialists  and  assistants.  They 
made  an  impressive  array  of  college  professors,  technical 
experts,  ethnological  experts  and  the  like.  Their  particular 
subjects  related  especially  to  European  matters. 

But  the  Senate  of  the  United  States,  whose  duty  under 
the  Constitution  requires  it  to  pass  upon  the  treaty,  was 
not  represented.  In  all  former  peace  conferences  in  which 
the  United  States  was  a  party,  the  most  eminent  men  of 
the  nation  were  chosen  for  the  performance  of  that  solemn 
duty,  if  we  omit  reference  to  the  treaty  concluding  the 
Mexican  war.  They  represented  both  political  parties, 
were  regularly  confirmed  and  commissioned  by  Congress  or 
by  the  Senate,  and  in  each  instance  care  was  taken  that  each 
branch  of  the  treaty-making  power  was  represented.  In  the 
case  of  the  Spanish  treaty,  President  McKinley  took  par- 
ticular care  to  give  representation  not  only  to  both  political 
parties,  but  selected  the  ablest  man  he  could  find  in  the 
United  States  Senate  of  the  opposite  party  for  that  re- 
sponsible trust,  George  Grey,  an  international  lawyer  of 
wide  reputation.  In  the  making  of  that  treaty  two  mem- 
bers, a  cabinet  secretary  and  an  ambassador,  represented  the 
the  executive  branch  of  the  government,  while  the  three 
others  were  from  the  Senate,  that  body  being  a  part  of  the 
treaty-making  power.  President  Wilson,  characteristic  of 
the  man,  ignored  not  only  precedent,  but  he  appointed  men 


The     World's  Peace  Congress  265 

with  apparently  no  fitness  for  the  great  task  before  them. 
Aside  from  Secretary  Lansing,  it  is  doubtful  whether  in  all 
the  country's  history  so  weak  a  body  of  commissioners  was 
ever  appointed  for  even  a  much  smaller  task.  None,  even 
of  the  President's  most  ardent  partisans,  undertook  to 
defend  him  in  thus  ignoring  the  nation's  entire  history. 

Immediately  these  details  were  attended  to,  friendly 
warnings  from  the  Allied  nations  to  one  another  began, 
probably  prompted  by  President  Wilson's  single-handed 
undertaking  in  the  peace  proposals.  Later  they  ran  danger- 
ously close  to  the  hostile,  beginning  with  the  first  prelimi- 
nary meeting.  This  first  meeting  of  delegates  preliminary 
to  the  Peace  Conference  took  place  in  London  on  Decem- 
ber 3,  1918.  All  of  the  Allied  principal  nations  were  repre- 
sented by  their  premiers  and  foremost  statesmen.  The 
United  States  was  not  represented. 

The  State  Department  at  Washington  promptly  in- 
formed the  Associated  Press  "that  any  action  looking  to  a 
demand  upon  Holland  for  the  extradition  of  William  Ho- 
henzollern  will  be  held  in  abeyance  until  President  Wilson 
reaches  Europe."  Mr.  Churchhill's  declaration  immedi- 
ately followed  the  conference,  to  the  effect  that  "we  do  not 
intend,  no  matter  what  arguments  and  appeals  are  ad- 
dressed to  us,  to  lend  ourselves  in  any  way  to  any  fettering 
restrictions  that  will  prevent  the  British  Navy  maintaining 
her  well-tried  and  well-deserved  supremacy."  This  state- 
ment the  New  York  World  correspondent  regarded  as  be- 
ing "addressed  especially  to  Woodrow  Wilson."  The  pur- 
pose of  it  was  probably  to  save  Mr.  Wilson  for  the  humilia- 
tion of  asking  for  something  which  under  no  circumstance 
would  be  granted. 

A  singular  preparation  for  his  diplomatic  mission  was 
his  repeated  assertion  that  he  alone  held  the  keys  to  a 
peace  of  justice,  and  that  the  Allied  statesmen  were  in- 
triguing for  a  peace  of  loot.  Before  he  sailed,  and  while  he 
was  on  the  ocean,  and  after  landing  in  Europe,  he  let  no 


266    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

occasion  pass  to  declaim  against  the  alleged  imperialism 
of  the  democratic  governments  of  Europe  and  their  hos- 
tility to  uthe  common  thought"  and  the  aspirations  of  the 
"plain  people."  It  was  this  attitude  of  the  President  of  the 
Republic  that  caused,  soon  after  it  was  announced  that  Mr. 
Wilson  was  to  attend  the  Conference,  Lord  Northcliffe  to  re- 
joice "that  Mr.  Wilson  is  to  be  brought  personally  into  con- 
tact with  men  who  can  convince  him  that  the  spirit  which  he 
denominates  unselfishness  necessarily  resolves  itself  into 
'give  and  take.' '  And  Mr.  Balfour  highly  regarded  a 
League  of  Nations  because  the  United  States  would  have  to 
"bear  a  large  share  in  the  work  it  involves."  It  thus  became 
apparent  that  the  prospective  negotiations  between  Presi- 
dent Wilson  and  the  Allied  Governments  were  coming  so 
early  in  the  proceedings  to  be  regarded  by  the  British  as 
trading  propositions. 

Before  the  President  sailed,  a  Washington  dispatch  de- 
clared that  this  nation's  naval  program  "will  be  a  factor 
in  the  discussion  concerning  the  freedom  of  the  seas";  and 
"the  size  of  the  American  navy,  actually  and  potentially, 
is  to  be  used  in  support  of  the  argument  the  President  is 
to  make."  And  from  the  President's  vessel  carrying  him 
to  the  Peace  Congress  was  wirelessed  the  message  to  the 
whole  world :  "Should  the  present  world  policy  of  competi- 
tive armaments  continue,  the  United  States  could  do  more 
than  hold  its  own."  * 

The  substance  of  the  President's  demand  was  that 
Great  Britain  should  surrender  her  position  as  the  leading 
naval  power  of  the  world,  while  it  was  a  recognized  fact 
that  it  was  Great  Britain's  naval  power  that  saved  civiliza- 
tion against  the  onslaughts  of  Prussian  autocracy. 

Whether  the  disposition  of  the  American  people  would 
authorize  such  an  unknown  factor  appears  not  to  have  been 

1 A  happy  contrast  was  President  Harding's  call  for  a  conference  of 
the  leading  nations  to  be  held  in  Washington,  November  12,  1921,  and 
the  prodigious  program  outlined  by  Secretary  Hughes,  head  of  the  American 
delegation,  on  that  date,  surprising  the  world,  on  disarmament. 


The     World's  Peace  Congress  267 

taken  into  consideration.  The  British  view  appeared  to  be 
that  the  United  States  had  the  undoubted  right  to  build 
as  many  dreadnaughts  as  her  people  were  willing  to  pay  for; 
and  that  such  an  enterprise  would  increase,  rather  than 
diminish,  the  safety  of  the  world.  Both  the  English  and  the 
American  people  smiled  at  the  President's  open  threat. 

While  the  President  was  on  his  way  to  Europe,  it  was 
casually  announced  by  the  secretary  of  the  preliminary  con- 
ference that  it  had  been  there  decided  that  Premier  Clemen- 
ceau  should  preside  at  the  sessions  of  the  Peace  Congress 
at  Paris. 

On  January  18,  1919,  the  Peace  Conference  of  the 
world  held  its  first  formal  and  plenipotentiary  session — an 
occasion  to  become  memorable  in  humanity's  interest. 
Apart  from  the  merits  of  the  matter,  the  President's  diplo- 
macy up  to  this  point  was  singularly  unfortunate.  For 
while  making  one  purpose  of  his  journey  the  proposal  to 
deprive  the  Allies  of  the  chief  weapon  which  enabled  them 
to  destroy  the  German  menace,  persistent  secrecy  regarding 
his  purposes  raised  doubts  and  fears,  while  employing  threat- 
ening intimations  hardened  suspicion  into  bitter  judgment. 

Moreover,  before  going  to  the  Peace  Congress,  he  made 
a  tour  of  Italy,  France  and  England,  addressing  vast 
throngs,  appealing  to  the  masses  as  against  their  rulers. 
For  this  he  was  temporarily  paid  homage  by  the  masses 
such  as  had  never  been  accorded  any  human  being.  For 
this  he  was  severely  criticized,  not  only  in  his  own  country, 
but  throughout  the  democratic  nations  of  Europe.  Later, 
he  was  anathematized  by  the  very  masses  who  had  rendered 
the  greatest  applause,  and  upon  the  question  of  nationality. 

But  at  length  the  Peace  Conference  had  begun  and  that 
was  the  paramount  fact  in  the  world  at  that  day.  There 
had  been  unwarranted  and  mischievous  delay.  There  had 
been  what  was  described  as  jockeying  for  position. 

Five  important  resolutions  were  adopted  by  the  Peace 
Congress  at  its  second  open  session.  Two  that  were  perti- 


268     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

nent  and  practical  were  the  appointment  of  a  commission  to 
determine  the  responsibility  of  the  authors  of  the  war,  and 
the  punishment  to  be  imposed  for  the  crimes  which  were 
committed.  Another  was  the  appointment  of  a  commission 
on  reparation. 

In  his  touring  of  Europe,  even  while  urging  his  interest 
in  "men  everywhere, "  the  President  was  sowing  the  seeds 
for  dissensions  in  the  Peace  Congress.  Without  making  his 
own  purpose  and  intent  plain  to  the  understanding,  he  com- 
mitted himself  and  assumed  to  commit  the  nation  to  a 
vague  scheme  of  a  league  comprising  all  of  the  nations  of 
the  world  to  be  formed  concurrently  with  the  making  of 
peace  and  not  after  it.  It  was  said  even  then  that  there 
was  no  probability  that  so  amazing  a  proposal  would  meet 
the  approval  of  tfie  United  States  Senate.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  and  as  was  very  fitting,  the  challenge  came  first  from 
that  nation  which  had  chiefly  borne  the  brunt  of  the  war 
and  which  by  long  and  bitter  experience  had  learned  the 
character  of  the  Prussian  autocracy.  Georges  Clemenceau, 
before  the  French  Chamber  of  Deputies,  s-aid: 

There  is  an  old  system  which  appears  condemned  today,  and  to 
which  I  do  not  fear  to  say  that  I  remain  faithful  at  this  moment. 
Countries  have  organized  the  defense  of  their  frontiers  with  the  neces- 
sary elements  and  the  balance  of  power.  This  system  appears  to  be 
condemned  by  some  very  high  authorities.  Yet  if  such  a  balance  had 
preceded  the  war,  if  England,  the  United  States,  Italy,  and  France 
had  agreed  that  whoever  attacked  one  of  them  attacked  the  whole, 
the  world  war  would  not  have  occurred.  There  is  in  this  system  of 
alliances,  which  I  do  not  renounce,  I  say  it  most  distinctly,  my  guid- 
ing thought  at  the  Conference,  if  your  body  permits  me  to  go  there. 

He  stated  to  them  that  if  they  desired  a  change  of  pilots 
that  was  the  time  to  change.  "Are  you  with  me  or  against 
me  ?  Speak  now  or  forever  hold  your  peace. "  The  cham- 
ber spoke  with  a  voice  of  nearly  three  to  one  in  approval 
of  the  policy. 


The     World's  Peace  Congress  269 

President  Wilson  was  prompt  with  retort.  Speaking 
the  very  next  day  at  Manchester,  England,  undoubtedly  with 
the  French  Prime  Minister's  words  in  mind,  he  said: 

If  the  future  had  nothing  for  us  but  a  new  attempt  to  keep  the 
world  at  a  right  poise  by  a  balance  of  power,  the  United  States  would 
take  no  interest,  because  she  will  join  no  combination  which  is  not  a 
combination  of  all  of  us. 

Thus  the  issue  was  joined.  Clemenceau  had  referred 
his  policy  to  the  popular  chamber  of  the  French  Congress 
for  its  judgment  and  received  approval  by  a  tremendous  ma- 
jority. President  Wilson  never  even  ventured  to  submit 
his  scheme  to  either  house  of  Congress;  but  when  he  asked 
the  nation  to  approve  his  undefined  course,  he  was  turned 
down  by  a  majority  of  more  than  a  million  votes. 

While  the  masses  in  Europe  did  not  understand  the  Wil- 
sonian  world-confederacy,  they  did  fully  appreciate  the 
blessings  he  seemed  to  bring  of  release  from  the  burden 
of  conscription,  and  thus  the  poor  took  the  gospel  home. 
As  stated  by  a  leading  French  paper,  the  Petit  Parisien: 

Our  sons  are  no  longer  to  be  taken  off  to  barracks  and  our  daugh- 
ters shall  not  henceforth  weep  over  slain  sweethearts.  Parents  will 
not  live  in  daily  terror  of  impending  military  crisis.  Taxes  will  not 
crush.  These  things  are  in  the  thoughts  of  the  masses  as  they  hail 
Wilson  in  great  cities  and  put  his  portrait  above  the  fireplace. 

No  peace  congress  had  ever  faced  so  many  intricate 
problems,  problems  on  whose  wise  and  equitable  solution 
the  whole  future  of  the  world  depended — making  perma- 
nent peace,  creation  of  a  League  of  Nations,  reconciling  con- 
flicting boundary  claims  of  many  nations,  setting  -up  new 
states  within  the  truncated  areas  of  the  vanquished  powers, 
the  insuring  of  their  liberty  and  unimpaired  integrity,  the 
assigning  of  mandates  over  millions  of  humanity  in  Asia  and 
Africa,  the  creating  of  legislative  machinery  to  improve 
conditions  of  labor  in  all  civilized  nations  of  the  world. 

And  in  the  midst  of  it  all,  never  did  it  seem  that  this  na~ 


270    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

tion  had  so  great  need  of  the  stimulating  voice  and  steadying 
counsel  of  the  leader  who  left,  in  Theodore  Roosevelt,  in 
January,  1919.  Never  were  the  sanity,  the  far-seeing  states- 
manship; the  splendid  Americanism  and  sturdy  common 
sense  of  Theodore  Roosevelt  more  to  be  desired  than  in 
the  hour  when  he  was  called  hence,  when  the  American 
people  were  facing  the  most  critical  decision  in  their  history, 
and  when  their  judgment  was  bewildered  by  conflicting 
appeals  inviting  partisanship,  patriotism,  idealism  and  in- 
ternationalism. 

The  supreme  need  of  the  world  was  the  earliest  pos- 
sible settlement  of  the  issues  of  war.  That  Mr.  Wilson 
prevented.  His  program,  such  as  it  was,  demanded  as  the 
first  requisite  the  support  of  informed  American  public  opin- 
ion; that  he  spurned.  The  next  requirement  was  that  the 
people  of  Europe  should  have  confidence  in  the  democratic 
governments  forming  the  foundation  of  the  League;  that 
he  very  largely  destroyed.  It  was  above  all  things  desirable 
that  there  should  be  unity  of  sentiment  among  the  Allies, 
including  the  United  States;  that  he  undermined.  And  it 
was  absolutely  necessary  for  success  that  he  should  have 
a  concrete  program  behind  his  idealistic  generalizations; 
that  he  never  possessed. 

As  a  result  of  the  delays  upon  which  the  President  in- 
sisted, when  he  found  the  treaty  draft  complete  upon  his 
return  to  Europe  from  America  in  mid-March,  1919, 
France,  the  frontier  of  civilization,  was  suffering  fiscal  pros- 
tration and  was  restrained  from  the  supreme  work  of  res- 
toration; Great  Britain  was  suffering  an  economic  and  in- 
dustrial crisis  of  indescribable  gravity;  Germany  was  in 
throes  of  civil  war  and  danger  of  general  anarchy;  and 
Bolshevism  had  taken  charge  in  Hungary,  and  was  inso- 
lently challenging  the  western  governments.  It  was  truth- 
fully charged  that  uhe  kept  us  out  of  peace. " 

Berlin  and  Vienna  greatly  rejoiced  over  the  schism  in 


The  World's  Peace  Congress  271 

the  Peace  Congress.  It  was  regarded  as  cause  for  regret 
and  shame  that  an  American  President  should  have  been 
foremost  in  providing  them  with  this  reason  for  exultation. 

The  Inner  Council  of  the  Peace  Congress — President 
Wilson  and  Premiers  Lloyd  George,  Clemenceau,  and  Or- 
lando— were  meeting  daily  in  a  small  room,  after  the  Presi- 
dent's return  to  Europe,  from  which  even  stenographers 
were  excluded,  in  an  endeavor  to  speed  up  the  peace  terms 
to  avert  the  peril  which  the  delay  had  invited. 

The  question  of  peace-making  is  a  question  between  the 
victorious  and  the  vanquished  belligerents  and  between  them 
alone,  and  should  have  been  accepted  and  acted  upon  as 
such.  But  about  every  other  day  in  the  Peace  Congress 
a  task  that  threw  its  shadow  over  the  deliberations,  and  for 
the  moment  made  everything  else  less  important,  was  the 
task  of  coping  with  Bolshevism.  So  severe  had  become 
the  charges  of  unnecessary  delay,  as  due  to  the  President's 
insistence  upon  the  League  of  Nations  scheme  being  inter- 
woven with  the  Peace  Treaty,  that  Premier  Lloyd  George 
came  to  his  rescue  with  the  statement  as  to  how  much  more 
rapidly  the  Peace  Congress  was  moving  than  did  the  Vienna 
Conference  of  over  a  hundred  years  previous.  President 
Wilson  feeling  the  blows  that  were  aimed  at  him,  gave 
out  a  statement,  after  his  return  to  Paris  in  March,  that 
he  believed  the  time  was  opportune  for  a  statement  which 
would  allay  apprehension  over  the  delay,  and  show  that  the 
revision  of  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  had  pro- 
ceeded at  night  sessions  without  any  interruption  to  the  dis- 
position of  the  other  main  questions.  As  early  as  February, 
Harvey's  Weekly  put  it  in  this  fashion: 

The  gravest  menace  of  the  world  today  is  in  the  futile  fiddling 
of  the  Peace  Congress.  Red  herrings  are  being  dragged  across  the 
trail  of  justice,  the  essentials  of  peace-making  are  being  delayed,  the 
agonizingly  urgent  work  of  reconstruction  in  France  and  other  coun- 
tries is  being  blocked,  discontent  and  Bolshevism  are  being  fostered 


272     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

even  in  our  own  land,  and  the  Blond  Beast  beyond  the  Rhine  is  being 
encouraged  to  lick  his  bloody  chops  and  snarl  at  the  world  with  re- 
newed threats  of  war.2 

The  perils  due  to  the  delaying  of  peace  for  the  sake 
of  a  headstrong  policy  became  more  manifest  and  more  men- 
acing, with  a  result  that  the  President's  arbitrary  mission 
diminished  in  importance.  The  vital  parts  of  the  peace  to 
be  imposed  upon  Germany  were  framed  in  his  absence,  and 
he  returned  to  the  Conference  to  find  that  the  settlement 
was  carried  further  toward  completion  than  during  all  the 
weeks  of  his  personal  activity. 

On  March  12,  1919,  Secretary  Lansing  stated: 

Two  words  tell  the  story — food  and  peace.  If  the  present  state 
of  chaos  continues  and  political  power  continues  to  grow  weaker, 
there  will  be  no  responsible  German  government  with  which  to  make 
peace;  there  will  be  no  government  strong  enough  to  carry  out  the 
conditions  of  the  treaty.  There  is  no  time  to  be  lost  if  we  are  to 
save  the  world  from  the  despotism  of  anarchy,  even  as  we  saved  it 
from  the  despotism  of  autocracy.  We  ought  to  make,  we  must  make, 
peace  without  delay. 

On  the  next  day  Frank  A.  Vanderlip,  described  as  "un- 
emotional a  banker  as  ever  reduced  human  problems  to  fig- 
ures," gave  this  startling  picture  and  warning: 

I  doubt  if  America  has  begun  to  comprehend  the  appalling  situa- 
tion which  confronts  Europe  and  the  wreck  which  the  whole  fabric 
of  civilization  may  be  facing.  America  was  once  told  there  should 
be  peace  without  victory.  What  we  have  is  victory  without  peace. 
Production  has  ceased,  and  unless  production  can  be  speedily  resumed 
chaos  may  ensue.  The  great  productive  machine  of  Europe  must  be 
started,  or  the  world  will  be  confronted  with  disaster  such  as  no 
experience  has  recorded. 

The  Germans  made  a  great  outcry  against  the  terms 
of  the  Treaty  of  Peace  as  presented  to  them  for  their  sig- 
nature. It  would  have  been  well  for  them  to  compare  the 

'February   15,    1919. 


The     World's  Peace  Congress  273 

document  thus  presented  to  them  with  that  which  they  pre- 
pared at  Brest-Litovsk  which  deprived  Russia  of  a  region 
cohering  one-third  of  her  railway  mileage,  three-fourths 
of  her  iron,  nine-tenths  of  her  coal,  and  nearly  her  entire 
industrial  territory,  together  with  a  population  of  fifty- 
six  millions,  and  required  an  enormous  indemnity  besides. 
That  treaty  was  enthusiastically  endorsed  by  the  nation 
which  came  to  Paris  crying  out  against  far  less  drastic 
terms. 

Said  Herr  Ebert,  speaking  for  the  Germans,  to  the 
Associated  Press  correspondent:  "If  the  American  de- 
mocracy actually  accepts  the  present  terms  of  peace  as  its 
own,  it  becomes  an  accomplice  and  abettor  of  political  black- 
mailers; it  surrenders  the  traditional  American  principle  of 
fair  play  and  sportsmanship,"  which  leads  a  keen  New  York 
weekly  to  observe : 

This  perjured  violator  of  the  most  solemn  pledges;  this  ravisher 
of  girls  and  kindergarten  children;  this  wholesale  murderer  of  aged 
men,  of  priests  at  the  altar  and  of  women  with  babies  in  their  arms; 
this  creature  who  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet  drove  off  tens  of  thou- 
sands of  men  to  slavery  and  of  women  to  enforced  debasement;  this 
common  thief  and  incendiary ;  this  dynamiter  of  hospitals  wherein  lay 
the  sick,  the  maimed  and  the  dying;  this  skulking  assassin  of  the  high 
seas;  this  international  brigand  who  in  cold  blood  and  of  calculated 
purpose  made  a  shambles  of  the  world  to  gratify  his  beastly  greed  for 
plunder  and  power — this  unspeakable  Caliban  of  nations,  now  ren- 
dered impotent,  has  the  unspeakable  effrontery  to  whine  about  Ameri- 
can "fair  play"  and  American  sportsmanship.3 

The  French,  to  whom  the  treaty  as  drawn  represented 
the  minimum  of  justice,  stood  for  absolute  rejection  of  the 
enemy  counter-proposal;  but  President  Wilson  favored 
modification  of  the  terms.  The  long  delay  in  making  peace 
enabled  the  forces  of  pacifism  and  internationalism  to  organ- 
ize in  all  the  Allied  countries.  This  gave  ground  for  the 
declaration  that  President  Wilson  was  standing  for  terms, 

8  Harvey's  Weekly,  May  24,  1919. 


274    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

not  that  would  satisfy  justice  but  that  would  satisfy  Ger- 
many. 

The  President's  arbitrary  methods,  with  the  acute  con- 
troversies and  long  delays  occasioned  thereby,  gave  the 
Germans  renewed  hope ;  and  as  they  saw  the  Allies  divided, 
their  confidence  grew  to  arrogance.  They  planned  to  chal- 
lenge every  item  in  the  treaty  that  did  not  satisfy  their  own 
interpretation  of  President  Wilson's  various  statements; 
to  widen  every  breach  that  had  been  created  among  their 
opponents;  to  incite,  by  appeals  and  propaganda,  the  paci- 
fist, Bolshevist,  and  radical  Socialist  element  which  existed 
in  all  countries. 

When  there  was  severe  criticism  of  the  Peace  Congress, 
and  particularly  of  President  Wilson,  in  the  spring  of  1919, 
for  his  delays  in  getting  the  Peace  Treaty  completed,  the 
propaganda  put  out  was  that  the  League  of  Nations  was 
not  causing  the  delay.  It  was  put  out  that  other  things 
were  causing  this  delay.  At  the  outset,  however,  before 
the  Congress  opened,  President  Wilson  had  stated  that 
there  should  be  no  peace  until  the  League  of  Nations  could 
simultaneously  be  formed.  The  President  gave  almost  his 
entire  attention  to  the  matter  of  the  League,  yet  he  was 
unable  to  get  the  Constitution  in  shape  to  present  to  the 
Peace  Congress  until  just  a  few  hours  before  he  started 
on  his  return  trip  to  America.  And  nearly,  if  not  quite, 
all  of  the  other  issues  which  were  alleged  to  be  responsible 
for  the  delay  never  arose  until  after  the  League  Constitu- 
tion had  been  pushed  to  the  fore;  and  some  of  them  could 
never  have  arisen  at  all  if  the  Peace  Treaty  had  been  made 
promptly;  they  arose  because  of  the  delay.  And  to  those 
who  were  not  bound  by  the  President's  view,  it  became  clear 
that  if  it  had  not  been  for  his  insistence  upon  putting  the 
League  of  Nations  before  everything  else,  the  Treaty  of 
Peace  would  have  been  made,  signed,  and  ratified  months 
before  it  was  even  presented  to  the  United  States  Senate, 
and  the  nations  would  have  been  far  on  the  way  in  their 


The     World's  Peace  Congress  275 

work  of  restoration — a  work  of  the  very  greatest  civic,  so- 
cial and  economic  importance.  Moreover,  these  other  issues 
which  were  falsely  alleged  to  be  the  causes  of  the  delay 
would  have  been  disposed  of  long  previously,  if  indeed  they 
had  arisen  at  all. 

President  Wilson's  famous  demand  for  freedom  of  the 
seas  was  cited  as  sufficient  reason  to  justify  his  trip  to 
Europe.  Yet  when  his  attention  was  called  to  the  fact,  in 
the  notable  White  House  Conference  after  his  return  from 
Europe,  that  under  the  League  of  Nations  there  would  be 
no  neutrals,  and  therefore  no  question  as  to  freedom  of 
the  seas,  he  admitted  that  his  insistence  upon  the  point 
was  something  of  a  joke  upon  himself.  By  and  by  all  the 
Fourteen  Points,  which  the  President  had  declared  as  the 
only  possible  basis  of  peace,  had  gone  into  the  discard 
except  the  last — which  was  the  League  of  Nations.  He  was 
willing  to  yield  everything  to  save  this  one. 

When  the  Senate  found  itself  wholly  ignored  by  the 
President  in  making  up  his  peace  commission,  it  knew  it 
would  be  called  upon  to  consider  in  detail  the  terms  of 
the  Treaty.  When  senators  found  themselves  shut  out, 
they  took  the  only  course  that  was  open  by  placing  them- 
selves on  record.  Speeches  were  made  on  the  floor  of  the 
Senate  attacking  the  engagements  to  which  the  President 
was  committing  the  country  in  the  League  Covenant.  It 
served  notice  on  the  Peace  Congress  that  the  Senate,  under 
the  Constitution,  was  a  part  of  the  treaty-making  power 
of  this  nation. 

And  all  the  world  was  crying  out  for  peace,  for  a  prompt 
settlement  that  would  close  at  the  earliest  date  the  dread- 
ful chapter  of  war  and  permit  the  exhausted,  famine- 
haunted  nations  to  resume  the  productive,  restorative  proc- 
esses of  peace.  But  this  idea  President  Wilson  spurned. 
His  decree  was  that  the  rebuilding  of  Europe  should  be 
postponed  until  the  future  of  the  whole  world  had  been 
arranged.  During  all  his  activities  he  contributed  nothing 


276    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

to  the  actual  making  of  peace;  on  the  contrary  he  ob- 
structed it  by  his  demand  that  it  should  be  deferred  until 
the  League-of-Nations  question  had  been  settled. 

A  desperate  effort  was  being  made  by  the  end  of  March, 
1919,  to  spread  the  belief  that  the  delay  in  dealing  with 
Germany  was  due  to  British  indecision,  to  Italian  imperial- 
ism, to  French  vindictiveness.  Large  propaganda  was  put 
out  from  the  American  press  bureau  to  support  this  view. 
It  was  stated  repeatedly  by  writers  who  were  friendly  to  the 
President  and  who  were  ready  at  all  points  to  give  the  Presi- 
dent a  clean  bill.  It  was  pressed  by  Mr.  Ray  Stannard 
Baker.4  But  the  record  was  too  clear  for  this  propaganda 
to  prevail  at  the  time  it  was  issued. 

In  his  speeches  in  Europe  President  Wilson  took  the 
view  that  the  most  important  thing  was  not  peace  but  the 
permanence  of  peace,  and  he  spoke  with  something  of  im- 
patience, almost  with  scorn,  about  those  who  were  intent 
on  the  details  of  the  peace  that  was  to  be  made  during  the 
ensuing  months  at  Paris.  As  he  stated  in  his  public  ad- 
dresses, prior  to  sitting  in  the  Conference,  it  was  not  merely 
with  America,  not  merely  with  one  nation,  not  even  a  group 
of  nations,  but  with  humanity  as  a  whole  that  he  was  con- 
cerned. Yet  there  is  always  the  problem  of  determining 
the  precise  boundary  where  a  statesman's  concern  for  hu- 
manity and  the  world  at  large  should  end,  and  his  concern 
for  his  own  people  and  his  own  country  should  begin. 

The  President's  attitude  toward  France  drove  her  into 
virtual  isolation,  since  his  exclusive  concern  was  to  create 
a  League  of  Nations.  Great  Britain's  dominant  aim  was 
to  form  some  sort  of  alliance  with  the  United  States.  Thus 
the  American  and  British  delegation  worked  in  harmony 
to  minimize  the  claims  of  France  and  to  defer  their  satis- 
faction. For  weeks  all  the  energies  of  the  conference  were 
devoted  to  the  League  project  and  discussions  of  remote 

4  "What  Wilson  Did  at  Paris,"  copyright,  1919,  by  Doubleday  Page  &  Co., 
PP-   56,  57,   58   and  65. 


The     World's  Peace  Congress  277 

territorial  issues,  while  the  supreme  problem  of  France's 
restoration  and  Germany's  penalties  were  neglected. 

On  March  30,  1919,  it  was  announced  from  Paris  that 
the  commission  on  responsibility  for  the  war  had  decided, — 

First,  solemnly  to  condemn  the  violation  of  neutrality 
and  all  the  crimes  committed  by  the  Central  Powers. 

Second,  to  urge  the  appointment  of  an  international 
tribunal  to  charge  all  those  responsible,  including  the  for- 
mer German  Emperor. 

But  Secretary  Lansing  submitted  a  separate  memoran- 
dum in  which  Wilhelm's  culpability  was  to  be  considered 
from  a  legal  point  of  view.  While  the  overwhelming  ma- 
jority of  the  commission  contended  that  the  Kaiser  was 
responsible  largely  for  the  acts  and  violation  of  the  rules 
of  war  committed  by  land  and  naval  forces,  Mr.  Lansing 
took  the  ground  that  what  was  done  in  his  name  was  sus- 
tained by  his  own  people,  and  that  for  that  reason  he  could 
not  be  held  legally  culpable. 

The  British  Premier  Lloyd  George  was  merely  echoing 
the  demands  of  his  nation  when  he  declared: 

The  Kaiser  must  be  prosecuted.  The  war  was  a  crime  in  the  way 
it  was  planned;  in  the  wantonness  with  which  it  was  provoked;  in 
the  manner  in  which  it  was  prosecuted.  The  men  responsible  must  not 
be  let  off  because  their  heads  were  crowned  when  they  perpetrated  the 
deeds.  The  government  will  use  its  whole  influence  at  the  Peace  Con- 
ference to  see  that  justice  is  executed. 

Misleading  propaganda  was  put  out  upon  almost  every 
conceivable  topic  from  the  world's  Peace  Conference  of 
Paris.  This  was  no  less  true  in  regard  to  the  damages  suf- 
fered by  the  various  nations  than  in  other  matters.  It  was 
made  to  appear  that  the  United  States  stood  third  in  suf- 
fering the  costs  of  the  war.  In  actual  money  that  was  true, 
as  a  real  fact  it  was  false.  But  it  was  put  out  for  the  pur- 
pose of  showing  the  commanding  position  that  the  United 
States  should  take  in  the  great  Conference.  But  when  it 


278     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

came  to  the  relative  wealth  of  the  various  nations,  it  was 
found  that  the  war  had  cost  Serbia  more  than  53  per  cent 
of  her  total  wealth,  Great  Britain  more  than  50  per  cent, 
Italy  about  50  per  cent,  France  45  per  cent,  Russia  30  per 
cent,  and  the  United  States  less  than  10  per  cent, — the 
United  States  standing,  instead  of  third,  at  the  very  bot- 
tom of  the  list,  getting  off  by  far  the  most-  cheaply  of  any. 
And  if  there  was  to  be  anything  of  justice  in  the  peace 
settlement,  the  nations  which  were  so  greatly  impoverished 
by  Germany's  ruthless  attack  should  have  been  reimbursed 
to  the  limit,  and  those  nations  should  have  had  most  to  say 
in  the  settlement  of  damages. 

Germany  was  required  to  accept  responsibility  for  all 
the  losses  and  damages  inflicted  upon  her  adversaries  by  the 
war,  although  not  to  guarantee  full  payment.  The  inter- 
Allied  Reparation  Commission,  appointed  by  the  Peace  Con- 
gress in  its  second  open  session,  was  to  determine  the 
total  obligation  to  be  met  by  Germany;  this  it  was  to  do 
within  two  years.  Then  it  would  present  a  schedule  of  pay- 
ments to  be  made  covering  30  years,  reparation  payments 
to  be  a  prior  charge  upon  her  revenues.  This  commission 
was  to  consist  of  delegates  representing  the  United  States, 
Great  Britain,  France,  Italy,  Belgium,  Japan,  and  Serbia. 
While  those  of  America,  Great  Britain,  France  and  Italy 
were  participants  in  all  proceedings  the  members  for  Japan 
and  Serbia  would'vote  only  on  questions  affecting  those  coun- 
tries; and  the  Belgian  delegates  would  take  part  except  when 
Japanese  or  Serbian  issues  were  under  consideration. 

In  response  to  President  Wilson's  request  that  the  Sen- 
ate approve  provisional  appointment  of  an  American  repre- 
sentative on  the  reparations  commission  to  be  created  under 
the  Peace  Treaty,  the  foreign  relations  committee  of  the 
Senate  adopted  a  resolution  declaring  that  until  the  Treaty 
was  ratified,  "no  power  exists"  to  carry  out  its  provisions, 
an  objection  well  taken,  in  view  of  subsequent  developments. 

The  British  view  was  that  all  damages  must  be  paid  by 


The     World's  Peace  Congress  279 

the  aggressor,  meaning  that  Germany  should  be  compelled 
to  pay  the  whole  cost  of  the  war,  including  the  expense 
to  the  Allies  of  raising,  equiping,  transporting  and  main- 
taining their  armies,  as  well  as  reparation  for  wanton  dam- 
age. The  French  view  was  that  reparation  should  include 
all  that  England  would  demand,  requiring  Germany  first 
to  settle  bills  for  destruction  in  violation  of  international 
law,  and  pay  the  other  bills  later  as  she  could.  The  Ameri- 
can position  was  that  reparation  from  Germany  should 
cover  only  such  damages  as  could  be  included  in  wanton 
destruction  and  violation  of  the  laws  of  war  and  of  nations. 
The  conference  committee  on  reparation  estimated 
$120,000,000,000  as  the  amount  which  the  enemy  countries 
ought  to  pay  the  Allied  nations.  For  many  days  the  ques- 
tion of  indemnities  continued  to  be  one  of  the  most  trouble- 
some before  the  conference,  the  chief  issue  becoming  not 
what  Germany  should  pay  but  what  she  could  pay.  Both 
Lloyd  George  and  Clemenceau  had  promised  their  constitu- 
ents that  Germany  would  be  made  to  pay  the  full  amount 
of  what  the  war  had  cost  the  Allies.  This  was  estimated 
by  the  British  at  one  hundred  and  twenty  billion  dollars 
and  by  the  French  as  high  as  two  hundred  billions.  The 
financial  experts  of  the  conference,  however,  concluded  that 
the  payment  of  any  such  sum  by  Germany  was  impossible. 
In  May,  1920,  the  amount  was  fixed  at  $30,000,000,000° 

6  In  late  April,  1921,  the  Reparations  Commission  fixed  upon  the  sum 
of  approximately  $33,000,000,000  for  Germany  to  pay,  it  having  until 
May  i,  1921,  to  conclude  its  work.  The  amount  determined  in  January 
was  a  great  reduction  from  the  $67,000,000,000  agreed  upon  in  the  previous 
July.  Yet  in  March,  Germany  submitted  counter  proposals  offering  about 
one-third  of  the  sum  the  Reparations  Commission  had  fixed  upon,  and  sought 
the  intervention  of  the  United  States  in  their  behalf.  But  the  new  Ad- 
ministration had  come  into  power,  and  it  very  promptly  declined  to  act 
upon  the  suggestion.  Thereupon  the  German  ministry  resigned.  The 
amount  finally  agreed  upon  was  of  the  present  sum  of  $21,000,000,000,  which, 
spread  over  the  forty-two  years  allowed  for  payment,  totalled  $56,000,000,000, 
including  interest. 

As  the  fateful  May  i  approached,  both  sides  mobilized  their  military 
forces,  France  having  declared  that  no  more  trifling  would  be  permitted 
on  the  part  of  Germany  in  fulfilling  her  obligations  under  the  Treaty,  by 
the  terms  of  whicb  Germany  accepted  "responsibility  for  causing  all  the 
loss  and  damage'  inflicted  upon  the  Allies,  and  undertook  "compensation 


280    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

— about  what  the  war  had  cost  the  United  States.     None 
of  this,  however,  was  to  be  paid  to  this  country. 

The  treaty  of  peace  contains  an  article  whereby  the 
Powers  "publicly  arraign  William  II.  of  Hohenzollern  for 
a  supreme  offense  ajgainst  international  morality  and  the 
sanctity  of  treaties."  And  "a  special  tribunal  to  try  the 
accused,"  with  five  judges  from  the  United  States,  Great 
Britain,  France,  Italy,  and  Japan,  is  provided.  While  the 
American  commissioners  at  the  Peace  Congress  gave  partial 
assent  to  the  position  of  the  majority  standing  for  criminal 
prosecution  on  the  charge  violating  the  usages  of  war,  led 
by  Mr.  Lansing  they  protested  against  including  violations 
of  "the  laws  of  humanity."  This  position  of  the  American 
commissioners  has  found  support  among  international  law 
experts.  An  Italian  parliamentary  commission  found: 

Crimes  attributed  to  the  former  kaiser  were  not  contemplated  in 
any  penal  code.  Nobody  can  be  called  to  answer,  and  be  punished, 
for  acts  which,  when  committed,  did  not  constitute  a  crime  contem- 
plated by  law.  It  is  impossible  to  ask  Holland  to  extradite  her  guest 
for  political  crimes  not  within  the  purview  of  present  treaties. 

On  January  15,  1920,  the  Supreme  Council  of  the  Allies 
made  a  demand  upon  the  government  of  Holland  for  the 
surrender  of  William  of  Hohenzollern,  former  emperor 
of  Germany,  that  he  might  be  tried  for  the  crimes  of  the 
Great  War. 

To  this  demand,  Holland's  reply,  on  January  23,  was  a 
peremptory  denial.  The  reason  given  was  that  Holland 
could  not  admit,  "in  the  present  case,  any  other  duty  than 
that  imposed  on  it  by  the  laws  of  the  kingdom  and  national 
tradition."  And  that  the  former  emperor  was  entitled 
to  the  benefit  of  the  country's  laws  and  of  the  traditional 
right  of  refuge  for  the  vanquished  in  international  conflicts; 

for  all  damages  done  to  the  civilian  population  and  their  property"  in  Allied 
countries.  England  was  ready  to  back  up  the  stand  of  France,  and  with 
the  United  States  refusing  to  take  a  hand  in  aiding  Germany,  there  was  but 
one  thing  for  Germany  to  do — meet  her  legal  international  obligations  in 
the  matter  of  reparations. 


The     World's  Peace  Congress  281 

and  that  the  sacred  duty  of  justice  and  national  honor  de- 
manded of  the  government  of  Holland  that  it  do  not  with- 
draw from  this  refugee  the  benefit  of  its  laws  and  this 
tradition. 

And  it  stated  that  "It  rejects  with  energy,  all  suspicion 
of  wishing  to  cover  with  its  sovereign  right  and  its  moral 
authority,  violations  of  the  essential  principles  of  the  solid- 
arity of  nations;  but  It  %cannot  recognize  an  international 
duty  to  associate  itself  with  this  act  of  high  international 
policy  of  the  Powers." 

The  original  One  Hundred,  selected  to  give  guidance 
to  the  Peace  Congress,  gave  way  to  the  Council  of  Ten;  and 
that  in  turn,  in  April,  1919  to  the  Council  of  Five,  including 
Japan;  then  Japan  was  dropped  from  the  inner  circle,  and 
Premiers  Clemenceau,  Lloyd  George,  Orlando,  and  Presi- 
dent Wilson,  known  as  the  Council  of  Four,  carried  on  the 
discussions  on  the  most  important  issues  of  the  conference 
among  themselves.  Later  Premier  Clemenceau  and  Lloyd 
George  with  President  Wilson,  constituted  the  inner  circle. 
These  came  to  be  known  as  the  "Big  Five"  the  "Big  Four" 
and  the  "Big  Three." 

Instant  approval  followed  the  suggestion  that  the  Peace 
Congress  hold  open  sessions.  Such  a  proposition  was  in 
harmony  with  the  open-air  diplomacy  urged  by  President 
Wilson.  It  was  a  part  of  the  new  and  accepted  order  of 
things.  It  was,  therefore,  with  a  shock  that  created  a 
shudder  when  the  suggestion  came  to  the  people  that  not 
only  were  the  Americans  to  be  deprived  of  direct  and  im- 
mediate knowledge  of  the  peace  proceedings  but  that  they 
were  to  be  furnished  with  such  garbled  information  as  the 
plan  of  President  Wilson  demanded  and  the  unworthy  in- 
genuity of  Creel  could  supply 

Increasing  secrecy  characterized  the  actions  of  the  inner 
circle  as  it  became  smaller.  Very  few  decisions  were  given 
out  officially,  and  this  led  to  speculations  on  the  part  of 
correspondents,  while  discontent  ^prevailed  generally  at 


282    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

Paris  over  the  news  embargo.  Articles  attacking  the  Con- 
ference for  its  secret  diplomacy;  charges  that  the  proceed- 
ings were  unduly  protracted;  rumors  of  "dissensions," 
"crises,"  "ultimatums"  were  numerous.  It  was  during  this 
period  that  President  Wilson's  action,  ordering  his  ship,  the 
"George  Washington,"  to  France  was  interpreted  as  a 
threat  to  coerce  his  fellow  delegates.  There  were  other 
wild  rumors  afloat  as  to  Clemenceau's  resignation  and  Italy's 
premier  breaking  away  ready  to  make  a  separate  peace  with 
Austria. 

With  Mr.  Wilson's  first  of  his  Fourteen  Points  for 
"open  Covenants  of  peace  openly  arrived  at,"  attacked  in 
the  Conference  it  seemed  to  be  the  first  to  be  definitely  and 
completely  nullified.  He  and  others  sought  to  blame  the 
Allies  but  the  Paris  correspondent  of  the  New  York  Trib- 
une gave  a  different  explanation: 

Judging  from  the  New  York  newspapers  arriving  in  Paris,  the 
impression  prevails  in  America  that  President  Wilson  had  made  a 
fight  for  his  first  point  against  the  Allied  delegates.  This  is  hardly 
correct.  He  has  been  throughout  one  of  the  most  determined  oppo- 
nents of  full  publicity.  He  promptly  agreed  to  closed  sessions  of  the 
conference.  He  has  repeatedly  protested  to  the  other  delegates  be- 
cause of  the  information  they  had  given  to  the  press. 

Before  President  Wilson  left  America  to  enter  the 
Peace  Congress  at  Paris  he  gave  out  the  statement  to  the 
effect  that  there  would  be  no  censorship  of  news  passing 
from  the  Peace  Conference  to  America.  Suddenly  the  news- 
paper men  in  Paris  became  aware  that  every  word  they 
wrote  was  being  read  by  both  French  and  American  censors 
and  that  on  occasions  some  of  it  was  held  up,  deleted,  or  en- 
tirely censored.  One  of  the  ablest  of  American  correspond- 
ents found  it  necessary  to  adopt  the  formula  which  he  had 
used  during  the  war  when  the  only  censorship  was  in  the 
hands  of  the  French — the  device  of  always  putting  into 
the  first  ten  lines  of  his  dispatches  some  allusion  to  "the 


The     World's  Peace  Congress  283 

glorious  French."  Another  correspondent  arranged  an 
understanding  with  his  people  in  America  to  the  effect  that 
his  editors  should  "always  look  for  the  real  story  in  the 
fourth  paragraph." 

Strange  as  such  devices  may  seem  to  Americans  at  home 
they  were  practiced  by  two  of  the  ablest  American  corre- 
spondents in  Paris.  It  was  necessitated  by  the  resolution 
adopted  in  one  of  the  preliminary  conferences  of  the  five 
powers  forbidding  any  delegate  to  the  Peace  Conference  to 
talk  to  newspaper  men.  And  this  secrecy  was  the  precursor 
of  all  kinds  of  garbled  and  manufactured  news  going  out 
from  Paris.  The  irritation  at  the  secrecy  which  enveloped 
Mr.  Wilson's  negotiations  abroad  grew  rapidly  after  his 
arrival  there.  It  broke  out  in  the  Senate  in  something  like 
open  revolt.  The  last  days  of  January  and  the  first  of 
February,  1919,  were  noted  days  for  assault  upon  the 
secrecy  in  both  the  Senate  and  the  House,  in  which  both 
political  parties,  the  majority  then  being  the  Democratic, 
engaged. 

In  the  Senate  the  attack  was  upon  the  president  himself 
so  far  as  he  was  responsible  for  the  utter  darkness  in  which 
he  saw  fit  to  keep  the  country  with  reference  to  engagements 
to  which  he  was  said  to  be  committing  the  nation  in  the 
Paris  negotiations.  Mr.  Wilson's  obsession  for  secretive- 
ness,  for  cloistered  seclusion,  apparently  took  the  form  of 
a  fixed  delusion  that  the  affairs  of  the  American  people  were 
things  with  which  the  American  people  had  no  right  to 
meddle. 

On  April  7,  1919,  the  Chicago  Daily  News  Peace 
Conference  Bureau  at  Paris  gave  out  information  that 
there  was  great  popular  resentment  against  President 
Wilson  because  he  failed  to  tell  the  people  what  he  was 
doing. 

A  prominent  writer  in  one  of  the  leading  American 
weeklies,  after  declaring  that  Paris  had  become  a  whisper- 
ing gallery,  stated : 


284    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

Secrecy  has  given  Germany  the  handle  with  which  to  spread  the 
news  that  serious  breaches  are  being  made  between  the  nations  allied 
in  war.  Secrecy  has  cloaked  the  vacillating  policy  which  first  sug- 
gests that  the  Lenine  government  in  Russia  is  unspeakable,  next  pro- 
poses conferences  with  its  representatives  at  Prinkipo,  considers  in- 
vasion of  Russia,  counts  its  endless  costs  and  rejects  it,  and  finally 
allows  an  American  emissary  to  go  to  Russia,  for  a  talk  with  Lenine 
— and  hopes  that  the  public  won't  find  out  that  he  has  been  sent. 
Secrecy  has  made  the  peace  a  long  way  from  a  people's  peace. 

This  secrecy  on  the  part  of  the  President  had  a  tendency 
to  grow,  causing  him  to  lose  favor  with  the  large  American 
public.  It  manifested  itself  in  a  pronounced  degree  in  his 
dealing  with  the  United  States  Senate  after  his  return  from 
Paris.  On  August  n,  1919,  he  declined  to  comply  with  a 
request  of  the  Senate  foreign  relations  committee  that  he 
furnish  it  with  desired  information  as  to  the  proceedings 
of  the  Peace  Conference. 

Harvey's  Weekly  for  May  3,  1919,  stated,  what  was 
probably  a  well  substantiated  truth  when  it  said:  "We 
must  doubt  if  ever  there  was  a  great  international  confer- 
ence conducted  with  less  frankness  and  openness,  or  with 
more  of  furtive  secrecy  and  subterranean  intrigue,  than 
this  has  been  under  the  President's  domination." 

What  the  American  people  desired  above  all  else  dur- 
ing the  days  of  the  Paris  Peace  Conference  was  the  truth  as 
to  what  was  going  on  in  Paris.  Nothing  damaged  their 
faith  in  the  President  more  than  the  suspicion,  however  ill- 
founded,  that  the  news  that  was  let  out  from  Paris  was  not 
the  truth,  but  only  something  that  was  permitted  to  pass 
the  censors.  This  suspicion  was  increased  by  the  knowledge 
that  the  cables  were  controlled  by  a  violent  partisan,  Post- 
master-General Burleson.  It  should  have  been  made  plain, 
and  carried  out  to  the  letter,  that  the  strangling  of  news  at 
its  source  was  not  to  be  permitted  by  willful  subordinates. 
The  unfortunate  thing  about  it  was  that  the  adopted  method 
fell  in  with  the  President's  purpose. 


The    World's  Peace  Congress  285 

On  April  14,  1919,  President  Wilson  announced  that  in 
view  of  the  nearness  of  the  completion  of  the  whole  work 
of  the  conference,  it  had  been  decided  to  invite  the  Ger- 
man peace  plenipotentiaries  to  come  to  France  on  April  25. 

After  three  months  had  elapsed  from  the  signing  of  the 
armistice  the  overshadowing  urgent  issues  of  the  war  re- 
mained virtually  untouched,  while  the  energies  of  the  con- 
ference had  been  devoted  to  experimental  innovations.  Bel- 
gium and  France  awaited  the  righting  of  wrongs  they  had 
suffered,  the  terms  to  be  imposed  upon  Germany  had  not 
yet  been  framed,  and  the  threatening  Russian  situation  had 
been  put  aside  with  an  evasion,  and  the  whole  economic 
recovery  of  the  world  had  been  retarded  by  continued  un- 
certainty, while  expecting  really  vital  settlements. 

Owing  to  this  acute  situation  there  was  an  outcry  against 
unnecessary  delays  from  every  part  of  the  Allied  regions. 
In  the  United  States  it  took  the  form  largely  of  placing  the 
blame  upon  President  Wilson  for  delaying  the  treaty  by 
insisting  upon  his  drafting  of  the  League  of  Nations.  It 
was  known  that  during  his  temporary  absence  in  the  United 
States  during  the  latter  part  of  February  and  early  March 
great  progress  had  been  made  on  the  treaty.  Delay  fol- 
lowed immediately  after  his  return.  Lloyd  George  assumed 
to  speak  for  the  conference,  knowing  that  President  Wil- 
son's explanation  would  avail  nothing,  and  declared  that 
matters  were  moving  rapidly  as  compared  with  the  great 
Vienna  Conference  during  which  eleven  months  were  con- 
sumed in  drafting  the  treaty.  Lloyd  George,  however, 
omitted  to  state  that  the  world  was  moving  much  more 
slowly  in  the  time  of  the  Vienna  Conference  than  at  the 
time  of  the  Paris  Conference  of  1919.  Then  there  were 
no  telegraphs,  telephones,  automobiles,  railroads  and  the 
numerous  other  contrivances  that  the  world  has  come  to 
regard  as  common  acquisitions  since  that  far-away  time. 

No.  14  in  the  President's  Fourteen  Points  providing  for 
"a  general  association  of  nations,"  represented  the  single 


286    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

definite  accomplishment  of  President  Wilson's  peace  mis- 
sion to  Paris. 

His  demand  of  the  "impartial  adjustment  of  colonial 
claims"  resulted  in  annexation  of  the  territories  in  question 
by  the  powers  which  wanted  them,  under  a  nebulous  sys- 
tem of  mandates.  While  invoking  "self-determination"  to 
keep  Danzig  from  the  Poles,  he  was  suspending  it  to  award 
Shantung  to  Japan  and  repudiating  it  in  forbidding  Italy 
to  possess  Italian  Fiume. 

From  the  time /the  President  departed  on  his  mission 
to  Europe  in  December,  1918,  the  chief  theme  of  wonder- 
ing writers  was  his  commanding  influence  over  the  nations 
and  their  leaders.  Pictured  as  a  benevolent  dictator  whose 
wisdom  and  vision  had  captivated  Europe,  whose  words 
made  peoples  forget  their  traditions  and  desires,  whose 
lifted  finger  could  be  the  signal  for  the  overturning  of 
thrones  and'governments,  he  was  represented  as  the  inspired 
champion  of  justice  and  idealism  against  the  forces  of  Allied 
intrigue,  ambition,  and  rapacity;  but  for  his  intrepid  ideal- 
ism, the  world  was  daily  informed  in  moving  accents,  the 
lofty  purposes  of  the  war  would  be  swept  away  in  the  cur- 
rents of  national  passion  and  greed;  and  unless  a  "Wilson 
peace"  were  made,  militarism  would  triumph  and  all  the 
sacrifices  of  the  struggle  would  have  been  in  vain. 

Yet  when  the  treaty's  terms  were  revealed,  they  were 
found  to  bear  scarcely  a  trace  of  his  handiwork.  The  news- 
papers, which  for  five  months  had  been  celebrating  the 
intervention  of  Mr.  Wilson  as  the  one  safeguard  of  mankind 
against  a  "peace  of  imperialism  and  loot,"  discussed  the 
Treaty  with  solemn  approval  and  without  mention  of  his 
name.  They  found  the  terms  "moderate,"  "even  lenient," 
marked  by  "cold,  passionless  justice,"  leaving  "no  rankling 
wounds."  The  terms  of  the  Treaty,  however,  are  in  vir- 
tually every  detail  those  which  were  laid  down  by  the  Allies 
two  years  previously  in  answer  to  President  Wilson's  de- 
mand for  "peace  without  victory";  they  are  the  identical 


The     World's  Peace  Congress  287 

terms  which  the  Administration  organs  constantly  de- 
nounced as  grossly  imperialistic  and  hostile  to  the  spirit  of 
the  age,  terms  which  the  President  had  to  go  to  Europe 
to  combat,  as  the  spokesman  of  higher  ideals  of  interna- 
tional right  and  human  liberty. 

That  Germany  should  acknowledge  responsibility  for 
her  crimes  and  pay  for  them  to  the  limit  of  her  capacity, — 
this  most  important  feature  in  the  Treaty  was  put  there 
by  the  Allies  against  the  President's  opposition.  He  op- 
posed the  provision  for  trial  of  the  former  kaiser,  and  that 
went  in.  He  wanted  the  German  fleet  sunk,  and  that  failed. 
He  declared  that  the  League-of-Nations  Covenant  should 
not  be  amended,  and  it  was  changed  in  the  particulars  most 
vital  to  this  country.  His  theory  was  that  Germany  should 
be  admitted  at  once  to  the  League  of  Nations,  but  severe 
probation  was  imposed  upon  her.  Perhaps  his  most  empha- 
tic declaration  was  that  America  would  enter  uno  combina- 
tion which  is  not  a  combination  of  all  of  us."  "There  can 
be  no  leagues  or  alliances  within  the  common  family  of  the 
League  of  Nations,"  was  his  decree.  Yet  he  came  back  to 
America  and  asked  the  Senate  to  ratify  an  alliance  with 
Great  Britain  and  France  requiring  the  United  States  to 
give  instant  aid  to  France  if  she  was  attacked  by  Germany. 

In  fact  the  list  of  casualties  among  the  principles  put 
forth  by  Mr.  Wilson  make  a  formidable  list  and  explains 
the  silence  of  those  who  had  predicted  a  peace  dictated  by 
him.  He  did  win  some  substantial  victories:  he  compelled 
the  Peace  Conference  to  offer  virtual  recognition  to  the 
Bolshevist  terrorists,  and  so  he  is  described  by  a  recent 
writer,  a  confidant  of  the  President  and  head  of  the  Press 
Bureau,  as  the  "real  liberal";  he  forced  a  delaying  of  the 
Peace  Treaty  by  adoption  of  the  League  Covenant;  he  pre- 
vented the  naming  of  Brussels  as  capital  of  the  League,  be- 
cause, as  he  explained,  the  Belgian  city  "incarnates  the 
enmity  between  races." 

Mr.  William  C.  Bullitt  testified  before  the  Senate  For- 


288    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

eign  Relations  Committee  that  the  English  statesmen, 
Lloyd  George  and  Balfour,  had  as  their  confidential  repre- 
sentative constantly  with  Colonel  House  and  President  Wil- 
son, Sir  William  Wiseman,  through  whom  was  arranged 
the  plan,  later  made  a  part  of  the  Treaty,  whereby  the 
United  States  agreed  to  recognize  the  British  protectorate 
over  Egypt,  which  "took  only  a  few  minutes."  On  this 
point  The  Nation  asks,  "How  is  it  that  the  British.  Prime 
Minister  and  his  Foreign  Secretary  were  able  to  keep  this 
insidious  janizary,  this  'extra-confidential  Foreign  Office' 
constantly  with  Colonel  House  and  the  President?  .  .  . 
what  an  ending  of  the  Fourteen  Points,  after  setting  the  best 
instincts  of  America  aflame,  after  getting  the  response  they 
had  from  every  democratic  element  the  world  over!  The 
poor,  disowned,  tattered  .  .  .  unmentionable  in  the  polite 
society  of  the  Peace  Conference,  .  .  .  brandished  at  last  in 
the  unscrupulous  hand  of  the  British  Foreign  Office  as  a 
mere  scarecrow  to  frighten  its  maker  into  a  docile  and  un- 
questioning obedience  to  the  will  of  economic  imperialism  I 
Really,  except  for  the  poor  Egyptians,  was  there  ever  an 
incident  as  comical  as  this  in  the  whole  history  of  inter- 
national affairs?"  ° 

It  is  difficult  to  understand  why  Belgium  of  all  nations 
concerned  should  have  had  to  suffer  the  pangs  of  neglect 
and  suspense,  and  should  have  been  compelled  to  threaten 
rejection  of  the  Treaty  in  order  to  get  approximate  justice 
from  her  friends.  Challenged  suddenly  by  an  overwhelm- 
ing power,  forced  to  choose  between  surrender  with  safety 
and  resistance  that  meant  a  living  martyrdom,  Belgium  did 
not  for  one  instant  hesitate ;  she  met  with  her  own  flesh  and 
blood  and  her  dauntless  soul  the  onrush  of  the  enemy,  and 
sank,  overcome  but  unconquered,  into  four  years  of  slav- 
ery. The  whole  world  rang  with  the  glories  of  her  fidelity 
and  heroism,  and  all  mankind  was  stirred  to  new  concep- 
tions of  faith  and  courage  by  the  spectacle  of  her  supreme 

0  The  Nation,  New  York,  September  27,  1919. 


The    World's  Peace  Congress  289 

devotion  to  duty.  The  name  of  Belgium  enlisted  armies, 
brought  brave  men  hastening  from  the  ends  of  the  earth 
to  avenge  her  wrongs  and  made  secure  the  civilization  she 
had  saved  by  her  sacrifice;  the  suffering  of  Belgium  wrung 
the  hearts  of  humanity  and  turned  to  her  such  an  outpour- 
ing of  sympathy  as  history  had  never  seen;  the  honor  and 
valor  of  Belgium  were  the  themes  of  statesmen  and  poets, 
and  her  deliverance  an  inspiration  of  a  mighty  crusade. 

In  every  statement  of  war  aims  by  the  adversaries  of 
Germany,  the  rescue  and  restoration  of  Belgium  held  first 
place.  Great  Britain  proclaimed  that  until  her  wrongs  were 
righted  the  empire's  sword  should  never  be  sheathed;  and 
after  the  war  had  raged  eighteen  months  Great  Britain  and 
France  and  Russia  united  in  the  solemn  pledge:  "The 
Allied  Powers  declare  that  when  the  moment  comes  the 
Belgian  Government  will  be  called  upon  to  take  part  in 
the  peace  negotiations,  and  they  will  not  end  hostilities 
without  Belgium  having  re-established  her  political  and 
economic  independence."  Even  President  Wilson,  who  had 
previously  argued  that  with  such  things  as  Belgium's  fate 
America  had  uno  concern,"  finally  declared  for  her  restora- 
tion thus:  "Without  this  healing  act  the  structure  and 
validity  of  international  law  is  forever  impaired." 

Yet,  with  the  Conference  of  the  nations  assembled  to 
frame  the  decrees  of  justice  and  reorganization,  Belgium  was 
slighted.  There  were  allotted  to  her  only  two  seats  in  the 
Council  of  the  peace  delegates,  while  Brazil  had  three,  and 
this  flagrant  discrimination  was  corrected  only  after  urgent 
protest  had  been  made. 

The  whole  world  had  expected  that  her  needs  would  be 
the  first  considered.  But  weeks  of  secret  deliberation  pro- 
duced no  help  for  the  prostrate  nation,  no  assurance  that 
justice  would  ultimately  be  done.  The  cloistered  statesmen 
in  Paris  preoccupied  themselves  with  problems  of  the  Bal- 
kans, of  Central  Europe,  of  the  enemy  powers,  of  turbulent 
Russia.  Contention  rose  and  fell  over  the  disposition  of 


290    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

African  colonies  and  Asiatic  concessions  and  islands  of  the 
remote  Pacific.  Above  all  there  was  debate  over  the 
League  of  Nations,  that  would  have  to  administer  the  affairs 
of  the  world  after  peace;  but  for  plundered,  impoverished 
Belgium  there  was  nothing  but  vague  intimations  that  event- 
ually her  rights  would  be  established  according  to  the  ideas 
of  the  controlling  groups  from  which  she  was  excluded. 

Her  condition  was  desperate;  yet  it  was  nearly  six 
months  after  the  ending  of  hostilities  before  her  pleas 
found  adequate  response.  She  had  counted  most,  perhaps, 
upon  the  championship  of  President  Wilson,  whose  solici- 
tude for  the  smaller  nations  had  been  so  eloquently  ex- 
pressed. 

Yet  the  Belgians  were  to  learn  that  precisely  because 
they  sacrificed  themselves  for  international  law  and  justice, 
they  must  be  dissociated  from  the  institution  created  to 
make  them  secure.  In  the  situation  the  needs  for  financial 
and  economic  support  were  so  urgent  that  the  Peace  Con- 
ference appointed  a  special  commission  on  February  15, 
to  report  on  the  matter.  Delay  followed  delay.  The  situ- 
ation became  so  desperate  that  at  the  end  of  March,  King 
Albert  went  to  Paris  to  make  a  personal  appeal,  in  which  he 
stated:  "The  time  for  promises  has  passed.  If  Belgium  is 
to  live  the  Council  must  act."  So  flagrant  had  become  the 
neglect  of  Belgium  that  the  London  Chronicle  made  this 
bitter  comment:  "While  other  subjects  are  passionately 
debated,  this  one,  on  which  no  debate  ought  to  exist,  is  al- 
lowed to  go  by  default."  At  the  end  of  April,  the  issue 
still  unsettled,  the  premier  and  other  members  of  the  cabi- 
net made  another  appeal  to  the  Council  for  an  assurance  of 
justice  and  for  an  immediate  advance  of  five  hundred  mil- 
lion dollars  from  the  indemnity.  On  May  3,  the  delegation 
from  Belgium  was  instructed  not  to  sign  the  treaty,  and 
this  in  response  to  a  nation-wide  petition  which  declared: 
"It  would  be  better  to  risk  having  nothing  rather  than  to 
abdicate  our  right  to  the  reparations  and  guarantees  prom- 


The     World's  Peace  Congress  291 

ised  by  most  solemn  assurances."  And  it  was  not  until  May 
5  that  the  Peace  Conference  awarded  to  Belgium  full  rep- 
aration and  priority  of  claim,  which  the  whole  world  im- 
mediately recognized  as  an  act  of  utmost  justice.  Yet  it  was 
President  Wilson  who  declared  in  one  of  his  peace  prin- 
ciples: "The  impartial  justice  meted  out  must  involve  no 
discrimination  between  those  to  whom  we  wish  to  be  just 
and  those  to  whom  we  do  not  wish  to  be  just."  And  "the 
treatment  accorded  to  Belgium  seems  to  have  been  dictated 
by  this  singular  rule  of  conduct,  an  expression  of  idealism  so 
lofty  that  it  forbids  any  distinction  between  aggressor  and 
victim."  7 

If  the  President's  course  puzzled  Americans,  it  puzzled 
European  statesmen  more.  Americans  knew  perfectly  well 
that  he  had  gone  to  Europe  in  the  first  instance  without  any 
authorization — indeed  had  gone  in  defiance  of  the  American 
verdict  given  at  the  election  in  November,  1918.  But  the 
fact  that  he  was  there  led  European  statesmen  to  accept 
him  as  the  representative  of  America  in  fact.  And  the  posi- 
tion in  which  they  found  themselves  in  relation  to  the  only 
head  of  a  nation  in  the  Congress  was  not  only  puzzling  but 
exasperating  with  his  lost  prestige. 

One  of  the  rocks  upon  which  President  Wilson  settled 
as  a  firm  foundation  for  the  structure  that  he  intended 
building  for  the  world  was  that  of  self-determination  for 
the  smaller  nations.  When  Venizelos,  the  statesman  from 
Greece,  asked  for  an  application  of  his  principle  of  self- 
determination,  even  after  Greece  had  stood  true  to  the 
cause  of  democracy  and  at  the  cost  of  civil  war,  he  still 
had  to  face  the  stubborn  hostility  of  President  Wilson  who 
had  arbitrarily  prevented  an  American  declaration  of  war 
against  Bulgaria,  Greece's  bitter  enemy  and  a  vassal  of 
Germany.  For  when  the  Greek  statesman  undertook  at  the 
peace  council  to  reward  that  country  with  territory  popu- 
lated by  Greeks,  President  Wilson,  disregarding  his  alleged 

T  Philadelphia  North  American,  May  8,  1919. 


292    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

principle  of  self-determination,  in  every  way  possible  under- 
took to  thwart  the  purpose,  going  so  far  even  as  to  insist 
upon  delivering  part  of  Grecian  Thrace  to  the  Bulgarians 
and  demanding  that  they  have  a  strip  of  land  leading  to  a 
port  on  the  ^gean — this  queer  strip  to  be  called  Wilsonia. 
But  the  San  Remo  conference  in  April  heard  Venizelos  and 
acted  without  regard  to  President  Wilson's  utter  disregard 
of  his  own  principle  of  self-determination  and  ruled  other- 
wise. 

The  gravamen  of  the  astounding  revelation  made  by  the 
publishing  of  the  Treaty  was  that  Great  Britain,  to  secure 
Japanese  support  for  her  claims  to  the  German  islands  in 
the  south  Pacific,  and  France,  to  draw  China  into  the  war  to 
obtain  the  German  vessels  interned  in  her  ports,  entered 
into  an  agreement  with  Japan  to  despoil  China  when  the 
time  came  to  adjust  conditions  and  territorial  lines  at  the 
close  of  the  war.  If  this  was  a  guilty  and  unspeakable  act, 
America  was  a  party  to  it,  as  developed  in  the  Peace  Con- 
ference. In  what  position  we  are  left  by  the  signing  of  the 
peace  pact  by  President  Wilson,  and  his  enthusiastic  en- 
dorsement of  the  Treaty  which  he  described  "as  nearly 
perfect  as  humanly  possible"  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  Mr. 
Wilson  traded  off  all  he  had  in  order  to  secure  a  League  of 
Nations  which  he  afterward  killed  by  his  obduracy.  For 
he  had  nothing  to  compromise,  no  "common  counsel"  to 
enter  into  with  the  Senate  or  his  countrymen. 

When  President  Wilson  told  the  American  Congress 
that  it  was  necessary  for  him  to  be  at  the  World's  Peace 
Congress  at  Paris  to  see  that  proper  interpretation  was 
given  his  self-enunciated  principles,  for  which,  he  assured 
the  world,  America  had  fought  for  the  first  time  in  Europe, 
the  country  did  not  understand  him.  But  what  became 
clear  as  the  months  of  discussion  of  the  League  of  Nations 
lengthened,  was  discerned  at  once  by  the  shrewd  statesmen 
of  Europe — his  dominant  purpose  of  returning  to  the 
United  States  with  a  League-of-Nations  Covenant.  With 


The    World's  Peace  Congress  293 

this  knowledge,  they  had  in  their  hands  the  key  to  the  sit- 
uation, and  they  used  it  to  the  full  throughout  the  Confer- 
ence. To  get  the  Covenant,  President  Wilson  paid  the 
price  demanded  by  sacrificing  his  principles  one  by  one,  as 
he  traded  off  what  he  had.  Mr.  Lansing,  in  his  testimony 
before  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee,  stated  that 
the  Fourteen  Points  were  never  discussed  by  the  Confer- 
ence— a  statement  for  which  President  Wilson  never  for- 
gave him. 

As  the  debate  progressed,  the  determination  of  America 
not  to  become  entangled  in  the  affairs  of  Europe  strength- 
ened and  the  League  Covenant  proportionately  declined  in 
favor. 

One  of  the  President's  definite  statements  made  in  the 
early  stages  of  the  Peace  Congress  was  that  the  United 
States  "will  join  no  combination  of  power  which  is  not  a 
combination  of  us  all."  It  stands  against  the  equally  frank 
declaration  of  Premier  Clemenceau  for  the  principle  of 
the  "balance  of  power."  Thus  upon  this  vital  point  there 
was  a  clear  conflict  of  purpose. 

Premier  Clemenceau  stated  it  very  pointedly,  toward 
the  end  of  the  Peace  Congress,  as  the  President  was  about 
to  return  to  his  own  country  in  these  words : 

Now  when  peace  is  signed  you  are  going  home  across  the  sea. 
The  English  are  going  home,  too.  But  France  stays  where  she  is. 

Marshal  Foch  has  told  you  that  France  is  the  barrier  protecting 
civilization,  and  so  France  and  civilization  must  be  protected. 

You  gentlemen  have  seen  the  character  of  the  Germans  along  the 
Rhine.  You  know  there  is  no  democracy  in  their  hearts.  You  know 
that  their  fawning  attitude  is  as  false  as  it  can  be.  And  so  I  say  to 
you,  France  wants  no  such  people  in  her  republic. 

We  don't  want  to  annex  Germany  up  to  the  Rhine,  but  we  do 
intend  to  see  that  the  German  military  machine  stays  behind  the 
river.  That  is  what  Marshal  Foch  meant,  I  believe.  If  we  don't 
have  that  protection,  France  must  maintain  always  an  enormous  army 
to  guard  civilization. 


294    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

With  our  great  loss  of  life  in  the  war  that  would  be  a  terrible 
burden  for  France.  We  must  have  a  natural  barrier  or  else  it  would 
be  madness  to  demobilize  our  army. 

I  hope  that  Americans  will  see  it  in  the  same  way.  I  hope  that 
the  soft  words  of  the  Germans  will  not  convince  the  Americans  that 
the  leopard  has  changed  his  spots.  So  far  I  am  unconvinced  that  the 
Germans  of  today  are  not  the  Germans  of  yesterday,  the  foes  of  the 
ideals  of  America,  the  ideals  of  France,  the  ideals  of  civilization,  the 
foes  of  all  that  is  desired  in  the  hearts  of  mankind. 

A  Paris  dispatch  of  April  23,  1919,  stated:  "In  a 
statement  issued  by  President  Wilson  today  he  declares 
that  Fiume  cannot  become  a  part  of  Italy."  And  he 
"points  out  that  every  condition  concerning  the  Adriatic 
settlement  has  been  changed  since  Italy  entered  the  war 
upon  the  promises  of  the  pact  of  London,  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  empire  having  disappeared.  He  notes  that  new 
states  have  been  created  for  which  Fiume  is  the  natural 
outlet  to  the  sea.  .  .  . 

"When  Premier  Orlando  received  President  Wilson's 
statement,  he  immediately  called  a  full  meeting  of  the 
Italian  delegation,  which  prepared  a  statement  on  the  sit- 
uation addressed  to  the  Italian  people." 

As  the  conflict  was  developing  between  President  Wil- 
son and  Premier  Clemenceau  when  it  was  felt  that  Clemen- 
ceau  was  right  and  his  position  unshakable,  not  only  in  the 
eyes  of  France  but  in  the  eyes  of  enlightened  thought  every- 
where among  civilized  nations,  and  it  was  apparent  that 
President  Wilson  was  attempting  to  meddle  in  foreign  af- 
fairs, particularly  in  France  which  had  suffered  so  greatly, 
while  Americans  had  suffered  so  little,  the  efforts  at  propa- 
ganda sent  out  from  Paris  by  the  American  delegation  and 
its  press  bureau,  was  stifling  in  the  fact  that  it  attempted  to 
belittle  the  ideals  in  France,  urging  her  grasping  disposition 
and  the  greed  of  her  statesmen  in  seeking  a  conclusion  of 
peace  after  America  had  won  the  Great  War.  And  this 
propaganda,  the  American  people  having  no  better  guide 


The    .World's  Peace  Congress  295 

at  that  moment,  went  far  toward  poisoning  the  minds  of 
Americans  against  France.  The  Paris  Matin  published  an 
open  letter  to  President  Wilson  from  Harry  de  Jouvent, 
spring  of  1919,  in  which  he  maintained  that  if  there  was  to 
be  a  League  of  Nations,  it  should  guarantee  reparation  from 
Germany.  He  declared  that  France  did  not  exact  repara- 
tion for  herself  alone,  and  continued:  "Today  as  yester- 
day France  interprets  the  hopes  of  the  nations.  She  is 
their  voice. "  And  he  asks  the  President  to  sheer  away 
from  those  who  would  say  that  reparation  was  impossible 
and  then  states:  "If  it  were  impossible  that  Germany, 
which  is  as  safe  as  before  the  war,  can  repair  the  crimes 
which  she  has  committed,  it  would  be  even  more  impossible 
for  her  victims  to  do  so.  In  that  case  there  would  be  noth- 
ing left  but  to  despair  of  humanity." 

And  on  this  matter  the  Philadelphia  Ledger  stated: 

False  to  the  terms  upon  which  the  armistice  was  signed ;  and  false 
therefore  to  her  own  plighted  word  and  that  of  her  Allies  and  her 
enemy,  is  the  demand  of  France  that  the  peace  treaty  shall  authorize 
her  expansion  into  the  Saar  basin.  The  principle  upon  which  France, 
with  the  nations  that  helped  to  save  her,  agreed  to  make  peace  is 
antagonistic  to  such  trickery  as  that  by  which  France  now  seeks  to 
grab  the  Saar  basin. 

This  latter  is  a  mere  suggestion  of  what  the  propa- 
ganda put  out  from  Paris  by  the  American  press  bureau 
was  accomplishing  in  seeking  to  develop  American  thought 
against  even  suffering  France. 

Perhaps  one  of  the  hardest  things  for  her  to  bear  was 
the  admonition,  coming  from  America  through  its  Presi- 
dent, that  she  must  not  irritate  the  sensitive  Germans. 

The  injustice  of  it  all  was  intolerable,  but  the  folly  of  it 
was  worse.  The  pleas  of  France  were  counting  less  with 
President  Wilson  than  the  threats  of  Germany.  It  is  doubt- 
ful whether  statesmanship  ever  produced  a  more  fatuous 
theory  than  that  Germany,  stripped  of  her  fleet  and  her 
colonies,  would  plot  against  a  strengthened  France  or  would 


296    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

regard  weakened  France  with  sentiment  of  fraternity  and 
gratitude.  This  was  not  a  matter  of  territorial  aggrandize- 
ment, but  of  strict  economic  justice,  which  the  President  of 
the  United  States  sought  to  deny  war-torn  France. 

As  though  it  were  not  enough  that  France  should  be 
compelled  to  contribute  most  to  the  peace,  after  contribut- 
ing incomparably  most  to  the  war,  sustained  efforts  were 
being  made  to  create  the  impression  that  she  was  obstruct- 
ing a  just  peace  by  her  ugreed"  and  "selfish  demands. "  This 
campaign  of  detraction  seriously  affected  public  opinion  in 
the  United  States;  and  it  was  supported  by  influential 
American  newspapers  upon  inspiration  coming  direct  from 
the  American  peace  mission  in  Paris.  This  propaganda  was 
becoming  a  powerful  factor  in  American  public  opinion  in 
early  April,  1919.  An  Associated  Press  dispatch  carried 
the  semi-official  statement  charging  that  "French  claims  are 
open  to  construction  as  meaning  something  more  than  mili- 
tary security  and  as  verging  upon  territorial  control." 

Dispatches  from  Europe  told,  after  he  had  been  in 
the  Congress  for  some  time,  that  "the  President's  position 
is  immensely  stronger  than  when  he  arrived"  and  "it  may 
be  authoritatively  stated  that  he  is  feeling  more  optimistic 
today  regarding  the  general  situation  than  at  any  time  since 
his  arrival  in  Europe,"  and  yet  it  was  as  early  as  the  Satur- 
day on  which  the  Peace  Council  began  sitting  that  the  report 
reached  America  of  "future  confirmation  that  Mr.  Wilson 
is  greatly  disillusioned"  and  "already  sees  the  impossibility 
of  realizing  all  his  ideals." 

The  afternoon  papers  of  April  23,  1919,  gave  the  first 
intimation  of  a  pending  rupture  in  the  delegations  at  the 
Peace  Congress.  This  was  brought  about  by  the  President's 
position  on  the  matter  of  Fiume  which  the  Italians  claimed 
under  the  London  convention  of  1917  and  by  President 
Wilson's  own  announced  principle  of  self-determination  for 
the  smaller  states.  News  began  to  reach  America  in  a  more 
exacerbated  form  when  it  became  evident  that  the  Italian 


The     World's  Peace  Congress  297 

Premier  Orlando,  after  President  Wilson's  appeal  over  the 
Italian  Government,  was  determined  to  withdraw  from  the 
Conference,  to  return  to  his  nation,  and  there  determine 
what  steps  should  next  be  taken.  The  situation  developed 
into  what  leading  American  journals  had  predicted  would 
happen  months  before  under  President  Wilson's  policy  of 
dictation.  The  Italians  charged  that  in  issuing  his  appeal 
to  the  Italian  people,  Mr.  Wilson  made  one  of  the  gravest 
errors  of  diplomatic  etiquette  in  the  history  of  diplomacy. 
They  charged  directly  that  at  3  130  on  the  afternoon  of 
April  23  they  received  from  Premier  Clemenceau  and  Lloyd 
George  and  Mr.  Wilson  a  proposal  which  gave  them  satis- 
faction on  the  Dalmatian  coast  and  proposed  to  make  Fiume 
a  free  city  under  neither  the  Italians  nor  Jugo-Slavs.  And 
that  the  next  they  knew  was  Mr.  Wilson's  appeal  direct  to 
the  Italian  people  over  the  heads  of  their  duly  accredited 
representatives  in  the  Peace  Congress,  instead  of  making 
it  to  the  Italian  Government. 

It  would  not  have  required  great  vision  to  see  what 
would  have  happened,  had  the  delegates  of  some  other  na- 
tion taken  that  action  with  reference  to  American  duly  ac- 
credited representatives  at  the  Peace  Congress.  American 
newspapers,  not  under  the  influence  of  the  Administration, 
deplored  the  lack  of  judgment  and  finesse  with  which  Presi- 
dent Wilson  gave  out  a  decision  as  he  did  in  the  Italian 
case.  The  Italian  press  backed  Orlando  in  his  position, 
while  flaying  Mr.  Wilson  for  a  bad  diplomatic  break.  The 
French  press,  more  reserved  in  its  expressions,  at  every  turn 
flayed  Mr.  Wilson  for  his  inconsistency.  A  poll  of  the 
newspaper  comment  taken  by  the  New  York  Tribune 
showed  that  the  press  in  the  United  States  was  divided  on 
the  Italian  crisis. 

The  situation  that  developed  in  the  Conference  in  the 
latter  part  of  April,  1919,  over  the  Fiume  question,  when 
Premier  Orlando  withdrew  from  the  Conference,  returned 
to  his  home  and  received  an  overwhelming  vote  of  confi- 


298    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

dence  and  then  returned  to  the  Congress  stronger  than 
before,  became  the  most  serious  crisis  for  the  Peace  Con- 
ference up  to  that  time.  Not  only  was  Italy  involved  against 
President  Wilson's  dictatorial  manner,  but  the  Poles, 
Czecho-Slovaks  and  Greeks  were  indignant  that  Americans 
resisted  their  territorial  claims.  Indeed,  every  nation  rep- 
resented had  grievances  against  the  United  States.  Eng- 
land alone  remained  discreetly  silent. 

It  was  President  Wilson  who  undermined  the  moral 
authority  and  the  actual  power  of  the  democratic  govern- 
ments by  traveling  over  Europe  preaching  a  crusade  against 
them,  inciting  the  peoples  to  distrust  their  leaders  as  men 
without  vision  or  humane  instincts  or  international  honor. 
But  the  revolt  came  later,  not  against  the  duly  constituted 
governments,  but  against  President  Wilson. 

Frank  H.  Simonds,  who  had  perhaps  as  firm  a  grasp 
upon  the  situation  in  the  Peace  Congress  as  any  newspaper 
correspondent  in  the  world,  gives  this  view  of  the  great 
crisis  in  the  conference: 

The  French  Government,  regretting  that  the  break  seems  immi- 
nent, is  resolved  to  make  no  more  surrender  of  the  essential  security  of 
France  to  Mr.  Wilson,  and  is  determined,  if  necessary,  to  endure  the 
evil  consequences  of  his  withdrawal  rather  than  yield  further. 

Lloyd  George  has  abandoned  Mr.  Wilson,  and  Mr.  Wilson 
knows  it. 

Mr.  Wilson  has  a  sketch  of  a  separate  treaty  with  Germany, 
which  is  his  final  threat  if  his  leadership  does  not  prevail. 

If  he  insists  on  going  home  there  will  be  great  disappointment, 
but,  I  think,  no  further  concessions.  The  possibility  that  he  will  go 
home  and  attempt  to  make  a  separate  peace  with  Germany  has  been 
threatened  here  privately  for  weeks,  and  has  at  last  been  discounted. 

Under  the  circumstances  those  at  a  distance  could  but 
wonder  and  speculate. 

The  Congress  of  Vienna,  though  it  attained  a  bad  repu- 
tation for  its  intrigues  and  secrecy,  the  Congress  of  Berlin, 
and  the  conferences  at  The  Hague,  as  well  as  all  other 


The    World's  Peace  Congress  299 

known  conferences  drew  protocols  in  which  could  be  found 
the  substance  of  the  opinions,  the  suggestions,  propositions 
and  counter-propositions  of  the  various  states.  Yet  in  the 
most  notable  Peace  Conference  the  world  ever  saw,  that  of 
Paris,  1919,  which  was  supposed  to  be  the  most  open  of 
any  the  world  ever  knew,  there  was  no  record  kept  of  any 
such  matters.  The  Ten,  then  the  Five,  and  after  that  the 
Four  preferred  not  only  to  discuss  in  secret,  but  to  leave 
no  trace  of  their  deliberations.  They  did  not  have  any 
secretaries  to  record  them.  They  broached  and  agitated  all 
questions  without  putting  anything  on  paper.  They  re- 
sumed on  one  day  what  they  had  settled  the  day  before. 
They  protested  against  language  attributed  to  them  on  the 
outside.  As  nothing  was  written  they  could  deny  every- 
thing and  begin  all  over  again.  In  the  state  of  things  as 
they  then  existed,  neither  congresses  nor  parliaments  nor 
peoples  are  left  with  any  authentic  documents  at  their  dis- 
position, and  they  had  to  content  themselves  with  the  verbal 
declarations  of  their  government  ministers,  and  on  many 
important  matters  no  two  of  them  seemed  to  agree  as  to 
their  meaning.  Some  day  there  will  be  some  kind  of  a  his- 
tory written  from  the  patching  together  of  the  various 
memoranda  and  denials  of  the  various  members.  It  will 
not,  however,  be  an  authentic  record  of  the  Congress. 

America's  honor  must  never  be  traded  off  for  an  indi- 
vidual mess  of  pottage.  America  must  never  be  made  an 
appendage  to  a  super-government  of  the  world. 


CHAPTER  XV 

THE  TREATY  OF  PARIS 

If  the  United  States  is  still  to  be  regarded  as  a  nation, 
then  the  most  notable  treaty  in  all  the  history  of  the  making 
of  treaties  is  a  matter  of  prime  concern  to  all  Americans, 
from  its  very  inception  to  the  last  syllable  of  the  process 
of  its  final  acceptance.  And  who  is  it,  in  this  day  of  "the 
new  order/'  that  dares  to  rise  and  say,  This  is  no  longer 
the  day  of  nations,  but  the  new  day  of  internationalism 
which  has  superseded  the  other?  Only  the  man  who  lacks 
in  his  system  the  spark  of  vital  Americanism.  The  United 
States  is  yet  a  nation,  under  a  republican  form  of  govern- 
ment, with  a  written  constitution  limiting  the  powers  of 
every  branch  of  its  vast  energy.  And  this  limiting  constitu- 
tion is  the  basic  law  of  the  land. 

The  basis,  then,  of  this  supreme  interest  of  all  Ameri- 
cans is  the  preservation  of  the  fundamental  law  of  the  land, 
that  freedom  in  its  highest  sense  to  the  individual  may  be 
kept  safe.  And  that,  after  all,  is  the  basis  of  the  freedom 
granted  to  human  society.  The  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  is  but  a  means  to  this  end. 

It  was  in  obedience  to  this  Constitution  that  America 
took  upon  itself  the  fateful  task  of  engaging  in  armed  con- 
flict with  a  dread  war  machine.  It  was  in  obedience  to  the 
same  instrument  that  her  delegates  met  with  other  assem- 
bled statesmen  of  the  world  to  close  the  direful  struggle. 
At  this  Peace  Congress  of  the  world  at  Paris  these  states- 
men met  to  determine  upon  what  terms  the  conflict  should 
be  ended.  Some  held  the  view  that  this  was  the  sole  purpose 
for  which  they  met  or  could  meet.  Others  declared  that 
they  were  at  liberty  to  initiate  any  movement  and  to  formu- 

300 


The  Treaty  of  Paris  301 

late  any  program  for  the  government  of  the  world  that  they 
might  feel  an  inclination  to  take  up. 

It  was  upon  these  two  simple  views  that  the  action  of 
the  Congress  depended.  Accepting  the  latter  view,  it  la- 
bored and  brought  forth  the  document  which  is  the  Treaty 
of  Paris.  It  undertook  the  accomplishment  of  two  purposes 
in  one  instrument:  Closing  the  armed  conflict  of  the  world 
and  defining  for  the  nations  a  form  of  government  for  the 
future. 

The  former,  and  that  only,  is  properly  the  Treaty  of 
Peace.  The  other  is  known  as  the  Covenant  of  the  League 
of  Nations,  and  was  made  a  constituent  part  of  the  former 
at  the  insistence  of  one  of  the  American  members  of  the 
peace  commission,  President  Wilson.  Thus,  when  the 
Treaty  was  completed  and  came  to  the  United  States  the 
two  were  combined  in  one,  and  the  whole  instrument  was 
known  as  the  Treaty  of  Peace. 

This  document  reached  the  United  States  outside  the 
usual  and  regular  channels.  It  leaked  to  America  and  into 
the  United  States  Senate,  much  to  the  chagrin  of  Presi- 
dent Wilson;  and  its  discussion  there  began  May  23,  1919, 
though  the  President  did  not  present  his  copy  of  it  in  that 
body  until  July  10.  He  had  been  called  upon  to  submit  the 
Treaty  through  regular  channels  when  the  document  was 
known  to  be  in  the  country.  He  refused,  though  it  was  on 
sale  in  the  leading  capitals  of  Europe.  Then  Senator  Borah 
informed  the  country  that  if  the  paper  was  to  be  withheld, 
he  would  read  the  entire  document  of  some  85,000  words 
into  the  Senate  record.  A  cablegram  from  the  President 
was  read  by  Senator  Hitchcock,  Administration  leader  in 
that  body,  asking  a  thorough  investigation  to  determine  how 
the  Treaty  had  reached  the  Senate.  This  immediately 
brought  Senator  Borah  to  his  feet,  with  the  statement  that 
he  had  the  Treaty  in  his  hands,  and  that  he  was  authorized 
by  those  from  whom  he  received  it  to  state  how  it  came 
into  his  possession,  namely,  through  Frazer  Hunt,  a  corre- 


302     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

spondent  of  the  Chicago  Tribune.  He  read  it  into  the 
record  June  9  after  points  of  order  had  been  made  against 
it  for  an  hour  with  a  view  to  its  suppression. 

The  Treaty  itself  is  a  remarkable  document.  The  long- 
est ever  written,  it  represents  the  combined  product  of  over 
two  thousand  experts  working  continually  through  a  series 
of  commissions  for  three  and  a  half  months  from  January 
18,  1919.  It  was  printed  in  parallel  pages  of  English  and 
French,  recognized  as  of  equal  validity,  though  prior  thereto 
the  French  was  understood  to  be  the  diplomatic  language 
of  the  world.  It  did  not  deal  with  questions  affecting 
Austria,  Bulgaria  and  Turkey,  except  in  so  far  as  to  bind 
Germany  to  accept  any  agreement  reached  with  these  for- 
mer allies  of  hers.  It  covered  a  vast  range  of  matters  to 
which  Senator  Moses  called  attention  when,  on  the  floor  of 
the  Senate,  he  expressed  himself  humorously  on  this  wise : 

In  this  Treaty  are  considerations  of  many  things — of  shoes  and 
ships  and  sealing  wax,  of  cabbages  and  kings.  It  roams  the  plains, 
sails  the  seas,  delves  into  the  earth  and  soars  into  the  sky;  Huns, 
horses  and  huntsmen  alike  come  within  their  purview;  books,  boun- 
daries and  bullets;  guns,  goats,  guarantees  and  governments;  war- 
ships,'water-ways,  woman  suffrage  and  Wilhelm  II — in  short,  the  al- 
phabet and  alliteration  alike  are  agonized  in  an  attempt  to  deal  ade- 
quately with  merely  a  topical  index  to  this  instrument  which  we  are 
asked  to  ratify  in  haste  lest  we  break  the  heart  of  the  world. 

Thomas  Jefferson,  eminent  in  the  early  history  of 
the  country,  informed  President  Washington  that  it  was 
advisable,  whenever  possible,  to  consult  the  Senate  concern- 
ing a  proposed  treaty  before  beginning  the  negotiations. 
Ignoring  this  advice  prudent,  since  no  treaty  is  valid  with- 
out approval  of  the  Senate,  President  Wilson  created  un- 
necessary opposition  in  the  Senate,  as  he  did  in  the  country, 
by  his  secret  methods  in  the  Peace  Congress  as  well  as  when 
preparing  for  his  attendance  thereon.  His  course  there- 
after only  widened  the  breach  between  the  executive  and 
the  ratifying  power,  in  particular  when  he  refused  informa- 


The   Treaty  of  Paris  303 

tion  requested  by  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee 
while  it  had  the  Treaty  under  consideration. 

When  President  Wilson  submitted  to  the  Senate  what  he 
said  was  the  only  authentic  Treaty,  he  was  described  as 
reading  his  address  slowly  and  in  a  clear,  quiet  voice.  His 
manuscript,  typewritten  on  small  pages,  he  held  in  his  left 
hand  and  with  his  right  he  punctuated  his  utterance  with  an 
occasional  gesture,  while  before  him  on  the  Vice-President's 
desk  lay  the  Treaty  brought  by  him  in  person  from  Paris. 

In  this  message  to  the  Senate  the  President  stated  that 
to  reject  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  now  would 
"break  the  heart  of  the  world" ;  that  many  issues  intervened 
to  make  the  Treaty  of  Peace  unot  exactly  what  we  would 
have  written";  that  the  compromises,  which  were  accepted 
as  inevitable,  "nowhere  cut  to  the  heart  of  any  principle" ; 
that  the  Peace  Treaty  as  a  whole  "squares"  with  the  prin- 
ciples that  were  agreed  upon  as  the  basis  of  peace.  He 
urged  prompt  ratification  and  with  no  substantial  change. 

When  it  was  declared  through  the  public  press  that  in 
submitting  the  Treaty  to  the  Senate  President  Wilson  had 
fired  the  opening  gun  in  his  fight  to  force  immediate  ratifica- 
tion of  the  League-of-Nations  Covenant  without  reserva- 
tion, it  was  also  stated  that  the  shell  landed  short  of  its 
mark;  that  Mr.  Wilson's  address  was  disappointing  to  his 
friends  and  encouraging  to  his  opponents ;  that  for  the  most 
part  it  was  a  repetition  of  what  he  had  said  on  former 
occasions;  and  that  it  furnished  none  of  the  information 
that  was  expected  by  both  sides  in  the  League  controversy. 
It  was  recognized  at  the  moment,  however,  that  full  and 
complete  information  was  promised  later. 

It  was  the  first  time  that  the  Senate  had  ever  received 
a  treaty  from  the  executive  in  open  session  and  began  its 
consideration  with  full  publicity.  For  the  first  time  a  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  reported  as  his  own  ambassador. 
In  the  matter  of  actions  and  policies  proposed  there  were 
innovations  of  the  most  far-reaching  nature.  The  situation 


304    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

was  described  as  unique  in  that  it  has  no  parallel  elsewhere. 
While  the  Peace  Treaty  and  Covenant  were  subject  to  criti- 
cism in  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Italy,  there  were  no  such 
conflicts  between  the  executive  and  legislative  branches  of 
the  government — the  reason  being  that  in  those  countries 
the  leaders  had  made  the  peace  project  a  coalition  agree- 
ment and  co-operation  instead  of  arbitrary  personal  direc- 
tion and  partisan  management. 

The  deliberations  on  the  Treaty  provoked  one  of  the 
most  bitter  and  prolonged  contests  between  the  Senate  and 
the  President  in  American  history,  with  the  controversy  cen- 
tering almost  wholly  about  the  League-of-Nations  Cove- 
nant. At  the  same  time  the  newspapers  of  the  nation  took 
up  the  discussion  with  vigor  and  the  rostrum  furnished 
some  of  the  ablest  debaters  the  country  possessed  on  both 
sides  of  the  great  question. 

There  are  three  distinct  stages  of  progression  by  which 
the  President  encouraged  the  bitterness  of  this  controversy : 
First,  when  he  passed  over  the  Senate  and  thus  ignored  all 
precedent  and  history  and  the  advice  of  the  early  publicists 
of  the  nation,  as  Thomas  Jefferson,  who  advised  President 
Washington  to  confer  with  the  Senate  before  undertaking 
negotiation  of  a  treaty,  since  that  body  must  pass  upon  a 
treaty  before  it  can  become  operative;  second,  in  refusing  to 
furnish  the  Senate  information  in  his  possession,  and  only 
in  his  possession,  so  that  it  might  reach  a  just  and  intelligent 
conclusion  in  its  consideration  of  the  Treaty;  third,  his  at- 
tempt to  create  against  the  Senate  a  public  sentiment,  based 
upon  false  foundations,  and  thus  force  the  Senate  to  action 
against  its  own  better  judgment. 

The  Senate's  effort  to  get  information  from  the  Presi- 
dent when  seeking  light  so  as  to  pass  intelligently  upon  this 
document  of  supreme  importance  to  the  nation  and  to  the 
world,  resulted  in  a  showing  of  efforts  on  the  part  of  the 
President  at  concealment  from  the  public  that  were  un- 
worthy of  a  man  in  his  high  position.  But  in  every  instance, 


The  Treaty  of  Paris  305 

it  indicated  the  President's  conception  of  government  under 
the  Constitution  as  revealed  in  his  written  works  of  years 
previous:  That  the  Senate  must  approve  what  the  execu- 
tive should  choose  to  devise  and  that  without  question;  that 
the  words  of  the  Constitution,  "advice  and  consent"  of  the 
Senate  were  words  with  some  meaning  outside  the  ordinary 
use  of  language  that  could  be  read  into  them  by  the  execu- 
tive. 

This  is  shown  in  the  President's  refusal  of  August  28, 
not  given  to  the  public  until  September  i,  to  submit  to  the 
Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee  other  treaties  to  which 
the  United  States  was  to  be  a  party,  upon  the  ground  that 
compliance  would  set  a  precedent  for  encouragement  of 
senatorial  encroachment  upon  the  presidential  prerogative; 
and  upon  the  further  ground  that  it  might  create  an  embar- 
rassment to  give  out  the  contents  of  a  treaty  before  it  was 
ready  for  final  action.  Replying  to  this  statement  of  the 
President's  reasons,  Senator  Lodge,  chairman  of  the  com- 
mittee, said: 

The  declaration  of  the  i6th  of  June  was  printed  some  time  ago 
in  the  Record,  from  the  English  White  Book,  the  declaration  having 
been  submitted  to  the  House  of  Commons  on  the  4th  of  July,  I  be- 
lieve. The  committee  asked  for  it  merely  because  they  thought  it 
would  be  better  that  it  should  be  officially  before  them. 

In  reply  to  another  request  of  the  committee  for  infor- 
mation upon  an  important  point,  so  essential,  in  fact,  that 
the  Senate  would  have  stultified  itself  in  passing  upon  the 
point  without  seeking  the  information  at  its  source,  and 
derelict  in  its  duty  as  well,  the  President  replied  that  as  he 
recollected  the  business,  to  use  his  phrase,  no  agreement 
had  been  reached  concerning  it  when  he  left  France  and  he 
had  heard  of  none  since.  This  was  concerning  the  division 
and  apportionment  of  the  war  indemnity  exacted  from  Ger- 
many. He  also  stated  that  he  was  "not  able  to  bring  from 
Paris  a  complete  file  of  papers"  relating  to  the  Treaty,  but 


306    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

"only  those  which  happen  to  be  in  my  hands" — a  remarkable 
admission  of  incompetence  and  neglect  of  duty.  If  the 
President  could  treat  his  Secretary  of  State  as  harshly  as  he 
treated  Mr.  Lansing  for  what  he  termed  his  offenses,  what 
terms  would  he  have  used  to  condemn  such  indifference  to 
the  public  for  an  offense  such  as  the  President  admits  he 
himself  committed,  in  leaving  essential  records  in  a  foreign 
land,  or  what  punishment  would  he  have  meted  out  to  him? 
Nor  was  the  Secretary  of  State  able  to  answer  vital  ques- 
tions, his  constant  reply  being  that  only  the  President  or 
Edward  M.  House  had  the  information  sought  by  the  com- 
mittee. The  refusal  of  the  President  to  furnish  the  com- 
mittee essential  documents  1  and  every  other  avenue  of  in- 
formation being  closed  by  the  Administration  to  the  commit- 
tee, the  chairman  was  compelled  to  announce  it  would 
report  the  Treaty  with  Germany  to  the  Senate. 

And  all  this  occurred  after  the  President  had  promised 
explicitly  that  he  would  furnish  the  Senate  with  all  informa- 
tion in  his  possession.  Instead,  he  suggested  the  White 
House  meeting  of  August  18.  It  was  the  President's  action 
which  kept  the  Treaty  in  the  committee  as  long  as  it  was, 
the  period  of  sixty  days,  and  under  consideration  forty-five 
days.  No  just  opinion  by  the  Senate  was  possible  with  the 
information  withheld  by  the  President.  In  violation  of  his 
written  stipulation  with  France  that  he  would  submit  to  the 
Senate  for  its  consideration  the  special  treaty  with  that 
nation  at  the  same  time  he  would  submit  the  Treaty  with 
Germany,  he  withheld  it  until  the  Senate  refused  to  proceed 
further  with  the  latter  until  the  other  was  submitted. 

It  was  during  the  stage  of  proceedings  when  the  com- 
mittee was  seeking  information  from  the  President  that  the 

1 A  refreshing  contrast  to  this  attitude  is  that  of  President  Harding  in 
submitting  to  the  Senate,  February  10,  1922,  the  treaties  of  Disarmament 
Conference  when  he  said:  "It  is  a  privilege  as  well  as  a  duty  to  ask  that 
advice  and  consent  which  the  Constitution  requires  to  make  these  covenants 
effective.  Accompanying  the  treaties  I  bring  to  you  the  complete  minutes 
of  both  plenary  sessions  and  committee  meetings,  and  a  copy  of  the  official 
report  made  to  me  by  the  American  delegation  to  the  Conference." 


The  Treaty  of  Paris  307 

White  House  Conference  of  the  President  with  the  Senate 
Foreign  Relations  Committee  took  place.  It  was  disillusion- 
ing to  the  committee  as  well  as  to  the  American  public  and 
to  the  world,  when  he  solemnly  declared  to  the  committee 
that  he  had  no  knowledge  of  the  secret  treaty  entered  into 
by  the  Allies,  by  virtue  of  which  Italy  entered  the  conflict. 
There  were  other  treaties  to  which  Senator  Johnson  in- 
vited his  attention — the  agreement  with  Rumania,  in  Au- 
gust, 1916;  the  several  agreements  touching  Asia  Minor; 
the  agreements  entered  into  in  the  winter  of  1917-1918,  be- 
tween France  and  Russia  relative  to  the  frontiers  of  Ger- 
many, and  particularly  concerning  the  Saar  Valley  and  the 
left  bank  of  the  Rhine — and  the  President  of  the  United 
States  declared  that  he  had  no  knowledge  of  any  of  them 
until  he  reached  the  Paris  Conference. 

Yet,  on  March  4,  1918,  Mr.  Balfour,  in  the  House  of 
Commons,  stated  that  "President  Wilson  is  kept  informed" 
as  to  the  treaties  entered  into  by  the  Allies.  It  was  the 
Russian  government  that  published  to  the  world  in  Novem- 
ber, 1917,  the  secret  treaties.  Late  in  1917  and  early  in 
1918,  the  English  paper,  the  Manchester  Guardian,  pub- 
lished almost  all  of  them;  and  early  in  1918  the  New  York 
Evening  Post  published  many  of  them.  One  cause  of  the 
downfall  of  the  Kerensky  government  in  Russia  was  the 
refusal  of  the  Allies  to  revise  certain  of  the  secret  treaties. 
The  secret  treaty  with  Italy,  known  as  the  London  Pact, 
was  made  April  27,  1915;  and  May  10,  1915,  it  was  out- 
lined to  the  world  by  Sir  Arthur  Evans  in  a  letter  to  the 
Manchester  Guardian.  It  was  given  to  the  American  pub- 
lic in  various  forms  and  in  various  publications,  long  prior 
to  the  meeting  of  the  Paris  Conference. 

And  President  Wilson  was  the  statesman  to  represent 
America  among  the  statesmen  of  the  world  in  the  Peace 
Congress,  where  he  first  knew  anything  of  these  secret 
treaties!  Yet,  in  the  armistice  agreements  the  boundary 
lines  were  fixed  almost  as  copied  from  the  secret  treaties. 


308    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  W ar 

He  was  able  to  write  and  sign  his  statement  upon  the  dis- 
position of  Fiume  without  having  seen  the  secret  treaty,  as 
he  admitted  under  the  questioning  of  Senator  Moses  of 
New  Hampshire. 

But  if  it  disillusioned  Europeans,  Americans  even  more. 
Confidence,  which  crumbled  when  the  President  in  seeking 
personal  advantage  through  a  Democratic  Congress  which 
he  asked  the  people  to  elect  in  fall  of  1918,  was  so  shat- 
tered after  the  August,  1919,  White  House  Conference 
that  the  President  found  it  necessary  to  tour  the  country  in 
support  of  the  Treaty  he  brought  home  and  especially  the 
League  of  Nations.  His  advocacy  of  the  matter  was  fatal, 
for,  as  often,  he  attempted  to  make  things  appear  what 
they  were  not,  and  his  temper  did  not  draw  the  American 
people  to  his  cause. 

And  to  all  of  this  was  added  the  adverse  features  of 
Secretary  Lansing's  testimony  before  the  Senate  commit- 
tee; then  the  statement  of  William  C.  Bullitt,  and  other  cir- 
cumstances that  led  the  people  to  believe  that  the  Presi- 
dent was  not  giving  them  a  square  deal.  It  strengthened  the 
Senate's  opposition  to  the  President's  arbitrary  and  wilful 
manner  of  seeking  to  make  treaties  and  of  binding  the  coun- 
try to  unprecedented  undertakings  without  consulting  the 
co-ordinate  treaty-making  power  of  the  government. 

In  all  the  queer  logic  used  by  the  President  in  his  con- 
ference at  the  White  House  with  the  Foreign  Relations 
Committee  of  the  Senate,  on  August  18,  1919,  none  per- 
haps was  stranger  than  his  seeking  to  answer  Senator  Bran- 
degee  as  to  the  scope  of  Article  X  in  regard  to  the  express 
"external  aggression"  when  he  stated: 

I  understand  that  Article  to  mean  no  nation  is  at  liberty  to  invade 
the  territorial  integrity' tot  another.  That  does  not  mean  to  invade  for 
the  purposes  of  warfare,  but  to  impair  the  territorial  integrity  of  an- 
other nation.  Its  territorial  integrity  is  not  destroyed  by  armed  inter- 
vention. It  is  destroyed  by  retention,  by  taking  territory  away  from 
it  that  impairs  its  territorial  integrity. 


The  Treaty  of  Paris  309 

The  logic  of  the  President  appeared  to  be  that  "exter- 
nal aggression"  or  "invasion"  of  the  territory  does  not 
mean  that  the  League  could  be  effective  in  restraining  it 
until  it  came  to  the  council  table  to  arrange  the  terms, 
which  would  mean  that  it  might  be  invaded  by  a  powerful 
army,  torn  asunder,  the  property  destroyed,  the  inhabitants 
carried  or  driven  away,  or  slaughtered;  and  yet  the  League 
of  Nations  was  not  to  become  effective  as  touching  that 
invasion  or  "external  aggression"  until  the  terms  of  peace 
were  to  be  settled,  with  the  aggressor  in  possession. 

A  weakness  in  the  committee's  report  was  that  it  failed 
to  recognize  any  good  features  in  the  Treaty.  It  did  justly 
demand,  however,  that  this  nation  "declines  to  assume,  ex- 
cept by  action  of  the  Congress,"  any  obligation  "to  preserve 
the  territorial  integrity  or  political  independence  of  any 
other  country,  or  to  interfere  in  controversies  between  other 
nations."  It  had  been  declared  by  the  President  that  this 
would  "cut  the  heart  out"  of  the  League-of-Nations  Cov- 
enant. The  committee  report  further  declared  that  "the 
United  States  reserves  to  itself  exclusively  the  right  to 
determine  what  questions  are  within  its  domestic  juris- 
diction," and  that  "the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  to  be  interpreted 
by  the  United  States  alone,  and  is  hereby  declared  to  be 
wholly  outside  the  jurisdiction  of  the  League  of  Nations," 
clarifying  the  most  vague  and  most  important  of  the  pro- 
visions. 

It  was  thus  made  clear  that  the  Covenant  of  the  League 
of  Nations  was  the  danger  from  the  outset  to  the  Treaty's 
ratification.  And  the  President's  rude  and  arbitrary  treat- 
ment of  the  Senate  from  the  beginning,  created  a  chasm  that 
was  never  bridged  and  which  he  appeared  to  desire  to  per- 
petuate. 

In  this  it  is  probable  that  history  will  conclude  that  the 
President  erred.  In  assuming  his  dictatorial  attitude 
toward  the  Senate,  a  body  of  co-equal  constitutional  author- 
ity in  treaty-making,  he  ignored  history,  tradition,  and  the 


3IO    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

written  Constitution  of  the  nation,  to  say  nothing  of  the 
respect  and  confidence  which  the  people  repose  in  this  con- 
stitutional body.  It  all  appears  to  have  come  about  as  a 
result  of  the  President's  misconception  of  executive  functions 
under  the  Constitution.  Either  that  or  an  inborn  desire  to 
assume  autocratic  powers  for  purposes  of  self-aggrandize- 
ment. As  a  sequel,  the  Senate's  position  steadily  grew 
stronger,  while  that  of  the  President  as  steadily  waned. 

As  a  result  of  his  peculiar  conception  of  executive  func- 
tions under  the  federal  Constitution,  or  for  some  other  rea- 
son of  equal  validity,  President  Wilson  appeared  to  think 
it  a  duty  that  he  should,  or  at  all  events  believe  that  he  could, 
create  a  public  sentiment  that  would  carry  him  through,  such 
sentiment  based  uppn  false  statement  of  fact;  in  other 
words,  that  he  could  make  people  believe  what  was  not  true, 
and  simply  because  he  said  it.  Examples  are  but  too  nu- 
merous. One  will  suffice  to  illustrate  his  method. 

On  September  25,  1919,  in  his  tour  across  the  country 
in  support  of  the  League  of  Nations,  President  Wilson  used 
this  remarkable  argument  at  Pueblo,  Colorado : 

I  had  gone  over  there  with,  so  to  say,  explicit  instructions.  Don't 
you  remember  that  we  laid  down  fourteen  points  which  should  contain 
the  principles  of  settlement?  They  were  not  my  points.  In  every 
one  of  them  I  was  conscientiously  trying  to  read  the  thought  of  the 
people  of  the  United  States,  and  after  I  uttered  those  points  I  had 
every  assurance  given  me  that  could  be  given  me  that  they  did  speak 
the  moral  judgment  of  the  United  States  and  not  my  single  judg- 
ment. 

It  was  on  this  kind  of  argument  that  the  President 
sought  to  make  the  American  people  believe  that  they  had 
given  him  a  mandate  to  insist  upon  his  terms  of  peace  as 
promulgated  in  his  Fourteen  Points.  He  never  disclosed, 
however,  who  it  was  that  had  jointly  with  him  worked  out 
the  Fourteen  Points  to  his  entire  satisfaction.  But  it  was 
with  that  kind  of  logic  that  the  people  were  made  suspicious 
of  President  Wilson's  right  intentions  and  that  discredited 


The  Treaty  of  Paris  311 

him  from  the  time  of  his  tour  across  the  country  as  they 
had  never  discredited  him  before. 

Upon  leaving  the  country  to  attend  the  Peace  Congress, 
President  Wilson  had  assured  the  Congress  of  his  own 
country  that  it  should  know  all  that  he  did.  It  soon  became 
evident  that  he  did  not  mean  to  keep  that  part  of  his  agree- 
ment. Immediately  after  he  had  submitted  the  Treaty  to 
the  Senate  for  its  consideration,  it  became  evident  that  if 
the  people  of  the  country  were  ever  furnished  "full  and  com- 
plete" information  about  the  League  of  Nations  and  the 
Peace  Treaty,  together  with  a  history  of  the  negotiations 
leading  up  to  them,  it  would  be  in  opposition  to  the  Presi- 
dent instead  of  with  his  aid  as  he  had  promised.  To  this 
end,  Administration  leaders  in  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations 
Committee  set  out  to  oppose  every  move  to  obtain  from  the 
President  the  reasons  back  of  the  Treaty  and  the  Covenant. 

When  the  situation  became  so  grave  that  he  no  longer 
dared  face  the  country  with  further  refusal,  the  President 
stated  that  he  would  receive  the  committee  at  the  White 
House  to  talk  over  the  great  instrument.  The  Senate, 
mindful  of  what  had  occurred  in  a  similar  meeting  at  the 
White  House  in  February,  declined  to  accept  this  invitation 
of  the  President,  unless  it  was  distinctly  understood  that 
it  was  to  be  an  open  meeting  and  for  the  use  of  the  public 
and  to  become  a  matter  of  record,  instead  of  a  White  House 
secret  conclave,  as  had  been  the  former  meeting.  From  this 
mid-summer  meeting  the  President  emerged  with  a  good 
reputation  as  a  casuist,  but  he  lost  tremendously  as  a  de- 
bater possessed  of  the  rugged  horse  sense  of  the  average 
American. 

The  first  decisive  vote  upon  the  reservations  which  the 
Senate  had  determined  to  make  to  the  Peace  Treaty  was 
that  upon  the  nation's  right  to  leave  the  League  of  Na- 
tions. This  occurred  on  November  8,  1919,  and  the  na- 
tion's right  was  sustained  by  a  vote  of  50  to  35.  This  was 
a  severe  blow  to  what  had  been  the  hopes  of  the  Adminis- 


312    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

tration  forces  that  the  Treaty  might  be  adopted  precisely 
as  President  Wilson  brought  it  back  with  him  from  Europe 
during  the  discussion. 

The  rejection  of  the  Treaty,  with  the  reservations 
adopted  by  the  Senate,  took  place  November  19,  1919. 
There  were  two  distinct  propositions  before  the  Senate  and 
on  these  various  propositions  from  three  to  ten  Democrats 
voted  with  the  Republicans.  When  President  Wilson  was 
disillusioned  as  to  Senate  procedure,  he  having  been  prev- 
iously of  opinion  that  it  required  two-thirds  of  the  Senate 
to  adopt  a  reservation,  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  to 
the  contrary  notwithstanding,  and  was  made  to  face  the 
fact  that  reservations  could  be  adopted  by  a  majority  vote 
of  that  body,  and  that  they  had  been  so  adopted,  he  sent 
a  written  communication  to  his  supporters  demanding  that 
they  vote  for  rejection  of  the  Treaty;  and  two-thirds  vote 
being  required  to  ratify,  it  was  accordingly  rejected  with 
the  reservations. 

After  the  rejection  of  the  Treaty  by  the  United  States 
Senate  in  a  decisive  vote  in  which  the  Republicans  were 
joined  by  prominent  Democrats,  the  interest  in  the  League 
of  Nations  was  not  lessened.  It  continued  to  be  discussed 
in  assemblies  everywhere;  votes  were  taken  upon  it  by  re- 
ligious bodies  particularly  in  urging  ratification  promptly, 
many  of  them  without  knowing  that  in  so  doing  they  were 
bartering  away  American  sovereignty  and  independence;  in 
mid-January,  1920,  the  colleges  and  universities  of  the  coun- 
try took  a  vote  upon  the  matter,  the  result  of  which  indi- 
cated a  considerable  majority  in  favor  of  reservations.  The 
paramount  question  then  became  whether  there  should  be  a 
compromise  between  the  position  assumed  by  the  President 
of  ratification  of  the  Treaty  as  he  presented  it  to  the  Sen- 
ate and  the  reservations  which  had  been  adopted  by  the 
Senate  previous  to  rejection  of  the  Treaty  on  November 
19.  At  the  Jackson  Day  dinner  in  Washington,  the  Presi- 
dent showed  the  same  obduracy  that  had  characterized  him 


The   Treaty  of  Paris  313 

throughout,  while  his  former  Secretary  of  State,  William 
J.  Bryan,  took  the  position  that  the  majority  in  the  United 
States  Senate  had  tl\e  right  to  its  own  views  without  being 
dictated  to  by  the  executive  and  a  compromise  should  be 
the  order  of  the  day.  So  prominent  became  this  issue  be- 
tween the  President  and  the  former  Secretary  of  State, 
that  all  the  other  noted  speakers  on  that  occasion  were  lost 
in  the  fog  of  discussion  which  followed. 

The  second  rejection  of  the  Treaty  occurred  just  four 
months  from  the  time  of  its  first  failure  of  ratification. 
Partisans  of  the  President  declared  that  it  was  due  to 
the  partisanship  of  Senator  Lodge  and  his  following.  The 
fact  is  the  President  gave  written  instructions  to  his  fol- 
lowers to  vote  against  ratification  if  any  change  was  made 
in  the  League-of-Nations  Covenant. 

During  the  long  discussion  in  the  Senate  and  over  the 
country  of  the  Treaty,  there  was  no  time  that  it  would 
not  have  been  ratified  promptly  but  for  the  Covenant,  a 
wholly  foreign  matter,  having  been  woven  into  it.  There 
would  have  been  no  serious  objection  on  the  part  of  either 
the  President  or  the  Senate.  It  was  the  matter  of  the 
League  of  Nations  alone  that  occasioned  controversy  and 
created  violent  opposition,  that  strained  the  relations  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  the  nations  associated  with 
her  in  the  war,  that  greatly  endangered  the  real  association 
for  the  purpose  it  was  thought  the  League  would  fulfill, 
and  which  delayed  peace  and  threatened  continued  disaster 
to  the  world. 

History  will  ask,  as  thousands  of  Americans  had  already 
asked,  Who  is  responsible  for  the  refusal  to  make  peace? 
Mr.  Wilson  sought  to  place  the  responsibility  on  the  Sen- 
ate; yet  the  Senate  was  eager  to  make  peace  and  to  ratify 
a  treaty  of  peace  that  would  leave  American  institutions 
and  freedom  of  action  unimpaired.  If  the  President  refused 
to  accept  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate  as  the 
Constitution  requires  on  a  matter  of  making  a  treaty,  the 


314    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

question  arose  whether  he  would  not  be  responsible  for 
failure. 

But  he  sought  to  carry  the  matter  away  from  the  Senate 
and  to  take  it  before  the  country,  for  which  there  is  no 
provision  in  the  Constitution.  In  other  words  he  was 
wholly  willing  to  ignore  the  constitutional  requirement  that 
he  make  treaties  of  peace  with  the  advice  and  consent  of 
the  Senate  and  to  adopt  a  method  outside  of  the  Constitu- 
tion by  an  appeal  to  a  vote  of  the  mass  of  the  people. 

And  yet  if  there  was  to  be  a  plebiscite,  the  President 
had  provided  no  means  by  which  to  force  a  vote  on  the 
simple  question,  as  he  would  have  it  passed  upon:  the 
Treaty  as  he  presented  it  or  no  treaty  at  all;  or  the  par- 
ticular Covenant  of  a  League  which  he  brought  from  Europe 
or  no  international  organization  at  all.  He  sought  to 
convince  the  people  that  he  was  with  the  people,  as  the 
Senate  was  against  the  people;  just  as  in  an  earlier  day  and 
in  another  land  Louis  Bonaparte  held  himself  put  to  be 
the  most  advanced  advocate  of  democratic  ideas  in  France, 
won  a  vote  by  the  people  and  overturned  the  Republic. 
And  even  should  President  Wilson  be  defeated  in  such  an 
appeal  he  could  easily  escape  the  obloquy  of  defeat  by  say- 
ing, "I  did  the  best  I  could,  I  bow  to  the  will  of  the  peo- 
pie." 

But  the  President  showed  plainly  that  his  devotion  to 
the  Treaty  of  Peace  and  to  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of 
Nations  was  variable.  He  clearly  told  the  Supreme  Coun- 
cil at  Paris  that  unless  his  authority  was  recognized  and 
his  decisions  complied  with  he  would  withdraw  the  Treaty 
from  the  Senate,  and  that  he  would  relieve  himself  of  all 
responsibility  if  his  will  did  not  prevail  in  the  dispute  be- 
tween Serbia  and  Italy.  He  did  not  hestitate  to  say  this, 
even  though  he  would  have  to  "face  the  unthinkable  task 
of  making  another  and  separate  peace  with  Germany"  and 
though,  to  quote  his  words,  he  would  have  to  "break  the 
heart  of  the  world." 


The  Treaty  of  Paris  315 

When  the  President's  proposal  for  a  "great  and  solemn 
referendum"  was  made,  as  stated  in  his  Jackson  Day  let- 
ter, it  really  meant  this  question:  "Shall  the  President  of 
the  United  States  conclude  treaties  without  advice  and  con- 
sent of  the  Senate?"  And  once  that  question  is  answered, 
another  President  with  the  same  characteristics  as  Wood- 
row  Wilson  might  easily  take  the  next  step  and  ask,  Shall 
the  President  make  laws  without  the  sanction  of  Congress? 
One  is  as  constitutional  as  the  other.  And  the  President 
who  would  undertake  to  overthrow  the  Constitution  on 
one  point  could  as  readily  assume  to  overthrow  it  on  the 
other. 

Not  only  Republicans  but  millions  of  Democrats  agreed 
with  William  J.  Bryan  that  the  president's  rejection  of  the 
Treaty  was  "a  colossal  crime." 

Said  Senator  Owen,  one  of  the  president's  staunchest 
adherents,  in  making  his  final  speech  before  the  roll  was 
called,  on  March  19,  1920: 

I  do  not  believe  there  is  a  single  Democratic  senator  who  would 
not  vote  for  this  resolution  of  ratification  if  it  were  not  for  the  belief 
of  such  senator  that  the  President  of  the  United  States  desires  them 
to  defeat  the  resolution  of  ratification  now  pending  and  would  regard 
their  failure  to  do  so  as  a  refusal  to  follow  his  view  as  party  leader. 

And  there  was  no  senator  in  a  better  position  than  he 
to  gauge  the  sentiments  of  his  colleagues;  nor  did  any  other 
senator  challenge  his  statement.  The  vote  was  49  to  35, 
and  its  return  to  the  President  was  ordered  by  the  Senate, 
and  there  it  remained  to  his  term's  close. 

There  was  never  any  show  for  ratification  in  the  dan- 
gerous form  in  which  President  Wilson  submitted  it  to 
the  Senate,  July  10,  1919.  His  refusal  to  permit  any 
change,  even  to  safeguard  the  interests  of  the  United  States, 
made  ratification  impossible.  His  written  instructions  that 
it  be  rejected  if  changes  were  to  be  made,  sealed  its  fate. 

And  the  event  makes  sardonic  comment  on  his  state- 


316    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

craft.  At  Paris  he  repeatedly  sacrificed  principle  to  save 
the  Covenant.  At  Washington  he  resisted  any  concession 
to  the  demands  for  the  nation's  safety.  The  Kansas  City 
Star,  in  commenting  upon  the  second  failure  of  the  Senate 
to  ratify  the  Treaty,  said: 

The  Peace  Treaty,  with  the  League  of  Nations,  is  dead.  It  has 
been  killed  by  the  President.  In  the  Senate  yesterday,  including  the 
pairs,  there  was  a  majority  of  eighteen  for  the  Americanized  Treaty, 
but  the  President  refused  to  release  the  seven  senators  whose  votes 
would  have  ratified  the  document. 

Both  houses  of  Congress  then  took  up  the  matter  of 
repealing  the  action  whereby  war  was  declared  to  exist  be- 
tween Germany  and  United  States.  On  April  9,  this  meas- 
ure passed  the  House  by  a  vote  of  242  to  150.  In  a 
modified  form,  it  passed  the  Senate.  But  the  President 
vetoed  the  measure,  thus  continuing  technical  war  of  his 
own  will,  which  he  so  much  deprecated  that  he  urged  Con- 
gress to  take  speedy  action  looking  toward  peace.  It  was 
not  peace  he  sought,  but  a  subterfuge. 

It  was  while  the  President  was  withholding  from  the 
Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee  the  important  treaty 
with  France,  in  direct  violation  of  his  solemn  agreement, 
that  he  was  urging  early  ratification  by  the  Senate  of  the 
document  he  brought  back  with  him  from  Europe,  declar- 
ing among  other  things  these : 

The  channels  of  trade  are  barred  by  war  when  there  is  no  war. 

Our  full  normal  profitable  production  waits  on  peace.  Our  mili- 
tary plans  wait  upon  it. 

The  nations  that  ratify  the  Treaty,  such  as  Great  Britain,  Bel- 
gium and  France,  will  be  in  a  position  to  lay  their  plans  for  con- 
trolling the  markets  of  the  world  without  competition  from  us,  if 
we  do  not  presently  act. 

Every  element  of  normal  life  among  us  depends  upon  and  awaits 
the  ratification  of  peace. 


The  Treaty  of  Paris  317 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  expressly  mentioned  as  an  understand- 
ing which  is  in  no  way  to  be  impaired  or  interfered  with  by  anything 
contained  in  the  Covenant. 

Immigration,  tariffs  and  naturalization  are  incontestibly  domestic 
questions  with  which  no  international  body  could  deal  without  ex- 
press authority  to  do  so. 

The  right  of  any  sovereign  state  to  withdraw  had  been  taken  for 
granted. 

The  United  States  will  undertake  under  Article  X  to  "respect 
and  preserve  as  against  external  aggression  the  territorial  integrity  and 
existing  political  independence  of  all  members  of  the  league."  And 
that  engagement  constitutes  a  very  grave  and  solemn  moral  obliga- 
tion. 

There  can  be  no  reasonable  objection  to  ...  interpretations  ac- 
companying the  act  of  ratification,  providing  they  do  not  form  a  part 
of  the  ratification  itself. 

In  the  famous  reply  of  the  Allies  to  President  Wilson, 
on  January  n,  1917,  declaring  the  objects  for  which  they 
were  engaged  in  the  war,  they  stated  the  principles  that 
became  basic  in  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace.  It  was 
a  solemn  declaration  from  which  they  never  swerved, 
whether  battles  were  lost  or  won,  until  the  final  victory.  To 
those  terms  they  held  when  President  Wilson  was  urging  a 
"peace  without  victory" ;  they  did  not  change  their  purposes 
when  Russia  withdrew  from  the  war,  nor  yet  when  the 
United  States  entered  it;  they  put  those  identical  prin- 
ciples into  the  armistice,  and  embedded  them  in  the  Peace 
Treaty.  The  result  was  a  settlement  which  the  organs  of 
the  Administration  afterward  hailed  as  a  product  of  wis- 
dom and  justice. 

In  speaking  of  the  American  colonies,  Edmund  Burke, 
the  great  Englishman,  declared:  "I  do  not  know  the 
method  of  drawing  up  an  indictment  against  a  whole  peo- 
ple." If  he  were  living  to-day  he  might  learn  from  the 
indictment  which  delivers  the  German  nation  to  a  moral 


318     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

judgment  from  which  there  will  be  no  appeal  now  or  here- 
after. The  measured  sentences  fall  upon  Germany's  self- 
slain  repute  like  clods  into  an  open  grave. 

And  in  this  connection  it  may  be  observed  that  it  is 
with  strange  irony  that  the  words  of  President  Wilson, 
"a  peace  of  justice,"  frequently  upon  his  lips,  were  used 
invariably  as  a  demand,  not  upon  Germany,  but  on  Ger- 
many's adversaries;  a  phrase  which  he  never  employed 
except  as  a  means  of  questioning  the  motives  and  decrying 
the  policies  of  the  nations  battling  against  the  common 
enemy;  the  habitual  form  of  his  warning  and  protest  against 
"imperialism"  and  "vindictiveness"  and  "greed"  which  he 
attributed  to  the  Allies; — strange  that  these  words  should 
enter  so  vividly  into  the  indictment  against  Germany, 
namely : 

Justice  is  what  the  German  delegation  asks  for  and  says  that 
Germany  has  been  promised.  But  it  must  be  justice  for  all.  There 
must  be  justice  for  the  dead  and  wounded  and  for  those  who  have 
been  orphaned  and  bereaved  that  Europe  might  be  freed  from  Prus- 
sian despotism.  There  must  be  justice  for  the  peoples  that  now  stag- 
ger for  those  millions  whose  homes  and  lands  and  property  German 
savagery  has  spoliated  and  destroyed. 

What,  then,  are  the  terms?  Only  a  few  may  be  here 
suggested  as  pointing  to  the  character  of  others.  The  terms 
of  the  Treaty  were  plainly  stated  and  none  too  severe  for 
the  crimes  committed  against  civilization.  Germany  was 
to  concede  the  reduction  of  her  territory  in  Europe  from 
208,825  square  miles  to  172,000  square  miles.  Her  popu- 
lation was  to  shrink  from  sixty-six  millions  to  fifty-four 
millions  through  the  liberation  of  peoples  held  in  unwilling 
subjection.  She  was  to  renounce  three  million  square  miles 
of  colonial  possessions  with  their  populations  of  thirteen 
millions.  Her  army,  which  in  peace  time  numbered  two 
million  men,  was  not  to  exceed  200,000,  and  after  March, 
1920,  was  to  be  cut  to  100,000.  She  was  to  dismantle  all 


The   Treaty  of  Paris  319 

fortifications  on  Helgoland  and  within  the  zone  of  30 
miles  of  the  Rhine.  The  fleet  which  she  treacherously  scut- 
tled after  its  surrender  was  not  to  be  replaced,  nor  would 
she  be  permitted  to  possess  military  or  naval  aircraft.  Ac- 
cepting responsibility  for  the  war,  she  was  to  assume  the 
obligation  of  repairing  all  damages  inflicted,  and  pay  there- 
for to  her  uttermost  capacity  under  the  supervision  of  an 
international  reparation  tribunal.  She  was  to  devote  her 
resources  for  a  generation  to  the  work  of  restitution  to 
the  nations  she  had  wronged. 

The  main  points  in  the  Peace  Treaty  are  as  follows : 

Alsace  and  Lorraine  go  to  France. 

All  the  bridges  over  the  Rhine,  on  their  borders,  are  to  be  in 
French  control. 

The  port  of  Danzig  is  permanently  internationalized  and  most 
of  upper  Silesia  is  ceded  to  Poland,  whose  independence  Germany 
recognizes.  Poland  also  receives  the  province  of  Posen  and  that  por- 
tion of  the  province  of  West  Prussia  west  of  Vistula. 

The  Saar  coal  basin  is  temporarily  internationalized.  The  coal 
mines  go  to  France. 

Germany  recognizes  the  independence  of  German-Austria  and 
Czecho-Slovakia. 

Germany's  colonies  are  taken  from  her  by  clauses  in  which  she 
renounces  all  her  territorial  and  political  rights  outside  of  Europe. 
The  League  of  Nations  will  work  out  the  mandatory  system  for  gov- 
erning these  colonies. 

Belgium  is  conditionally  given  the  Malmedy  and  Eupen  districts 
of  Prussia  bordering  on  Belgium,  with  the  opportunity  to  be  given 
the  inhabitants  to  protest.  The  League  of  Nations  has  the  final 
decision. 

Luxembourg  is  set  free  from  the  German  customs  union. 

All  concessions  and  territory  in  China  must  be  renounced.  Shan- 
tung is  ceded  to  Japan. 

Germany  recognizes  the  French  in  Morocco  and  the  British  pro- 
tectorate over  Egypt. 

German  troops  and  authorities  must  evacuate  Schleswig-Holstein 
north  of  the  Kiel  canal  within  ten  days  after  peace.  A  commission 


320    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

will  be  appointed  to  supervise  a  vote  of  self-determination  in  the  ter- 
ritory, and  the  districts  wishing  to  join  Denmark  will  be  ceded  by 
Germany. 

Helgoland  must  be  demolished,  and  by  German  labor.  The  Kiel 
canal  must  be  opened  to  all  nations. 

The  German  cables  in  dispute  are  surrendered. 

Germany  may  not  have  an  army  of  more  than  100,000  men  and 
cannot  resort  to  conscription. 

She  must  raze  all  her  forts  for  fifty  kilometers  east  of  the  Rhine 
and  is  almost  entirely  prohibited  from  producing  war  material.  Vio- 
lation of  the  5O-kilometer  zone  restriction  will  be  considered  an  act 
of  war. 

Only  six  capital  ships  of  not  more  than  10,000  tons  each  are  al- 
lowed Germany  for  her  navy.  She  is  permitted  six  light  cruisers, 
twelve  destroyers  and  twelve  torpedo  boats  in  addition  to  six  battle- 
ships, but  no  submarines. 

All  civilian  damages  are  to  be  reimbursed  by  Germany,  her  initial 
payment  to  be  20,000,000,000  marks,  with  subsequent  payments  to 
be  secured  by  bonds.  She  must  replace  shipping  ton  for  ton,  handing 
over  a  great  part  of  her  economic  resources  to  rebuilding  the  devas- 
tated regions. 

Parts  of  Germany  will  be  occupied  on  a  diminishing  scale  until 
reparation  is  made. 

Germany  must  agree  to  the  trial  of  former  Emperor  William  by 
an  international  court  for  a  supreme  offense  against  international 
morality  and  to  the  trial  of  others  of  her  subjects  for  violations  of 
the  laws  and  customs  of  war. 

The  Allies  and  Germany  accept  the  League  of  Nations,  Germany, 
however,  only  in  principle  and  not  as  a  member. 

All  treaties  and  agreements  with  Bolshevik  Russia  must  be  abro- 
gated, as  well  as  the  treaty  of  Bucharest  with  Rumania. 

German  prisoners  of  war  are  to  be  repatriated,  but  the  Allies 
will  hold  German  officers  as  hostages  for  Germans  accused  of  crimes. 

After  months  of  uncertainty  and  disunion,  this  most  mo- 
mentous and  far-reaching  compact  ever  drawn  was  signed 
by  the  envoys  of  virtually  all  the  civilized  and  stable  gov- 
ernments of  the  earth;  and  after  nearly  five  years  of 
strife,  unparalleled  in  extent  and  destructiveness,  peace  was 


The  Treaty  of  Paris  321 

re-established  by  the  signing  of  the  Treaty.  As  President 
Wilson  declared,  there  was  framed  for  better  or  worse, 
"the  charter  for  a  new  order  of  affairs  in  the  world." 

To  the  superficial  view  the  Treaty  looked  like  a  finality 
— the  nations  had  counselled  together  and  established  peace, 
and  the  world,  it  seemed,  was  freed  from  war  or  the  im- 
minent threat  of  it.  Yet  upon  sober  examination  it  was 
perceived  that  this  was  the  least  conclusive  document  of 
the  kind  in  history.  Instead  of  solving  the  world's  dangers 
and  difficulties,  the  Treaty  merely  declares  the  manner  in 
which  civilization  would  endeavor  to  solve  them.  It  was 
really  not  a  settlement.  It  was  merely  a  program  for  a 
settlement,  and  the  test  of  its  value  lay  in  the  application  of 
its  provisions. 

And  herein  it  quickly  exhibited  its  weakness.  By  mid- 
October,  1919,  it  had  been  ratified  by  Great  Britain,  France, 
Italy,  and  Germany.  Under  its  terms,  this  was  sufficient  to 
make  it  effective  upon  exchange.  There  was  no  immediate 
exchange  of  ratification,  as  it  was  hoped  that  the  United 
States  would  become  a  party  by  ratification.  Exchange  by 
the  ratifying  nations  took  place  January  10,  1920,  and  the 
Treaty  became  fully  operative  among  these  nations.  When 
news  dispatches  from  Paris,  on  January  5,  1920,  told  the 
country  that  the  United  States  ambassador  to  France  had 
requested  the  Supreme  Council  to  precede  future  decisions 
of  that  body  with  the  formula,  "Allied  Powers,"  instead 
of  "Allied  and  Associated  Powers,"  as  formerly  used,  the 
French  newspaper  Echo  de  Paris  declared:  "This  marks 
the  determination  of  the  United  States  not  to  participate 
officially  in  the  decisions  to  be  reached  in  Paris." 

And  now  came  the  danger  from  the  weakness  of  this 
momentous  document.  When  the  Allies,  in  the  spring  of 
1920,  and  even  before  that,  were  unwilling  to  exert  them- 
selves as  a  unit  to  save  the  Treaty  from  violation  and  be- 
coming a  mere  scrap  of  paper  in  the  hands  of  Germany, 
France  stepped  in,  as  she  did  in  the  beginning  of  the  world 


322     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

conflagration,  and  declared  that  Germany  must  observe 
the  terms  of  the  Treaty,  at  least  so  far  as  movement  toward 
the  French  border  was  concerned.  And  Belgium,  as  she  did 
at  the  beginning  of  the  world  conflagration,  boldly  stepped 
to  her  side,  and  shoulder  to  shoulder  they  served  emphatic 
notice  upon  Germany  that  at  least  that  portion  of  the  Treaty 
was  in  force.  Then  President  Wilson  interposed  an  objec- 
tion, and  declared  France  had  militaristic  aims.2  While 
the  fact  is,  Germany  was  plainly  and  openly  violating  the 
most  essential  parts  of  the  Treaty  as  affecting  France,  in- 
cluding the  requirement  to  furnish  coal  to  replace  that 
wantonly  destroyed,  and  the  reduction  of  her  army.  When 
the  statesmen  of  Europe  came  together  at  San  Remo,  in 
April,  1920,  to  take  up  these  matters  which  affected  Europe 
primarily  and  almost  solely,  the  matters  were  quickly  ad- 
justed. France's  complete  reply  to  President  Wilson  was, 
See  that  Germany  disarms,  and  then  we  shall  disarm.  And 
in  this  conference,  on  April  21,  Lloyd  George  stated  rather 
pointedly  that  the  League  Covenant  was  inserted  in  the 
Peace  Treaty  out  of  deference  to  President  Wilson;  and 
now  that  President  Wilson  was  to  all  intents  and  purposes 
out  of  European  politics,  the  time  had  come  to  clear  the 
decks  of  impracticabilities. 

In  his  statement  the  President  is  perfectly  clear  and 
says  that  the  purpose  of  the  League  of  Nations  is  to  protect 
the  world  against  the  French  government,  and  not  against 
a  revival  of  kaiserism  or  the  overwhelming  terror  of  Bol- 
shevism. That  is  to  say,  to  curb  the  imperialistic  ambitions 
of  the  French  democracy  which,  for  the  protection  of  its 
own  existence  and  the  freedom  of  the  world  had  lost  over 
a  million  men  killed — 57  per  cent  of  the  country's  manhood 
between  the  ages  of  19  and  34  years — 300,000  more  mem- 
bers missing  and  never  recovered;  her  wounded  numbering 
above  3,000,000,  of  whom  700,000  were  rendered  per- 

3  The  most  cordial  reception  given  Marshal  Foch  when  he  visited  the 
United  States  in  October  and  November,  1921,  went  far  toward  wiping 
out  this  unwarranted  blot  upon  the  page  of  Franco-American  friendship. 


The  Treaty  of  Paris  323 

manently  helpless.  With  France's  40,000,000  of  a  popula- 
tion it  meant  what  would  be  the  equivalent  of  3,000,000 
of  Americans  killed  with  over  800,000  more  missing  and 
never  recovered,  9,500,000  wounded  of  whom  2,000,000 
would  be  so  maimed  as  to  be  permanently  helpless.  This 
should  be  sufficient  answer  to  Mr.  Wilson's  accusation 
against  France  which  he  singles  out  particularly  to  compare 
with  Germany  under  kaiserism  as  an  unbridled  aggressor. 

It  was  proclaimed,  however,  in  a  joint  statement  by  the 
three  Allied  powers  on  April  26  that  they  stood  unequivo- 
cally for  full  execution  of  the  Treaty.  President  Wilson 
was  not  present  and  the  Europeans  found  themselves  cap- 
able of  settling  European  matters  without  his  hand.  Their 
statement  said: 

The  Allies  are  unanimous  in  declaring  that  they  cannot  tolerate 
a  continuance  of  these  infractions  of  the  Treaty;  that  the  Treaty 
must  be  executed,  and  remain  as  the  basis  of  relations  between  Ger- 
many and  the  Allies ;  and  that  they  are  resolved  to  take  all  measures 
— even,  if  necessary,  the  occupation  of  additional  German  territory,  in 
order  to  insure  execution  of  the  Treaty.  Germany  must  understand 
that  the  unity  of  the  Allies  for  the  execution  of  the  treaty  is  as  solid 
as  it  was  for  war. 

Germany,  still  seeking  a  way  of  escape  from  the  penalty 
for  her  crimes  against  civilization,  did  not  promptly  comply 
with  these  requirements.  And  when,  July  8,  1920,  another 
critical  point  was  reached  in  the  conference  of  the  Allies 
with  the  Germans  at  Spa,  in  Belgium,  Germany  was  plainly 
told  that  the  time  limit  for  accepting  the  Franco-British 
terms  of  disarmament  was  set  for  noon  of  the  following  day, 
and  that  the  German  army  was  to  be  reduced  to  150,000 
by  October  i.  It  was  France  that  had  caused  the  Treaty  to 
be  executed,  and  that  in  the  face  of  President  Wilson's 
unfounded  accusations. 

In  this  connection  history  must  note  the  fact  that  from 
the  time  President  Wilson  returned  from  Europe  with  the 
Treaty,  embodying  the  undertakings  to  which  he  sought  to 


324    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

bind  the  country  without  authority  from  the  people,  the 
Administration  was  making  large  plans  for  a  United  States 
army  that  seemed  beyond  all  proportion  to  any  demands, 
except  for  such  obligations.  While  Secretary  Baker  saw 
no  need  of  preparation  when  actual  war  was  confronting 
the  nation  and  thanked  God  for  lack  of  it,  now  when  the 
war  was  ended  and  the  world  was  exhausted  he  was  plan- 
ning for  an  army  of  576,000.  It  set  the  country  to  asking 
why. 

While  President  Wilson  had  declared  in  his  New  York 
address,  upon  his  second  departure  to  attend  the  Peace 
Congress,  that  the  League-of-Nations  Covenant  should  be 
so  inextricably  interwoven  with  the  Treaty  that  it  could 
not  be  untangled  without  destroying  the  whole  document, 
Secretary  Hughes  deftly  performed  the  feat  and  the  sepa- 
rate treaty  which  he  prepared  was  accepted  by  Germany, 
and  October,  1921,  it  was  ratified  by  the  Senate. 

uln  the  multitude  of  counsellors  there  is  safety";  but 
one  headstrong  man's  wisdom  may  be  fatal. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

As  a  policy  of  the  Administration,  the  League  of  Na- 
tions was  given  a  place  overshadowing  any  other.  Upon 
its  success  President  Wilson  declared  that  his  place  in  his- 
tory must  be  based.  By  it  his  reputation  must  be  made; 
without  it,  it  must  fall. 

Whether  it  gave  any  individual  or  any  administration  a 
standing  in  history  is  of  little  consequence.  Whether  a 
great  policy  such  as  that  proposed  would  advantage  the 
nation  or  the  world  is  a  matter  of  supreme  importance.  If 
it  could  but  put  into  practice  in  the  world  the  great  prin- 
ciple of  social  justice,  it  would  be  worth  all  the  efforts  and 
all  the  heart-burnings  the  throes  of  its  bringing  forth  re- 
quired. 

And  President  Wilson  was  consistent,  persistent,  in- 
sistent upon  this  one  thing,  however  much  he  wavered  in 
the  other  great  affairs  of  state.  He  held  that  The  League, 
The  Covenant,  and  not  some  other,  must  prevail.  He  held 
that  the  American  people  had  given  him  a  mandate  which 
he  must  obey,  and  which  he  did  obey,  in  bringing  from  the 
Paris  Peace  Congress  the  instrument  at  first  called  the 
Constitution  of  the  League,  which  later  became  the  Cove- 
nant of  The  League  of  Nations.  And  sight  must  never  be 
lost  of  the  fact  that  there  is  a  distinction  with  a  difference 
between  a  league  and  The  League.  The  former  is  the 
policy  of  the  nation  and  the  world;  the  latter,  that  of  Presi- 
dent Wilson. 

From  history's  earliest  dawn  there  have  been  associa- 
tions of  nations.  These,  in  the  earliest  days,  were  almost 
wholly  for  defensive  or  offensive  purposes  in  war.  In  mod- 

325 


326    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

ern  times  they  have  been  placed  upon  a  firmer  basis,  as 
they  have  been  upon  a  higher  plane.  The  more  advanced 
thought  in  the  United  States  provoked  and  built  up  the  idea 
of  a  league  of  the  more  progressive  nations  of  the  world 
to  enforce  peace  upon  all  the  nations  of  earth.  Much  had 
already  been  accomplished  in  the  way  of  education  along 
that  line  when  the  coming  of  the  Great  War  gave  added 
impetus.  Individuals  and  societies  in  all  sections  of  the 
country  were  giving  of  their  energy  to  forward  the  move- 
ment. Former  President  William  H.  Taft  was  chosen 
president  of  the  national  organization.  Once  the  new  idea 
of  the  League  of  Nations,  as  announced  by  President  Wil- 
son, was  brought  forward,  Mr.  Taft  became  its  enthusiastic 
supporter;  so  enthusiastic,  in  fact,  that  it  was  thought  his 
enthusiasm  ran  away  with  his  better  judgment.  On  the 
Pacific  coast  speaking  in  behalf  of  the  Covenant  he  went 
so  far  as  to  declare  that  those  who  did  not  support  it  he 
would  not  trust  over  night.  Later  he  materially  modified 
his  attitude,  when  the  dangers  lurking  in  the  instrument 
were  pointed  out  to  him  concretely. 

Very  early  in  the  days  of  the  European  conflict,  Theo- 
dore Roosevelt  said  : 

The  one  effective  move  for  obtaining  peace  is  by  an  agreement 
among  the  great  Powers,  in  which  each  should  pledge  itself  not  only 
to  abide  by  the  decisions  of  a  common  tribunal,  but  to  back  its  deci- 
sions with  force.  The  great  civilized  nations  should  combine  by 
solemn  agreement  in  a  great  world  league  for  the  peace  of  righteous- 
ness.1 

And  this  idea  grew  with  him  with  the  years  of  the  Euro- 
pean tragedy.  He  felt  that  in  the  group  of  democracies 
whose  representatives  met  in  Paris  to  settle  the  issues  of 
the  Great  War  there  was  the  foundation  of  the  structure, 
ready  built  and  cemented  by  the  common  ideals  of  govern- 
ment and  of  law;  and  that  this  structure  should  be  strength- 
ened by  creating  confidence  in  it.  In  his  last  dictated  article, 

1  Philadelphia  North  American,  October  18,  1914. 


The  League  of  Nations  327 

but  which  he  had  not  the  opportunity  to  correct  when  death 
intervened,  he  gave  to  the  world  his  idea  of  a  real  league 
of  nations  in  the  beginning  days  of  the  World  Peace  Con- 
gress. 

Would  it  not  be  well  to  begin  with  the  league  which  we  actually 
have  in  existence,  the  league  of  the  Allies  who  have  fought  through 
this  Great  War?  .  .  .  The  American  people  do  not  wish  to  go  into 
an  overseas  war  unless  for  a  very  great  cause  and  where  the  issue  is 
absolutely  plain.2 

At  the  same  time  he  criticized  the  nebulousness  of  President 
Wilson's  expressions,  so  far  as  they  were  permitted  to 
reach  this  country,  stating  that  it  was  ua  serious  misfortune 
that  our  people  are  not  getting  a  clear  idea  of  what  is  hap- 
pening on  the  other  side,"  touching  a  league  of  nations, 
while  uwe  all  earnestly  desire  such  a  league,  only  we  wish 
to  be  sure  that  it  will  help  and  not  hinder  the  cause  of 
world  peace  and  justice." 

It  was  not  until  President  Wilson  began  to  grip,  as  he 
believed,  some  international  relationships,  that  he  was  cap- 
able of  assuming  so  advanced  a  position  as  the  great  former 
President.  Before  American  entered  the  war,  and  only 
four  years  before  he  was  in  his  mortal  combat  with  the 
Senate,  he  voiced  his  conviction  in  these  words:  "Every 
man  who  stands  in  this  presence  should  examine  himself 
and  see  whether  he  has  a  full  conception  of  what  it  means 
that  America  should  live  her  own  life."  And  referring  to 
the  nation's  relations  with  the  rest  of  the  world  he  de- 
clared : 

We  cannot  form  alliances  with  those  who  are  not  going  our  way ; 
and  in  our  might  and  majesty  and  in  the  confidence  and  definiteness 
of  our  own  purpose  we  need  not  and  we  should  not  form  alliances 
with  any  nation  in  the  world. 

But  during  the  Great  War  he  came  to  believe,  according 
to  his  public  statements,  that  internationalism  was  greater 

"Kansas  City  Star,  January  13,  1919. 


328     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

than  nationalism;  that  the  Covenant,  as  he  brought  it 
back  from  Europe,  was  greater  than  the  American  govern- 
ment. It  was  by  degrees  that  he  reached  this  stage,  and 
only  after  association  with  European  statesmen,  as  witness 
his  various  statements;  for  in  his  original  position  his  utter- 
ances were  merely  in  the  negative  form. 

In  his  address  to  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace,  on  May 
27,  1916,  he  declared  that  "the  United  States  is  willing 
to  become  a  partner  in  any  feasible  association  of  nations 
...  to  maintain  inviolate  the  security  of  the  highways 
of  the  sea  for  the  common  and  unhindered  use  of  all  the 
nations  of  the  world,  and  to  prevent  any  war  begun  either 
contrary  to  treaty  covenants  or  without  warning  and  full 
submission  of  the  cause  to  the  opinion  of  the  world." 

Accepting,  September  2,  1916,  renomination  for  the 
presidency,  he  declared  that  "the  nations  of  the  world  must 
unite  in  joint  guarantee  that  whatever  is  done  to  disturb  the 
whole  world's  life  must  first  be  tested  in  the  court  of  the 
whole  world's  opinion  before  it  is  attempted." 

On  January  22,  1917,  in  an  address  to  the  Senate  he 
stated  that  "the  peace  must  be  followed  by  some  definite 
concert  of  power  which  will  make  it  virtually  impossible 
that  any  such  catastrophe  should  ever  overwhelm  us  again." 

In  his  address  to  Congress  asking  a  declaration  of  war, 
on  April  2,  1917,  he  declared  that  "our  object  is  to  set 
up  among  the  self-governed  peoples  of  the  world  such  a 
concert  of  purpose  and  of  action  as  will  insure  the  observ- 
ance of  its  principles." 

To  the  Russian  Provisional  Government  he  stated  in 
his  message  of  May  26,  1917:  "The  free  peoples  of  the 
world  must  draw  together  in  some  common  covenant  .  .  . 
the  brotherhood  of  mankind  must  be  given  a  structure  of 
force  and  reality." 

Stating  his  Fourteen  Points  in  the  address  to  Congress 
on  January  8,  1918,  he  announced  as  the  last: 


The  League  of  Nations  329 

A  general  association  of  nations  must  be  formed  under  specific 
covenants  having  the  purpose  of  affording  mutual  guarantees  of  po- 
litical independence  and  territorial  integrity  to  great  and  small  na- 
tions alike. 

In  his  address  to  the  Mexican  editors  at  the  White 
House  on  June  7,  1918,  he  said:  "The  whole  family  of 
nations  will  have  to  guarantee  to  each  nation  that  no  nation 
shall  violate  its  political  independence  or  its  territorial  in- 
tegrity." 

While  touring  Europe,  in  response  to  the  address  of  the 
French  socialists  on  December  14,  1918,  he  declared  it  to 
be  necessary  that  security  against  absolutism  and  militarism 
"should  be  supported  by  a  co-operation  of  the  nations  which 
shall  be  based  upon  fixed  and  definite  covenants  and  which 
shall  be  made  certain  of  effective  action  through  the  instru- 
mentality of  a  league  of  nations."  And  while  in  Europe 
he  gave  his  definition  of  the  league  thus: 

My  conception  of  the  league  of  nations  is  just  this — that  it  shall 
operate  as  the  organized  moral  force  of  man  throughout  the  world, 
and  that  whenever  or  wherever  wrong  and  aggression  are  planned  or 
contemplated  this  searching  light  of  conscience  will  be  turned  upon 
them  and  men  everywhere  will  ask,  "What  are  the  purposes  that  you 
hold  in  your  heart  against  the  fortunes  of  the  world  ?" 

A  keen  analyst  in  collating  these  views  of  President 
Wilson,  declaring  that  his  ideas  as  given  out  after  reach- 
ing Europe  were  more  nebulous  than  before,  commented: 
"If  an  enduring  league  of  nations  is  to  be  created,  the 
structure  must  be  erected  by  statesmen  who  are  builders. 
It  will  never  rise  at  the  waving  of  an  oratorical  wand  and 
the  utterance  of  vague  formulas  of  aspirations."  3  It  was 
an  uncontradicted  fact  that  up  to  the  end  of  1918  the  man 
who  had  made  the  idea  his  own  and  then  undertook  to 
establish  it  as  an  accomplished  reality,  was  still  promoting 

"Philadelphia  North  American  for  December  30,  1918. 


33°    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

abstract  theory  and  unformulated  plan.  After  urging  it 
for  two  and  a  half  years,  when  called  upon  to  present  a 
definite  program  he  was  able  only  to  outline  vague  aspira- 
tions. It  was  this  that  led  Senator  Knox  to  state:  "I  am 
entirely  ignorant  of  what  the  President  means  by  a  league 
of  nations" ;  and  a  Democratic  Senator  to  say  that  what  he 
could  gather  from  the  President's  idea  was  a  world  federa- 
tion to  which  a  large  part  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  United 
States  would  be  surrendered;  while  a  third  gave  it  as  his 
idea  that  Mr.  Wilson  sought  to  have  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  give  law  to  the  nations;  and  yet  others  took 
the  view  that  he  aimed  at  nothing  but  a  general  entente  of 
governments,  based  upon  precepts  of  morality  and  justice. 

It  was  in  this  frame  of  mind  that  President  Wilson 
began  sitting  with  the  world's  statesmen  at  Paris  to  settle 
peace  upon  the  world.  How  he  delayed  the  business  that 
was  of  first  importance  has  been  related  elsewhere.4  The 
cables  having  been  taken  over,  the  public  was  kept  in  the 
dark  as  to  what  was  taking  place  by  way  of  binding  the 
nation  in  a  league.  Nor  was  the  nation  aware  that  an 
American  plan  for  a  league  of  nations  was  proposed,  until 
the  fact  was  disclosed  upon  close  questioning  of  the  Presi- 
dent by  senators  at  a  White  House  conference  with  the 
Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee  after  the  Treaty  was 
concluded.  Even  then  the  President  did  not  permit  this 
plan  to  come  to  the  light.  The  form  adopted  was  drawn 
by  the  British  General  Smuts  and  patterned  upon  the  form 
of  government  of  the  British  Empire. 

Just  before  President  Wilson  returned  to  the  United 
States  in  February,  for  the  closing  days  of  Congress,  he 
read  to  the  peace  conference  the  League-of-Nations  Con- 
stitution. This  he  permitted  to  reach  this  side  of  the 
Atlantic.  So  violent  and  sweeping  was  the  criticism  of  the 
program  that  flared  up  in  the  Senate  that  some  eager  edi- 
tors were  asking  whether,  after  all,  the  entire  project  was 

4  See  chapter  on  The  Peace  Congress. 


The  League  of  Nations  331 

to  be  wrecked  by  the  nation  that  had  been  regarded  as  its 
special  sponsor.  President  Wilson  had  sent  in  advance  of 
his  coming  a  message  requesting  that  there  be  no  discussion 
of  the  League  until  he  could  present  it  to  the  people.  This 
request  was  wholly  disregarded  on  all  sides.  The  most 
violent  discussion  ensued.  Some  of  the  staunchest  of  rock- 
ribbed  Democrats,  as  the  veteran  Henry  Watterson  of  Ken- 
tucky, took  decisive  stand  against  the  constitution;  while 
some  of  the  most  prominent  men  of  the  opposite  party,  as 
former  President  Taf t,  took  a  firm  stand  for  the  instrument. 
Promptly  thirty-nine  senators  signed  a  statement  that  they 
would  not  vote  for  ratification  of  the  Treaty  with  this  Con- 
stitution as  a  part  thereof.  This  doomed  it  to  defeat. 
President  Lowell  of  Harvard  University,  favoring  the  Con- 
stitution as  a  whole,  thought  it  faulty  in  construction,  some- 
what loosely  drawn,  and  requiring  some  amendments. 
Senator  Lodge,  declaring  in  favor  of  the  principle  of  a 
league  of  nations  to  insure  the  peace  of  the  world,  strongly 
opposed  the  form  in  which  presented,  one  of  about  forty 
plans  suggested.  It  was  felt  that  the  one  which  President 
Wilson  accepted  and  brought  to  America  had  not  safe- 
guarded vital  interests  of  the  United  States,  but  he  an- 
nounced that  "there  is  good  and  sufficient  reason  for  the 
phraseology  and  substance  of  each  article."  And  when  he 
failed  to  justify  or  even  intelligently  explain  the  new  doc- 
trine, there  was  immediate  and  fierce  attack  from  all 
quarters,  and  the  country  was  being  stirred  as  it  had  not 
been  since  war  days. 

At  noon  of  March  4  the  new  Senate  began  its  existence. 
When  President  Wilson,  on  the  evening  of  that  day,  as  he 
was  taking  his  departure  a  second  time  for  the  Paris  Peace 
Congress,  appeared  for  a  public  address  in  New  York,  he 
and  former  President  Taft  went  upon  the  platform  arm  in 
arm.  The  public  interest  was  at  high  pitch.  Of  the  100,- 
ooo  applications  for  admission  to  the  place  of  meeting,  the 
Metropolitan  Opera  House,  all  had  to  be  denied  except  the 


33 2     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

3,400  for  whom  there  were  seats  and  an  additional  500 
whom  the  law  permitted  to  stand.  Mr.  Taft  spoke  first. 
The  President  followed.  He  knew  of  the  statement  signed 
by  the  39  senators,  namely: 

Now,  therefore,  be  it  resolved  by  the  Senate  of  the  United  States 
in  the  discharge  of  its  constitutional  duty  of  advice  in  regard  to 
treaties,  that  it  is  the  sense  of  the  Senate  that,  while  it  is  the  sincere 
desire  that  the  nations  of  the  world  should  unite  to  promote  peace 
and  general  disarmament,  the  constitution  of  the  League  of  Nations 
in  the  form  now  proposed  to  the  Peace  Conference  should  not  be  ac- 
cepted by  the  United  States. 

It  cut  him  to  the  quick.  He  looked  upon  it  as  an  attack 
upon  him  and  as  an  intrusion  of  the  Senate  upon  executive 
privilege  of  making  such  treaties  as  seemed  best  to  him 
without  suggestion  from  that  body.  Braced  by  the  inspira- 
tion of  what  he  accepted  as  popular  approval,  he  lashed  the 
legislative  body  in  a  tone  of  jeering  defiance,  declaring  that 
Senators  displayed  "comprehensive  ignorance  of  the  state 
of  the  world"  and  that  he  would  hang  them  as  high  as 
Haman,  but  hang  them  the  other  way,  and  that  he  "loathed 
their  pigmy  minds."  It  was  felt  through  the  nation  that 
such  intemperate  language  was  beneath  the  dignity  of  the 
high  office  occupied  by  Mr.  Wilson;  it  was  felt  so  all  the 
more  since  the  nation  was  looking  to  him  to  make  clear  the 
purposes  and  undertakings  to  which  he  was  seeking  to  bind 
the  Republic;  and  when  they  asked  for  bread  he  gave  them 
a  stone.  For  on  that  historic  occasion  he  declared: 

When  that  treaty  comes  back,  gentlemen  on  this  side  will  find 
the  Covenant  not  only  in  it,  but  so  many  threads  tied  to  the  Cove- 
nant that  you  cannot  dissect  the  Covenant  from  the  treaty  without 
destroying  the  whole  vital  structure. 

And  partisans  of  the  President  assailed  the  protesting  sen- 
ators as  enemies  of  peace,  pro-German  marplots,  and  pet- 
tifogging obstructionists. 

Yet  at  the  very  time  that  these  accusations  were  being 


The  League  of  Nations  333 

made,  the  Senate  statement  was  opening  the  eyes  of  states- 
men of  other  nations,  and  causing  a  change  in  the  attitude 
of  the  French  press  and  of  the  European  delegates  to  the 
Peace  Congress  at  Paris.  And  when  President  Wilson 
reached  Paris  he  was  obliged  to  face  the  fact  that  the  Peace 
Congress  had  arranged,  in  his  absence,  a  peace  based  on 
practical  considerations,  with  the  League  separate.  He 
thereupon  halted  the  proceedings  until  the  Covenant  was 
intertwined  as  a  component  part  of  the  Treaty.  It  is  a 
fine  part  of  the  irony  of  the  situation  that  it  was  Switzer- 
land, and  not  Mr.  Wilson  or  his  associates,  that  urged  an 
amendment  to  the  Covenant  confirming  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, so  far  as  that  appears  in  the  Covenant.  So  eager  did 
Mr.  Wilson  become  to  secure  approval  of  his  position 
touching  the  Covenant  that  other  nations,  seeing  his  atti- 
tude, took  advantage  of  it  to  gain  their  own  points.  Ruth- 
less he  had  been  in  the  use  of  his  great  prestige  in  the  Peace 
Congress,  ruthless  became  others  in  return.  He  was  com- 
pelled to  engage  in  trading  to  gain  his  point.  The  Japanese 
were  keen  students  of  his  methods,  and  they  drove  a  ruth- 
less bargain,  even  with  more  poignancy  than  he.  On  April 
2,  Baron  Makino,  head  of  the  Japanese  delegation,  de- 
clared: "We  are  not  too  proud  to  fight,  but  we  are  too 
proud  to  accept  a  place  of  admitted  inferiority  in  dealing 
with  associate  nations."  As  a  result  of  their  ruthlessness, 
the  Japanese  acquired  possession  of  a  province  inhabited 
by  36,000,000  Chinese.  And  immediately  President  Wilson 
returned  to  America,  he  was  put  on  the  defensive  in  this 
deal  of  Japan,  and  which  an  American  delegate,  Secretary 
of  State  Lansing,  declared  was  not  necessary  to  obtain 
Japan's  approval  of  the  League  Covenant. 

President  Wilson  appeared  conscienceless  in  his  bold 
statements  to  the  assembled  statesmen  of  the  world  that  he 
had  from  the  American  people  a  mandate  to  form  a  League 
of  Nations.  If  there  was  any  mandate  given  it  was  in  the 
adverse  verdict  of  the  1918  election,  and  its  fair  interpreta- 


334    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

tion  would  seem  to  indicate  a  command  that  he  remain  at  his 
constitutional  post  of  duty  in  Washington  rather  than  taking 
up  an  unauthorized  post  in  Paris.  He  had  sought  to  blind- 
fold European  statesmen  by  taking  over  control  of  all  the 
ways  of  communication  between  the  United  States  and  Paris 
under  the  subterfuge  that  it  was  a  war  necessity,  and  suc- 
ceeded until  the  ways  of  communication  were  again  open 
and  free  to  the  world.  It  was  on  April  28,  1919,  in  refer- 
ring to  the  League  Covenant,  that  he  made  to  the  Peace 
Congress  this  astounding  declaration: 

If  we  return  to  the  United  States  without  having  made  every 
effort  in  our  power  to  realize  this  program,  we  should  return  to  meet 
the  merited  scorn  of  our  fellow-citizens.  They  expect  their  leaders 
to  speak  their  thoughts.  .  .  .  We  have  no  choice  but  to  obey  their 
mandate.  But  it  is  with  the  greatest  enthusiasm  and  pleasure  that 
we  accept  that  mandate.  .  .  .  We  would  not  dare  abate  a  single  item 
of  the  program  which  constitutes  our  instructions. 

There  was  never  a  more  audacious  pretense  than  that  the 
people  had  given  President  Wilson  a  mandate  or  instruc- 
tions to  deliver  the  country  unreservedly  to  international- 
ism. Like  so  many  of  the  war  powers,  it  was  taken  upon 
purely  gratuitous  assumption.  But  its  chief  evil  lay  in  the 
fact  that  it  misled  European  statesmen,  who  did  not  feel 
at  liberty  to  set  lightly  aside  the  statements  of  the  only 
head  of  a  nation  in  the  Congress,  even  if  they  knew  his 
statements  to  be  without  foundation  in  fact.  Yet,  when 
these  same  statesmen  did  permit  themselves  to  be  led 
astray  after  the  warning  resolution  signed  by  the  thirty- 
nine  senators,  they  should  not  have  accused  the  American 
people,  as  some  did,  of  dishonor.  If  they  did  not  know  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States,  they  should  have  known 
it  required  action  by  the  Senate  in  treaty  making. 

After  the  President's  return  to  Europe  in  March,  the 
Constitution  of  the  League  of  Nations  became  the  Cove- 
nant. In  this  country  its  supporters  were  termed  Cove- 


The  League  of  Nations  335 

nanters.  And  while  the  instrument  was  given  to  the  public 
in  all  the  leading  capitals  of  Europe,  it  was  denied  the 
American  public.  Even  the  Senate,  which  must  pass  upon 
it  officially,  the  President  declined  to  furnish  a  copy,  and 
it  was  first  given  that  body  outside  of  official  channels. 

But  on  July  10,  1919,  President  Wilson  appeared  in 
person  before  the  Senate  and  read  the  text  of  the  Treaty, 
which  contained  the  Covenant.  Now  the  fight  waxed  more 
fierce  than  before.  Mr.  Wilson  appeared  to  use  more 
suave  methods,  evidently  to  gain  senators  to  his  side  of  the 
controversy  and  to  win  the  people.  But  both  distrusted 
him.  Both  sought  enlightenment  and  found  it  not.  The 
first  opportunity  that  offered,  in  his  Boston  speech  when  he 
landed  in  his  own  country  in  February  with  the  League 
Constitution,  he  ignored.  In  his  later  efforts  he  was  but 
confusing.  In  his  White  House  conference  with  the  Senate, 
his  logic  fared  badly  under  questioning  of  the  senators. 

Meanwhile  every  means  known  to  the  propagandist  was 
being  used  to  forestall  a  correct  judgment  on  the  part  of 
the  public.5  Mr.  Taft's  statements  in  support  of  the  Cove- 
nant were  given  more  space  than  he  could  command  while 
President,  except  on  special  occasions.  In  August,  1919, 
the  joint  committee  on  printing  of  the  Senate  and  House 
discovered  that  propaganda  favoring  the  League  Cove- 
nant was  printed  and  distributed  at  government  expense.6 
In  a  speech  in  Boston,  July  8,  1919,  Senator  Hiram  W. 

5  It  was  announced  from  Washington  that  arrangements  had  been  com- 
pleted whereby  the  Mount  Clemens,  Michigan,  news  bureau,  the  press 
agency  supported  by  Henry  Ford  for  publicity  in  his  libel  suit  against  the 
Chicago  Tribune,  would  report  President  Wilson's  tour  across  the  country 
in  behalf  of  the  League  of  Nations  free  of  charge,  for  it  had  its  own  cor- 
respondent on  the  President's  train.  An  announcement  sent  to  editors 
throughout  the  country  stated  that  it  would  supply  the  President's  speeches 
"in  plate  form  of  two  or  three  columns  free  of  charge,  transportation  pre- 
paid, to  such  papers  as  desired  them."  The  estimated  cost  of  this  service 
was  $500,000.  The  circular  offering  this  free  service  did  not  state  who 
would  pay  the  bills. 

"Among  the  publications  named  were  National  School  Service,  with  a 
half-million  circulation;  School  Life,  with  40,000,  a  semi-monthly;  the  Great 
Lakes  Bulletin,  daily,  put  out  by  the  Naval  Training  Station  at  Great  Lakes, 
Illinois;  and  the  Life  Buoy,  at  the  Navy  Yard,  Portsmouth,  New  Hampshire. 


336    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

Johnson  charged  that  the  propaganda  covering  the  whole 
country  was  devoted,  not  to  the  dissemination  of  truth  but 
to  deceiving  the  people,  paid  for  by  millions  of  dollars 
wrung  by  taxation  from  an  over-burdened  people,  and  con- 
cluded: "We  have  been  picking  our  pockets  to  poison 
our  minds." 

To  combat  the  powerful  influence  of  the  Administration 
with  the  people's  money  supporting  it,  there  was  organized 
the  League  for  the  Preservation  of  American  Independence, 
in  which  prominent  men  of  the  country,  regardless  of  politi- 
cal affiliation,  became  active  with  a  view  to  setting  the  es- 
sential facts  about  the  League-of-Nations  Covenant  before 
the  people  in  their  true  light. 

And  the  people  began  gripping  the  situation.  At  first 
apathetic,  the  several  steps,  whether  of  planned  deception 
or  of  purposed  enlightenment,  by  which  the  people  reached 
the  height  stand  out  clear.  And  each  step  gained  was  but 
gathering  force  to  hurry  the  great  mass  of  the  people  on 
to  the  next.  In  it  all,  it  is  a  remarkable  fact  that  many 
ministers,  churches,  and  teachers  were  misled  by  the  Presi- 
dent's sophistry.  But  the  momentum  became  so  great  as 
to  carry  all  before  it.  The  first  step  was  the  President's 
declaration  that  he  would  be  bound  by  the  decision  of  the 
people  at  the  polls  in  the  1918  election,  and  then  deliber- 
ately ignoring  his  pledge  not  only,  but  in  violation  of  his 
own  pronouncement  of  "open  covenants  openly  arrived  at," 
cutting  off  all  communication  with  his  own  nation,  sitting 
in  secret  conclave  to  bind  his  nation  to  dangerous  under- 
takings. This  was  followed  by  his  casting  aside  the  first 
opportunity  offered  him,  in  his  Boston  speech,  to  explain 
to  his  countrymen  to  what  he  was  pledging  the  nation.  He 
not  only  had  thus  ignored  the  people,  but  still  more  offen- 
sively ignored  the  request  of  the  Senate  for  information  that 
would  enable  it  to  pass  intelligently  upon  the  great  instru- 
ment as  required  by  the  Constitution.  The  next  step  of 


The  League  of  Nations  337 

enlightenment  to  the  nation  was  his  calling  individual  sen- 
ators to  the  White  House,  one  at  a  time,  to  talk  over  in- 
formally the  Covenant,  and  the  views  they  gave  out  after 
they  had  interviewed  the  President.  But  greatly  more 
enlightening  was  the  White  House  conference  7  with  the 
Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee,  when  he  undertook  to 
state  his  views  of  the  document;  for  he  had  been  telling 
the  whole  country,  in  season  and  out,  that  he  could  make 
clear  every  point  so  that  no  one  need  hesitate  in  its  sup- 
port. Until  then,  many  senators  withheld  judgment;  so 
did  many  people.  Though  he  had  repeatedly  deceived  them, 
and  they  knew  it,  they  willingly  heard  him  yet  again.  But 
they  were  thinking.  He  had  not  convinced  the  Senate. 
He  would  now  awaken  the  people  to  force  the  Senate  to 
action.  When  he  submitted  the  Covenant  to  the  Senate  on 
July  10,  he  asked  prompt  action.  When  the  Senate  asked 
of  him  documents  to  aid  in  its  consideration  of  the  instru- 
ment, he  failed  to  furnish  any.  They  called  witnesses  that 
seemed  to  possess  knowledge,  among  them  Secretary  of 
State  Lansing  whose  position  antagonized  the  President. 
Much  time  was  lost  in  seeking  information  at  the  best 
sources. 

The  next  and  final  step  on  the  part  of  the  President  was 
to  go  before  the  country.    He  undertook  a  tour  from  the 

TAt  the  President's  suggestion,  this  conference  was  arranged  and  it  was 
held  in  August,  1919.  Asked  as  to  Article  X,  of  which  he  is  said  to  be  the 
framer,  whether  it  did  not  bind  the  United  States  to  undertakings  inconsist- 
ent with  the  nation's  fundamental  law,  he  saidlit  was  not  legally  binding, 
but  that  it  had  a  moral  obligation  that  was  more  binding  than  would  be  a 
legal.  He  informed  the  committee  that  aside  from  the*  Treaty  itself  there 
is  no  record  of  the  proceedings  of  the  Paris  Peace  Congress.  He  said: 
"Each  day  the  matters  discussed  were  summarized  and  the  conclusions 
reached  were  recorded  as  a  process  verbal" ;  which  means  that  these  records 
will  be  kept  secret  and  that  the  only  copies  are  held  by  members  of  the 
Council.  He  further  stated  it  as  his  "confident  impression  from  the  debates 
that  accompanied  the  formulation  of  the  Covenant"  that  the  unconditional 
right  of  withdrawal  from  the  League  remained  in  the"  United  States, 
adding:  "That  is  my  interpretation"  and  "I  am  confident  that  that  was 
the  view."  Yet  he  opposed  putting  that  plainly  in  writing  into  the  solemn 
instrument,  willing  to  hinge  America's  most  vital  interests  upon  his  "inter- 
pretation*' and  a  "view." 


338     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

Atlantic  to  the  Pacific  and  back  again,  speaking  at  the  more 
important  centers.  In  the  earlier  of  these  addresses,  he 
again  stepped  a  few  paces  beneath  the  dignity  of  his  high 
office  when,  in  referring  to  the  Senate,  he  termed  those 
opposing  the  Covenant  as  "contemptible  quitters,"  and  ad- 
vised them  to  "put  up  or  shut  up."  Throngs  met  him 
everywhere.  The  people  were  eager  to  know  what  he  had 
to  say  of  this  new  thing.  His  answers  but  confused  the 
people  seeking  information.  In  his  Des  Moines  address 
he  declared:  "I  have  come  out  to  fight  for  a  cause.  That 
cause  is  greater  than  the  Senate.  It  is  greater  than  the 
government.  It  is  as  great  as  the»cause  of  mankind."  The 
sophistry  of  this  did  not  deceive  the  people.  It  stirred  them 
to  a  deeper  study  of  the  great  issue  between  the  President 
and  the  Senate.  Many  condemned  the  Senate.  Many  good 
people  took  issue  with  the  Senate.  Many  church  bodies 
passed  resolutions  supporting  the  President  and  condemning 
the  Senate.8  This,  however,  did  not  affect  the  thoughtful 
leaders  of  the  churches.  It  was  the  Senate  that,  in  that 
crucial  hour,  saved  the  fundamental  law  of  the  land,  and 
real  leaders  acknowledged  the  fact.  In  his  commencement 
address  on  June  8,  1919,  Chancellor  James  R.  Day,  of 
Syracuse  University,  condemned  the  Covenant  as  an  in- 
famous bargain,  declaring: 

The  fear  that  should  seize  the  heart  of  every  red-blooded  citizen  of 
this  country  to-day  is  that  the  position  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  is  threatened  in  settlement  of  world  controversies  at 
Paris.  I  would  reject  and  overthrow  everything  before  I  would  re- 
ject the  Constitution  of  the  United  States. 

And  referring  to  the  safeguard  of  the  vital  instrument, 
he  said: 

8  It  became  almost  a  fad  for  some  one  in  such  a  body  seeking  a  little 
local  notoriety  to  offer  a  resolution  to  that  effect;  and  then  to  call  for 
a  vote.  As  no  one  knew  much  about  it,  the  vote  was  almost  invariably 
nearly  unanimous  for  the  resolution.  These  were  published  in  the  news- 
papers and  it  operated  as  strong  propaganda  for  the  cause. 


The  League  of  Nations  339 

If  there  is  any  body  of  men  of  whom  the  American  people  should 
be  proud  to-day  it  is  their  senators,  standing  firmly  for  the  defense 
of  the  sacred  institutions  of  our  country.  Thank  God  that  there  is  a 
remnant  of  statesmanship  left  standing  between  America  and  the 
imperial  quagmires  of  internationalism. 

This  position  was  but  typical  of  independent  thinkers. 
The  bodies  of  men  and  women  who  voted  for  a  resolution 
because  some  one  presented  it,  and  for  no  better  reason, 
were  not  typical  of  the  best  traditions  of  the  country. 

And  as  President  Wilson  proceeded  on  his  trip  across 
the  continent,  he  constantly  lost  ground,  while  men  of  the 
type  of  Chancellor  Day  who  gave  reasons  for  their  faith 
instead  of  sophistry  for  confusion  of  the  inquiring  mind 
were  winning.  When,  as  he  did  at  Des  Moines,  the  Presi- 
dent declared  that  uto  alter  that  Treaty  is  to  impair  one 
of  the  first  charters  of  mankind,"  he  was  giving  utterance 
to  statements,  blasphemous  to  Americanism,  that  turned 
Senate  and  people,  without  regard  to  party,  against  him 
and  his  views.  It  was  on  September  14,  while  on  his  tour 
of  the  country,  that  the  week  of  celebration  of  the  adoption 
of  the  Constitution  began,  emphasizing  the  value  of  consti- 
tutional government.  One  might  have  expected  the  Presi- 
dent to  pause  long  enough  to  give  some  expression  upon 
the  importance  of  such  government  as  opposed  to  oligarchic, 
autocratic,  or  mob  government,  and  of  the  value  which  the 
Constitution  and  the  government  founded  upon  it  had  been 
to  mankind.  But  he  did  not  do  that;  instead,  he  was  urging 
his  countrymen  to  force  their  Senate  to  approve  a  Covenant 
which  was  a  theory  with  him,  but  which  he  expounded  to 
them  as  greater  than  the  government. 

The  further  he  proceeded  in  his  discussion,  the  more 
the  people  obtained  an  insight  into  the  weakness  of  his 
position  and  the  unworthiness  of  his  demands.  They  raised 
questions  as  to  the  instrument  which  he  brought  back  with 
him  from  Paris.  He  demanded  that  the  nation  make  the 
supreme  sacrifice  "without  counting  the  cost."  At  Salt 


34°    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

Lake  City  he  was  questioned  outright,  as  he  had  been  in 
less  obvious  form  previously.  He  was  hurt  by  these  ques- 
tionings. He  had  not  convinced  the  people,  except  that 
he  was  wrong.  He  had  spent  himself.  Taken  ill  from 
the  great  strain  and  disappointment,  he  was  hurried  back 
to  Washington,  while  the  whole  nation,  forgetting  for 
the  time  his  ill-conceived  mission,  eagerly  read  about  and 
discussed  his  critical  condition.  It  is  doubtful  whether,  in 
all  American  history,  there  was  a  campaign  of  equal  magni- 
tude that  was  so  sterile  of  result  except  as  it  stirred  the  na- 
tion to  its  danger. 

He  was  immediately  followed  by  Senator  Hiram  W. 
Johnson  who  stirred  the  people  everywhere  he  went,  as 
far  as  the  Twin  City,  when  he  returned  to  Washington. 
This  was  the  first  revealment  of  how  deeply  the  people 
were  interested  in  this  rather  abstruse  and  obscure  subject. 
At  Kansas  City  delegations  came  to  hear  Senator  Johnson 
from  four  states,  including  Oklahoma  and  Texas. 

The  great  issue,  as  raised  by  President  Wilson,  was  be- 
tween him  and  the  Senate.  As  stated  by  an  eminent  publi- 
cist, his  attitude  was  that  "at  no  lime  shall  the  Senate  be 
permitted  freely  to  perform  its  constitutional  duty,  which 
is  equivalent  to  saying  that  one  man  can  absolutely  deter- 
mine the  future  destiny  of  the  United  States."  9  The  Sen- 
ate perforce  accepted  the  challenge.  The  people  became 
referee.  He  sought  to  make  it  appear  that  the  Senate  was 
against  a  league  of  nations,  as  he  confused  the  people  at 
first  when  he  declared  that  eighty  per  cent  of  the  people 
were  in  favor  of  a  league  of  nations.  He  could  as  truth- 
fully have  said  ninety  per  cent;  for  very  few  are  not  in 
favor  of  a  league.  But  to  favor  some  league  was  one  thing; 
to  favor  the  Covenant  which  he  submitted  to  the  Senate  was 
quite  another  matter.  Therefore,  the  Senate  wanted  to 
change  the  Covenant  so  as  to  meet  America's  demands.  He 
refused  to  permit  any  changes  in  the  instrument  itself, 

"David  Jayne  Hill  in  North  American  Review  for  November,  1919. 


The  League  of  Nations  341 

but  was  willing  that  clarifying  statements  might  be  made 
by  the  Senate  outside  of  the  Covenant.  This  would  have 
been  of  no  value,  except  to  confuse,  since  it  would  be  no 
part  of  the  instrument.  The  conclusions  reached  by  the 
Senate  committee  majority  presented  the  issue  that  came 
before  the  country  in  acute  form.  It  said: 

The  League  as  it  stands  demands  sacrifices  of  American  inde- 
pendence and  sovereignty  which  would  in  no  way  promote  the  world's 
peace,  but  which  are  fraught  with  the  gravest  dangers  to  the  future 
safety  and  well-being  of  the  United  States.  We  exact  nothing  for 
ourselves,  but  we  insist  that  we  shall  be  the  judges,  and  the  only 
judges,  as  to  the  preservation  of  our  rights,  our  sovereignty,  our 
safety,  and  our  independence. 

President  Wilson  declared  that  to  change  Article  X  of 
the  Covenant  would  ucut  the  heart  out  of  the  League." 
This  noted  Article  is  this : 

The  members  of  the  League  undertake  to  respect  and  preserve 
as  against  external  aggression  the  territorial  integrity  and  existing 
political  independence  of  all  members  of  the  League. 

In  case  of  any  such  aggression,  or  in  case  of  any  threat  or  danger 
of  such  aggression,  the  council  shall  advise  upon  the  means  by  which 
this  obligation  shall  be  fulfilled. 

The  crucial  test  in  the  Senate's  consideration  of  the 
Treaty  came  on  November  13,  19 19,  when,  by  a  vote  of 
46  to  33,  it  adopted  a  reservation  to  this  Article.10  And 
though  the  President  in  his  Cheyenne  address  had  declared 
that  a  reservation  substantially  this  he  would  regard  as 
a  rejection,  it  made  no  difference  in  the  vote.11 

"This  celebrated  reservation  is  in  these  words:  "The  United  States 
assumes  no  obligation  to  preserve  the  territorial  integrity  or  political  in- 
dependence of  any  other  country  or  to  interfere  with  controversies  between 
nations,  whether  members  of  the  League  or  not,  under  the  provisions  of  Ar- 
ticle X,  or  to  employ  the  military  or  naval  forces  of  the  United  States 
under  any  article  of  the  treaty  for  any  purpose,  unless  in  a  particular  case 
the  Congress,  which  under  the  Constitution  has  the  sole  power  to  declare 
war  or  authorize  the  employment  of  the  military  forces  of  the  United 
States,  shall,  by  act  or  joint  resolution,  so  provide." 

"Mr.  Wilson  entertained  the  delusion  that  a  reservation  could  be 
adopted  only  by  a  two-thirds  vote,  instead  of  by  a  majority  vote. 


342     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

Around  this  issue  waged  one  of  the  most  hardly  con- 
tested struggles  in  all  American  history.  It  reached  be- 
yond the  seas  and  involved  statesmen  of  other  great  na- 
tions. Because  of  this  Covenant  being  made  a  component 
part  of  the  Treaty,  it  was  rejected  by  the  Senate  on  No- 
vember 19,  1919,  seven  Democrats  joining  the  majority 
party  in  rejecting  ratification  of  the  unchanged  Treaty. 
Four  Democrats  voted  with  the  Republicans  to  ratify  with 
the  reservations  that  had  been  voted  by  a  decisive  majority 
of  the  Senate. 

Efforts  at  compromise  were  then  made  by  such  ardent 
advocates  of  the  Covenant  as  former  President  Taft.  But 
President  Wilson  was  obdurate.  The  official  statement  of 
his  position  was  that  uhe  has  no  concession  or  compromise 
of  any  kind  in  mind."  Prominent  men  of  both  political 
parties,  leaders  in  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace,  sought 
a  compromise,  all  to  no  effect.  Indeed,  it  was  a  fact  no- 
where disputed  that  ratification  would  have  taken  place 
on  November  19,  had  not  the  President  intervened  with 
a  letter  to  his  partisans  in  the  Senate  to  vote  down  the 
resolution  of  ratification  with  reservations — an  attempt  to 
override  the  will  of  that  body  and  to  paralyze  its  constitu- 
tional powers. 

After  this  action  there  was  a  variety  of  statements  as 
to  the  President's  position.  This  discussion  he  ended  on 
January  8,  at  the  Jackson  Day  banquet  in  Washington, 
by  a  formal  statement  that  rather  than  permit  any  modi- 
fication of  the  Covenant  he  would  carry  it  into  the  presi- 
dential campaign  by  a  "great  and  solemn  referendum." 
On  the  same  occasion  William  J.  Bryan  took  issue  with 
the  President,  declaring  that  it  was  the  Senate's  right  to 
adopt  reservations  as  it  saw  fit.  Thus  came  the  cleavage 
that  ran  through  the  fall  campaign  to  the  undoing  of  execu- 
tive arrogancy. 

Immediately  following  the  President's  Jackson  Day 
statement,  more  than  a  score  of  Democratic  senators  framed 


The  League  of  Nations  343 

a  plan  for  a  bi-partisan  conference  with  Republicans  and 
began  a  series  of  daily  meetings  on  January  15  for  thresh- 
ing out  their  differences.  Mr.  Wilson  still  intervening, 
stated  as  late  as  January  26  that  the  Lodge  reservations 
would  "chill  our  relationship"  with  the  associated  European 
powers.  Unfortunately  for  this  utterance  of  the  President, 
Viscount  Edward  Grey,  special  ambassador  from  Great 
Britain  to  the  United  States,  but  whom  President  Wilson 
declined  to  see,  made  public  in  England  the  result  of  his 
observations  on  the  situation  in  the  United  States.  Febru- 
ary i,  1920,  he  stated  that  Great  Britain  should  not  except 
to  the  position  of  the  United  States  in  making  reservations 
to  the  Covenant.  It  at  once  put  the  President  on  the  de- 
fensive. It  placed  him  and  his  supporters,  as  their  oppo- 
nents put  it,  in  the  position  of  being  even  more  British  than 
the  Britons,  since  Viscount  Grey  declared  that  there  could 
be  no  objection  even  to  an  increase  of  the  vote  of  the  United 
States  to  more  than  one,  should  it  so  desire.  Remarkable 
as  was  the  fact  that  a  statement  of  a  foreign  ambassador 
affecting  American  politics  was  made  and  published  broad- 
cast without  resentment,  it  was  yet  more  remarkable  that 
it  was  warmly  received  by  Americans.  This  was  due  in 
great  measure  to  its  timeliness,  speaking  as  he  did,  not 
only  for  Great  Britain,  but  for  the  other  Allied  nations 
who  had  done  everything  short  of  official  proclamation  to 
indicate  their  willingness  to  have  the  United  States  make 
such  reservations  as  it  deemed  proper. 

President  Wilson  had  told  the  Senate  that  failure  to 
ratify  the  Treaty  with  the  Covenant  would  "break  the  heart 
of  the  world."  Yet  he  prevented  ratification  on  terms  satis- 
factory to  the  Senate,  to  the  people,  and  to  the  nations  of 
Europe.  He  gave  the  impression  not  only  to  the  American 
public  but  to  the  European  nations  as  well,  that  he  was 
willing  that  the  heart  of  the  world  should  break  unless 
all  would  submit  to  his  one  arbitrary  will. 

On  the  final  vote  by  the  Senate  on  ratification,  March 


344    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

19,  1920,  of  the  49  voting  in  the  affirmative  28  were  Re- 
publicans and  21  Democrats — a  gain  of  14  of  the  Presi- 
dent's party  to  his  opponents  since  the  vote  on  November 
19,  1919.  Just  before  this  vote  was  taken,  Senator  Owen, 
of  the  President's  party,  and  one  of  his  staunch  supporters, 
stated  it  as  his  belief  that  there  was  not  a  Democratic  sen- 
ator who  would  not  vote  for  ratification  if  each  did  not 
believe  that  the  President  wanted  him  to  vote  its  defeat. 
As  a  matter  of  history,  every  Democratic  senator  but  six 
voted  for  pne  or  more  of  the  reservations  under  the  leader- 
ship of  Senator  Lodge.  It  was  not  a  matter  of  partisanship 
with  them;  it  was  a  matter  of  Americanism.  But  partisan 
newspapers  attempted  to  accuse  the  leaders  against  the 
dangerous  Covenant  of  seeking  partisan  advantage;  and 
many  good  people  were  misled  by  the  baselessness  of  the 
charge.12 

From  its  lofty  inception  until  eliminated  by  the  final 
vote  of  March  19,  1920,  the  League  of  Nations  constantly 
lost  ground.  The  reasons  assigned  were  many.  Perhaps 
the  most  potent  was  the  method  by  which  President  Wilson 
undertook  to  force  the  Covenant  upon  the  people  in  the 
first  place  without  consideration  or  discussion;  and,  when 
discussion  became  inevitable,  by  misleading  the  people  by 
false  and  illogical  premises  to  believe  the  thing  was  right 
but  which  the  general  discussion  disclosed  as  all  wrong  from 
the  American  point  of  view  and  in  conflict  with  the  United 
States  Constitution.  And  it  looked  as  if,  when  the  "great 
and  solemn  referendum"  was  held  on  November  2,  1920, 
there  was  nothing  more  to  be  said;  that  the  avalanche  of 
ballots  buried  it  beyond  all  possibility  of  resurrection.  It 
will  probably  be  discovered,  however,  that  there  is  a  place 
for  an  association  of  nations  such  as  the  American  people 

"A  fair  example  is  an  article  by  Samuel  Plantz,  president  of  Lawrence 
College,  in  the  Northwestern  Christian  Advocate,  Chicago,  December  17, 
1919.  Such  men  failed  to  perceive  that  it  was  President  Wilson,  and  not 
the  Senate,  who  was  seeking  to  pull  the  wool  over  the  eyes  of  the  people. 
The  Senate  was  living  up  to  the  best  traditions  of  that  notable  body,  as 
Chancellor  Day  recognized. 


The  League  of  Nations  345 

desire.  But  there  is  an  end  of  the  Covenant  such  as  Presi- 
dent Wilson  brought  from  Paris  and  submitted  to  the 
United  States  Senate  on  July  10,  1919.  It  was  Wilsonism, 
and  not  a  league  of  nations,  that  brought  disaster  to  the 
President's  political  party — a  disaster  which  he  himself  in- 
vited and  in  the  face  of  warnings  from  those  of  his  own 
political  faith  who  had  at  heart  the  best  interests  of  the 
nation  and  of  the  world. 

The  United  States  Constitution  is  the  fundamental  law 
of  the  land,  and  is  greater  than  internationalism;  and  he 
who  declares  the  latter  the  greater  is  of  an  unsafe  type  of 
American. 

The  action  of  President  Wilson's  successor  in  July, 
1921,  calling  a  conference  of  the  great  powers  to  consider 
disarmament  seems  a  more  direct  and  more  efficient  method 
of  helping  the  world  to  the  path  of  peace  than  setting  up  a 
kind  of  world  government  to  which  the  fundamental  law 
of  the  land  must  be  subordinated. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

THE  ADMINISTRATION  AND  POLITICS 

From  its  beginning,  the  American  nation  has  success- 
fully maintained  popular  government.  This  it  has  accom- 
plished through  definite,  well-organized  political  parties,  by 
means  of  which  all  classes  of  people  have  been  free  to  ex- 
press their  convictions  upon  any  great  public  matter.  This 
is  the  antithesis  of  class  domination  as  found,  for  example, 
in  Russia  under  the  czar  and  in  more  pronounced  form  in 
the  present  regime,  where  class  rule  is  supreme,  as  it  was 
in  Prussia  prior  to  the  Great  War. 

Two  positions  of  President  Wilson  assumed  during  the 
two  terms  he  served,  while  seeming  fatally  inconsistent  with 
this  view  are  really  in  accord.  A  partisan  of  the  more  nar- 
row type,  he  has  been  regarded  as  a  liberal.  As  a  liberal, 
however,  he  has  not  been  found  generous  toward  the  most 
thorough  Americanism.  In  the  liberal  has  been  found  the 
man  of  great  position  favorable  to  a  class  that  would 
strengthen  his  position  as  an  individual.  If  this  liberalism 
tended  toward  internationalism  instead  of  nationalism,  that 
was  no  concern  of  his.  The  chief  aim  was  greater  power 
within  the  grasp  of  the  President.  If  that  could  be  at- 
tained through  a  strictly  political  organization,  then  that 
was  the  channel  of  operation.  If  working  through  a  class 
seemed  the  more  feasible,  then  that  was  the  chosen  channel. 
A  careful  study  of  the  acts  of  President  Wilson's  Adminis- 
tration beneath  the  surface  and  out  of  view  of  the  public, 
where  he  chiefly  worked,  discloses  that  every  act  of  the 
first  importance  faithfully  kept  this  one  aim  in  view,  sweep- 
ing from  the  great  circumference  straight  and  rigidly  to  the 
center,  as  the  spokes  of  a  great  wheel  from  its  rim  to  the 

346 


The  Administration  and  Politics  347 

hub.  Never  was  this  purpose  lost  from  sight.  And  any 
study  of  the  Administration's  politics  based  upon  any  other 
theory  will  be  fatally  defective. 

Examples  of  this  mode  of  operation  are  numerous  and 
glaring.  One  will  well  illustrate  this  view.  Others  will 
be  found  in  this  chapter.  When  the  President  yielded  to 
the  demands  of  the  railway  trainmen  just  prior  to  the  presi- 
dential election  in  1916,  he  bowed  to  an  imperious  class 
demand.  It  is  probably  the  most  considerable  bribe  ever 
offered  and  paid  for  the  presidency,  though  put  into  a  form 
that,  on  the  surface,  partook  of  the  nature  of  an  act  of 
virtue.  Mr.  Wilson  was  willing  to  operate  through  a 
political  party  so  long  as  that  accomplished  his  purpose; 
through  any  organized  class,  when  that  offered  him  more. 

It  accords  well  with  his  theory  enunciated  during  the 
years  in  his  study  prior  to  entering  upon  the  presidency, 
when  seeking  to  express  something  of  his  philosophy  of 
American  government.  He  declared  that  the  chief  execu- 
tive engaged  much  in  politics.  And  when  placed  on  the 
higher  level,  this  is  laudable;  when  dragged  in  the  mire 
for  any  purpose,  and  chiefly  when  for  personal  ambition,  it 
is  most  reprehensible  to  America's  best  thought.  The 
slogan  of  Jackson's  administration  that  uto  the  victor  be- 
longs the  spoils,"  was  excepted  to,  even  in  that  day.  In 
a  measure,  it  was  the  practice  in  the  Civil  War  period  and 
immediately  after,  when  the  spoils  system  again  gained  the 
ascendency.  But  all  this  occurred  when  there  was  no  civil- 
service  merit  system  in  existence.  Moreover,  it  was  thought 
that  the  nation  had  advanced  somewhat  in  its  view  of  pub- 
lic office  as  a  public  trust  between  that  day  and  President 
Wilson's  incumbency. 

Indeed,  prior  to  his  occupying  the  office  of  chief  execu- 
tive of  the  nation,  Woodrow  Wilson  had  declared  himself 
repeatedly,  and  was  looked  to  by  civil-service  reformers  as, 
a  friend  and  champion  of  the  civil-service  merit  system. 
And  when  he  became  chief  executive  of  the  nation,  it  was 


348     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

stated  broadly  in  the  land  that  civil-service  rules  would  be 
strictly  adhered  to  and  the  scope  of  the  merit  system  en- 
larged. It  was  announced  with  large  publicity  that  the 
post-offices  throughout  the  country  would  be  served  by  men 
who  had  earned  their  position  by  their  capacity  for  that 
kind  of  service  to  the  public. 

Yet  the  Administration  had  scarcely  ended  these  an- 
nouncements to  the  public  when  it  began  its  system  of  fla- 
grant disregard  of  merit  in  the  postal  service.  It  was  the 
method  that  obtained  throughout  the  two  terms  of  the  Ad- 
ministration of  announcing  in  advance  its  virtuous  purposes 
and  then  working  to  accomplish  its  concealed  designs.  An 
early  notable  example  was  the  displacing  of  Mr.  Morgan, 
the  capable  postmaster  of  New  York  City,  who  had  worked 
his  way  through  the  grades  to  the  highest  position  of  the 
kind  in  the  country,  than  whom  there  was  no  abler  or  more 
dependable  man  for  good  service,  to  make  way  for  a  man 
Tammany  wanted,  »the  chief  organization  of  corruption  in 
New  York  politics.  This  was  in  contrast  with  the  method 
of  Mr.  Cleveland  when  he  came  to  the  presidency.  He 
was  large  enough  a  President  to  continue  in  that  office  a 
capable  official  whom  he  found  there.  But  it  soon  came  to 
be  understood  that  Mr.  Burleson  was  appointed  to  the  office 
of  Postmaster-General  for  the  purpose  of  building  up  a 
strong  partisan  political  system  throughout  the  country. 
It  was  discovered  that  he  was  using  an  appointee,  covered 
into  the  civil  service  by  presidential  order,  to  write  political 
letters  to  ascertain  how  a  senatorial  campaign  was  progres- 
sing in  Nevada,  through  the  postmasters  of  that  state. 
The  next  day  after  this  activity  was  divulged  to  the  public, 
an  activity  in  violation  of  law  and  of  the  civil-service  rules, 
Mr.  Burleson,  evidently  to  divert  public  attention  from  his 
own  impropriety,  issued  this  statement  to  the  public:  "I 
sincerely  regret  that  certain  Republican  leaders  have  thrust 
partisanship  into  the  congressional  contest,  which,  under 
our  constitution,  was  unavoidable  at  this  critical  period 


The  Administration  and  Politics  349 

of  the  World's  War,"  and  referred  in  a  sneering  manner  to 
the  suggestion  of  Will  Hays,  national  chairman  of  the  op- 
position political  party,  that  "We  are  not  Republicans  or 
Democrats;  we  are  Americans"  and  there  should  be  a  united 
effort  to  elect  members  of  Congress  for  their  Americanism 
and  not  for  their  political  partisanship. 

It  has  been  frequently  asked  why  Woodrow  Wilson, 
private  citizen,  professed  so  heartily  his  friendship  for  the 
merit  system  in  the  civil  service,  while  throwing  it  so  strenu- 
ously into  the  discard  when  he  became  President.  The  ques- 
tion is  capable  of  intelligent  answer  only  as  President  Wil- 
son's career  is  studied  in  the  light  of  his  personal  ambitions. 
A  study  of  his  acts  shows  that  with  him  the  end  justified  the 
means  of  its  attainment.  He  sought  a  place  of  power  and 
notoriety  beyond  that  of  any  other  of  human  kind.  To  this 
end  he  sought  to  build  up  first  of  all  a  powerful  partisan 
machine  which  he  sought  later  to  convert  into  a  yet  more 
powerful  personal  Wilson  machine.  If  his  public  acts  and 
public  omissions  be  looked  upon  from  this  point  of  view, 
it  will  explain  many  things  otherwise  mystifying  and  in- 
explicable. This  will  explain  Mr.  Burleson,  who  became 
known  as  the  most  incompetent  Postmaster-General  the 
country  ever  had  and  perhaps  the  most  abject  slave  to  po- 
litical methods  any  President  ever  knew.  It  is  true  that 
he  overworked  the  method  until  the  people  protested,  but 
protests  accomplished  nothing  either  with  Mr.  Burleson  or 
the  President,  either  to  correct  the  error  of  his  appoint- 
ments or  to  rectify  the  wrong  done  to  faithful  men  and 
women  by  the  execrable  methods  of  the  Postmaster-General. 

The  numerous  cards  and  posters  used  by  the  Democratic 
national  committee  to  secure  the  re-election  of  President 
Wilson  in  1916  became  familiar  to  the  public  at  large. 
What  was  used  in  one  section  of  the  country  was  used  prac- 
tically everywhere,  except  where  it  was  feared  their  use 
would  alienate  votes.  Just  before  the  election,  the  St. 
Louis  Republic  contained  this  advertisement  which  was 


350    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

similar  to  those  appearing  simultaneously  in  hundreds  of 
newspapers : 

YOU  ARE  WORKING: 

— Not  Fighting! 

ALIVE  AND  HAPPY: 

— Not  Cannon  Fodder! 

WILSON  AND  PEACE  WITH  HONOR? 

or 
HUGHES  WITH  ROOSEVELT  AND  WAR? 

Roosevelt  says  we  should  hang  our  heads  in  shame  because  we  are 
not  at  war  with  Germany  in  behalf  of  Belgium! 

Roosevelt  says  that  following  the  sinking  of  the  "Lusitania"  he 
would  have  foregone  diplomacy  and  seized  every  ship  in  our  ports 
flying  the  German  flag.  That  would  have  meant  war! 

Hughes  Says  He  and  Roosevelt  Are  in  Complete  Accord! 

The  Lesson  Is  Plain: 

IF  YOU  WANT  WAR 
VOTE  FOR  HUGHES! 

If  You  Want  Peace  with  Honor  and  Continued  Prosperity, 
VOTE  FOR  WILSON! 

Mr.  Wilson  was  re-elected  by  a  tactical  blunder  on  the 
part  of  the  opposition  in  California. 

Mr.  Wilson  not  only  took  a  keen  personal  interest  in 
the  primaries  and  elections  in  the  several  states;  he  took 
a  hand  in  directing  them.  Sometimes  he  wrote  letters  to 
the  people  seeking  to  govern  their  action,  sometimes  his 
trusted  lieutenants  went  into  the  states  to  bring  to  fruition 
his  plans.  In  cases  in  which  he  was  not  able  to  bring  under 
his  control  the  member  of  the  House  or  of  the  Senate  af- 
fected, he  sought  to  displace  him  with  one  more  tractable. 
His  hand  was  noticeable  in  Alabama,  in  Georgia,  and  in 


The  Administration  and  Politics  351 

Mississippi,  as  unfailing  Democratic  states.  In  some  sec- 
tions, and  particularly  in  Mississippi,  his  accomplishments 
were  for  the  betterment  of  the  country.  But  the  method  is 
obnoxious  to  America's  political  sense  and  to  a  sense  of 
justice.  If  carried  to  its  logical  conclusion,  it  would  build 
up  so  mighty  a  personal  autocracy  in  the  presidency  that 
no  man,  with  any  feeling  of  manhood  or  independence, 
would  dare  raise  so  much  as  a  finger,  if  displeasing  to  the 
President.  He  sought  to  control  states  that  were  as  un- 
questionably Republican.  While  denying  that  he  took 
any  direct  part  in  the  election  in  Maine,  he  did  not  deny 
that  men  close  to  him  and  active  in  Administration  circles 
took  an  open  and  pronounced  part  in  the  canvass  in  that 
state.  The  President's  chief  spokesman  in  the  Senate,  J. 
H.  Lewis,  was  active  in  the  New  Hampshire  campaign. 
He  sought  to  overturn  in  his  own  state  of  New  Jersey  the 
situation  for  his  personal  advantage.  His  senatorial  spokes- 
man, Senator  Lewis,  seeing  the  handwriting,  was  desirous 
of  withdrawing  from  the  campaign  in  Illinois,  until  the 
President  urged  his  candidacy.  In  Wisconsin  the  Presi- 
dent's activity  was  particularly  obnoxious  in  that  it  was 
placed  upon  the  ground  of  loyalty  against  disloyalty,  the 
attack  being  upon  Mr.  Lenroot,  the  opposition-party  candi- 
date, though  the  President's  candidate,  Joseph  E.  Davies, 
had  never  been  in  a  position  to  vote  upon  any  of  the  mat- 
ters pertaining  to  the  war.  Even  the  Vice-President  went 
into  that  state  to  support  the  President's  candidate.  The 
loyalist  Lenroot's  most  convincing  reply  to  the  President's 
interference  in  this  state  was  contained  in  his  speech  de- 
livered at  Dodgeville,  Wisconsin,  March  27,  1918,  preced- 
ing a  special  election  for  filling  a  vacancy,  when  he  said: 

If  before  the  war  I  was  disloyal,  then  President  Wilson,  too,  was 
disloyal. 

Three  months  before  we  entered  the  war,  I  did  not  say  that  the 
European  war  must  end  by  "peace  without  victory."  President  Wil- 
son said  that 


352    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

Three  days  after  the  sinking  of  the  "Lusitania,"  I  did  not  say 
"we  were  too  proud  to  fight."  It  was  President  Wilson  who  said 
that. 

On  the  1 8th  day  of  January,  1916,  I  did  not  say  that  I  was 
"inclined  to  think  that  Germany  had  a  right  to  sink  belligerent  mer- 
chant ships  without  warning."  It  was  President  Wilson  who  said 
that. 

Five  weeks  before  we  entered  the  war  I  did  not  say  that  armed 
neutrality  would,  in  my  opinion,  be  sufficient  to  protect  American 
rights  upon  the  seas,  nor  did  I  then  say  that  I  was  not  then  contem- 
plating war  or  any  steps  that  might  lead  to  it.  It  was  President 
Wilson  who  said  that. 

I  did  not,  on  May  27,  1916,  say  that  "with  the  causes  and  objects 
of  the  European  war  we  are  not  concerned."  It  was  President 
Wilson  who  said  that. 

If  possible,  the  situation  in  Michigan  threw  a  somewhat 
darker  shadow  on  the  President's  purposes,  where  the  at- 
tempt was  made  to  win  the  election  of  a  man,  of  the  op- 
position political  party,  in  the  person  of  Henry  Ford,  the 
automobile  manufacturer.  Mr.  Ford  was  known  at  all 
times  as  outrageously  and  distinctively  a  pacifist  who  would 
do  President  Wilson's  bidding  as  a  member  of  the  Senate. 
On  the  witness  stand,  in  his  action  against  the  Chicago 
Tribune  for  libel,  he  convicted  himself  of  his  anti-Ameri- 
canism and  showed  that  the  only  possible  fact  that  brought 
him  prominently  before  the  people  and  to  the  President's 
attention  was  his  millions  made  as  a  result  of  American  in- 
stitutions. He  had  declared  that  the  American  flag  was 
nothing  but  to  arouse  American  sentiment  by,  and  that 
after  the  war  the  flags  would  come  down  from  his  factories 
never  to  go  up  again,  and  that  the  American  flag  would  be 
superseded  by  the  international  flag.  This  is  the  man  who 
was  President  Wilson's  choice  for  a  seat  in  the  United 
States  Senate,  and  to  secure  the  election  of  whom  all  the 
prestige  of  his  high  office  was  used. 


The  Administration  and  Politics  353 

With  the  President  using  all  of  the  power  of  his  great 
office  to  gain  the  election  of  a  man  of  the  Ford  type,  and 
using  all  the  influence  of  the  same  high  office  to  secure  the 
defeat  of  Lenroot  who  had  been  nominated  on  the  loyalty 
issue  against  the  influence  of  the  pacifist  Senator  La  Follette 
of  the  same  state,  the  question  is  raised  at  once  as  to  the 
type  of  Americanism  President  Wilson  represented  and  for 
what  purpose  he  wanted  to  use  his  type  of  men  in  the  Senate. 
As  all  these  events  occurred  during  the  notable  war  year 
of  1918,  from  early  spring  until  the  November  election, 
there  seems  little  doubt  that  he  sought  to  focus  every 
possible  turn  of  public  opinion  in  the  November  election 
with  a  view  to  gaining  a  subservient  Congress  in  both  of 
its  branches.  Once  this  was  accomplished,  the  way  was 
clear  to  carrying  out  the  purposes  of  his  personal  ambition. 
The  course  of  the  President  himself  has  permitted  history 
to  question  his  motive,  whether  his  purpose  was  to  seek  an 
inconclusive  peace  with  the  backing  of  the  nation,  to  gain 
a  place  of  first  position  in  the  world's  history  among  others, 
or  to  become  the  dominating  figure  in  world  politics.  In 
any  event,  history  will  question  his  loyal  Americanism,  as 
well  as  his  purpose. 

Early  in  1918,  on  the  floor  of  the  Senate,  Senator  Smoot 
arraigned  the  President's  partisanship  in  these  true  words: 

We  can  only  regret  that  our  commander-in-chief  in  this  stupen- 
dous war,  around  whom  we  rally  to  a  man  in  his  efforts  to  achieve 
victory,  has  not  seen  fit  to  abstain  from  partisan  activities  in  contests 
for  specific  political  offices  and  thereby  reciprocate  in  spirit  and  deed 
the  real  non-partisanship  so  essential  to  success. 

He  recalled  that  whenever  criticism  was  levelled  at 
those  guilty  of  incompetence  or  worse,  the  retort  was  that 
they  were  aiding  the  kaiser,  as  was  true  in  the  airplane 
fiasco  and  in  the  munitions  breakdown;  and  then  added, 
what  was  also  known  to  be  true : 


354    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

Practically  all  Republicans  of  the  Senate  and  House  have  laid 
aside  party  lines  since  the  declaration  of  war  and  have  voted  for  leg- 
islation asked  by  the  President,  though  much  of  it  was  revolutionary 
and  socialistic  in  character,  and  in  some  cases  unjustifiable  and  un- 
necessary. 

Late  in  the  summer  of  1918,  after  the  President  had 
done  everything  it  seemed  possible  for  him  to  do  to  secure 
the  election  of  men  he  desired  in  Congress,  except  the  last 
eventful  throw,  he  issued  a  statement  declaring  that  politics 
was  adjourned  till  the  war  should  end.  This  seemed  too 
good  to  be  true,  in  view  of  what  he  had  seen  .It  to  do  in 
the  line  of  building  up  a  personal  political  machine  from 
the  days  the  tremendous  German  drive  began  in  France  in 
March  to  the  time  he  made  the  announcement.  But  once 
more  he  was  taken  at  his  word,  as  he  hoped  to  be.  For  it 
was  a  pet  scheme  of  the  Administration  that  whenever  it 
was  about  to  do  something  that  would  outrage  the  Ameri- 
can sense  of  right,  it  would  announce  something  virtuous. 
Taken  at  his  word,  that  politics  was  really  adjourned  for 
the  period  of  the  war,  Republican  national  chairman,  Will 
H.  Hays,  proposed  to  the  Democratic  chairman  a  plan  that 
would  minimize  party  strife  during  those  dark  days  of  the 
war  and  promote  the  election  of  loyalists.  The  proffer  was 
evaded.  And  there  was  regret  among  loyalists  that  the 
President  himself  declined  to  recommend  such  a  course. 
It  did  not  harmonize  with  his  ulterior  plans.  He  wanted 
men  to  do  his  personal  bidding.  Accordingly,  after  Henry 
Ford  had  lost  the  Republican  primary  by  a  vote  of  two  to 
one,  he  sought  election  to  the  Senate  as  a  Democrat.  The 
President's  plans  demanded  that  he  have  control  of  that 
body  in  one  form  or  another. 

How  much  the  President  meant  of  his  "Politics-is- 
adjourned"  statement,  became  apparent  in  October,  ten 
days  before  the  national  elections  were  to  take  place, 
when  he  issued  a  statement  to  the  country,  beginning  as 
follows : 


The  Administration  and  Politics  355 

MY  FELLOW  COUNTRYMEN  :  The  congressional  elections  are  at 
hand.  They  occur  in  the  most  critical  period  our  country  has  ever 
faced  or  is  likely  to  face  in  our  time.  If  you  have  approved  of  my 
leadership  and  wish  me  to  continue  as  your  unembarrassed  spokesman 
in  affairs  at  home  and  abroad,  I  earnestly  beg  that  you  will  express 
yourselves  unmistakably  to  that  effect  by  returning  a  Democratic  ma- 
jority to  both  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives.  I  am  your 
servant  and  will  accept  your  judgment  without  cavil.  .  .  . 

The  leaders  of  the  minority  in  the  present  Congress  have  unques- 
tionably been  pro-war,  but  they  have  been  anti-Administration.  At 
almost  every  turn  since  we  entered  the  war  they  have  sought  to  take 
the  choice  of  policy  and  the  conduct  of  the  war  out  of  my  hands  and 
put  it  under  the  control  of  instrumentalities  of  their  own  choosing. 

At  the  time  of  this  appeal,  the  campaign  was  prac- 
tically closed  on  account  of  the  epidemic  of  influenza.  This 
the  President  knew.  And  when  he  added: 

I  need  not  tell  you,  my  fellow  countrymen,  that  I  am  asking  your 
support,  not  for  my  own  sake  or  for  the  sake  of  a  political  party,  but 
for  the  sake  of  the  nation  itself — 

he  raised  a  large  question  as  to  his  sincerity  by  making 
the  appeal  under  such  circumstances.  He  knew  that  much 
he  said  was  not  true.  He  knew  that  it  was  his  party  that 
had  elected  as  speaker  of  the  House,  Champ  Clark,  who 
left  the  speaker's  chair  to  make  a  speech  against  the  draft 
act  of  his  own  Administration,  declaring  that  to  him  a 
conscript  and  a  convict  looked  much  alike,  willing  to  stig- 
matize the  millions  of  America's  splendid  manhood  that 
left  their  colleges  and  places  of  business  to  go  to  Europe 
to  fight  the  battles  of  humanity.  He  knew,  also,  that  not 
Republicans  but  Democrats  were  blocking  effective  meas- 
ures for  prosecution  of  the  war;  that  Claude  Kitchen, 
pacifist  of  the  first  order,  chairman  of  the  important  ways 
and  means  committee  of  the  House,  failed  to  put  through 
the  necessary  measures  to  carry  forward  the  war  to  which 
he  was  opposed;  that  S.  Hubert  Dent,  chairman  of  the 
House  military  affairs  committee,  was  so  much  of  a  pacifist 


356    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

that  the  work  of  this  most  important  wartime  committee 
had  to  be  turned  over  to  a  Republican,  Mr.  Kahn,  of  Cali- 
fornia, in  order  to  get  action  on  the  Administration's  pro- 
gram. 

For  months  the  people  were  beginning  to  distrust  the 
President.  But  it  was  war  time  and  they  stood  by  him. 
Now,  however,  the  end  of  their  patience  with  what  they 
believed  to  be  his  camouflaging  was  reached.  He  did  not 
state  the  truth  and  they  knew  it.  It  was  impossible  to 
reconcile  his  recent  renunciation  of  politics  with  this  abrupt 
substitution  of  partisanship  at  the  nation's  peril.  It  was 
all  too  apparent.  It  came  as  a  blow  in  the  face  of  the 
people  that  the  President  could,  for  personal  advantage, 
descend  so  far  from  his  high  estate.  It  was  for  the  unmis- 
takable purpose  of  furthering  his  own  towering  ambition 
and  was  instinctively  felt  as  a  reflection  upon  the  Republic 
itself.  The  President  recorded  mental  perversion  when 
he  issued  his  statement;  the  people  recorded  clarity  of  vis- 
ion at  the  ballot-box. 

Generally  speaking,  politics  was  interned  at  the  nation's 
capital  from  April  i,  1917,  except  for  the  President's  ac- 
tivities in  a  more  or  less  clandestine  manner,  until  he  is- 
sued this  partisan  appeal  of  October.  After  that  there  was 
no  end  to  the  outcry  and  the  battle-ground  became  fierce, 
chiefly  by  means  of  printed  matter.  He  had  thrown  down 
the  bars  to  all  restraint  upon  the  part  of  the  opposition. 
On  the  same  day  that  the  President  issued  this  appeal, 
there  came  statements  from  leaders  of  the  minority  in  both 
the  Senate  and  the  House.  Said  one : 

The  voters  of  Michigan,  to  take  a  single  example,  are  called  upon 
to  support  Henry  Ford — notorious  for  his  advocacy  of  peace  at  any 
price,  for  his  contemptuous  allusions  to  the  flag,  for  the  exemption 
of  his  son  from  military  service — on  the  sole  ground  that  he  will 
blindly  support  the  President. 

Referring  to  the  support  the  President  had  received 


The  Administration  and  Politics  357 

in  war  measures,  the  statement  was  most  damning  to  the 
President's  appeal: 

Although  the  Republicans  of  the  House  are  in  the  minority,  they 
cast  more  actual  votes  on  seven  great  war  measures  than  the  Demo- 
cratic majority. 

What  is  the  record  of  the  Senate  ?  On  fifty-one  roll-calls  on  war 
measures  between  April  6,  1917,  and  the  29th  of  May,  1918,  the 
votes  cast  by  Republicans  in  favor  of  such  measures  were  72  per  cent, 
while  only  67  per  cent  of  the  votes  cast  on  the  Democratic  side  were 
in  favor  of  such  measures.  Those  were  the  President's  own  measures. 

The  result  of  the  election  was  most  heartening  to  the 
loyal  American.  It  was  not  that  he  cared  so  much  whether 
Republicans  or  Democrats  were  chosen  as  whether  real 
Americans  were  chosen  to  the  national  legislature.  While 
the  most  that  was  looked  for  by  any  one  prior  to  the  elec- 
tion was  that  the  Republicans  might  win  the  House  by  a 
small  majority,  overturning  the  overwhelming  majority  of 
the  Democrats,  the  nation  laughed  at  the  large  majority 
received  in  the  House  by  the  Republicans,  they  also  having 
a  Senate  majority. 

By  the  end  of  the  first  month  after  the  election,  there 
was  scarcely  any  paper  of  consequence  that  did  not  con- 
tain a  sharp  criticism  of  the  President  and  his  advisers, 
when  they  found  themselves  free  to  speak.  Papers  which 
had  faithfully  supported  the  President  in  his  policies  se- 
verely censured  his  dictatorial  interference  in  congressional 
contests.  The  New  York  World  saw  in  it  grave  dangers, 
while  the  Times  was  "more  than  a  little  perplexed  to  find 
the  clue  and  key  to  Mr.  Wilson's  selections,  indorsements, 
and  repudiations  of  candidates." 

Some  of  the  local  results  were  particularly  enlightening. 
In  Missouri,  Champ  Clark's  state,  which  was  regarded  as 
wholly  safe  for  the  President's  party,  the  Republicans 
elected  their  candidate  to  the  Senate  by  a  majority  of 
30,000,  and  Champ  Clark  himself  was  barely  saved  from 
defeat.  South  Dakota,  in  which  state  George  Creel  had 


358    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

played  to  the  Non-partisan  appeal  at  the  public's  expense, 
the  Republicans  elected  the  most  one-sided  legislature  in  its 
history.  Indeed,  one  meaning  of  the  election  was  the  elimi- 
nation of  Creelism,  with  its  attemps  to  stifle  honest  criti- 
cism and  to  substitute  official  opinion  for  public  opinion. 

It  also  meant  cancelling  the  "advance  veto,"  whereby 
the  President,  by  intervention,  dictated  what  bills  should 
be  passed  by  Congress,  even  what  bills  should  be  presented 
to  Congress  for  consideration.  It  was  a  stinging  rebuke 
for  the  President's  attempt  to  maintain  the  political  dic- 
tatorship which  he  had  set  up. 

Not  less  surprising,  alike  to  friend  and  foe  of  the  Presi- 
dent's attitude,  were  the  figures  which  the  election  returned. 
No  one  thought  that  the  President's  appeal  had  stirred  the 
soul  of  America  so  deeply  until  the  count  was  completed. 
While  two  years  previously  the  Democratic  majority  for 
the  presidency  was  nearly  600,000,  now  the  Republican 
majorities  for  representatives  in  Congress  aggregated  more 
than  1,200,000.  In  1916  the  President  carried  30  states 
and  his  opponent  18;  now  the  Democrats  carried  19  and 
their  opponents  29  states.  In  the  White  House  absolute 
silence  reigned,  on  results. 

The  President,  as  the  people  came  to  believe,  willingly 
played  for  the  vote  of  a  class,  even  the  dangerous  class, 
in  his  practical  politics.  The  vote  of  the  laboring  man 
should  always  be  prized  as  that  of  a  man  deserving  high 
consideration.  But  the  vote  of  a  class  calling  itself  the 
laboring  people  merely  because  they  are  organized,  while 
a  vastly  larger  number  who  are  unorganized  are  just  as 
truly  laboring  people,  should  not  be  sought  more  than  that 
of  any  other  class  as  a  class.  Indeed,  in  their  destructionist 
tendency  they  deserve  greatly  less  consideration  unless  it 
be  punitive  consideration. 

And  yet  it  was  to  the  selfishness  of  this  class  organiza- 
tion that  President  Wilson  showed  himself  ready  to  bow. 
As  director-general  of  railroads,  William  G.  McAdoo,  under 


The  Administration  and  Politics  359 

date  of  October  22,  1918,  modified  a  former  order  as  to 
railroad  men  engaging  in  politics.  The  new  order  permitted 
it  in  towns  where  the  population  was  composed  largely  of 
rail  workers.  He  had  not  foreseen  the  result.  Or,  if  he 
did,  it  made  no  difference.  The  workers  obeyed  his  edict. 
They  did  not  directly  take  active  part  in  organized  politics 
in  the  1918  campaign.  They  employed  others  to  do  it, 
who  were  not  in  the  active  service  of  the  railroads.  A 
circular  sent  out  by  the  Railroad  Employes'  Department, 
American  Federation  of  Labor,  Omaha,  addressed  to  "the 
railroad  employes,  State  of  Nebraska,"  signed  by  S.  H. 
Grace,  an  officer  of  the  organization,  stated: 

The  Democratic  candidate  for  United  States  Senator,  John  H. 
Morehead,  has,  through  the  public  press,  in  answer  to  our  inquiry, 
stated  that  he  favors  Government  operation  of  the  railroads.  It  is, 
therefore,  to  your  interest  to  vote  for  him  if  you  are  of  the  same 
opinion. 

Making  the  world  safe  for  Democracy  is  the  duty  of  all  who  are 
interested,  regardless  of  the  length  of  time  it  may  require  to  do  it; 
and  in  order  to  strengthen  the  Administration  of  President  Wilson 
men  should  be  elected  to  Congress  at  this  time  who  will  counsel  and 
work  for  him. 

In  view  of  the  benefits  already  received  from  the  present  Admin- 
istration, we,  as  Railroad  Employes,  should  show  our  appreciation  and 
vote  for  all  Democratic  candidates  for  Congress  at  this  time  in  order 
to  show  that  we,  as  a  class,  are  with  our  President,  Woodrow  Wilson, 
first,  last,  and  all  the  time. 

It  was  first  of  all  to  the  class  spirit  that  President  Wil- 
son appealed.  It  was  not  to  the  laboring  man  as  such, 
not  to  the  American  as  such,  but  the  organized  crowd  with 
a  vote  that  could  be  swung  to  him.  This  was  his  appeal 
in  1916.  The  response  is  indicated  by  the  method  em- 
ployed in  1918,  as  shown  in  the  quotation  from  the  circular, 
put  out  by  Mr.  Grace  who  was  only  an  employe  of  the  rail- 
road employes. 

The  politics  of  the  Administration  was  not  satisfied  with 


360    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

these  attempted  manipulations  in  the  several  states  and 
in  the  nation  at  large  and  through  the  various  channels 
chosen.  It  extended  to  the  nation's  taxing  powers.  Speaker 
Champ  Clark  of  Missouri  left  the  Speaker's  chair  to  make 
a  speech  from  the  floor  of  the  House  against  the  draft  act, 
declaring  that  to  him  a  conscript  looked  much  like  a  con- 
vict. The  chairmanships  of  the  two  most  important  war- 
time committees  of  the  House,  ways  and  means  and  military 
affairs,  were  respectively  in  the  hands  of  Claude  Kitchin  of 
North  Carolina  and  S.  Hubert  Dent  of  Alabama.  These 
three  prominent  men  sought  to  block  measures  for  carry- 
ing forward  the  war. 

And  it  was  these,  with  their  sectional  associates,  who 
showed  marked  favoritism  to  the  one  great  industry  of 
the  South.  Ready  to  tax  productions  of  all  kinds  from 
the  North  and  West,  when  a  suggestion  was  made  that  a 
maximum  price  be  placed  on  cotton,  as  had  been  done  in 
the  case  of  wheat,  there  was  such  an  outburst  of  rage  from 
congressmen  from  that  section  that  the  matter  was  dropped, 
though  the  price  of  its  only  competitor,  wool,  was  con- 
trolled by  the  government.  These  men  controlled  the  leg- 
islative machinery  of  the  country  and  the  President  feared 
that  if  he  defied  them  he  might  find  it  difficult  to  gain  his 
end  for  the  future.1 

Indeed,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  under  an  agreement 
entered  into  in  August,  1918,  the  government  fixed  maxi- 
mum prices  on  sixty-six  items  touching  leather,  the  politics 
in  cotton  became  so  notorious  as  to  border  on  scandal. 

The  historian  would  gladly  draw  the  veil  over  another 
episode  in  the  Administration's  political  activities  in  a> 
dangerous  way  in  time  of  the  country's  peril,  and  thus  close 
the  chapter. 

But  history  will  ask  about  Leonard  Wood  and  Theodore 
Roosevelt — why/  the  two  most  notable  fighting  men  in 

*In  this  matter  it  is  enlightening  to  compare  Mr.  Wilson's  views  as 
expressed,  prior  to  his  entering  upon  the  duties  of  the  presidency,  in  his 
"New  Freedom,"  pp.  75,  91,  107,  in,  130-131,  and  161. 


The  Administration  and  Politics  361 

America  were  not  permitted  to  fight  for  their  country  in 
civilization's  cause. 

General  Wood  had  the  foresight  to  grasp  the  nation's 
needs  long  before  the  country  was  at  war.  He  planned 
the  Plattsburg  training-camp  and  executed  his  plan.  It 
appears  to  have  been  his  chief  offense  in  the  eyes  of  the 
Administration.  Yet  it  was  upon  this  plan  that  all  of 
the  training-camps  brought  into  being  during  the  war  were 
devised.  The  Allies  knew  him,  knew  his  ability,  and  fully 
expected  him  to  be  sent  to  Europe  with  the  American 
forces.  Americans,  regardless  of  political  affiliation,  ex- 
pected no  less.  A  thorough  physical  examination  by  a  board 
of  capable  surgeons  showed  the  baselessness  of  the  Admin- 
istration's statement  that  he  was  not  physically  fit.  More- 
over, he  had  been  in  Europe  during  the  great  conflict  and 
knew  conditions  as  no  other  American  military  leader  knew 
them.  His  views  were  so  valuable  that  he  was  jfiven  an 
audience  by  the  President  of  France.  Heard  by  the  Senate 
committee  on  military  affairs,  President  Wilson  was  then 
urged  to  see  and  hear  him.  Senator  Thomas  of  the  com- 
mittee and  a  member  of  the  President's  own  party  per- 
sonally urged  the  President  to  hear  the  General  on  a  mat- 
ter of  the  utmost  importance  to  the  entire  country. 

On  the  other  hand,  Secretary  of  War  Baker,  the  self- 
satisfied  pacifist,  refused  to  hear  him.  The  President  was 
obdurate.  General  Wood  remained  in  Washington  nine 
days  before  being  ordered  by  Secretary  Baker  to  Kansas 
to  clean  up  a  camp.  But  otherwise  he  was  ignored  by  the 
Administration,  though  the  President  had  dates  with  many 
others,  some  of  really  insignificant  relative  importance.2 

"Harvey's  War  Weekly  is  authority  for  a  statement  showing  the  Presi- 
dent's officially  registered  appointments  during  these  nine  days: 

Monday,   March  25: 
2:00  p.m. — A    newly    appointed   minister   from    Honduras,    Antonio   Lopez- 

gutinez. 

2:15 — The  Netherlands  Minister. 
2:30— Senator  Hollis. 
5  :oo — Representative   Helvering. 
5:30—  H.  E.  Wills  and  F.  E.  Burgess. 


362    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

The  country  was  stirred  by  this  conduct  on  the  part  of 
the  Administration.  The  Administration  offered  no  ex- 
planation, after  the  falsity  of  its  statement  of  his  physical 
unfitness  was  shown.  It  was  assumed  it  could  offer  none. 
A  dignified,  highly-respected,  and  strictly  non-political 
weekly  stated: 

The  attention  of  the  War  Department  is  invited  to  the  fact  that 
its  treatment  of  General  Wood  carries  on  the  face  of  it  a  suggestion  of 
discrimination  and  discourtesy  so  palpable  and  disconcerting  that  it 
may  well  disturb  the  confidence  of  the  country  at  the  very  time  when 
public  confidence  and  public  morale  are  of  supreme  importance. 

For  General  Wood  is  not  merely  an  American  and  a  soldier;  he 
is  an  American  of  the  Americans,  and  a  soldier  whose  professional 
career  has  been  an  unbroken  series  of  successes — administrative,  diplo- 
matic, and  military.  Not  only  is  he  the  ranking  general  of  the 
American  army,  an  officer  of  proved  and  universally  admitted  ability, 
but  by  the  sheer  force  of  his  character  and  the  fine  quality  of  his 
patriotism,  he  has  become  one  of  those  really  representative  Americans 
who  are  as  greatly  honored  in  the  Old  World  as  in  the  New.3 

Tuesday,  March  26: 
2:30— Cabinet. 
4:30— Dr.  Franklin  Martin. 
5  :oo — Senator  Wolcott. 

Wednesday,  March  27: 

2:30 — War  Council — Chairman  Hurley,  of  the  Shipping  Board;  McCormick, 

of  War  Trade  Board;   Baruch  of  War  Industries  Board;    Secretary 

McAdoo;   Food  Administrator  Hoover;   Fuel   Administrator  Garfield; 

Secretary  of  Navy  Daniels;   and  Acting  Secretary  of  War  Crowell. 

Thursday,  March  28: 

4:30 — Former  President  Taft  and  Dr.   Lanell. 
5:00 — Commissioner  Harris. 
5:30 — E.  W.  Scudder,  Editor  of  the  Newark  News. 

Friday,   March   29: 
2:15 — Charles  Denby. 
2:30 — Cabinet. 

4:15 — Acting  Secretary  of  War  Crowell. 
4:30— Representative  Howard. 

Saturday,  March  30:    No  Callers 
Sunday,  March  31:     No  Callers. 
Monday,  April  i : 
2:00 — The  Archbishop  of  York. 
4:30 — Governor  Guntor  of  Colorado. 
5:00 — Mr.  George  Creel. 
10:00 — Marine  Barracks — Army  and  Navy  League  Ball. 

Tuesday,    April    2: 

Cabinet,  A.   Mitchell  Palmer,   and   Dr.   Garfield. 
8n8  Scientific  American,  542. 


The  Administration  and  Politics  363 

And  had  the  President  been  capable  of  rising  above 
the  level  of  partisan  and  personal  politics  to  that  of  a  great 
American,  he  would  have  found  a  place  in  which  the  great- 
est living  American  would  have  fitted  perfectly  in  carrying 
forward  the  great  tasks  that  lay  upon  the  nation  in  over- 
coming the  destroyer  of  civilization.  Theodore  Roosevelt 
sent  to  the  battle  line  his  four  sons,  one  of  whom  found  his 
final  resting-place  in  the  eternal  camping-ground  of  France 
beyond  the  enemy's  lines.  But  the  great  leader  himself  was 
denied  the  privilege  of  gratifying  his  countrymen's  expecta- 
tions. 

Keen  was  Clemenceau's  understanding  of  the  needs  of 
the  hour  when,  in  May,  1917,  the  great  Frenchman  ad- 
dressed to  President  Wilson  a  remarkable  open  letter  in 
which  he  said: 

At  the  present  moment  there  is  in  France  one  name  which  sums 
up  the  beauty  of  American  intervention.  It  is  the  name  of  Roose- 
velt. He  is  imbued  with  simple,  vital  idealism.  It  is  possible  that 
your  own  mind,  inclosed  in  the  austere  legal  frontiers,  has  failed  to 
be  impressed  by  the  vital  hold  which  personalities  like  Roosevelt  have 
on  popular  imagination.  The  name  Roosevelt  has  a  legendary  force 
in  our  country  at  this  time,  and  in  my  opinion  it  would  be  a  great 
error  to  neglect  the  force  which  everything  counsels  us  to  make  use  of. 

I  only  claim  for  Roosevelt  what  he  claims  for  himself — the  right 
to  appear  on  the  battle  field  surrounded  by  his  comrades.  With  what 
joy  our  soldiers  have  greeted  the  starry  banner!  Yet  more  than  one 
poilu  asked  his  comrade,  "But  where  is  Roosevelt?" 

In  harmony  with  his  treatment  of  Leonard  Wood  and 
Theodore  Roosevelt,  was  the  President's  practice  of  elimi- 
nating from  the  nation's  service  in  the  time  of  great  need 
its  great  men  in  every  line  of  activity,  until  the  situation 
became  so  appalling  as  to  threaten  disaster.  Then  a  call 
was  made  for  such  men  as  Charles  M.  Schwab  and  former 
President  Taft 

And  so  camouflaged  was  the  Administration's  system 
of  political  activity,  that  the  people  were  led  to  believe  it 


364    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

was  statesmanship,  until  the  summer  of  1918  revealed  his 
purpose.  That  President  Wilson  was  one  of  the  most  con- 
summate maladroit  politicians  America  ever  produced, 
friend  and  foe  alike  must  admit.  He  played  the  game  in 
"keeping  the  nation  out  of  war,"  played  it  in  getting  the 
nation  into  war,  played  it  in  keeping  the  nation  at  war 
after  hostilities  ceased,  played  with  the  labor  problem  and 
with  the  liquor  problem,  played  it  in  sacrificing  able  men 
whom  he  should  have  retained,  as  Secretary  of  War  Gar- 
rison, and  in  keeping  in  the  background  men  whom  he 
should  have  been  the  first  to  send  to  the  front.  Men  were 
sacrificed  by  the  ten  thousand  and  money  by  the  billion 
upon  the  altar  of  a  personal  ambition  when  forbidding 
preparation  for  the  inevitable  conflict  of  arms.  In  1916 
his  popularity  was  high.  Then  a  chief  form  of  appeal  by 
a  candidate  for  congressional  honors  was:  "A  vote  for 
William  Hanks,  Democratic  candidate  for  Congress,  is  a 
vote  for  President  Wilson  and  his  policies."  Two  years 
later  the  glamor  was  gone  and  the  form  of  appeal  was  gone 
with  it. 

It  is  probably  the  most  pronounced  instance  in  American 
history  of  a  man  riding  on  the  high  tide  of  popularity  who 
sacrificed  an  unequalled  opportunity  to  serve  America  and 
the  world  to  an  insatiable  but  narrow  ambition  conditioned 
upon  small  politics — and  lost. 


CHAPTER   XVIII 

WILSON  AND  WILSONISM 

Wilson,  the  Man  of  Mystery ;  Wilson,  the  Much  Misun- 
derstood— around  these  phrases  and  others  like  them  has 
already  gathered  sufficient  of  the  myth  kind  to  build  up, 
in  the  decades  to  follow,  a  real  Solon  or  a  pseudo-Gracchus; 
enough  mystifying  specimens  to  burden  the  centuries  with 
the  task  of  unmasking  the  historical  inaccuracies  of  the 
present. 

President  Wilson  is  just  of  the  human  kind — not  more, 
not  less;  with  human  capacities,  with  human  frailties.  If 
it  were  to  be  recorded  as  a  matter  of  history  that  he  let 
go  of  truth  to  accomplish  his  set  purpose,  it  would  be  re- 
garded as  harsh  and  unbecoming;  or  that  he  undertook  de- 
liberately to  deceive  and  mislead  the  public  to  attain  per- 
sonal ends,  it  would  be  resented  as  a  libel  upon  a  large 
historic  figure;  or  that  he  had  an  unconquerable  passion  to 
outshine  any  other  of  human  kind,  there  would  at  once  fol- 
low the  challenge  for  the  proof. 

Yet,  it  may  be  recorded  that  any  citizen  who  would 
solemnly  pledge  his  word  before  the  whole  world  that  he 
"will  accept  your  judgment  without  cavil"  when  asking 
approval  at  a  national  election,  and  immediately  the  judg- 
ment is  adverse  he  deliberately  prepares  to  flout  that  re- 
quested judgment,  as  in  the  1918  election,  any  such  citizen 
in  the  ordinary  walks  of  life  necessarily  forfeits  the  confi- 
dence of  his  fellows  as  a  common  prevaricator,  and  takes 
his  place  in  their  judgment  where  he  has  himself  fixed  it. 

If,  then,  a  consideration  of  President  Wilson's  char- 
acter and  characteristics  is  prefaced  with  two  simple  facts, 
all  of  the  much-declared  Mystery-Man  disappears  and  he 

365 


366    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

appears  what  he  actually  is — the  Human-Man  and  the  more 
likable.  The  old  rule  of  the  Latin  poet  still  holds :  Never 
call  in  the  gods  to  help  out  of  a  difficulty  until  the  necessity 
arises.  It  is  most  unfortunate  for  history  that  too  many 
"interpreters"  felt  that  the  necessity  was  upon  them.  And 
the  two  simple  facts  that  they  so  constantly  overlooked  are, 
first,  that  President  Wilson  had  an  overweening  ambition 
for  personal  ends ;  second,  that  his  own  chosen  channels  for 
accomplishing  his  purposes  were  often  outside  the  limits  set 
by  present  moral  standards  of  society.  Keeping  in  mind  at 
all  times  these  two  facts,  much,  if  not  all,  of  the  so-called 
mystery  attaching  to  Mr.  Wilson  dissolves  as  readily  as 
the  veil  of  mist  in  the  bright  sunshine.  Then  much  of  the 
otherwise  inexplicable  is  explained  and  many  of  the  acts 
of  Mr.  Wilson  that  have  seemed  strange  are  easily  under- 
stood. 

If,  indeed,  those  who  have  made  him  to  appear  largely 
as  a  Man  of  Mystery,  as  Herron,  Hapgood,  Creel,  Baker, 
and  Tumulty,  had  ceased  "interpreting"  him  and  his  acts 
for  the  people,  there  would  have  been  no  mystery;  and  if 
President  Wilson's  methods  had  been  other  than  of  the 
clandestine  and  furtive  type,  if  he  had  dealt  frankly  with 
the  people  and  their  representatives,  there  had  been  no  need 
of  "interpreters"  of  him  and  his  acts  of  administration. 
And  these  were  forced  interpretations  that  were  given  to 
the  people  from  time  to  time,  forced  by  the  President's 
confirmed  habit  of  seclusion  and  failure  to  meet  the  people 
openly  and  squarely.  These  interpretations  put  out  so  la- 
boriously, at  first  deceived  the  people  in  no  small  measure; 
but  never  after  the  President's  partisan  appeal  just  prior 
to  the  1918  elections.  In  that  appeal  the  President  was  dis- 
robed to  nakedness  before  the  country  with  a  swiftness  and 
sureness  not  dreamed  of.  The  interpreters  had  done  their 
last  bit  of  deception  upon  the  people.  With  that  unfailing 
insight  of  the  American  people  into  a  moral  purpose  on 


Wilson  and  Wllsonism  367 

the  part  of  men  in  a  position  of  commanding  influence,  they 
grasped  the  idea  back  of  the  appeal  and  dealt  a  blow  that 
would  have  dazed  a  less  obdurate  individual.  With  an 
audacity  that  amazed  and  a  contempt  for  public  opinion 
that  baffled  the  nation,  President  Wilson  proceeded  to  carry 
out  his  previously  determined  course  of  personally  super- 
vising the  Peace  Congress  in  Europe.  Taking  control  of 
the  means  of  communication  with  his  own  country  under  the 
pretext  of  a  war  necessity  after  the  war  had  ended,  as  he 
himself  declared  in  his  address  to  Congress  in  Washington, 
he  felt  the  more  at  liberty  to  state  to  the  gathered  states- 
men of  the  world  that  he  had  a  mandate  from  his  nation 
— with  a  hardihood  seldom  found  in  the  annals  of  states- 
manship. And  when  done  with  his  self-imposed  mission 
there,  he  returned  to  his  own  countrymen  and  declared  that 
the  Covenant  which  he  presented  to  them  and  which  he 
demanded  that  the  Senate,  a  co-ordinate  power  in  making 
treaties,  approve  as  written,  was  the  "irreducible  minimum" 
which  the  European  nations  would  accept  as  a  compact 
for  a  league  of  nations,  until  Viscount  Grey  visited  this 
country  and  let  the  American  people  know  better.  It  was 
this  utter  hardness  and  perversity  to  moral  obligation  on 
the  part  of  Mr.  Wilson  repeatedly  exhibited  to  the  people 
that  made  him  the  Man  Understood,  the  Man  without  Mys- 
tery. He  stood  now  before  the  people  just  as  he  was — a 
man  who  sought  to  accomplish  his  purposes  through  chan- 
nels outside  the  moral  code  usually  accepted  in  modern  so- 
ciety. His  human  frailties  overcame  his  human  moral 
strength.  With  the  mask  pulled  off  by  the  people,  he  was 
seen  as  his  real  self.  The  people  turned  from  him  and  left 
him  in  his  self-imposed  isolation  and  seclusion.  Assuming 
to  force  the  hand  of  the  Senate  by  a  presumptuous  appeal 
to  the  people  a  second  time,  the  people  turned  upon  him  and 
his  misrepresentations  with  a  second  blow,  this  time  with 
a  paralyzing  effect  that  astonished  not  only  the  country,  but 


368     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

the  civilized  world.  The  President  was  not  misunderstood; 
he  was  thoroughly  understood.  The  President  was  not 
misrepresented;  he  was  misrepresenting. 

It  cannot  be  questioned  that  in  his  personal  relations 
Mr.  Wilson  was  the  acme  of  honor  and  a  fine  personality. 
Born  and  educated  in  the  South  until  he  matriculated  at 
Princeton  College  in  1875  'm  hi§  nineteenth  year,  he  par- 
took of  the  qualities  of  gentlemen  bred  in  the  Southland; 
but  he  cultivated  the  habit  of  seclusion  and  drilled  himself 
to  the  performance  of  difficult  tasks.    He  set  himself  apart 
from  the  people;  and  while  he  assumed  to  speak  for  the 
people,  it  was  not  as  one  of  them.     It  was  in  the  abstract. 
While  of  splendid  idealism,  his  idealism  almost  invariably 
ran  counter  to  the  best  public  thought,  because  it  was  in 
the  abstract.    While  a  student  in  Johns  Hopkins  University, 
only  forty  miles  from  the  seat  of  government,  he  could 
write  freely  on  government  without  taking  the  trouble  to 
go  to  the  nation's  capital  to  see  the  government  in  operation. 
Thus  he  developed  idealism   at  the  expense  of  prac- 
ticality.    It  has  been  said  by  his  admirers  that  he  reminds 
one  of  Lincoln.     If  he  does,  it  is  chiefly  in  contrast.     Lin- 
coln, too,  was  an  idealist;  but  he  came  in  touch  with  the 
people;  he  was  of  the  people;  he  came  into  contact  with  the 
harsh  realities  of  life.    When  he  was  flat-boating  down  the 
Ohio  and  the  Mississippi,  he  came  into  actual  contact  with 
the  horrors  of  slavery.     The  conviction  that  slavery  was 
wrong  was  burned  into  his  soul  by  this  contact,  and  led  him 
to  declare  that  if  ever  the  opportunity  offered  he  would  hit 
the  thing  with  a  hard  blow.     With  Mr.  Wilson  it  was  a 
matter  of  abstracting  upon  government  in  the  study,  instead 
of  going  to  Washington  to  see  it  in  operation.     In  the 
matter  of  a  league  of  nations  he  could  erect  an  a  priori 
world  government  without  so  much  as  seeing  how  it  would 
affect  his  own  nation  when  put  into  operation. 

Cultivating  the  abstract,  he  was  led  to  cultivate  aloof- 
ness from  his  fellows.    Loving  government  in  the  abstract, 


Wilson  and  Wilsonism  369 

he  loved  men  in  the  abstract.  He  appeared  to  have  no  very 
real  belief  in  the  destiny  of  the  United  States  as  a  political 
entity;  likewise  he  spoke  freely  of  umen  everywhere,"  but 
he  did  not  love  men  as  human  beings,  as  individuals.  He 
had  less  interest,  except  as  it  touched  him  in  person,  in 
national  feeling,  that  jealous  affection  for  the  United  States 
as  an  individual  nation,  which  appeared  so  strongly  in 
two  of  his  predecessors,  Cleveland  and  Roosevelt;  likewise 
little  interest  in  men  as  men,  except  as  groups  interested 
him  personally,  as  in  the  1916  demands  upon  Congress  in 
a  group  that  would  support  him  in  the  election.  He  could 
talk  well  of  matters  that  seemed  to  be  of  interest  to  indi- 
viduals, but  it  was  to  select  bodies  and  his  addresses  were 
cold.  The  response  was  similarly  cold.  When  he  met 
great  concourses  of  people  in  his  tour  westward  to  place  the 
Covenant  before  the  country,  it  was  chiefly  artificial  and 
cold  greetings  that  he  received,  lacking  in  the  cordial  spon- 
taneity that  met  Roosevelt  in  any  section  of  the  country 
he  visited. 

Comparison  has  been  made  of  Wilson's  style  and  com- 
mand of  English  with  that  of  Lincoln.  Wilson  was  college 
bred  and  a  college  professor  of  English;  Lincoln  was  a  rail- 
splitter  and  a  back-woodsman  purely  until  he  reached  ma- 
turity, when  he  studied  law  in  the  loose  easy  way  of  his 
day.  On  the  fiftieth  anniversary  of  Lincoln's  immortal 
Gettysburg  address,  Mr.  Wilson  on  the  same  spot  delivered 
the  semi-centennial  address.  The  former,  though  one  of 
,the  briefest  ever  delivered,  is  a  classic  studied  in  the  great 
universities  of  the  world;  the  latter,  though  the  set  address 
of  the  day,  has  been  forgotten,  if  ever  it  was  given  a 
thought  afterward.  So,  also,  with  Mr.  Wilson's  short 
letters.  They  were  commonplace  in  contrast  with  Lincoln's 
letter  of  eternal  life  to  Mrs.  Bixby,  which  he  began  by  an 
ordinary  reference  to  the  adjutant  general's  report.  Per- 
haps no  finer  of  Mr.  Wilson's  style  and  sentiment  is  found 
than  that  in  his  address  accepting,  on  behalf  of  the  nation, 


37°    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

the  Lincoln  Memorial  built  on  the  site  of  the  log  cabin 
in  which  Lincoln  was  born;  and  yet  it  falls  far  below  Mr. 
Lincoln's  best. 

The  two  great  men  are  said  to  be  alike  in  their  spirits, 
both  given  largely  to  introspection.  Lincoln,  as  a  boy  and 
young  man,  was  almost  the  antithesis  of  Wilson,  however. 
He  engaged  in  and  greatly  enjoyed  the  crude  sports  of  the 
early  day  in  the  Ohio  valley  backwoods.  Mr.  Wilson,  on 
the  other  hand,  was  given  to  aloofness  in  his  young  man- 
hood days,  holding  himself  apart  from  the  common  run  of 
mankind,  and  cultivating  the  secluded  life  from  his  college 
days  to  the  end  of  his  days  in  the  presidency  of  the  nation. 
If  ever  Mr.  Wilson  saw  an  evil  that  penetrated  his  soul  as 
the  sight  of  slavery  which  Mr.  Lincoln  saw  as  his  boat 
floated  down  the  Mississippi  penetrated  the  soul  of  the 
latter,  the  world  never  knew  it.  If,  as  Mr.  Wilson's 
interpreters  declare,  he  could  view  the  barbarity  of  German 
warfare  which  was  sinking  helpless  women  and  children 
into  a  degradation  beneath  that  of  American  slavery  of  a 
half-century  previous,  and  not  have  it  affect  his  view  of 
public  duty,  then  there  is  a  great  difference  between  the 
spirit  of  Woodrow  Wilson  and  that  of  Abraham  Lincoln 
as  related  to  God's  humanity. 

But  these  instances  are  sufficient  to  indicate  that  what- 
ever likenesses  there  may  be  between  Mr.  Wilson  and  Mr. 
Lincoln,  the  contrasts  were  so  wide  and  so  deep  as  to  practi- 
cally obliterate  them.  Likenesses  are  found  between  any 
two  men.  It  is  the  contrasts  that  differentiate  them — not 
only  the  personal  contrasts  above  indicated,  but  contrasts 
in  approaching  public  audiences.  Mr.  Lincoln's  addresses 
to  the  public,  including  his  debates  with  Douglas,  were  en- 
lightening. On  the  contrary,  the  addresses  of  Mr.  Wilson 
to  enlighten  the  people  upon  the  purposes  of  the  Covenant 
have  no  title  to  be  considered  .as  the  addresses  of  the 
scholarly  statesman  intent  upon  informing  the  public  upon 
weighty  matters  of  national  moment.  He  sank  to  the  level 


Wilson  and  Wilsonism  371 

of  substituting  personal  vituperation  for  convincing  argu- 
ments which  he  could  not  command.  His  railings  at  the 
Senate  majority  which  refused  to  abdicate  its  constitutional 
functions  in  obedience  to  his  imperious  will,  are  perhaps  the 
most  humiliating  episode  our  history  of  the  presidency  re- 
cords; and  coming  from  a  gentleman  distinguished  for 
scholarship  and  culture  but  adds  to  its  revolting  quality. 

Nor  is  this  chargeable  to  his  changeableness,  a  marked 
characteristic.  His  "interpreters"  termed  this  a  quality 
indicative  of  growth.  He  himself  rather  gloried  in  the 
quality,  declaring  that  "consistency  is  the  hobgoblin  of  little 
minds."  But  the  common  sense  of  the  common  people  could 
see  neither  sense  nor  logic  In  his  statement.  It  raised  with 
them  the  question  of  common  honesty.  In  speaking  to  the 
Daughters  of  the  American  Revolution  on  April  19,  1915, 
he  uttered  these  words: 

America  has  a  heart,  and  that  heart  throbs  with  all  sorts  of  in- 
tense sympathies;  but  America  has  schooled  its  heart  to  love  the 
things  that  America  believes  in,  and  it  ought  to  devote  itself  only 
to  the  things  that  America  believes  in. 

If  his  later  declaration,  made  while  urging  the  Covenant 
upon  the  people  in  September,  1919,  that  it  was  greater  than 
the  American  government,  indicated  a  growth,  then  it  was 
a  dangerous  growth,  which  the  people  discovered  and 
checked.  He  had  declared  that  the  people  of  the  United 
States  should  remain  neutral,  even  in  thought;  when  the 
"Lusitania"  went  down,  that  we  were  "too  proud  to  fight" ; 
as  late  as  May,  1916,  referring  to  the  war,  "with  its  causes 
and  objects  we  are  not  concerned.  The  obscure  fountains 
from  which  its  stupendous  flood  has  burst  forth  we  are  not 
interested  to  search  for  or  explore."  And  yet  the  causes 
of  the  war  were  as  well  known  at  that  time  as  they  were 
on  April  2,  1917,  when  he  advised  Congress  to  declare 
war,  not  by  reason  of  those  "causes,"  but  solely  because  of 
the  German  warfare  against  commerce  which  had  destroyed 


372     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

American  ships  and  American  lives  and  was  substantially 
a  war  against  mankind.  Yet  again,  in  January,  1918,  when 
the  country  was  in  the  midst  of  its  war  preparations,  in 
putting  forth  his  Fourteen  Points  as  the  "only  possible  pro- 
gram" for  our  consent  to  peace,  four  of  the  Points  related 
exclusively  to  those  "controversies  on  the  other  side  of  the 
water,"  previously  denounced  by  him  when  action  on  the 
part  of  the  United  States  was  urged  by  those  with  vision 
compatible  with  America's  best  traditions  in  statesmanship. 
And  still  later,  in  his  Baltimore  address  of  April  6,  1918, 
the  first  anniversary  of  American's  entrance  into  the  war,  he 
referred  to  the  occasion  as  "this  moment  of  utter  disillu- 
sionment." This  is  what  some  termed  "growth"  of  the 
President — he  having  reached  the  stage  which  the  people, 
as  a  whole,  had  reached  three  years  previously.  It  is  but  a 
suggestion  of  the  President's  opportunism,  which  is  but 
another  word  for  seeking  present  personal  or  party  ad- 
vantage; and  in  this  case  party  was  but  used  for  personal 
advantage,  the  only  rational  explanation  of  President  Wil- 
son's otherwise  strange  statecraft. 

Notwithstanding  this  personal  relation  to  his  methods, 
perhaps  because  of  it,  there  was  a  personal  charm  and  mag- 
netism that  was  for  the  moment  winning.  But  it  was  felt 
to  be  artificial,  with  the  appearance  of  listening  with  defer- 
ence and  being  governed  by  the  opinion  of  the  listener,  until 
out  of  sight,  when,  also,  immediately  out  of  mind.  He  was 
seldom  seen  even  by  cabinet  members.  He  was  coldly  intel- 
lectual, caring  little  for  companionship  or  counsel.  To 
the  great  masses  of  Americans,  he  was  looked  upon  as  un- 
sympathetic, inscrutable,  passionless.  Those  having  official 
business  with  him  transacted  their  business  and  left,  taking 
away  with  them  no  atmosphere  of  a  great  personality,  none 
of  the  touch  that  made  Mr.  Wilson  become  a  part  of  the 
lives  of  other  men,  such  as  Lincoln,  Roosevelt,  Cleveland, 
almost  all  Presidents  imparted.  He  wore  the  gray  mask, 


Wilson  and  Wilsonism  373 

and  it  was  never  removed.  There  was  no  spiritual  contact 
between  President  and  people. 

The  shiftiness  and  vacillation  of  the  President,  if 
prompted  by  opportunism,  personal  advantage,  were  then 
grounded  in  selfishness.  And  it  has  been  directly  charged 
that  he  was  selfish.  Certainly  they  were  not  due  to  lack  of 
self-confidence,  with  which  he  was  always  abundantly  en- 
dowed. His  selfishness  was  indicated  by  his  repeated  in- 
junction to  take  "common  counsel,"  and  then  taking  his 
own  counsel;  by  his  ungenerous  act  in  refusing  to  say  to  the 
Senate,  or  its  committee,  that  he  had  accepted  its  sugges- 
tions for  changes  in  the  league  constitution;  but  making  the 
changes  in  Paris  and  seeking  credit  for  them.  Indeed,  it 
w;as  seen  very  early  in  his  administration,  in  an  episode 
almost  forgotten:  He  accepted  the  platform  adopted  in 
which  was  urged  a  constitutional  amendment  for  single 
terms  of  Presidents;  it  declared  the  pledge  in  these  words: 
"We  pledge  the  candidate  of  this  convention  to  this  prin- 
ciple. "  And  when  the  amendment  was  proposed  in  Con- 
gress he  denounced  it  as  "highly  arbitrary  and  unsatisfac- 
tory" and  declared  that  any  disapproval  of  his  position  in 
the  issue  was  to  him  "a  matter  of  perfect  indifference." 

Nor  was  Mr.  Wilson's  self-confidence  always  well 
grounded.  Relying  upon  his  own  powers  of  accomplishment, 
when  he  ignored  the  American  people  and  the  co-ordinate 
treaty-making  power  of  the  Senate,  in  going  to  the  Paris 
Peace  Congress,  and  there  practically  ignoring  the  four 
commissioners  whom  he  took  with  him,  with  all  of  the 
prestige  derived  from  the  fact  that  he  was  the  only  head 
of  a  nation,  and  that  the  most  powerful  nation,  in  the  Con- 
gress, he  was  outwitted;  and  from  the  beginning  of  his 
unwarranted  undertaking,  began  and  continued  to  lose 
ground  to  the  end  of  his  official  career.  His  failure  in  the 
Congress  is  noted  by  a  writer  who  was  in  the  Congress  as 
a  member  of  the  British  corps  on  economics: 


374    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

It  was  commonly  believed  at  the  commencement  of  the  Paris 
Conference  that  the  President  had  thought  out,  with  the  aid  of  a 
large  body  of  advisers,  a  comprehensive  scheme  not  only  for  the 
League  of  Nations,  but  for  the  embodiment  of  the  Fourteen  Points 
in  an  actual  treaty  of  peace.  But  in  fact  the  President  had  thought 
out  nothing;  when  it  came  to  practice,  his  ideas  were  nebulous  and 
incomplete.  He  had  no  plan,  no  scheme,  no  constructive  ideas  what- 
ever for  clothing  with  the  flesh  of  life  the  commandments  which  he 
had  thundered  from  the  White  House.1 

This  plain  statement  explains  well  why  he  could  not  convince 
the  Senate  or  the  people  of  the  United  States  that  his 
Covenant  should  be  accepted  without  change — he  had  not 
thought  out  the  matter  to  a  final  conclusion.  As  he  heard 
deficient  students  reply  in  his  college  days  as  student  and 
professor:  "Not  prepared,"  so  now  he. 

Added  to  this  defect  was  the  fact  that  he  lacked  leader- 
ship, a  fatal  lack  in  an  attempt  to  carry  out  a  large  plan 
of  constructive  work.  While  he  had  a  consuming  passion 
for  power,  the  only  weapon  he  knew  and  used  freely,  never 
relinquishing  any  that  he  could  gain  and  retain,  he  could 
not  lead  men.  This  was  due  to  the  defects  in  his  make-up 
indicated  in  the  foregoing.  He  could  not  meet  men  as  his 
equals.  He  was  incapable  of  team  work.  So  long  as  any 
one  associated  with  him  accepted  his  viewpoint,  all  went 
well.  But  that  was  not  team  work;  that  was  becoming  his 
clerk.  And  men  with  vision  are  not  mere  clerks.  It  is  need- 
less to  name  the  strong  men  of  his  cabinet  who  left  him. 
Perhaps  the  most  level-headed  man  associated  as  such  was 
Secretary  Franklin  K.  Lane;  and  he  is  the  man  who  said, 
when  overruled  by  Secretary  Baker,  "the  people  are  not  in- 
terested in  cabinet  quarrels."  Men  of  noted  leadership, 
and  ready  to  meet  any  emergency  were  displaced  by  men 
of  small  capacity  for  leadership.  His  essential  weakness  as 
a  leader  lay  in  the  fact  that  he  failed  to  discover  public 

1John  Maynard  Keynes,  "Economic  Consequences  of  Peace,"  pp.  42-43, 
Harcourt,  Brace  &  Howe,  New  York,   1920. 


Wilson  and  Wilsonism  375 

opinion  and  to  understand  that  America  is  not  an  autocracy 
but  a  republic  ruled  by  the  majority. 

He  stated  that  he  could  do  but  one  thing  at  a  time — 
that  he  had  a  "one-track  mind."  While  engaged  in  doing 
a  thing,  in  that  he  was  absorbed  to  the  exclusion  of  all  else. 
Some  have  declared  that  his  was  a  "one-compartment  mind" ; 
that  he  could  reach  out  and  open  one  compartment  of  his 
brain  as  a  systematic  man  would  reach  into  a  drawer  and 
take  out  a  paper,  and  when  done  with  it  return  it,  forgetting 
all  about  it  in  taking  up  the  next.  Everybody  wanted  to 
know  what  was  going  on  in  this  mind,  which  was  thought 
to  be  of  the  greatest  influence  on  the  destinies  of  the  world, 
when  he  was  at  the  height  of  his  world  power,  late  in 
1918.  Haughty,  he  was  intolerant  of  opposition;  wanted 
people  to  agree  with  him,  and  did  not  want  to  be  convinced 
that  he  was  wrong;  did  not  like  to  have  his  vision  clouded 
or  his  confidence  in  his  own  conclusions  shaken.  Said  one 
of  his  interpreters: 

Mr.  Wilson  keeps  hirhself  cloistered  pondering  the  facts.  There 
is  something  almost  uncanny  in  the  man,  in  his  seclusion,  his  ear 
deliberately  closed  to  suggestion,  sifting  and  sorting  his  facts,  work- 
ing on  them  as  a  mathematician.2 

This  writer  also  states  that  Mr.  Wilson  knew  that  most 
men  reach  their  conclusions  in  a  superficial  way  and  not 
giving  due  weight  to  facts — a  method  that  is  without  appeal 
to  Mr.  Wilson. 

Mr.  Wilson's  powers  are  of  a  type  that  does  not  permit 
him  to  be  the  servant  of  the  people.  While  he  spoke  much 
of  a  mandate  from  the  people,  his  test  of  what  the  people 
wanted  appeared  to  be  what  he  had  determined  to  do.  His 
type  is  for  solitary  rule,  not  for  a  government  of  the  people 
and  by  the  people. 

His  type  is  essentially  destructive,  not  constructive. 
When  he  appealed  to  the  Italian  people  over  the  heads  of 

a"Woodrow  Wilson — an  Interpretation,"  by  A.  Maurice  Low,  p.  290, 
Little,  Brown  &  Co.,  Boston,  1918. 


376    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

their  rulers,  it  involved  the  same  principle  as  when  he  ap- 
pealed to  the  people  as  against  the  Senate.  In  neither  case 
did  he  succeed.  On  the  contrary,  both  attempts  were  flat 
failures.  The  man  who  can  make  such  an  appeal  may  not 
be  capable  of  recognizing  himself  as  an  enemy  of  consti- 
tutional government.  But  if  given  a  free  hand,  he  would, 
perhaps,  not  see  what  he  had  brought  upon  the  nation  until 
the  forces  of  disintegration  had  gone  so  far  that  no  deter- 
rent could  be  found  to  save  from  utter  destruction.  His 
example  has  shown  what  dangers  lurk  in  granting  large 
and  unnecessary  powers  to  a  willful  executive. 

A  fatal  defect  in  Mr.  Wilson's  character  was  his  capac- 
ity for  creating  division  when  unity  was  the  demand  of  the 
situation.  He  created  division  in  American  sentiment  prior 
to  America's  entrance  into  the  Great  War,  until  by  the 
continued  efforts  of  the  pro-Americans  as  against  the  pro- 
Germans  the  sentiment  became  so  overwhelming  as  to  com- 
pel action  by  the  President;  he  created  division  in  the  Paris 
Peace  Congress  when  harmony  on  the  part  of  the  Allies 
was  a  crying  demand;  he  created  division  in  his  own  party 
until,  early  in  1920,  it  began  to  slip  away  from  him  and 
became  largely  a  party  against  him  and  anything  which  he 
favored;  again  he  created  at  first  division  in  American 
sentiment  on  the  matter  of  a  league  of  nations  when  senti- 
ment was  becoming  almost  solid  for  such  an  association,  and 
such  division  continued  until  the  people  began  to  understand 
Mr.  Wilson's  purpose  when  they  became  almost  a  unit 
against  his  Covenant.  The  Wilson  myth  was  shattered  in 
America  before  it  was  in  Europe;  but  once  the  image  began 
to  totter  overseas,  the  reaction  was  more  pronounced  than 
in  his  own  country.  The  people  in  America  accepted  many 
things  he  said  and  did  in  their  old-time  spirit  of  raillery — 
and  smiled.  With  Europeans,  to  whom  he  had  become  a 
demigod,  when  they  found  that  their  idol  was  but  human 
clay  of  a  type  so  different  from  what  they  had  been  led  to 


Wilson  and  Wilsonism  377 

expect,  the  disappointment  was  so  severe  a  strain  that  they 
were  furious.  He  made  headway  only  so  long  as  he  was 
able  to  maintain  the  illusion  that  his  demands  were  backed 
by  America;  but  once  the  masquerade  ended,  the  disillu- 
sionment in  Europe  was  something  terrible.  When  the  na- 
tion entered  the  armed  conflict  for  justice  and  liberty,  the 
sacrifice  made  the  nation  the  best  beloved  in  all  the  world; 
and  when  it  stood  ready  to  take  its  full  share  in  rebuilding 
the  broken  civilization,  the  expectations  of  humanity  were 
the  highest.  But  when  he  dashed  these  hopes,  here  is  what 
the  French  statesman  Brieaux,  whom  America  had  the 
right  to  look  upon  as  a  friend,  said  at  the  end  of  1919  : 

Your  President  came  to  France  fortified  by  a  prestige  which  he 
owed  to  the  courage  of  your  soldiers  and  to  the  generosity  of  your 
nation.  ...  At  the  peace  table  he  asked  us  to  make  heavy  conces- 
sions. We  tried  to  make  him  understand  that  he  was  wrong  but  he 
insisted.  .  .  .  Recognize  this,  that  our  error  in  having  thought  that 
Mr.  Wilson  spoke  for  America  was  excusable.  It  was  the  first  time 
that  one  of  your  Presidents  ever  came  to  Europe.  You  permitted  him 
to  come  and  we  had  the  right  to  assume  that  he  had  your  word  in  his 
valise  and  that  he  was  authorized  to  say  to  us:  "I  speak  for  America, 
and  I  alone." 

Thus  President  Wilson's  methods  caused,  not  common,  but 
divided  counsel  among  the  Allies  after  the  close  of  the 
Great  War  and  until  he  left  the  presidency,  and  placed 
America  in  a  position  of  humiliation  before  the  world.  The 
fact  that  European  statesmen  should  have  known  what  the 
United  States  Constitution  required  as  to  the  making  of 
treaties  and  what  the  invariable  practice  of  Presidents  had 
been  in  conformity  with  such  requirements  in  great  matters 
did  not  take  away  the  annoying  sting  of  the  rebuff,  or  re- 
lieve of  the  sense  of  the  division  created  by  Mr.  Wilson. 

To  say  nothing  additional  to  what  has  been  said  in  this 
chapter  as  to  his  political  morality,  one  ground  for  this 
constant  division  of  sentiment  where  it  should  have  been 


378     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

a  determined  unit  was  his  constant  willfulness  in  the  face 
of  new  and  untried  situations;  ucommon  counsel"  he  thrust 
to  the  winds,  though  he  so  often  urged  it.  This  was  well 
illustrated  in  his  relations  to  aspiring  peoples.  Brushing 
lightly  aside  counsel  from  any  source,  he  erred  in  his  judg- 
ment that  the  German  people  were  backing  the  Imperial 
German  Government  only  because  they  were  compelled 
through  force;  for  the  German  people  backed  the  Hohen- 
zollern  Government  to  the  last.  Again,  he  erred  in  relation 
to  the  Czecho-Slovaks,  loyal  to  the  last  ounce  of  their  man- 
hood to  the  cause  of  the  Allies  and  human  liberty;  for  Euro- 
pean monarchies  and  France  had  already  acknowledged 
their  independence  when,  on  September  3,  1918,  Secretary 
Lansing  announced  that  the  United  States  recognized  their 
National  Council  as  a  de  facto  government.  It  was  felt  as 
a  humiliation  that  the  world's  great  democracy  should  be 
so  tardy  in  its  recognition  of  the  aspirations  for  demo- 
cratic government  on  the  part  of  these  peoples  just  released 
from  autocracy's  domination.  He  erred  in  pronouncing 
the  counter-revolution,  headed  by  Lenine  and  Trotzky  ter- 
rorists, the  revolution;  he  had  failed  to  distinguish  between 
the  government  that  rose  on  the  ruins  of  czarism,  and  that 
which  crushed  the  life  out  of  the  only  semblance  of  demo- 
cratic government  that  Russia  had  known  since  the  days 
of  czarism  began. 

And  though  this  may  be  attributed  to  the  President's 
error  of  judgment,  whether  founded  in  ignorance  or  not, 
sight  must  not  be  lost  of  the  fact  of  the  President's  mental 
perversity  which  is  well  set  out  by  one  of  the  best-informed 
observers  at  the  Paris  Peace  Congress : 

President  Wilson  is  conscious  of  his  power  of  persuasion.  That 
power  enables  him  to  say  one  thing,  do  another,  describe  the  act  as 
conforming  to  the  idea,  and  with  act  and  idea  in  exact  contradiction 
to  each  other,  convince  the  people,  not  only  that  he  has  been  consistent 
throughout,  but  that  his  act  cannot  be  altered  without  peril  to  the 
nation  and  danger  to  the  world.  We  do  not  know  which  Mr.  Wilson 


W 'Us on  and  Wilsomsm  379 

to  follow — the  Mr.  Wilson  who  says  he  will  not  do  a  thing  or  the 
Mr.  Wilson  who  does  that  precise  thing.3 

Mr.  Wilson's  acts  were  in  themselves  sufficient  to  divide 
public  opinion  until  the  people  became  so  exasperated  as  to 
unite  against  him.  Among  these  acts  were  his  defiance  of 
American  history,  including  the  right  of  the  Senate  to  take 
counsel  with  him;  his  absolute  defiance  of  the  constitutionl 
right  of  the  Senate  in  the  matter  of  concluding  treaties  as 
sustained  by  the  United  States  Supreme  Court;  his  vacilla- 
tion in  the  face  of  impending  events  of  great  moment  and 
withal  his  unwillingness  to  accept  advice;  his  evasions  and 
deceptions  to  gain  a  personal  or  partisan  end,  after  exhib- 
iting great  ignorance  or  extreme  carelessness  in  large  mat- 
ters of  policy;  his  haughtiness  and  peremptoriness  in  dealing 
with  his  peers  or  with  other  nations,  creating  antagonism 
where  harmony  was  the  chief  demand;  his  insulting  epithets 
hurled  at  the  Senate,  a  part  of  a  co-ordinate  branch  of  the 
government  and  chosen  as  directly  by  the  people  as  he,  for 
no  reason  other  than  that  it  refused  to  sign  on  the  dotted 
line  at  his  command;  his  meddling  in  European  affairs  that 
were  none  of  America's  after  the  great  conflict  ceased, 
though  he  wavered  and  vacillated  when  Prussian  autocracy 
was  sapping  the  foundations  of  public  opinion  throughout 
the  land,  and  he  then  declared  that  with  the  causes  of  the 
war  we  had  no  concern — these  and  multifold  other  acts  and 
expressions  of  President  Wilson  kept  the  nation  divided 
when  it  should  have  been  firmly  knitted  together  for  the 
certain  conflict,  and  separated  friendly  nations  when  they 
should  have  been  united  in  policy,  and  humiliated  America 
when  it  should  have  remained  on  the  mountain  top  of  the 
world's  esteem,  and  resulted  in  his  own  disastrous  debase- 
ment in  the  world's  best  thought  after  gaining  the  very 
pinnacle  of  power  and  respect.  Leaving  the  nation  leader- 

3  "The  Inside  Story  of  the  Peace  Conference,"  by  E.  J.  Dillon,  p.    134, 
Harper  &  Brothers,  New  York,   1920,  quoting  The  Tribune,  Chicago,  July 


380    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

less  at  a  crucial  hour  by  going  to  Europe  threatened  bewil- 
dering consequences  such  as  had  never  come  to  the  nation 
after  a  war.  In  the  words  of  the  eminent  writer  previously 
quoted : 

When  President  Wilson  left  Washington  he  enjoyed  a  prestige 
and  a  moral  influence  throughout  the  world  unequalled  in  history.4 

But  President  Wilson  seemed  bent  upon  carrying  out 
in  practice  what  he  declared  in  earlier  years  when  writing 
in  the  privacy  of  his  study,  the  morals  of  which,  if  he  lost 
sight  of,  the  people  with  unerring  judgment  brought  to 
severe  condemnation  when  opportunity  offered : 

The  President's  power  of  compelling  compliance  on  the  part  of 
the  Senate  lies  in  his  initiative  in  negotiation,  which  affords  him  a 
chance  to  get  the  country  into  such  scrapes,  so  pledged  in  the  view  of 
the  world  to  certain  courses  of  action,  that  the  Senate  hesitates  to 
bring  about  the  appearance  of  dishonor  which  would  follow  its  re- 
fusal to  ratify  the  rash  promises  or  to  support  the  indiscreet  threats 
of  the  Department  of  State.5 

Instead  of  meeting  a  matter  four-square,  this  expression 
indicates  his  determination  to  carry  a  point  by  fair  means 
or  foul.  When  he  was  hailed  in  France,  England,  and 
Italy  as  the  hope  of  the  world,  it  was  the  result  of  two 
false  assumptions :  That  in  international  policy  he  was  the 
representative  man  of  America,  and  that  when  the  Covenant 
was  incorporated  in  the  peace  treaty  it  was  America's 
special  contribution  to  the  settlement.  By  April,  1919,  the 
question  was  whether  he  could  crystallize  opinion  in  his  own 
country  so  as  to  sustain  his  own  point  of  view  of  committing 
the  country  to  a  place  in  the  concert  of  powers.  The  mad- 
ness of  his  course  in  attempting  his  domineering  method  in 
America  failed  as  it  did  in  Europe.  The  people  would  have 
none  of  the  fair-or-foul  method  suggested  in  his  written 
works.  It  must  be  fair  or  none  of  it. 

4Keynes'  "Economic  Consequences  of  Peace,"  p.  38. 

0  "Constitutional   Government,"   by   Woodrow   Wilson,    pp.   233-234. 

Compare  this  threat  with  Brieaux'  statement  above. 


Wilson  and  Wihonism  381 

It  is  not  strange  that,  in  conformity  with  the  foregoing 
characteristics  of  President  Wilson,  he  was  so  often  taking 
the  side  that  the  event  showed  to  be  wrong  and  which  the 
better  thought  of  the  country  felt  to  be  the  wrong;  though 
the  people,  in  accordance  with  the  best  traditions  of  the 
nation,  held  in  abeyance  its  own  judgment  out  of  defer- 
ence to  the  Chief  Executive  until  he  was  shown  unworthy  of 
such  deference,  a  fact  well  illustrated  in  the  case  of  Theo- 
dore Roosevelt  who,  like  almost  all  Americans,  was  misled 
by  the  Administration  at  the  beginning  of  the  Great  War. 
Instances  abound  of  this  undesirable  quality  of  Mr.  Wil- 
son's mental  processes.  When  America's  moral  sense  was 
beginning  to  feel  the  stirrings  within,  he  was  not  concerned 
with  the  causes  and  declared  for  neutrality  even  in  thought; 
and  when  the  conflict  ceased  and  the  world  needed  and 
demanded  peace,  he  refused  it  to  America  though  he  had 
declared  that  to  do  so  would  break  the  heart  of  the  world. 
When  the  demands  of  the  situation  were  insistent  that  he 
remain  at  his  sworn  post  of  duty  in  Washington,  he  took 
himself  to  Europe  and  sought  to  administer  the  affairs  of 
the  nation  from  Paris.  When  the  nation  expected  his  oft- 
proclaimed  "open  covenants  openly  arrived  at"  to  be  put 
into  operation,  he  closed  all  communication  between  Paris 
and  America  by  taking  over  all  channels  of  information 
as  a  war  necessity.  When  America  looked  to  him  for  some 
word  of  enlightenment  on  the  Paris  processes  at  the  earliest 
opportunity,  offered  in  his  Boston  address  upon  his  first  re- 
turn to  his  own  county  he  informed  the  people  of  the 
impropriety  of  giving  such  information ;  and  when  he  under- 
took to  educate  the  American  public  as  to  the  merits  of  the 
Covenant  in  his  tour  of  the  country  in  September,  1919,  so 
turgid  6  was  the  stream  of  his  language  that  people  turned 

8  Notwithstanding  Mr.  Wilson's  remarkably  smooth  language,  often  of 
the  most  polished  style,  he  displayed  remarkable  facility  in  murkiness  where 
the  importance  of  the  occasion  demanded  the  most  terse  and  clear  ex- 
pression. Vivid  descriptions  of  his  phrasings  have  been  used  to  char- 
acterize his  language.  A  few  picked  up  at  random  are  these:  "stimulating 
rhetoric,"  "rhetorical  persuasivness,"  "airy  assumptions,"  "rhetorical  rhap- 


382    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

away  from  him  in  largest  proportion  where  they  heard*.him 
in  largest  numbers.7  They  declined  longer  to  follow  the 
ignis  fatuus  of  fine  phrases  seemingly  designed  to  hide  some 
ulterior  purpose. 

Can  anything  be  added  that  will  help  to  define  the  in- 
tangible thing  known  as  Wilsonism?  A  key-statement  of 
his  is  that  uttered  during  the  1916  presidential  campaign: 
"I  am  willing  to  play  for  the  verdict  of  history."  It  was 
looked  upon  by  the  best  American  opinion  as  a  worthwhile 
aim;  as  an  expression  of  the  vision  that  belongs  to  states- 
manship. By  that  time,  his  "men-everywhere"  idea  was 
gaining  a  prominent  place  in  public  addresses  and  state 
papers.  His  statement  of  April  19,  1915,  already  quoted  in 
this  chapter,  indicates  that  at  that  time  he  held  to  American 
tradition.  Between  that  time,  however,  and  the  time  of  his 
touring  the  country  in  behalf  of  the  Covenant,  in  Septem- 
ber, 1919,  when  he  declared  that  the  Covenant  was  greater 
than  the  Senate,  was  greater  than  the  government,  a  marked 
change  took  place  in  his  views  of  what  America  means.  At 
the  latter  time  he  had  no  word  to  speak  in  behalf  of  what 
America  meant  or  what  the  Constitution  of  the  nation 
meant  to  the  world,  though  it  was  Constitution  week. 

This  was  a  gradual  change  from  nationalism,  that  force 
which  had  made  America  a  respected  power  in  the  whole 
world,  to  internationalism  in  which  America  was  to  be 
degraded  from  her  lofty  position  of  influence  for  right- 
eousness among  the  nations.  His  declaration  of  interna- 

sodies,"  "resounding  phrases,"  "pious  platitudes,"  "smug  formulas,"  "tumid 
rhetoric,"  "moving  accents,"  "rhetorical  generalities,"  "alluring  rhetorical 
phrases,"  "polished  periods,"  "stately  rhetoric,"  "poetic  and  eloquent  utter- 
ance," "skillful  appeals,"  "resounding  generalities,"  "resounding  platitudes," 
"pure  rhetoric,"  "smoothly  eloquent  assertion,"  "rhetorical  appeal,"  "unsub- 
stantial rhetoric,"  'high-sounding  phrases,"  "platitudes  that  tickle  the  ear," 
"rhetorical  utterance,"  "fatal  gift  of  phrase-mongering,"  "soaring  oratorical 
flights,"  "vain  and  flabby  phrases,"  "seductive  rhetoric,"  "cloudy  rhetoric," 
"vague  dissertations." 

While  New  York  and  Pennsylvania  rolled  up  such  tremendous  ma- 
jorities against  Wilsonism  in  the  national  election  on  November  2,  1920, 
they  fell  below  the  proportionate  majorities  through  the  west  where  Wilson 
was  comparatively  strong  in  1916  and  where  he  made  his  direct  appeal  to 
save  the  Covenant,  September,  1919. 


Wilson  and  Wilsonism  383 

tionalism  reached  its  height  when  he  had  gained  the  pinnacle 
of  his  fame.  This  occurred  while  in  Italy  and  when  he 
addressed  the  French  Socialists,  while  touring  Europe  be- 
fore sitting  in  the  world's  Peace  Congress.  He  proclaimed 
internationalism  with  all  the  force  at  his  command,  even 
assuming  that  he  could  back  up  his  statements  with  the 
army  and  navy  of  the  United  States,8  and  appealing  to 
international  socialists  as  against  their  governments,  as 
against  nationalism.  From  that  time  to  the  close  of  his 
administration  he  never  made  a  ringing,  soul-stirring  address 
as  to  the  good  that  real  Americanism  could  accomplish 
among  the  sons  of  men. 

This  was  logical  from  the  bent  of  his  own  mind  as  indi- 
cated by  the  character  of  men  whom  he  placed  in  important 
positions — Creel,  Steffens,  Herron,  Bullitt,  Hale,  Hapgood, 
to  mention  only  a  few.  His  return  to  America  witnessed 
encouragement  of  internationalism  and  socialism.  The  lat- 
ter became  defiant,  even  of  the  Government.  Some  good 
people  failed  to  see  the  danger  of  his  appeal,  and  in  diluted 
form  re-presented  it  to  the  public,  the  favorite  formula 
being,  uNow,  if  only  our  nationalism  does  not  become  too 
strong."  And  this  at  the  very  moment  when  radicalism, 
encouraged  by  the  process,  was  seeking  to  tear  the  very 
vitals  from  America — radicalism,  so  greatly  encouraged 
by  Mr.  Wilson  as  to  become  a  definite  part  of  Wilsonism. 
Anarchism  was  a  part  of  the  process.  It  received  definite 
encouragement  from  the  Administration,  as  shown  in  the 
chapters  on  "Disloyalty"  and  "Russia  and  Bolshevism." 
When  he  undertook  to  frame  a  world  order  upon  interna- 
tionalism, declaring  that  it  must  be  accepted  "without  count- 
ing the  cost,"  he  was  doing  it  to  the  exclusion  of  American 
nationalism.  And  as  a  result  radicalism  became  so  bold 
that  he  was  compelled  to  take  cognizance  of  it  in  his  1919 

8  See  his  threatening  statement  announced  but  a  few  weeks  before  from 
his  vessel,  the  "George  Washington,"  as  he  was  on  his  way  to  meet  the 
assembled  statesmen  of  the  world. 


384    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

annual  address.  But  Italy  had  already  turned  away  from 
his  internationalism,  resenting  his  intrusion;  France  and 
England  gave  it  no  heed;  and  at  the  first  opportunity,  Amer- 
ica so  emphatically  repudiated  his  suggestions  as  to  leave 
no  hope  of  recovery  for  his  ill-fated  foreign  doctrines. 

Personal  government,  as  distinguished  from  constitu- 
tional government,  was  a  marked  feature  of  Wilsonism. 
Making  his  personal  representative,  Edward  M.  House, 
instead  of  the  legally  established  channels,  the  means  of 
communication  with  foreign  governments;  creating  the  great 
issue  between  the  Senate  and  the  people  on  the  one  hand  as 
standing  for  the  laws  and  the  Constitution,  and  himself  on 
the  other  as  standing  for  personal  government  and  inter- 
nationalism; undertaking  to  initiate  a  peace  policy  affecting 
all  the  Allies  without  consulting  them  in  the  matter;  reveal- 
ing a  purpose  to  transform  his  legitimate  leadership  into 
what  was  practically  a  dictatorship  by  employing,  for  the 
establishment  of  revolutionary  doctrines,  powers  which  had 
been  created  for  or  assumed  by  him  for  the  conduct  of  the 
war — these  acts  and  others  of  the  same  character  were 
symptoms  of  the  disease. 

Only  the  future  will  determine  into  what  niche  history 
will  place  President  Wilson.  That  he  has  bulked  large 
from  the  time  America  entered  the  world  conflict,  there  can 
be  no  dispute.  That  a  sharp  and  swift  decline  came  as  a 
result  of  Wilsonism  is  also  a  fact  cut  deeply  into  current 
events.  That  early  in  his  administration  a  literary  coterie 
of  a  certain  political  cult,  not  orthodox  in  Americanism, 
men  whom  he  favored  in  appointments,  began  to  write  him 
down  in  a  definite  place  in  history,  artificial  though  it  was, 
is  well  known  to  those  even  moderately  informed.  That 
his  own  nation  repudiated  him  and  his  doctrines  in  the 
sweeping  majorities  of  November  2,  1920,  is  too  patent 
to  need  further  statement.  But  his  vacillation,  his  evasion 
of  responsibility  in  making  decision  when  prompt  decision 
was  the  imperative  demand  of  the  occasion,  his  willfulness 


Wilson  and  Wilsonism  385 

and  obduracy — these  kept  him  from  attaining  the  maximum 
of  historic  largeness  which  was  within  his  grasp,  which  had 
been  flung  to  him  by  the  swift  tide  of  events.  When  civiliza- 
tion was  turning  a  critical  corner  he  became  the  Hamlet  in 
the  performance.  "Wilson  is  the  most  pathetic  example 
of  wasted  opportunities  our  history  or  any  other  history 
affords.  As  a  dignified,  firm,  constitutional  President  of 
the  United  States,  remaining  at  home  where  he  belonged, 
sharing  honors  and  responsibilities,  forgetting  Wilson  once 
in  awhile,  he  could  have  gotten  anything."  9 

In  view  of  the  foregoing,  Wilsonism  may  be  defined  as 
the  idea  developed  by  Woodrow  Wilson  as  President  of 
the  United  States,  of  internationalism  over  nationalism;  a 
moderate  degree  of  radicalism  bordering  on  anarchism; 
vacillation  and  evasion  of  responsibility  for  decision  when 
decision  was  a  clear  demand;  willfulness  and  obduracy  run- 
ning to  personal  government  and  disregarding  written  and 
unwritten  laws;  seeking  to  cover  from  public  view  grave 
errors  of  administration  and  policy,  resulting  in  duplicity 
and  attempted  deception  of  the  public;  and  the  sequel  of 
announcing  open  counsel  and  action,  while  practicing  secret- 
iveness  and  using  furtive  methods. 

The  public  never  lost  interest  in  the  notable  personality 
of  President  Wilson  to  the  last  moment  of  his  incumbency. 
Their  sympathy  followed  his  physical  weakness  as  he  left 
the  inaugural  ceremonies  of  his  successor  and,  almost  help- 
less, found  his  way  through  the  capitol  to  the  conveyance 
waiting  to  carry  him  from  the  final  scene  of  his  official 
career  to  his  private  home.  Yet  no  sympathy  followed  his 
statecraft. 

That  he  has  left  a  large  impress  upon  the  nation  is  be- 
yond question.  That  there  is  danger  to  constitutional  gov- 
ernment with  certain  types  of  men  is  evidenced  by  the 
processes  through  which  he  undertook  to  lead  the  people 

9  Personal  letter  from  Harvey  W.  Morrow,  Omaha,  October,  n,  1920. — 
Author. 


386    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

to  accept  a  super-government  to  replace  the  American  Con- 
stitution. 

Americanism  as  grounded  in  the  Constitution  must  be  a 
cardinal  principle  of  any  man  fit  to  be  President  of  the 
United  States.  Too  great  a  price  has  been  paid  for  orderly 
government  to  permit  it  to  be  waved  aside  upon  an  untried 
theory. 


CHAPTER   XIX 

PROFITEERING 

Grand,  noble,  inspiring  is  the  Spirit  of  America  in  war. 
It  has  ever  been  so.  Mean,  degrading,  despised  of  man- 
kind is  that  other  spirit  which  takes  personal  toll  of  disas- 
ter. The  ghoul  is  found  on  the  field  of  the  destruction 
caused  by  earthquake,  hurricane,  flood,  or  fire.  For  him  the 
extremest  penalty  imposed  by  his  fellows  of  the  race  is 
none  too  extreme.  In  his  class  is  the  profiteer,  who  takes 
advantage  of  the  destruction  of  war. 

History  is  always  curious  and  prying  after  facts  in 
strange  places  and  in  strange  ways.  "Is  it  possible, "  it 
asks,  "that  there  were  found  men  and  women  so  mean  and 
so  demeaning  as  to  take  advantage  of  the  horrors  of  the 
Great  War  for  selfish  gains?"  And  if  so,  it  wants  to  know 
further  whether  these  exactions  were  tolerated  by  the  Ad- 
ministration that  looked  after  the  interests  of  "men  every- 
where." 

Of  wrong  views  and  taking  untenable  positions  on  al- 
most every  great  public  matter  pertaining  to  the  Great  War, 
whether  on  preparedness,  on  pushing  it  vigorously  to  a  final 
conclusion,  on  looking  toward  peace,  on  peace-making,  or 
on  readjustment  after  the  conflict  ceased,  it  is  beyond  the 
possibility  of  charge  against  the  President  that  in  the  mat- 
ter of  profiteering  he  had  any  personal  interest  in  the  deadly 
game  of  grab.  But  how  did  his  Administration  function  in 
this  great  game? 

When  he  was  entering  upon  his  first  term  in  the  presi- 
dency, his  pronouncement  was  substantially  this:  "Woe  be 
to  the  business  concern  or  individual  that  undertakes  to 
rule  this  Administration  or  to  exact  toll  from  the  hard  earn- 

387 


388     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

ings  of  the  common  people !"  He  hurled  his  anathemas 
against  those  who  plundered  in  the  Civil  War,  of  which  he 
had  read.  But  this  of  which  he  had  read  was  but  a  minia- 
ture of  the  real  plundering  that  occurred  during  his  own 
incumbency.  It  was  always  well  for  the  bully  to  talk  loud 
when  there  was  no  danger;  it  was  another  matter  to  speak 
softly  and  carry  a  big  stick. 

One  prime  cause  of  the  opportunity  for  gambling  with 
the  Government  when  the  country  was  rushed  into  the  war 
was  the  state  of  unpreparedness  in  which  the  country  found 
itself  when  the  cause  of  civilization  called  across  the  waves 
for  immediate  action.  A  chief  outcry  against  the  war  was 
that  it  was  forced  upon  the  country  by  the  munition  manu- 
facturers because  of  the  opportunity  it  offered  for  pelf. 
Unfortunately  for  this  alarm,  it  came  almost  wholly  from 
two  classes :  The  professional  pacifist  and  the  ardent  pro- 
German.  That  the  munition-maker  had  always  been  a  prof- 
iteer, the  records  make  clear.  That  they  were  such  in 
peace  as  well  as  in  war,  is  shown  by  the  figures : 

The  American  Armor-Plate  Syndicate  sold  Russia  armor  plate  at 
$249  per  ton.  The  United  States  could  not  get  it  at  less  than  $616. 
It  ought  to  be  said  that  the  low  price  to  Russia  was  protested  by 
other  manufacturers.  The  protest  led  to  a  conference  in  Paris  and 
that  to  an  international  agreement  on  armor  plate.  Three  years  later 
the  price  was  lowered  to  the  United  States,  and  from  1896  to  1914 
the  government  bought  plate  from  the  trust  at  $440  per  ton.  But, 
according  to  the  report  of  the  present  chief  of  ordnance,  Rear  Ad- 
miral Strauss,  it  was  making  the  same  plate  in  a  factory  of  only 
20,000  tons'  capacity  at  $229  per  ton.  For  powder  which  it  makes 
in  its  own  factories  at  thirty-six  cents  per  pound,  the  government  paid, 
in  seven  years,  prices  varying  from  fifty-three  to  eighty  cents. 

And  this  writer  furnishes  other  valuable  data  touching  this 
matter.1 

1"The  League  of  Nations,"  pp.  102,  103,  by  Horace  M.  Kallen.  Marsh- 
all Jones  Co. 


Profiteering  389 

While  these  transactions  were  taking  place  under  the 
law,  others  were  outside  the  law.  The  airplane  scandal,  the 
shipbuilding  contracts,  the  almost  endless  ramification  of 
deals  put  through  in  the  various  branches  of  the  War  De- 
partment— these  made  it  look  like  one  unified  network  of 
grab;  it  looked  as  if  the  Administration  was  functioning 
better  along  these  lines  than  in  getting  the  real  war  machine 
into  motion.  In  the  middle  of  1918,  it  was  disclosed  by 
the  Department  of  Justice,  illegal  transactions  had  gone  so 
far  as  to  involve  contractors,  agents,  and  manufacturers  in 
soliciting,  in  Washington,  government  war  orders  under 
agreements  to  pay  illegal  commissions.  Simultaneously  with 
these  announcements,  raids  were  made  on  hundreds  of  busi- 
ness offices  of  manufacturers  throughout  the  United  States 
in  search  of  papers  to  show  the  scope  of  the  wanton  practice. 
These  contracts  made  for  the  government  ran  into  the 
hundreds  of  millions  of  dollars,  making  a  large  profit  for 
the  commission-fee  agent  as  well  as  for  the  manufacturer 
obtaining  the  contract.2 

The  rush  and  hurry  incident  to  the  unprepared  state  of 
the  nation  when  war  was  upon  it,  after  two  full  years  of 
warning,  created  the  opportunity  for  the  profiteer.  It  gave 
no  opportunity  to  select  with  any  reasonable  degree  of 
deliberation  either  the  brain  or  the  material  forces  that 
were  to  direct  the  nation's  latent  energy  for  repelling  the 
onslaughts  of  the  mightiest  war  machine  the  world  had  ever 
known.  President  Wilson  declared  with  much  complacency 
that  the  equanimity  of  his  usual  course  of  thought  could 
not  and  should  not  be  disturbed.  It  was  one  of  his  general 
statements,  without  reference  to  the  concrete  facts  in  the 

2  As  illustrative  of  this  type  of  profiteering  in  manufacturers'  contracts 
in  the  war,  there  is  cited  the  case  of  a  contract  drawn  up  in  a  Washington 
hotel,  whereby  it  was  agreed  that  one  Bittan  was  to  pay  the  other  party 
a  five  per  cent  commission  on  a  contract  for  about  100,000  raincoats,  and 
six  per  cent  on  all  subsidiary  contracts.  With  the  statement  that  the  $5000 
cash  payment  asked  was  for  an  official  in  the  Quartermaster's  Department 
in  Washington,  the  assurance  was  given  that  they  could  obtain  contracts 
whenever  the  government  was  in  the  market.  Bittan  paid  the  $5000  and 
the  transaction  was  completed. 


39°    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

case,  that  lay  at  the  bottom  of  so  much  mischief  to  his  ad- 
ministration. His  thought  became  disturbed.  His  whole 
administration  was  upset.  For  now  something  had  to  be 
done.  At  first  the  people  did  not  know  what  was  being  done. 
Senator  Chamberlain,  of  the  President's  own  party,  pretty 
completely  overturned  the  Administration's  equanimity  by 
his  charge  in  his  New  York  speech  that  the  War  Depart- 
ment had  ceased  to  function.  Among  the  things  to  be  done 
was  to  get  guns  and  anything  else  that  might  look  like 
preparation,  no  matter  how  or  where.3 

How  far  petty  and  grand  profiteering  in  high  places 
of  the  Administration  became  a  virus  that  infected  wider 
circles  of  the  Administration,  and  yet  wider  circles  of  busi- 
ness after  the  war,  can  never  be  determined.  That  it  under- 
mined greatly  the  moral  stamina  of  the  nation  there  can 
hardly  be  a  doubt.  It  was  only  a  few  months  after  the 
uncovering  of  the  old-guns  deal,  that  complaints  were  be- 
coming general  that  rent-profiteering  was  the  rule  in  the 
great  centers  where  war  contracts  were  being  carried  out, 
such  as  shipyards.  The  government  found  it  necessary  to 
stay  the  process.  At  Wilmington  the  workers  were  notified 
by  the  landlords  to  move  out,  unless  they  would  agree  to 

3  In  May,  1918,  after  Senator  Chamberlain's  New  York  address,  when 
the  War  Department  was  laying  before  the  House  Committee  on  Appropria- 
tions its  plans  for  carrying  out  the  ordnance  program,  it  developed  that  in 
the  schedule  was  an  item  for  $450,000  for  the  purchase  of  thirty  old  guns 
from  Francis  Bannerman,  who  had  an  assortment  of  old  guns,  and  whose 
place  of  business  on  an  island  in  the  Hudson  River  was  known  as  Banner- 
man's  Arsenal;  and  that  these  were  guns  which  the  government  had  sold 
five  years  previously  at  $87.67,  now  to  be  purchased  by  the  government  at 
$15,000.  Until  this  hearing,  there  was  no  publicity  to  the  transaction. 

And  as  illustrating  the  method  of  setting  in  operation  the  brain  forces 
of  the  nation,  when  the  emergency  was  upon  it,  the  instance  is  cited  of 
Bernard  M.  Baruch,  former  chairman  of  the  War  Industries  Board  and 
later  an  adviser  to  President  Wilson  in  the  Peace  Congress,  and  John 
D.  Ryan,  head  of  the  Anaconda  Copper  Company  and  who  was  placed  at 
the  head  of  the  aircraft-production  service,  two  very  capable  men,  who 
were  selected  to  organize  the  copper  interests  of  the  country  to  sell  copper 
to  the  government  at  prices  fixed  by  the  War  Industries  Board.  The 
Philadelphia  North  American  of  August  13,  1919,  is  authority  for  the  state- 
ment that,  under  this  arrangement,  the  copper  sold  to  the  War  Department 
aggregated  $153,334,478  in  price,  the  copper  interests  making  a  clear  profit 
of  $50,000,000,  or  over  30  per  cent,  as  shown  by  the  House  investigation 
of  ordnance  expenditures. 


Profiteering  391 

pay  a  greatly  increased  rental.  The  government  declared 
that  the  landlord  who  attempted  to  profit  thus  at  the  ex- 
pense of  the  shipyard  employes  or  to  eject  the  worker, 
would  be  dealt  with  in  a  similar  manner  by  the  government. 
At  the  same  time,  the  government  undertook  to  construct 
houses  for  its  workers  at  some  of  the  industrial  centers. 
Other  remedies  were  instructions  to  the  local  assessors  by 
the  cities  to  increase  the  assessed  value  upon  the  basis  of  the 
increased  rent;  local  committees  on  rent  profiteering  being 
established  in  thirty  cities  through  the  home-registration 
service  to  call  upon  profiteering  landlords  to  show  improve- 
ments and  expenses  justifying  the  rent  increases  demanded; 
and,  in  case  of  refusal,  to  publish  the  facts  in  full  without 
comment. 

This  profiteering  reached  out  into  every  branch  and  de- 
partment of  civil  life  after  the  clash  of  arms  was  silenced. 
It  was  not  because  the  nation's  supplies  had  been  exhausted. 
America's  great  resources  had  scarcely  been  touched.  Now 
dealers  were  not  satisfied  with  a  fair  profit  of  ten  per  cent; 
they  advanced  prices  of  goods  to  make  a  fifty-per  cent  profit. 
Profiteers  seeing  the  great  amount  of  money  in  the  hands 
of  the  workingmen,  set  about  to  get  it;  and  the  great  mass 
of  people  who  had  not  been  fawned  upon  by  the  Adminis- 
tration, as  had  the  organized  laboringman,  in  increased  pay, 
stood  amazed  at  the  steady  flow  of  money  from  these 
people  to  whom  it  came  easily.  And  these  millions  of  men 
and  women,  paid  no  more  now  than  before  the  war,  were 
compelled  to  pay  this  additional  fifty  per  cent  for  every- 
thing they  had  to  eat  and  wear.  It  was  difficult  for  them 
not  to  remember  these  things  when  they  went  to  the  polls 
on  November  2,  1920. 

From  the  time  of  the  armistice  there  were  ebullitions  con- 
cerning the  government's  taking  a  hand  in  stopping  profit- 
eering. There  was  nothing  visible,  to  the  end  of  1918, 
to  support  it  except  talk  and  note-writing.  Yet  instances 
were  known  and  publicly  cited  in  which  prices  charged  by 


392     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

some  distributors  of  groceries  netted  them  from  200  to  300 
per  cent,  from  that  time  on. 

It  was  the  memorandum  of  the  Federal  Trade  Com- 
mission's report,  made  public  August  7,  1919,  that  removed 
the  mask  as  never  before,  showing  the  system  of  food 
hoarding  and  of  profiteering.4  It  stirred  the  entire  country. 
A  nation-wide  campaign  was  inaugurated  to  combat  the 
conscienceless  pilfering  of  the  people.  Co-operation  be- 
tween state  and  federal  authorities  was  sought.  In  some 
instances  stocks  of  foodstuffs  were  seized;  some  profiteers 
sought  to  transfer  the  hoarded  stocks.5  The  declaration 
in  the  report  that  unless  the  packers  were  stopped,  they 
were  about  to  dominate  all  important  foods  in  the  United 
States,  as  well  as  the  world  meat  trade,  created  as  much 
discussion  by  the  public  as  any  question  since  the  armis- 
tice. 

Rent  profiteering  touched  a  few  places  during  the  war, 
outside  of  government  circles.  But  after  the  war  it  seemed 
to  fail  none.  In  New  York  it  became  so  aggravated  that 
churches  were  thrown  open  to  shelter  those  turned  into  the 
street.  The  legislature  found  it  necessary  to  make  new  laws 
governing  landlords. 

No  less  than  these,  did  the  workmen  bring  the  blight  of 

4  This  report  showed  no  depletion  of  food  stocks.  On  the  contrary,  sup- 
plies on  hand  June  i,  1919,  ran  from  3  to  298  per  cent  above  those  of  a 
year  earlier,  yet  with  a  constant  and  large  increase  in  prices. 

6  On  August  15,  1919,  just  eight  days  after  the  Commission's  report 
became  public,  a  telegram  was  sent  from  the  governor  of  Ohio  to  the 
United  States  Attorney  General,  that  one  Cleveland  concern  was  about 
to  remove  its  hoard  to  Chicago.  Thereupon  the  federal  attorneys  in  Ohio 
were  instructed  to  take  necessary  action,  should  the  attempt  be  made. 

At  the  same  time,  the  federal  attorney  at  Detroit  informed  the  De- 
partment of  Justice  at  Washington  that  in  three  cases  he  had  filed  libels,  and 
had  seized  10,460,000  eggs  and  300,000  pounds  of  butter. 

And  the  following  day  there  were  seized  in  St.  Louis  15,664,880  eggs 
held  for  seven  owners  by  the  Mound  City  Ice  &  Cold  Storage  Company. 

In  Newark,  New  Jersey,  forty  warehousemen,  packers  and  wholesale 
food  dealers  were  required  to  appear,  with  their  books,  before  a  special 
federal  grand  jury  to  testify  as  to  profiteering  in  foodstuffs. 

In  Buffalo  libels  were  filed  involving  thirty  or  forty  firms,  the  stocks 
including  3,590,000  pounds  of  butter  and  3,000,000  dozen  of  eggs. 

Other  sections  of  the  country  furnished  their  quota  of  these  leeches 
sucking  the  life  blood  from  the  public. 


Profiteering  393 

profiteering  to  the  land.  One  of  the  worst  types  of  profit- 
eer during  the  war,  and  one  of  the  first,  was  the  workmen 
engaged  on  war  contracts,  already  receiving  a  wage  out  of 
all  proportion  to  the  pay  of  others,  notably  government 
clerks,  clerks  in  banks,  sales  people  in  stores,  stenographers 
and  the  vast  numbers  who  go  to  make  up  the  great  American 
citizenship.  Taking  advantage  of  the  government's  needs, 
he  threatened  and  sulked,  he  shirked,  he  was  a  slacker.  He 
was  less  a  better  citizen  than  the  poorly-paid  clerk;  and  it 
will  be  difficult  for  him  to  justify  his  conduct  before  the  en- 
lightened citizenship  of  his  country — as  difficult  as  it  was 
for  President  Wilson  to  justify  his  coddling  of  him,  shrink- 
ing before  his  unwarranted  demands.  He  was  as  low  a  type 
of  profiteer,  whether  in  building  worthless  ships,  in  hiding 
out  of  sight  at  nine  dollars  per  day,  or  by  pursuing  any 
like  course,  as  was  the  profiteer  in  clothing,  munitions,  or 
food.  His  kind  was  encouraged  by  the  Administration,  and 
he  flourished  to  the  Administration's  finish.  It  is  true 
that  in  mid-summer,  1919,  the  President,  when  organized 
railroad  men  approached  him  for  another  increase  in  wages 
or  else  a  decided  lowering  of  living  costs,  did  not  accede 
to  their  demands  but  went  to  Congress  with  the  matter. 
Congress  declared  there  were  ample  laws;  that  what  was 
needed  was  enforcement.  Though  the  country  had  been 
earnest  and  long  in  its  complaints  upon  the  high  cost  of 
living,  the  Administration  gave  no  heed  to  these  scores  of 
millions,  Americans  all.  It  was  once  more  the  threat  of  a 
few  organized  railroad  men  that  gained  his  ear,  a  class 
whose  wages  had  kept  approximate  pace  with  living  costs, 
while  those  of  the  other  great  millions  had  not.  Eager 
to  tour  the  country  in  support  of  the  League-of-Nations 
Covenant,  he  attempted  to  pass  the  responsibility  on  to  Con- 
gress by  asking  that  body  to  enact  what  were  practically  the 
same  laws  then  in  existence  for  the  Administration's  control 
of  profiteering.  Neither  the  war-time  food  laws  nor  the 
war-time  fuel  laws  had  been  changed. 


394    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

The  situation  was  well  summarized  by  an  eastern  news- 
paper keenly  analytical  of  national  situations : 

Manufacturers  have  looted  the  purchasing  public,  not  only  by 
cornering  raw  materials  and  inflating  prices,  but  by  shamelessly  low- 
ering the  quality  standards  of  their  goods,  until  to-day  merchants 
who  are  jealous  of  their  reputations  have  to  fight  to  get  products  they 
dare  to  guarantee  as  sound.  Wholesalers,  jobbers  and  retailers,  down 
to  the  smallest,  have  joined  in  the  game  of  grab.  Labor,  yielding  to 
the  prevailing  spirit,  has  used  its  power  of  organization  to  get  its 
share.  Nay,  the  whole  public  has  been  infected,  and  over  the  entire 
country  there  is  sweeping  a  wave  of  greed,  of  extravagance,  of  idle- 
ness, of  devil-may-care  defiance  of  all  the  principles  of  economics  and 
morals.6 

But  action  of  the  government  in  the  prosecution  of  pro- 
fiteers was  slow  and  uncertain.     Immediately  the  President 
went  before   Congress   for   action,    the   Attorney-General 
began  warnings  through  the  public  press.    A  blare  of  trum- 
pets never  frightened  criminals  of  their  type.    The  method 
was  described  as  ua  gesture  made  by  pointing  the  finger 
at  the  profiteers. "     The  President  began  the  crusade  by 
making  the  favorite  gesture  of  a  politician  incapable  of 
doing  anything  substantial — appealing  for  legislation.    This 
gesture  is  the  special  favorite  when  the  politician  is  dealing 
with  economic  forces  which  he  does  not  understand  and 
does  not  so  study  that  he  may  understand.    From  that  time 
on  the  office  of  the  Attorney-General  gave  out  threatening 
statements  with  fair  regularity  to  the  end — monthly  state- 
ments.    The  end  came  October  15,   1920,  when  the  final 
statement  announced  that  the  campaign  would  end  Novem- 
ber   I — the    day   before    election — one    reason    for    which 
was  insufficient  appropriation  to  carry  on  the  work,  while 
another  stated  that  falling  prices  made  it  less  needful.  The 
people  refused  the  bait.     While  Mr.  Palmer  was  prose- 
cuting, prices  continued  to  rise ;  and  when  the  break  came,  it 
came  from  other  causes.     So  outrageous  had  become  pro- 

*  Philadelphia  North  American,  January  i,  1920. 


Profiteering  395 

fiteering  in  clothing  by  the  spring  of  1920,  that  what  became 
known  as  the  overalls  campaign  was  started  as  a  protest — 
started  as  a  local  impulse,  it  became  a  nation-wide  phenom- 
enon. It  grew  so  rapidly  that  through  whom  or  where 
it  started  was  lost  sight  of.  In  public  offices  and  in  courts, 
in  halls  of  legislation  and  private  business,  overalls  were 
worn.  Clubs  and  societies,  eagerly  formed  associations 
and  individuals  hastened  to  encourage  the  wearing  of  over- 
alls. College  undergraduates  and  high-school  pupils, 
learned  professors  and  dignified  presidents  wore  overalls. 
Mayors  were  inaugurated  in  overalls;  "denim  and  calico" 
weddings  were  solemnized.  It  was  a  campaign  more  power- 
ful than  the  thunderings  monthly  from  the  office  of  the 
Attorney-General  of  the  United  States;  more  effective  than 
his  prosecutions  of  profiteers,  resulting  in  181  convictions 
(one  to  about  each  600,000  people),  fines  aggregating 
$275,000,  and  sentences  aggregating  ten  years  and  ten 
months,  at  a  cost  to  the  government  of  $500,000.  The  big 
profiteers  were  not  molested.  They  met  their  signal  pun- 
ishment in  the  inexorable  law  of  supply  and  demand,  a  law 
beyond  the  reach  of  Attorneys-General,  Presidents  or  Pro- 
fiteers. 

It  was  this  law,  mightier  than  peoples,  potentates  and 
powers,  that  bore  with  relentless  weight,  at  first  upon  the 
suffering  people,  then  upon  the  shameless  profiteer.  The 
difficulty  with  its  operation  was  that  the  government  did  not 
see  to  it  that  it  had  free  course,  and  it  played  into  the  hands 
of  the  evil-doers — played  by  the  people  to  an  excess  that 
gave  the  profiteer  the  upper  hand,  while  debauching  the 
former.7 

'Instances  are  as  widely  spread  as  the  broad  land.  A  few  will  illus- 
trate : 

In  New  York  a  leading  Broadway  clothing  house  making  a  whole- 
window  display  of  serviceable  suits  at  $25,  was  unable  to  dispose  of  them 
until  the  price  was  marked  notably  higher.  In  St.  Paul  a  woman  of  most 
modest  means  went  to  a  leading  store  with  $100  with  which  to  purchase  a 
coat,  and  found  nothing  satisfactory  until  the  salesman  showed  one  at  $300. 
She  wanted  to  pay  the  $100  cash,  the  balance  of  $200  on  time.  The  head 
of  the  department  was  called  and  refused;  but  a  little  later  she  returned 


396    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

But  not  spoiling  the  great  masses  who  were  under  the 
extreme  pressure  of  high  prices  with  a  but  slightly  increased 
income,  it  led  to  resentment  everywhere  at  the  profiteering 
in  sugar,  a  staple  of  home  life.  Here  the  mightier  law  was 
strangled  almost  unto  death.  It  was  one  of  the  things  that 
was  probably  not  forgotten  by  the  masses  at  the  polls  on 
November  2,  1920.  It  was  in  late  summer,  1919,  that  the 
Sugar  Equalization  Board,  in  two  separate  communications 
at  two  different  times,  warned  President  Wilson  of  sugar 
shortage  and  that  there  would  be  an  increase  in  the  cost 
of  sugar  if  he  did  not  agree  to  the  purchase  of  the  1920 
Cuban  crop  at  the  price  then  offered — 6^/2  cents  per  pound. 
He  refused  to  act  on  these  urgent  representations.  The 
crop  was  sold  elsewhere.  Shortly  afterward,  Attorney- 
General  Palmer,  without  any  warrant  in  law,  suggested  to 
the  Louisiana  producers  that  they  were  permitted  to  charge 
17  to  1 8  cents  per  pound  at  the  plantation.  The  Cuban 
planters  readily  took  their  cue  from  these  suggestions.  The 
price  of  sugar  immediately  began  to  rise  by  leaps  and 
bounds.  An  increase  of  two  cents  per  pound  meant  an  in- 
crease of  $180,000,000  to  the  American  people  per  year. 
With  sugar  at  the  price  of  1 8  to  22  cents  per  pound  in  Feb- 
ruary, 1920,  the  American  people  were  paying  substantially 
a  billion  dollars  tribute  to  the  sugar  profiteers,  through  the 
attitude  of  President  Wilson  and  his  Attorney-General — 
as  Harvey's  Weekly  said  at  the  time:  "Because  one  man 
was  omniscient  and  another  hebetudinous."  By  early  May, 
1920,  after  much  false  publication  of  the  scarcity  of  sugar 
in  the  world,  it  became  known  that  imports  of  sugar  from 

with  the  additional  $200  and  took  the  coat.  A  Philadelphia  dealer,  unable 
to  sell  a  line  of  silk  stockings  at  $2.50,  cleared  out  the  entire  stock  in  a  few 
days  by  marking  them  up  to  $4.  In  a  small  up-state  town  in  Pennsylvania, 
a  merchant  was  offering  at  $8  a  good  shoe  that  cost  him  $5.50  a  pair. 
An  employe  in  a  factory,  after  looking  them  over,  said  he  would  like  some- 
thing better,  whereupon  the  merchant  asked  him  to  call  later  and  he  could 
satisfy  him.  Changing  the  same  shoes  to  other  packages  and  marking  them 
up  to  $15  he  made  sale  to  the  factory  employe,  who  then  informed  fellow 
workers  of  his  bargain,  and  the  merchant  sold  all  his  $8  shoes  at  the  higher 
figure. 


Profiteering  397 

all  sources  for  the  year  ending  June  30,  1920,  would  show 
an  increase  of  about  14  per  cent  over  those  of  the  preced- 
ing year,  making  a  total  of  approximately  two  pounds  of 
sugar  a  week  for  the  use  of  every  man,  woman,  and  child 
in  the  country.  Sugar  prices  continued  advancing  until  in 
some  important  centers  was  reached  the  price  of  35  cents 
per  pound;  and  many  grocers  would  sell  it  only  in  limited 
quantities  with  other  purchases  in  their  stores.  There  was 
a  clear  20  cents  a  pound  between  the  import  price  and  the 
retail  price — probably  the  largest  scheme  of  bleeding  the 
whole  mass  of  the  American  people  ever  forced  upon  the 
country  by  a  President  contrary  to  the  written  advice  of 
men  expert  in  the  line  of  the  duties  laid  upon  them.  When 
the  banks  refused  longer  to  back  these  profiteers,  the  infla- 
tion began  to  disappear,  they  began  to  try  to  save  one  an- 
other, the  price  of  sugar  dropped,  after  some  dealers  had 
lost  many  hundreds  of  thousands  of  dollars,  and  by  the 
end  of  1920,  sugar  was  selling  at  8  cents  retail  in  the  same 
cities  where  it  had  reached  the  35-cent  price. 

In  February,  1921,  the  United  States  grand  jury  at  In- 
dianapolis accused  mine  operators  and  labor  leaders  of  con- 
spiring to  mulct  the  public  of  every  dollar  possible,  while 
staging  a  conflict  as  a  camouflage. 

Let  it  never  be  forgotten  that  the  interest  of  the  great 
mass  of  American  citizenship  is  paramount  to  all  others 
combined. 


CHAPTER   XX 

RECONSTRUCTION 

Readjustment  or  reconstruction?  All  understand  that 
it  refers  to  the  period  immediately  following  the  signing 
of  the  armistice,  when  the  nation  was  seeking  to  return  to 
normalcy;  and  while  some  writers  insist  that  it  was  a  period 
of  readjustment,  others  understand  that  it  was  a  period  of 
reconstruction.  The  former  would  be  correct  if  the  coun- 
try were  simply  getting  back  to  where  it  was  before  the 
clash  of  arms.  But  there  was  something  more :  a  reconstruc- 
tion of  industrial  and  social  forces.  A  new  world  came  out 
of  the  furnace  of  conflict;  much  of  the  dross  was  gone.  It 
would  have  been  a  disaster  for  America  to  seek  to  adjust 
herself  to  the  old  status.  It  was  the  period  of  RECON- 
STRUCTION. 

It  was  not  easy  for  the  world  to  meet  these  conditions 
thrust  upon  it  by  the  Great  War.  Seven  million  of  the  choic- 
est of  the  world's  men  slain  in  battle;  7,000,000  more  so 
seriously  disabled  as  to  be  no  longer  available  as  producers 
— these  14,000,000  of  the  world's  most  capable  laborers  out 
of  the  race  created  a  condition  in  the  economic  world  that 
required  time  to  meet.  In  the  United  States  alone  5,000,- 
ooo  were  taken  from  ordinary  occupations  to  meet  the  fight- 
ing requirements,  while  a  very  large  number  besides  were  re- 
quired to  manufacture  and  transport  all  kinds  of  war  imple- 
ments— all  withdrawn  from  the  ordinary  course  of  business 
at  a  time  when  there  was  a  correspondingly  acute  demand 
for  men  and  goods  in  every  part  of  Christendom,  confront- 
ing this  nation  with  an  accumulated  deficit  of  production  and 
productive  power. 

While  the  war  was  still  in  progress,  the  Administration 

398 


Reconstruction  399 

gave  some  slight  attention  to  matters  pertaining  to  the  days 
after.  The  Council  of  National  Defense,  organized  pri- 
marily for  the  war  emergency,  passed,  as  a  permanent  body, 
into  such  reconstruction  tasks  as  seemed  imminent.  As 
early  as  June,  1918,  a  small  staff  from  it  was  organized  to 
"survey,  classify  and  digest  the  reconstruction  activities"  of 
this  and  other  lands,  with  instructions  to  report  to  the 
proper  department.  If  any  other  active  effort  looking 
toward  prepartion  for  the  reconstruction  period  was  made 
by  the  Administration  before  the  war  ceased,  it  is  so  slight 
as  to  be  negligible.  For  this  reason  it  was  freely  charged 
against  the  Administration  that  it  was  as  unprepared  for 
peace  as  it  had  been  for  war. 

When  President  Wilson  was  asked  to  create  a  recon- 
struction commission,  he  declined  upon  the  ground  that  he 
preferred  to  leave  that  work  to  the  various  war  boards.  In 
fact,  nothing  was  done,  although  it  was  pointed  out  to  him 
at  the  time  that  the  chief  commercial  nations  of  Europe 
were  at  that  very  time  constituting  commissions  of  their 
ablest  men  for  that  purpose.  The  British  were  thinking  of 
reconstruction  the  next  year  after  they  entered  the  war; 
and  their  government,  even  before  Asquith  was  replaced 
by  Lloyd  George,  had  taken  action  accordingly.  The  idea 
grew  with  them,  and  they  were  so  much  impressed  with  the 
importance  of  the  "new  world  after  the  war"  that  an  out- 
and-out  ministry  of  reconstruction  was  created.  Not  even 
in  the  darkest  days  of  their  fiery  ordeal  did  they  fail  in 
steady  preparation  for  the  day  they  foresaw  after  the  bat- 
tling should  cease.  For  the  entire  four  years  the  British 
Board  of  Trade  had  been  co-ordinating  the  work;  their 
commissions  had  been  at  work  for  months  at  home  and 
abroad  gathering  data  and  making  ready  for  the  new  era. 

The  United  States  Chamber  of  Commerce  addressed  to 
President  Wilson  a  letter  indicating  an  anxiety  among  busi- 
ness men  of  this  country  to  know  what  course  the  Govern- 
ment proposed  pursuing.  And  immediately  the  armistice 


4OO    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

was  signed  he  took  under  consideration  the  appointment  of 
a  reconstruction  commission  to  develop  a  program  for  the 
nation's  return  to  a  peace  basis,  such  commission  with  ad- 
visory powers  only.  Nothing  came  of  it.  As  is  now  a 
well-known  part  of  the  history  of  the  time,  he  was  engrossed 
with  international  affairs  to  the  almost  total  exclusion  of 
the  affairs  of  his  own  nation.  For  nine  months  the  nation 
was  plunging  toward  an  economic  and  social  crisis  that  was 
appalling  to  contemplate.  And  the  nation's  head  mani- 
fested a  profound  unconcern  for  the  seriousness  of  the  sit- 
uation. 

This  attitude  was  indicated  when,  in  December,  1918, 
he  was  asked  by  a  notable  gathering  of  the  business  men  of 
the  country  for  suggestions  of  guidance.  This  was  the 
Reconstruction  Congress,  held  at  Atlantic  City,  of  indus- 
trial leaders,  the  most  representative  and  important  gather- 
ing of  that  character  ever  held  in  this  country.  At  such  a 
time  it  was  of  supreme  importance.  With  nearly  5,000 
delegates  from  all  sections  of  the  country,  representing  380 
different  industries,  it  was  of  chief  importance  because  of 
what  it  proposed  to  accomplish.  This  congress,  naturally 
looking  to  the  head  of  the  nation  for  an  expression  as  to 
the  Government's  point  of  view  in  the  serious  situation  then 
confronting  the  country,  asked  him  to  state  that  position. 
He  paused  long  enough,  in  his  preparations  for  sailing  for 
Europe,  to  make  this  amazing  reply: 

You  may  be  sure  that  I  would  send  a  message  to  the  meeting  if  I 
knew  what  message  to  send ;  but  frankly,  I  do  not.  It  is  a  time  when 
we  must  all  thoughtfully  take  counsel  and  apply  the  wisest  action 
to  circumstances  as  they  arise. 

In  this  mood  of  exalted  preoccupation  he  left  the  country, 
with  no  one  in  the  nation's  capital  for  seven  months  with 
authority  to  speak  or  act  for  the  executive  branch  of  the 
government.  If  he  saw  the  storm  clouds  gathering  over 
the  land,  he  manifested  no  concern  until  given  a  rude  shock 


Reconstruction  401 

by  the  demands  of  a  few  organized  railroad  men,  in  the 
summer  of  1919,  who  bluntly  informed  him  of  the  disaster 
in  store  unless  he  quickly  awoke  from  his  international 
dream.  "Let  somebody  drop  a  match,  and  it  will  be  a 
sorry  day  for  all  of  us,"  is  what  the  railroad  man  said, 
truthfully  portraying  the  result  of  a  policy  which  the  rail- 
road men,  with  the  aid  of  the  President,  had  forced  upon 
the  country. 

An  Administration  lacking  policy,  program  or  leadership 
at  this  time  became  an  invitation  to  an  economic  debauch. 
A  spirit  of  recklessness  seized  the  country,  and  "there  en- 
sued an  orgy  of  profiteering  which  caught  into  its  intoxicat- 
ing influence  well-nigh  every  class  and  group  of  popula- 
tion." 

Such  being  the  attitude  of  the  head  of  the  Administra- 
tion, there  was  not  much  to  be  expected  from  the  heads  of 
the  several  departments.  And  whatever  effort  was  made 
was  without  concerted  plan  or  co-ordination — the  same 
weakness  that  had  held  the  Administration  helpless  in  its 
war  efforts.  The  industrial  and  social  leaders  of  the  coun- 
try, after  looking  in  vain  for  guidance  and  constructive 
leadership  from  that  source,  concluded  to  proceed  with 
what  measure  of  assistance  they  could  obtain  from  any 
quarter.  It  was  thought  that  a  federal  employers'  indus- 
trial body  could  accomplish  something  by  going  to  Europe 
and  there  at  first-hand  study  conditions  in  the  devastated 
part  of  the  world.  Accordingly,  a  little  more  than  two 
months  after  the  conflict  closed,  Secretary  of  Labor  Wil- 
son commissioned  such  a  body  to  go  to  Europe  to  inquire 
into  the  industrial  conditions  and  the  method  by  which  the 
industrial  leaders  and  laborers  there  were  meeting  the  sit- 
uation. 

A  suggestion  of  the  results  of  the  lack  of  a  head  at 
Washington  was  found  in  the  antagonism  that  developed 
between  the  Department  of  Commerce  and  the  Railroad 
Administration  in  the  spring  of  1919,  while  the  President 


402    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

was  in  Paris.  The  Industrial  Board  of  the  department 
had  made  an  attempt  at  stabilizing  prices.  This  the  Rail- 
road Administration  attacked  upon  the  ground  that  it  was 
interfering  with  prices  of  steel  rails.1  Abolishment  of  the 
board  by  Secretary  Redfield  on  May  9,  1919,  brought  to  an 
end  a  bitter  controversy  of  almost  two  months  between 
these  two  federal  branches  of  the  public  service  that  were 
very  important  at  that  particular  time,  Mr.  Redfield  de- 
claring that  so  far  as  his  department  was  concerned  the 
law  of  supply  and  demand  would  be  permitted  to  govern 
in  problems  of  industrial  reconstruction.  He  later  resigned 
his  cabinet  position. 

But  before  he  resigned,  he  assumed  the  position  appar- 
ently that  the  United  States  should  not  seek  to  extend  its 
trade  until  the  other  countries  of  the  world  had  had  an 
opportunity  to  gain  a  firm  footing,  in  the  markets  of  South 
America  and  other  lands.  In  an  authorized  interview,  he 
is  quoted  by  the  Federal  Trade  Service,  published  by  the 
Publicity  Corporation  of  Washington,  as  saying: 

We  have  a  great  decision  to  make.  It  is  whether  we  shall  take 
this  opportunity  and  the  immediate  rich  profits  it  offers,  or  whether 
we  shall  restrain  our  energies  for  awhile,  giving  France,  England, 
Belgium,  Italy,  the  neutrals  and  even  Germany's  reborn  people  a  fair 
and  free  opportunity  to  get  on  their  feet. 

And  Secretary  of  Labor  Wilson  declared,  at  an  even  earlier 
date,  that  we  had  made  about  all  the  provision  that  could  be 
made  for  foreign  trade  as  a  means  of  securing  additional 
markets.  "The  first  thing  is  to  know  where  the  trade  can 
be  had,  and  through  the  commercial  attaches  of  our  con- 
sulates operating  through  the  Department  of  Commerce  we 
have  kept  continually  in  touch  with  the  possible  opportuni- 

1  Director-General  of  Railroads  Hines  made  public  a  statement  on  May 
23,  announcing  that  he  had  been  compelled  to  purchase  200,000  tons  of 
steel  rails  at  the  steel  trust's  own  price,  upon  ascertaining  that  six  large 
companies  had  sent  in  bids  that  were  identical,  not  only  in  price,  but  as 
to  conditions,  and  that  all  were  in  strict  accordance  with  those  approved 
by  the  federal  Industrial  Board. 


Reconstruction  403 

ties.*'  2  And  he  properly  added  that  shipping  was  an  impor- 
tant factor  to  be  considered.  It  was  a  remarkable  contrast 
with  the  position  of  the  head  of  the  Department  of  Com- 
merce himself. 

But  in  the  midst  of  all  the  confusion  and  lack  of  co-or- 
dination on  the  part  of  the  Administration  at  this  crucial 
time,  there  remained  one  man  who  maintained  his  balance 
and  who  had  a  plan — Secretary  of  the  Interior,  Franklin 
K.  Lane.  He  planned  to  locate  the  returning  fighters  on 
the  public  lands  of  the  United  States,  of  which  there  were 
millions  of  acres:  15,000,000  of  arid  land  to  which  it  was 
proposed  to  bring  water  for  irrigation;  70,000,000  of 
swamp  lands  that  might  be  drained;  200,000,000  of  cut- 
over  land,  that  which  was  once  timbered,  from  which  were 
to  be  cleared  brush  and  stumps.  These  he  offered  to  the 
returning  men  on  easy  terms.  It  was  a  worthy  idea.  But  it 
failed  for  two  chief  reasons:  First,  wages  were  too  good 
at  easier  employment  in  great  industrial  centers;  and,  sec- 
ond, the  Anglo-Saxon  of  to-day,  though  his  ancestors  were 
the  greatest  subduers  of  wild  prairies  and  the  greatest  van- 
quishers of  stumps  and  swamps  the  world  ever  saw  and  that 
with  the  small  means  of  civilized  life  at  hand,  wants  the 
modern  school  and  church  and  all  that  goes  with  a  com- 
munity furnished  with  these  easier  means  of  helping  his 
children  at  once  to  the  higher  step  in  a  progressive  life. 
Had  life  been  found  less  attractive  in  the  larger  wages  at 
the  great  centers  of  life,  Mr.  Lane's  plan  would  have  been 
more  attractive.  It  deserved  better  consideration  than  it 
received. 

The  foregoing  is  substantially  the  efforts  of  the  Admin- 
istration at  the  beginning  of  the  crucial  period  known  as 
the  Reconstruction.  Other  efforts  on  its  part  were  defensive, 
as  shown  elsewhere.3  They  were  in  no  sense  aggressive 
reconstructive  programs.  Even  the  Conference  of  Gov- 

*  Collier's  Weekly,  February  i,  1919. 
'Chapter  on  "Profiteering." 


404    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

ernors  and  Mayors  called  for  the  White  House  March  3 
and  4,  while  the  President  was  temporarily  in  the  country, 
was  of  this  character,  the  resolutions  then  adopted  con- 
demning the  doctrines  which  inveigh  against  God  and  gov- 
ernment. For  then  it  was  already  seen  to  what  the  Presi- 
dent's recently  proclaimed  internationalism  and  his  more 
recent  dallying  with  the  Bolshevistic  doctrines  of  Russia 
were  leading  in  this  country. 

Thus  it  devolved  upon  the  leadership  of  the  country's 
business  men  to  supply  the  lack.  Even  in  the  midst  of  the 
rejoicing  over  victory  and  peace  there  ran  an  undercurrent 
of  uncertainty  and  apprehension  in  the  business  world  be- 
cause of  the  realization  that  the  Government  faced  the 
great  change  without  policy  or  program.  Manufacturers, 
bankers,  and  merchants  had  beseiged  Washington  in  vain 
for  some  suggestion  as  to  a  definite  plan  on  the  part  of 
the  Government.  Its  inertia  was  again  indicated  in  its 
process  of  laying  down  keels  by  the  shipping  board  and  of 
floundering  in  shipping,  while  fighting  to  maintain  shipping 
rates  ten  times  as  high  as  before  the  war  and  the  billions 
put  into  shipping  was  rapidly  tied  up  to  the  docks  to  perish, 
with  no  plan  or  program,  and  clerks  and  supervisors  no 
longer  required  crowded  the  shipping  service,  eating  up  the 
government  payroll.  In  contrast,  within  forty-eight  hours 
after  the  signing  of  the  armistice,  the  director  general  of 
the  British  mercantile  marine  began  demobilizing  his  forces, 
and  in  six  months  had  sold  more  than  1,200  ships,  realizing 
more  than  $300,000,000  without  loss;  and  not  a  clerk  or 
cent  of  expense  in  that  once  vast  department  of  that  gov- 
ernment remained.  It  was  completely  out  of  the  shipping 
business. 

First  in  importance  in  the  matter  of  private  leadership 
in  the  reconstruction  period  was  the  Atlantic  City  Congress 
of  December,  1918.  Most  prominently  announced  through 
the  public  press  of  all  the  acts  of  this  congress  was  the 
roundly  applauded  declaration  of  John  D.  Rockefeller,  Jr., 


Reconstruction  405 

that  "in  these  days,  the  selfish  pursuit  of  personal  ends  at 
the  expense  of  a  group  cannot  and  will  not  longer  be  tol- 
erated." His  industrial  creed,  as  it  was  termed,  took  the 
very  important  position  of  recognizing  three  equally  inter- 
ested parties  in  all  industrial  activity — capital,  labor,  and 
the  community.  This  was  a  matter  of  fundamental  impor- 
tance, as  neither  of  the  other  two  groups  had  ever  seemed 
to  think  that  the  great  mass  of  the  people  had  any  right  to 
consideration  in  their  quarrels  that  were  so  disastrous  to 
the  community  at  large. 

In  the  early  months  after  the  armistice  signing,  all  in- 
dustries were  waiting  for  "the  bottom  to  drop  out  of 
prices."  But  there  was  a  constant  rise.  Some  were  of 
opinion  that  prices  were  up  to  remain  high  permanently 
and  made  extensive  contracts  accordingly.  But  in  early 
February,  1920,  there  began  the  fall  in  prices,  and  it  was 
at  once  realized  that  manufacturers  must  at  once  make  a 
readjustment  and  purchase  with  greater  caution.  By  this 
time  exchange  was  so  out  of  balance  that  $69  would  enable 
an  American  to  purchase  $100  worth  of  goods  in  London, 
while  $36  in  France  and  $29  in  Italy  would  purchase  the 
same  amount. 

It  was  a  year  previous  that  there  was  on  all  sides  the 
great  fear  of  unemployment  in  the  country,  bringing  into 
existence  a  considerable  quantity  of  written  matter  urging 
that  all  kinds  of  work  proceed  at  once,  of  which  probably 
the  most  famous  appeal  is  that  of  Richard  H.  Edmonds  in 
the  Manufacturers'  Record,  when  he  said: 

Build  that  house  now;  construct  that  highway  at  once;  build  that 
school,  that  church ;  repair  that  broken  pavement ;  build  that  garage, 
and  even  that  chicken-coop,  now — not  to-morrow.  Go  ahead  with 
your  plans;  speed  the  nation  on  the  road  to  full  employment,  and 
thus  hasten  the  day  of  individual  and  national  prosperity  and  safety. 
Preach  this  from  the  pulpit,  ye  ministers  of  the  gospel;  act  it  from 
the  pews,  ye  laymen  who  profess  a  love  of  humanity;  put  it  into  ef- 
fect, ye  county,  municipal,  and  state  officials;  and  remember,  ye  busi- 


406    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

ness  men  of  America,  .  .  .  that  there  is  something  in  this  infinitely 
higher  and  more  important  than  the  small  amount  of  money  involved 
which  you  think  you  could  save  by  waiting. 
Government  officials,  particularly  those  in  high  positions  in 
the  Department  of  Labor,  were  urgent  in  their  utterances 
in  this  direction. 

And  the  great  employers  acted  upon  the  idea  with 
good  results.  Indeed,  many  of  them  planned  for  conversion 
of  their  war  plants  into  peace-time  operations  as  soon  as 
hostilities  should  cease.  Such  was  the  plan  of  the  monster 
Eddystone  plant  at  Philadelphia,  owned  by  the  Baldwin 
Locomotive  Works,  and  which  had  made  a  great  record 
during  the  war.  Likewise  the  Du  Pont  Powder  Company, 
with  plants  in  various  states,  affords  a  striking  example  of 
the  foreseeing  method  of  dealing  with  the  employment 
problem  precipitated  by  peace.  At  that  time,  of  its  100,- 
ooo  men  and  women  employes,  80  per  cent  were  engaged 
wholly  in  war  work,  three-fourths  of  these  were  transferred 
into  peace  industries  with  scarcely  a  ripple,  such  as  chemi- 
cals, dyes,  paints,  leather  substitutes.  When  the  Adminis- 
tration was  helpless  to  point  the  way,  business  men  pro- 
ceeded without  regard  to  the  Government's  purposes,  even 
though  it  was  the  Administration  which  was  responsible 
for  an  increase  of  wages  for  labor  out  of  all  proportion  to 
the  returns  for  vastly  more  exacting  service  to  the  commu- 
nity, such  as  teaching.  And  from  these  abnormal  levels  in 
wages  and  consequently  in  materials  it  was  known  that 
there  must  inevitably  be  a  sharp  recession.  And  while 
both  labor  and  capital  recognized  this  fact,  neither  was  will- 
ing to  make  the  first  concession;  and  between  the  two,  the 
public  met  the  usual  fate  of  being  the  chief  sufferer. 

In  the  early  months  of  1919,  the  Employment  Service 
of  the  federal  government  and  of  the  several  States  was 
watching  anxiously  for  the  bad  spots  of  unemployment  over 
the  country;  and  even  within  a  month  of  the  close  of  the 
fighting  reports  were  received.  The  reports  at  the  end  of 


Reconstruction  407 

the  first  week  in  December,  1918,  showed  that  of  the  122 
cities  reporting  to  Washington,  only  16  showed  unemploy- 
ment conditions;  and  in  91  of  these  cities  the  relations  be- 
tween capital  and  labor  were  reported  good,  in  8  as  un- 
settled, and  in  5  as  acute.  In  the  New  England  area, 
Bridgeport  reported  7,500  unemployed,  Derby  1,000,  Hart- 
ford 3,000,  an  increase  of  1,500  over  the  preceding  week, 
and  Meriden  1,500,  an  increase  over  the  preceding  week 
of  500.  The  steel  and  iron  industries  were  laying  off  men. 
In  Boston,  Worcester,  and  Lynn  upwards  of  23,000  were 
out  of  employment  among  textile  workers,  while  many  con- 
cerns were  on  two-thirds  time.  There  was  heavy  unem- 
ployment among  boot  and  shoe  workers,  brick-layers,  car- 
penters, laborers  and  machinists.  Only  in  New  Hampshire 
and  Vermont  did  the  demand  for  workers  equal  the  supply. 

About  Albany  a  surplus  of  6,000  was  reported,  an  in- 
crease of  200  in  a  week;  while  Buffalo's  increase  was  1,000, 
making  a  total  of  20,000.  Newark's  surplus  was  6,000, 
Jersey  City's  5,000,  Trenton's  3,000;  while  Pittsburg  re- 
ported 12,000  unemployed  common  laborers,  6,000  semi- 
skilled workers,  and  1,000  clerks,  besides  1,700  miners; 
and  similar  reports  came  from  other  large  industrial  cen- 
ters of  the  Eastern  States.  Cleveland  reported  75,000 
unemployed  workers,  Dayton  1 1,000,  and  other  Ohio  points 
large  numbers. 

The  middle  west,  the  south,  and  the  Pacific  coast  all 
reported  substantially  the  same  conditions.  Of  all  the  cities 
of  the  country  reporting  to  Washington  for  the  week  end- 
ing February  24,  1919,  sixty  per  cent  reported  heavy  unem- 
ployment— an  increase  of  fifty-eight  per  cent  over  the  week 
previous  and  fifty-seven  per  cent  over  the  week  before  that; 
the  number  of  cities  reporting  an  approximated  equality  of 
demand  and  supply  decreased  twenty-nine  per  cent  in  the 
one  week.  Every  week  for  the  first  three  months  after  the 
signing  of  the  armistice  showed  the  same  tendency. 

And  now,  at  a  rather  late  day,  the  Administration  was 


408     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

becoming  alarmed  and  sent  out  danger  signals.  November 
19,  1918,  a  week  after  the  armistice  was  signed,  Roger  W. 
Babson,  head  of  the  statistical  organization  which  furnished 
merchants,  bankers  and  investors  with  a  periodical  "barome- 
ter letter,"  urged  concessions  to  labor,  closing  with  this 
question:  "Shall  we  all  voluntarily  give  up  something,  or 
shall  we  all  run  the  risk  of  losing  everything?"  It  was 
stated  that  fundamental  economic  conditions  were  bad, 
and  that  a  period  of  trouble  and  depression  was  just  ahead 
and  could  not  be  sidetracked.  The  number  out  of  employ- 
ment at  the  end  of  four  months  after  the  conflict  of  arms 
closed  was  formidable,  the  number  between  December  3, 
1918,  and  January  31,  1919,  being  multiplied  twenty-five 
times,  the  number  at  the  latter  date  being  about  1,500,000 
which  had  increased  in  two  weeks  to  2,000,000.  President 
Wilson  summoned  to  Washington  governors  of  the  various 
States  to  consider  the  situation;  and  while  they  expressed 
confidence  that  there  was  little  danger  of  violence  during 
the  reconstruction  period,  there  was,  throughout  the  land, 
clearly  defined  expression  of  doubt  as  to  the  validity  of  this 
opinion.  The  United  States  Employment  Service,  reorgan- 
ized to  find  positions  for  the  returned  fighting  men  of  the 
nation,  practically  suspended  activities  on  March  22,  1919, 
because  of  the  failure  of  Congress  to  make  an  appropria- 
tion for  its  maintenance.  Its  agents  performed  their  most 
efficient  service  in  efforts  at  the  demobilization  camps  to 
put  the  discharged  service  men  into  suitable  employment, 
unless  they  already  had  something  definite  in  view.  And 
through  their  efforts,  communities  throughout  the  land  were 
organizing  bureaus  for  this  purpose,  managed  by  local  com- 
mittees.4 It  was  a  highly  commendable  plan. 

*  The  Employment  Service  showed  itself  effective  in  many  lines.  Start- 
ing as  a  small  beginning  in  the  immigration  service,  it  suddenly  leaped  to 
a  position  of  usefulness  and  importance  that  challenged  the  admiration 
of  the  world.  Unknown  until  about  January,  1918,  as  an  essential  unit 
of  service,  in  ten  months  it  moved  2,500,000  men  from  peace  to  war  activity; 
and  by  the  middle  of  January,  1919,  operating  the  reverse  process,  it  had 
placed  twenty-five  per  cent  of  all  war  workers  who  wanted  employment. 


Reconstruction  409 

But  it  was  severely  criticized.  It  was  declared  to  be 
one  form  of  the  propaganda  used  by  the  Administration  to 
make  things  appear  what  they  were  not.  While  the  figures 
given  in  the  foregoing  paragraphs  are  from  official  sources, 
whereby  the  press  of  the  country  was  made  to  believe  that 
its  continuance  was  a  necessity,  the  deductions  are  open 
to  question,  and  in  some  cases  the  figures  themselves. 
Industry,  a  newspaper  interested  in  the  country's  industrial 
development,  declared  that  fewer  men  were  out  of  work 
at  the  end  of  six  months  after  the  war  ended  than  in  any 
year  preceding  the  war.  The  Iron  Trade  Review  criticized 
the  method  of  the  service  in  securing  the  figures  as  to  the 
number  of  unemployed.5  The  Washington  Evening  Star 
published  figures  taken  from  representative  papers  in  Wash- 
ington, Philadelphia,  St.  Louis,  Detroit,  Pittsburg,  New 
York,  Boston,  Cleveland  and  Buffalo  showing  that  the  ad- 
vertising for  help  in  January  and  February,  1919,  was 
larger  by  1,406  advertisements  than  for  the  same  months 
a  year  earlier.6  And  an  inspection  of  the  pages  of  adver- 
tising in  the  metropolitan  newspapers  in  late  1919  and  early 
1920  shows  page  after  page  given  to  the  most  expensive 
advertising  for  "help  wanted."  Common  laborers  were 


In  early  1918,  it  devised  plans  for  effecting  the  wheat  harvest  of  that 
year  with  the  minimum  of  loss.  Establishing  offices  in  the  great  centers 
of  the  wheat  belt,  speed  and  efficiency  marked  every  movement  of  the  great 
land  army  of  harvesters  numbering  nearly  10,000  under  its  direction.  Co- 
operation was  sought  from  newspapers,  and  other  agencies  used  were  mov- 
ing pictures,  the  national  grange,  commercial  organizations,  and  rural 
telephone  lines. 

Owing  to  the  failure  of  appropriation  to  continue  its  service,  the  re- 
duction ordered  in  March,  1919,  cut  its  force  80  per  cent,  leaving  a  mere 
skeleton  of  its  former  force. 

5  In  the  case  of  the  Cleveland  figures,  it  stated  that  the  Employment 
Service  asked  for  an  estimate  from  its  local  office  there,  which,  in  turn, 
asked  for  an  estimate  from  the  Cleveland  Federation  of  Labor,  and 
then  the  two  were  to  make  a  guess.  This  guess  was  then  forwarded  to 
Washington  where  it  was  given  out  as  fact. 

0  The  advertising  for  female  help  amounted  to  265,095  lines  as  com- 
pared with  210,443  for  the  same  period  of  the  preceding  year.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  papers  selected  from  eight  cities  for  the  same  months  showed  61,095 
lines  of  advertising  for  "situations  wanted"  (male)  as  against  57,509 
for  a  year  earlier. 


410    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

those  most  readily  taken  up  in  the  early  days  of  reconstruc- 
tion. 

The  period  immediately  after  the  war  closed  was 
marked  by  strikes  of  unusual  violence  in  the  United  States, 
with  the  avowed  purpose  of  destroying  so-called  capitalism 
and  orderly  government.  It  is  to  be  regretted  that  promi- 
nent in  this  effort  at  destruction  were  noted  leaders  of 
organized  labor  who  herded  many  of  the  honest  laborers 
like  so  many  sheep  into  the  wrong  fold.  And  it  was  with 
less  basis  for  strikes  than  ever  known  in  history.  There 
was  never  less  need  for  increased  wages  than  at  that  time, 
or  for  improved  conditions  of  work  or  living  of  the  laborer, 
as  shown  elsewhere.7  The  propaganda  was  actively  at  work 
blowing  smoke  into  the  eyes  of  the  American  people,  seek- 
ing to  blind  them  to  the  fact  that  it  was  the  European 
variety  of  Bolshevism  finding  its  way  in  America.  And  by 
the  time  of  the  next  presidential  election,  the  people  were 
awake  to  the  fact  that  the  broad  announcement  of  Samuel 
Gompers,  President  of  the  American  Federation  of  Labor, 
that  it  was  the  duty  of  organized  labor  to  support  the  party 
and  policies  of  President  Wilson,  was  not  sound  either  in 
sentiment  or  principle.  Honest  laboring  men  by  the  hun- 
dreds of  thousands  repudiated  the  whole  destructionist 
scheme.  Said  a  leading  newspaper  on  the  Atlantic  sea- 
board: 

Whatever  may  be  the  constructive  aims  of  Mr.  Gompers  and 
his  followers  in  the  American  Federation  of  Labor,  the  purpose  is  that 
which  was  proclaimed  on  the  very  first  day  of  the  strike  by  John  Fitz- 
patrick,  head  of  the  strike  committee:  "We  are  going  to  socialize  the 
basic  industries  of  the  United  States.  This  is  the  beginning  of  the 
fight."  And  with  radicalism  in  control  of  the  basic  industries — the 
necessaries  of  existence — there  would  be  created  such  a  condition  of 
civil  war  as  now  threatens  Great  Britain.8 

1  Chapters  on  "Labor  and  Wages"  and  "Russia  and  Bolshevism." 
8  Philadelphia  North  American  of  September  30,  1919. 


Reconstruction  411 

It  was  the  time  chosen  by  Bolshevism  and  all  of  its  hy- 
brid associates  to  overturn  the  best  government  the  world 
ever  knew — and  for  a  class  purpose  wholly.  The  situation 
was  sobering,  even  alarming,  almost  desperate.  It  gave 
serious-minded  people  pause.  But  the  result  of  the  1920 
national  election  was  as  hard  a  hit  at  radical  laborism,  with 
which  Mr.  Gompers  was  dallying,  as  it  was  at  Wilsonism. 
Indeed,  upon  the  statements  of  both  President  Wilson  and 
President  Gompers,  the  minds  of  the  two  lay  alongside 
of  each  other,  and  to  strike  one  was  to  strike  both.  The 
blow  was  sent  home. 

When,  in  the  face  of  a  national  calamity,  in  the  summer 
of  1916,  the  organized  railroad  men,  aided  by  President 
Wilson,  forced  their  demands  upon  the  country  through 
a  servile  Congress,  they  set  a  pace  that  was  followed  by 
all  classes  where  it  was  possible,  for  increases  in  prices 
and  costs  of  living.  Had  the  government  conscripted  labor 
and  capital  at  the  same  wages  it  paid  the  fighting  boys, 
there  might  have  been  a  modicum  of  justice  in  the  process. 
But  the  debauch  begun  in  1916  continued  throughout  the 
reconstruction  period. 

The  first  feeling  of  timidity  and  uncertainty,  immedi- 
ately following  the  cessation  of  hostilities,  soon  gave  way 
to  a  riot  .of  money-spending.  Hotels  everywhere  demand- 
ing exorbitant  rates  were  crowded  to  capacity  and  travellers 
found  it  difficult  to  secure  lodging  unless  engaged  well  in 
advance.  Theaters  the  country  over  were  doing  a  record- 
breaking  business.  High-priced  restaurants  were  patron- 
ized beyond  anything  ever  before  known.  Dealers  in? 
jewelry  and  in  the  most  expensive  kinds  of  men's  and  wom- 
en's apparel,  purveyors  of  all  the  infinite  varieties  of  things 
unnecessary  and  of  high  cost  did  an  unheard-of  business. 
Nor  was  this  on  the  part  of  the  rich  people  who  could  well 
afford  to  indulge  in  such  a  riot  of  buying.  But  it  was  while 
they  were  turning  their  suits  and  having  them  retailored, 
that  men  and  women  working  for  modest  salaries  and  in 


412    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

humble  position  were  freely  purchasing  of  jewelry  and  gar- 
ments that  cost  hundreds  of  dollars  apiece. 

Now  the  country  was  reaping  the  reward  of  the  enor- 
mously bulged  prices  that  were  forced  by  organized  labor 
upon  the  country  in  1916.  Office  boys  who  were  receiving 
$8  to  $10  per  week  were  put  on  the  war-plant  pay-rolls  at 
$20  to  $30;  unskilled  laborers  jumped  from  $15  to  $40. 
The  farmers  were  stripped  of  labor  by  the  lure  of  the  prices 
paid  by  industrial  centers,  while  his  costs  were  rising,  ne- 
cessitating a  rise  in  cost  of  the  food  he  produced.  Then 
labor,  finding  that  its  bulkier  envelope  brought  no  better 
living,  made  fresh  demands.  Building  ceased  because  of 
excessive  prices  for  material  and  labor,  rents  shot  skyward, 
railroad  rates  increased — and  labor  insisted  on  higher 
wages.  The  vicious  cycle  was  in  full  swing.  It  was  at  this 
time  that  organized  railroad  men  again  made  demand  upon 
President  Wilson  for  further  increase  of  wages  unless  there 
was  to  be  a  reduced  cost  of  living;  and  while  the  President 
was  discoursing  upon  "the  judgment  of  society"  and  dwell- 
ing upon  his  constructive  statesmanship  in  world  affairs, 
A.  B.  Garretson,  chairman  of  union  railroad  representatives, 
was  frankly  describing  the  contest  as  one  between  the  cave- 
men when  he  said : 

In  times  like  these,  men  go  back  to  primal  instinct — to  the  day  of 
the  caveman,  who,  with  his  half-gnawed  bone,  snarled  at  the  other 
caveman  who  wanted  to  take  his  bone  away.  We  leaders  are  fighting 
for  our  men,  the  railroads  are  fighting  for  their  stockholders,  and  the 
shippers  for  themselves.  The  public  will  pay. 

It  was  shortly  after  this,  in  late  1919,  that  public  jour- 
nals were  comparing  prices  and  other  conditions  after  the 
close  of  the  Civil  War  with  conditions  prevailing  at  the 
close  of  the  Great  War.  Referring  to  the  earlier  period, 
a  New  York  correspondent  of  the  London  Times  stated  at 
that  time: 

This  war  has  brought  the  levity  of  the  American  character  out 
in  bold  relief.  The  indulgence  in  every  variety  of  pleasure,  luxury, 


Reconstruction  413 

and  extravagance  is  simply  shocking.  There  is  something  saddening 
in  the  high  glee  with  which  the  people  here  look  upon  a  grievous 
national  calamity.  The  jewelers'  shops  .  .  .  have  trebled  their 
trade;  the  love  of  fine  dresses  and  ornaments  on  the  part  of  women 
amounts  to  madness.  They  have  money  and  they  must  enjoy  it. 

Suggestive  of  the  increased  cost  of  living  at  that  time, 
these  figures  are  cited: 

Eggs  jumped  from  fifteen  to  twenty-five  cents  a  dozen,  cheese 
from  eight  to  eighteen  cents  a  pound,  potatoes  from  $1.50  to  $2.25 
per  bushel.  All  necessities  rose  in  value  from  sixty  to  one  hundred 
per  cent.  Wages  lagged  behind,  the  average  increase  in  all  trades 
being  about  twenty-five  per  cent. 

But  one  who  passed  through  the  high-living  costs  after 
the  Great  War  may  smile  at  the  foregoing  figures,  especially 
when  it  is  remembered  that  the  paper-dollar  value  of  that 
time  was  far  below  that  of  gold,  while  in  the  reconstruction 
period  of  1919-1921  they  possessed  equal  value.  For 
now  eggs  went  to  $1.00  a  dozen,  and  in  late  1920  sold 
in  the  middle  West  at  $1.20;  turkeys  at  Thanksgiving,  1920, 
retailed  at  fifty  cents  per  pound.  Potatoes  were  sold  at 
$6.00  per  bushel,  in  the  spring  of  1920,  in  a  distinctively 
potato  section  of  the  central  Northwest,  where  butter 
reached  $1.00  a  pound  in  a  famous^dairying. State.  These 
prices  fairly  represent  costs  of  the  time,  as  affected  by 
foodstuffs. 

As  touching  the  building  costs  in  early  1920,  an  architect 
in  a  section  of  the  country  where  the  lumber  business  is 
prominent  stated  publicly  that  the  general-contract  low  bid 
of  $4,090  on  a  house  in  1915  had  been  raised  to  $11,800 
for  exactly  the  same  specifications,  and  that  a  $4,265  house 
of  1915  would  cost  $12,950  at  the  beginning  of  1920,  while 
number-one  maple  flooring  costing  $37  per  thousand  feet  in 
1916  was  held  at  $200  in  February,  1920. 

According  to  the  National  Industrial  Conference  Board, 
during  the  period  from  July,  1914,  to  March,  1920,  the 
increase  in  living  cost  was  95  per  cent,  or  about  1.4  per 


414    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

cent  a  month;  but  that  during  the  year  previous  the  total 
was  21  per  cent,  or  about  1.75  per  cent  a  month.  Begun 
by  the  reckless  extravagance  in  all  directions  on  the  part  of 
the  Administration,  the  unprecedented  inflation  of  prices 
was  continued  by  equally  reckless  buying  by  the  public  until 
the  first  sign  of  a  break  came  with  the  overalls  movement 
late  April,  1920.  The  hoarders  and  profiteers  tried  to 
laugh  it  out  of  court  as  an  absurd  transitory  fad,  but  it 
proved  their  undoing.  Negligible  in  itself  in  the  quantity 
of  clothing  purchased,  the  movement,  by  the  sympathy  en- 
gendered among  all  classes  of  the  general  public,  created 
a  determined  sentiment  against  swollen  prices  that  was  of 
great  value  at  that  particular  time. 

And  while  it  had  been  fact  that  to  mention  the  possi- 
bility of  a  lowering  of  wages  was  taboo,  and  particularly 
among  newspapers,  it  was  evident  that  in  mid-autumn  of 
1920,  a  decisive  slackening  was  shown  in  dropping  over- 
time work.  With  this  elimination  came  a  just  demand  for 
a  higher  standard  of  production  per  man.  From  that 
time  on  there  was  a  constant  and  strong  recession.  By  De- 
cember of  that  year  there  was  a  sharp  decline  in  wages,  in 
many  instances  upon  the  initiative  of  the  workers  them- 
selves. And  as  1921  dawned,  men  were  out  of  employ- 
ment who,  but  a  short  six  months  previous,  could  have  had 
any  one  of  a  half-dozen  remunerative  positions.  Organ- 
ized labor  had  overshot  the  mark,  creating  a  deep-seated 
public  opposition;  now  the  high  wages  had  disappeared 
in  riotous  living  of  a  year  earlier,  and  self-respecting  men, 
going  about  looking  for  something  to  do,  brought  back 
into  current  vernacular  the  old  familiar,  but  long-lost, 
"tramp." 

The  November,  1920,  letter  to  the  public,  put  out  by 
the  National  City  Bank  of  New  York  stated: 

For  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  the  United  States,  a  period  of 
expansion  has  been  checked  and  prices  have  turned  decisively  down- 
ward without  a  banking  panic. 


Reconstruction  415 

And  for  this  fact,  the  banks  of  the  country  deserve  great 
credit  for  refusing  longer  to  aid  those  who  were  going  the 
swift  short  road  to  financial  oblivion  until,  about  the  middle 
of  1920,  the  banks  of  the  land  called  a  firm  halt  to  the 
ruinous  pace.  But  so  sudden  was  this  step  which  should 
have  been  taken  earlier,  that  before  mid-December  so  many 
men  were  out  of  employment  that  governors  of  States  and 
mayors  of  cities  were  called  upon  to  take  up  public  work 
that  had  been  in  contemplation,  in  order  that  men  might 
not  suffer  through  the  winter.9 

And  at  this  very  time,  dealers  of  the  country  were  going 
through  an  ordeal  that  tested  the  strongest  fiber.  Said 
one  of  them: 

The  world's  commerce  is  going  through  the  fires.  .  .  .  The 
clouds  are  black,  but  thank  God  there  is  sunshine  behind  the  clouds. 
It  took  neither  a  bright  man  nor  a  courageous  man  to  prosper  during 
the  boom  just  past,  but  you  must  have  a  backbone  now,  you  must  be 
a  fighter  in  this  great  game  of  commerce  and  you  must  be  prepared 
to  fight  clean.10 

The  problem  with  every  dealer  in  commodities  was  to  get 
rid  of  his  war-priced  stocks  with  the  least  possible  loss 
when  the  crisis  came.  Each  group  of  dealers  thought  his 
suffered  most.  Each  winced  under  the  galling  load,  yet 
bravely  met  his  fate.  The  wage-earner  who  was  first  to  be 
favored  by  the  arbitrary  demands  upon  the  nation  through 
the  President  in  1916,  was  the  last  to  meet  the  losses.  The 
farmer  was  probably  hit  the  hardest  and  complained  the 
most  bitterly.  But  all  were  touched — manufacturer,  job- 
ber, retailer,  farmer,  toiler.  It  was  inevitable  that  each 
group  had  to  absorb  his  portion  of  the  loss  due  to  the  prick- 
ing of  the  bubble.  There  was  sympathy  with  all,  except 

8  See  resolutions  of  the  Manufacturers'  and  Employers'  Association  of  the 
State  held  at  Jackson,  Michigan,  December  10,  1920.  This  severe  condi- 
tion of  unemployment  continued  to  grow  until  President  Harding  called 
a  conference  in  Washington,  autumn  of  1921  to  devise  means  for  its 
abatement.  A  month  later  it  was  said  1,000,000  of  the  unemployed  had 
been  put  to  work. 

10  George  H.  Capper  of  Chicago,  in  December,  1920. 


4i 6    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

the  profiteer,  whether  among  the  capital  class  or  the  organ- 
ized-labor class  whose  production  was  far  below  standard 
with  an  immoderately  increased  pay  coming  from  the  great 
unorganized  third  party,  the  large  general  public,  for  whom 
no  President  entered  a  plea.  A  full  year  before  the  final 
adjustment  came,  there  were  warnings  of  the  coming  de- 
cline in  unprecedented  prosperity  and  high  prices,  that  the 
country  was  entering  upon  the  final  phase  of  the  delirium 
— the  delirium  of  the  profiteer  in  commercial  and  industrial 
life  as  well  as  of  the  organized  labor;  the  delirium  of  spend- 
ing without  considering  the  possible  lean  years  of  the  period 
that  was  to  follow. 

But  prices  of  garments,  cost  of  housing  with  1,000,000 
houses  fewer  than  the  demands,  wages,  and  pricking  of  the 
inflation  bubble  were  not  all  that  demanded  serious  atten- 
tion during  the  reconstruction  days.  There  was  a'so  a 
crying  need  for  education  in  the  spirit  of  American  ideals, 
a  need  emphasized  with  the  discovery  that  in  some  sections 
of  the  country  there  had  been  tampering  with  schoolbooks 
in  the  interest  of  German  propaganda.  From  the  splendid 
public  service  rendered  by  the  schools  during  the  war  came 
an  impetus  to  project  school  effort  further  into  civic  and 
national  affairs;  and  this  at  the  very  time  when  the  pay  of 
teachers  was  far  below  that  of  wage-earners  who  paid  noth- 
ing to  prepare  for  their  common  toil,  resulting  in  a  deplet- 
ing of  the  ranks  of  the  more  competent  teachers.  So  deep 
was  the  impression  the  war  made  upon  educators  that  at 
the  meeting  of  the  National  Education  Association,  early 
in  1919,  the  greater  number  of  the  topics  discussed  were 
upon  the  war's  reconstruction  of  educational  aims  and  ideals. 

In  all  of  the  great  aims  of  the  reconstruction  period, 
perhaps  nothing  surpassed  in  importance  that  of  this  educa- 
tional purpose.  On  approximately  the  same  plane,  however, 
was  the  insistent  demand  for  social  justice,  particularly  a 
more  equitable  system  by  insurance  against  the  hazards  of 
sickness,  unemployment,  and  old  age,  relieving  workers  of 


Reconstruction  417 

the  anxieties  tormenting  beyond  endurance.  To  this  end, 
there  was  a  large  demand  for  full  recognition  of  the  dignity 
and  authority  of  labor  in  the  scheme  of  democratic  civiliza- 
tion— not  merely  a  group  who  happened  to  be  of  organized 
labor  and  urged  the  debarment  of  all  who  happened  not 
to  belong  to  their  group,  the  closed-shop  workers,  but 
equally  of  all  honorable  laborers.  For  the  disclosures  in  the 
building  profiteering  investigations  of  New  York,  late  in 
1920,  besmirched  prominent  organized  labor  leaders  as 
badly  as  it  did  the  contractors.  And  the  laborer  who  is 
ready  to  smite  the  honorable  laboring  man  simply  because 
he  happens  not  to  belong  to  the  organization  is  not  less  a 
danger  to  society  than  the  employer  who  will  smite  a  labor- 
ing man  because  he  does  belong  to  the  labor  union.  And 
the  investigation  revealed  the  pitiable  fact  that  the  Bethle- 
hem Steel  operators  boycotted  dealers  who  employed  union 
men;  and  union  labor  boycotted  those  employing  men  who 
did  not  belong  to  the  union.  Again  it  was  the  great  third 
party,  the  general  public,  that  suffered;  and  this  third  party 
was  unable  to  distinguish  between  the  tactics  of  the  other 
two.  Both  were  accursed  in  its  view. 

But  the  materialism  of  these  two  antagonistic  forces, 
dominant  for  the  moment,  could  not  persist  without  extreme 
danger  to  the  nation.  It  was  the  force  seeking  the  upper 
hand  the  first  year-and-half  after  the  close  of  the  war;  but 
when  the  people  saw  through  their  purpose,  the  nation 
turned  its  back,  deserting  the  materialism  for  the  spiritual 
forces.  At  the  beginning  of  1919,  the  president  of  the  Uni- 
versity of  Minnesota  in  a  public  address,  relating  to  the 
spiritual  forces  operating  in  reconstruction,  declared  that 
labor  was  then  face  to  face  with  its  most  critical  situation 
in  history,  and  urged  all  groups  to  set  their  faces  in  the 
right  direction  and  work  for  a  better  mutual  understanding. 
He  added: 

Present  conditions  are  calling  for  the  new  American.  Changes 
have  come,  and  more  are  coming.  The  new  American  must  have 


41 8     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

initiative,  a  spirit  of  independence,  and  an  appreciation  of  honesty. 
The  present  period  is  one  of  clash  between  things  that  are  old  and 
things  that  are  new. 

This  was  the  sentiment  calling  for  an  honest  day's  work 
for  a  full  day's  pay;  and  a  square  deal  on  the  part  of  the 
employer  for  the  employe ;  and  a  square  deal  on  the  part  of 
the  union  man  toward  his  fellow  outside  of  the  union.  It 
called  for  a  square  deal  all  around. 

If  captains  of  industry  and  captains  of  unionized  labor 
were  pilfering  the  great  public  of  the  last  obtainable  nickel 
in  a  quiet,  gentlemanly  fashion,  others  sought  their  end 
in  a  less  canonical  manner,  during  this  period.  A  crime 
wave  swept  the  nation  from  the  close  of  the  war,  with 
increasing  pressure  and  volume,  until  its  crest  was  reached 
by  the  ushering  in  of  the  year  1921.  So  violent  did  it  be- 
come that  in  many  cities  the  police  were  unable  to  cope  with 
it.  New  York,  Chicago,  even  Philadelphia,  and  other  cities 
became  notorious  centers  of  lawlessness  and  lax  .morals. 
In  other  places  men  of  the  American  Legion  offered  their 
services  to  help  subdue  the  criminals.  Private  citizens  armed 
themselves  for  self-defense.  Officers  were  instructed  to 
shoot  to  kill.  And  when  the  public  became  so  fully  aroused 
that  it  would  not  permit  itself  longer  to  be  trifled  with  in 
the  pursuit  of  its  orderly  and  legitimate  business,  the  ter- 
rorism began  to  diminish.11  In  large  measure  the  great 
impetus  given  these  outbursts  of  the  criminal  instinct  must 
be  attributed  to  the  profligacy  and  dishonesty  of  the  Ad- 
ministration in  dealing  with  the  public  during  the  Great 
War. 

While  this  deplorable  side  of  human  nature  was  mani- 
festing itself;  while  shameless  employers  were  battening 
on  some  employes;  while  no  less  shameless  labor  leaders 
were  aiding  in  the  pilfering  of  the  general  public,  it  was 
a  great  relief  to  know  that  God  was  not  lost  sight  of  in 

"The  character  of  the  criminal  features  changed,  but  not  immediately 
the  degree.  In  November,  1921,  United  States  Marines  were  placed  on 
guard  to  protect  the  mail  against  robbery,  with  instructions  to  shoot  to  kill. 


Reconstruction  419 

the  greatest  period  in  which  it  was  man'  privilege  to  live. 
Though  the  ill-starred  Inter-Church  World  Movement  cre- 
ated a  feeling  of  depression,  it  taught  valuable  lessons. 
And  other  movements  of  world-wide  import  came  into  being 
in  individual  denominations.  Scarcely  had  the  clash  of 
arms  ceased,  when  these  denominations  began  to  make  ap- 
peal, for  world-rebuilding  of  civilization,  for  sums  running 
into  the  hundreds  of  millions,  additional  to  regular  expenses. 
After  all  the  endless  millions  poured  out  for  welfare  work 
in  the  war,  it  seemed  like  an  unwise  move  to  call  for  other 
millions  at  such  a  time.  The  Methodist  church  started 
the  appeals  by  asking  for  $85,000,000,  or,  conditionally, 
$105,000,000;  it  received  $120,000,000.  The  Baptists 
then  asked  for  $100,000,000  and  other  prominent  denomi- 
nations in  similarly  large  sums. 

In  the  year  1920  lay  the  crisis  of  reconstruction.  The 
most  dangerous  corner  was  turned  in  safety,  the  speed  hav- 
ing slackened.  As  the  year  died  away,  an  age  passed  into 
history.  The  supreme  efforts  of  Bolshevism  to  capture  the 
great  democracy  of  the  western  hemisphere,  materially 
aided  by  the  indifference  if  not  actual  sympathy  of  the  Ad- 
ministration, failed.  Falsifying  organized-labor  leaders 
were  taught  a  severe  lesson  in  the  trouncing  it,  together  with 
Wilsonism,  received  at  the  hands  of  the  great  mass  of  the 
people  in  the  national  election  of  that  year.  Profiteers  and 
domineering  captains  of  industry  were  shown  that  a  new 
day  had  dawned.  Social  justice  and  higher  ideals  of  even 
the  traditional  Americanism  were  given  a  new  impetus. 
The  world  looked  brighter  than  ever  before.  President 
Harding's  harking  back  to  the  Americanism  of  Washington 
and  Lincoln,  in  his  inaugural  address,  stirred  the  great  mass 
of  the  people  to  new  enthusiasms. 

Never  again  should  the  nation  be  permitted  to  be  head- 
less in  the  severely  exacting  days  of  a  crisis. 


CHAPTER   XXI 

INSURANCE  AND  COMPENSATION 

From  its  foundation,  the  nation  has  been  grateful  to 
those  who  went  forth  in  time  of  peril  to  fight  its  battles. 
One  manifestation  of  its  gratitude  has  been  in  taring  for 
the  disabled  and  aged  veteran,  and  for  his  widow  and  chil- 
dren. The  large  aggregate  of  its  pension  bill 1  for  wars 
preceding  the  Great  War  is  but  suggestive  of  other  care  it 
has  bestowed,  such  as  soldiers'  homes,  orphans'  schools. 

During  the  Great  War  there  was  added  a  new  and 
greatly  improved  feature  to  the  pay  of  the  man  in  service 
and  those  dependent  upon  him.  This  was  an  allotment  by 
the  government  to  the  wife  and  child  left  at  home,  in  part 
deducted  from  the  man's  pay,  in  part  paid  from  the  United 
States  treasury,  but  all  sent  direct  to  the  wife  by  the  gov- 
ernment. Most  beneficent  in  its  conception,  the  execution 
of  this  law  became  a  farce  and  a  national  disgrace  by  reason 
of  the  Administration's  failure  to  meet  these  payments  as 
they  became  due;  and  the  anxiety  of  the  fighting  man  for 
his  wife  and  babe  at  home  became  to  him  a  greater  horror 
than  facing  the  guns  of  the  enemy  war-machine.2 

A  yet  greater  improvement  upon  the  government's  plan 
for  caring  for  the  fighting  man  and  his  dependents  was  the 
law  prepared  by  Mr.  McAdoo,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury. 
The  Act  of  October  6,  1917,  permitted  each  man  in  the 
service  to  take  out  a  life  insurance  policy  to  the  amount 
of  $10,000,  for  the  payment  of  which  the  government  was 
responsible.  No  safer  insurance  was  ever  known  in  all  the 

*The  total  to  June  30,  1920,  was  $5,830,815,717,  of  which  $5,502,445,815 
was  for  Civil  War  pensions. 

"See  chapter  on  "Labor  and  Wages." 

420 


Insurance  and  Compensation  421 

world's  history,  and  none  at  so  low  a  rate.  The  insured 
is  permitted  to  carry  this  insurance  for  five  years  after  peace 
shall  have  been-  declared  by  presidential  proclamation. 

The  same  law  granted  the  fighting  man  compensation 
for  disability  incurred  in  the  service;  and,  in  case  of  his 
death,  to  his  widow  and  children,  or  other  relatives  depend- 
ent upon  him.  At  the  same  time  provision  was  made  for 
rebuilding  the  men  after  their  fight  in  the  war  was  over, 
so  that  they  might  continue  the  battle  in  life's  keen  struggle 
on  a  more  nearly  even  footing.  It  undertook  to  rehabilitate 
the  disabled  so  as  to  restore  them,  at  least  in  some  meas- 
ure, for  useful  activity,  indemnifying  them,  so  far  as  may 
be,  for  the  loss  occasioned  through  any  incurable  lessening 
of  efficiency. 

It  was  the  most  advanced  position  ever  taken  by  any 
government  since  governments  began  to  exist  among  men, 
in  a  matter  of  this  kind.  At  the  time  of  the  enactment  of  the 
law  it  was  aptly  described  as  "the  most  generous  piece  of 
legislation  ever  written  on  the  statute  books  of  a  grate- 
ful nation."  And  the  nation  assigned  large  credit  to  those 
who  conceived  and  brought  it  forth. 

By  the  end  of  July,  1918,  the  total  amount  of  insurance 
taken  by  the  nation's  fighting  men  was  $25,000,000,000,  an 
amount  exceeding  the  fondest  dreams  of  the  most  sanguine, 
that  for  July  alone  being  $4,000,000,000.  At  the  close  of 
the  war,  the  total  had  grown  to  $39,669,198,000,  taken 
by  4,539,048  men,  the  average  per  policy  being  the  amount 
of  $8,740.  The  claims  made  for  payment  on  these  policies 
amount  to  $900,000,000  during  the  war  activities;  and  dur- 
ing the  same  period  the  premiums  paid  in  on  all  policies 
amounted  to  $2OO,ooo,ooo.3  Great  energy  was  displayed 
by  the  officials  having  the  matter  in  charge  to  see  that,  so 

'The  law,  embracing  the  allotment,  insurance,  compensation,  and  re- 
habilitation features,  originally  provided  compulsory  allotment  of  at  least 
$15  monthly  to  the  wife.  The  government's  allowances  were  made  only 
on  request  and  after  payment  of  the  compulsory  allowances.  The  gov- 
ernment allowed  $15  for  wife  alone,  $25  for  wife  and  one  child,  $32.50 
for  wife  and  two  children,  and  $5  for  each  additional  child  up  to  the 


422    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

far  as  may  be,  every  man  in  the  service  was  insured.  The 
success  in  the  widely  scattered  sections  of  Europe  was  due 
in  great  measure  to  the  efforts  of  35  officers  and  65  men 
who  left  Washington  and  on  Christmas,  1917,  sailed  from 
New  York  to  urge  the  importance  of  insurance  upon  the 
men. 

This  just  provision  for  the  fighting  men  of  the  nation 
must  be  attributed,  at  least  in  very  marked  measure,  to 
Secretary  McAdoo,  as  one  more  of  the  notable  things  his 
great  brain  was  able  to  accomplish  for  the  country.  When 
the  bill  was  drawn,  he  gave  to  the  public  through  the  usual 
news  channels  the  statement  that  the  scandal  connected  with 
the  old  pension  system,  in  vogue  up  to  that  time,  was  to 
be  avoided;  and  that  the  American  public,  as  well  as  ad- 
ministrative officials,  would  be  spared  the  humiliation  of 
having  repeated  the  unworthy  conduct  that  had  attached 
to  the  old  pension  system.  The  idea  caught  the  eye  of  the 
American  people,  and  they  were  misled  by  not  inquiring 
into  the  basis  for  any  such  statement.  Even  intelligent  men, 
those  accustomed  to  investigate  and  to  set  before  the  public 
only  well-established  facts,  were  relying  upon  Mr.  Mc- 
Adoo's  statement.4 

That  the  various  laws  providing  pensions  for  the  sol- 
maximum  of  $50.  For  one  child  alone  $5  was  allowed;  for  two,  $12.50;  for 
three,  $20;  for  four,  $40;  and  $5  for  each  additional. 

The  compensation  feature,  which  originally  allowed  a  man  $30  a 
month  for  total  disability,  was  increased  to  $80  by  the  amendment  known 
as  the  Sweet  bill,  which  became  law  December  24,  1919;  and  thereunder,  a 
man  with  wife,  from  $45  to  $90;  with  wife  and  one  child,  $55  to  $95;  with 
wife  and  two  or  more  children,  $65  to  $100. 

There  is  preserved  in  a  steel  cabinet  in  the  insurance  division  of  the 
War  Risk  Bureau  a  paper  of  rare  historic  significance.  It  is  the  original, 
grimy  with  the  soil  of  the  trench,  bearing  the  names  of  those  who  signed 
on  it  for  insurance  the  night  before  going  out  at  daybreak  into  No  Man's 
Land,  signed  under  a  strong  enemy  offensive,  some  of  the  signers  never 
to  return.  It  is  preserved  with  the  sacredness  of  the  last  will  and  testa- 
ment of  those  boys. 

4  In  the  Editor's  Preface  to  the  publication,  "Effects  of  War  upon  In- 
surance, with  Special  Reference  to  the  Substitution  of  Insurance  for  Pen- 
sions," issued  as  No.  6  of  Preliminary  Economic  Studies  of  the  War,  by 
the  Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace,  appears  this  statement: 
"The  old-fashioned  method  of  pensions  was  unsatisfactory  from  several 
points  of  view.  Not  only  was  it  inadequate  in  numerous  instances,  but  it 


Insurance  and  Compensation  423 

diers  in  wars  preceding  the  Great  War  were  abused  is  well 
known.  All  were  based  upon  disability  of  the  applicant  up 
to  a  few  years  before  the  Great  War  shook  Europe.  The 
Act  of  October  6,  1917,  the  basic  law  governing  in  the 
Great  War,  is  also  based  upon  disability;  and,  in  case  of 
widows,  the  provisions  are  not  greatly  unlike  those  govern- 
ing pensions.  When  two  widows  claim  the  same  compensa- 
tion, the  same  kind  of  evidence  will  be  required  to  determine 
their  claimed  rights  as  has  always  been  required  since  the 
Government  existed.  A  man  who  was  not  in  the  service, 
but  claims  that  he  was,  will  have  to  seek  to  establish  his 
right  to  the  compensation  just  as  men  always  have  in  the 
past.  If  an  ex-service  man  claims  that  he  was  disabled  in 
the  service  or  in  any  manner  provided  by  law,  that  claim 
will  have  to  be  established  by  human  records  and  human 
testimony,  just  as  it  has  been  heretofore.  And  unless  human 
nature  has  undergone  a  revolution  since  October  6,  1917, 
there  will  be  the  same  tendency  to  corruption,  to  intrigue,  to 
securing  something  for  nothing  that  there  always  has  been. 
It  may  be  lessened;  but  even  that  is  doubtful,  if  there  is 
any  basis  for  an  opinion  in  the  duplication  of  wives  who 
appeared  for  allotment  upon  the  same  man's  service,  even 
before  the  author  of  the  law  had  left  office,  or  the  war  was 
concluded.  The  law  is  great,  the  greatest  of  the  kind  ever 
enacted  by  man;  but  that  is  hardly  sufficient  reason  for  mis- 
leading the  public  as  to  its  unequalled  merits.  In  brief,  in 

afforded  many  opportunities  for  corruption,  political  intrigue  and  unfair 
distribution." 

The  learned  author  of  this  publication  states  (p.  153)  with  perhaps 
something  more  of  reserve:  "Pensions  have  not  infrequently  been  used 
to  further  political  ends.  Considerations  of  fairness  and  equity  as  be- 
tween individual  pensioners  have  been  so  often  disregarded  that  the  old 
pension  system  in  the  United  States  became  a  reproach  to  the  representa- 
tive form  of  government.  The  generosity  of  a  grateful  people  to  those 
who  gave  their  lives  and  services  to  the  perpetuation  of  the  republic  was 
prostituted  by  selfish  considerations. 

"The  contrast  between  the  old  system  of  pensions  and  that  provided 
by  the  war-risk  insurance  acts  of  1917  is  most  striking.  The  feature  of 
compensation,  so  far  as  such  an  end  is  possible,  is  made  the  basis  of  the 
new  laws." 

Name  of  Bureau  later  became  Veterans  Bureau. 


424    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

the  underlying  idea  of  disability  in  this  law,  as  in  previous 
enactments,  it  seems  that  three  words,  "Compensation  for 
disability,"  have  been  substituted  for  the  single  word  "Pen- 
sion." And  already  charges  are  being  made  of  political 
intrigue  in  seeking  advantages  additional  through  Congress; 
and,  to  their  credit  be  it  said  as  a  matter  of  early  history 
in  the  affair,  the  ex-service  boys  as  a  whole  are  standing 
firmest  against  it.  The  one  great,  distinguishing,  and  bene- 
ficent feature  of  the  law  is  the  provision  for  rehabilitating 
the  disabled  fighter  and  financial  aid  to  his  wife  and  children 
while  he  is  undergoing  the  rebuilding  process.  There  is 
nothing  in  it  to  prevent  intrigue,  corruption,  whether  politi- 
cal or  other,  or  scandal,  more  than  in  preceding  laws. 

The  War  Risk  Bureau  originated  when  the  Great  War 
began  in  Europe.  It  began  in  September,  1914,  with  the 
intention  of  providing  facilities  for  the  insurance  of  Ameri- 
can vessels,  cargoes,  and  seamen  against  the  risks  of  war, 
and  had  as  its  office  two  small  rooms  in  the  basement  of 
the  Treasury  Building  in  Washington,  and  three  years  later 
the  Bureau  had  only  93  employes. 

Then  came  the  great  law  of  October  6,  1917,  creating 
the  military  and  naval  divisions  for  consideration  of  allow- 
ances to  the  fighting  men  and  their  dependents,  and  swiftly 
it  became  the  largest  bureau  to  meet  the  immediate  demands 
upon  its  energy.  In  August,  1918,  the  employes  numbered 
over  8,000,  while  by  the  following  March  they  had  in- 
creased to  more  than  17,000.  These  were  officed  in  eighteen 
widely  separated  buildings,  of  which  the  insurance  division 
alone  occupied  four.  By  the  late  summer  of  1919,  the 
number  of  employes  was  reduced  to  about  15,000.  Later 
all  were  officed  in  one  building  of  eleven  stories. 

At  the  time  when  this  work  was  so  heavily  thrown  upon 
the  bureau,  it  was  necessary  to  scour  the  country  for  help, 
and  green  clerks  without  any  office  experience  whatever  were 
accepted,  and  yet  the  cry  was  for  more  clerks. 

Added  to  this  impediment  was  the  more  serious  one,  be- 


Insurance  and  Compensation  425 

cause  the  more  fundamental,  of  undertaking  to  establish 
it  in  a  new  bureau  without  organization  and  at  a  time  when 
every  conceivable  organization  facility  of  Government  was 
employed  to  the  utmost  in  forwarding  measures  for  the 
battle-front;  a  bureau  without  proper  records  and  without 
the  proper  trained  force  of  clerks.  And  this  was  in  face  of 
the  fact  that  the  Bureau  of  Pensions,  thoroughly  organized, 
with  a  large  trained  office  force  in  operation  for  decades, 
with  records  and  the  card  index  system,  with  its  own  work 
lessening  by  reason  of  the  depleting  of  the  Civil  War  pen- 
sion lists,  could  have  handled  the  matter  most  efficiently. 

It  appeared  to  be  another  manifestation  of  the  Admin- 
istration malady  of  seeking  something  new  upon  the  ground 
that  the  old  and  tried  must  be  corrupt  or  untrustworthy;  of 
disregarding  experience  and  probable  results.  The  results 
soon  appeared.  Speaking  of  the  administration  of  this 
notable  statute,  President  Wilson  said : 

This  nation  has  no  more  solemn  obligation  than  healing  the  hurts 
of  our  wounded  and  restoring  our  disabled  men  to  civil  life  and  op- 
portunity. The  Government  recognizes  this,  and  the  fulfilment  of 
the  obligation  is  going  forward,  fully  and  generously.  ...  It  is 
merely  the  payment  of  a  draft  of  honor  which  the  United  States  of 
America  accepted  when  it  selected  these  men  and  took  them  in  their 
health  and  strength  to  fight  the  battles  of  the  nation.  They  have 
kept  the  faith.  Now  we  keep  faith  with  them. 

The  words  were  nobly  spoken.  But  what  of  the  event? 
In  any  great  and  new  undertaking  suddenly  thrust  upon 
a  new  organization,  particularly  governmental  organization, 
there  are  sure  to  be  mistakes  and  resulting  complaints.  But 
what  reason  ever  existed  for  withholding  the  pay  and  allot- 
ments, small  though  they  were,  from  the  fighting  lads  and 
their  wives  and  babes  at  home  when  they  went  willing  to 
pay  the  price  with  their  lives,  while  men  enjoying  the  com- 
forts of  home  who  did  not  leave  their  firesides  to  go  into 
the  trenches  were  regularly  paid  two  to  four  or  six  times 
as  much  from  the  United  States  treasury,  never  missing  a 


426    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

pay-day  on  schedule  time?  What  reason  ever  existed  for 
the  failure  of  an  efficient  administration  of  the  trust  to 
which  the  President  so  eloquently  referred? 

Yet,  after  fifteen  months  from  the  armistice  which 
brought  the  armed  conflict  to  a  close,  nineteen  months  after 
the  Federal  Board  for  Vocational  Training  was  organized, 
the  Administration  was  not  keeping  faith  with  those  who, 
the  President  declared  and  the  world  knew,  had  kept  the 
faith.  Of  the  more  than  300,000  injured  in  the  war,  more 
than  200,000  were  registered  as  disabled.  Of  these,  no,- 
ooo  were  recognized  as  eligible  for  training  under  the 
Board  of  Vocational  Training,  and  there  were  placed  in 
actual  training  slightly  over  24,000,  of  whom,  after  nine- 
teen months,  217  had  been  placed  in  useful  and  gainful 
occupations  at  a  time  when  positions  were  crying  on  all 
hands  for  persons  to  come  and  occupy. 

In  the  War  Risk  Bureau,  complaints  arose  from  every 
section  of  the  country  by  the  tens  of  thousands.  The  clerks 
were  occupied,  they  worked  hard  enough  to  bring  results. 
But  it  was  the  treadmill  process.  There  ensued  delay, 
confusion,  and  aggravation  of  claimants  who  should  have 
had  immediate  attention.  The  administration  of  the  office 
was  severely  criticized,  both  from  within  and  from  with- 
out. Affairs  in  the  Bureau  were  topsy-turvy  and  apparently 
without  head  to  any  portion  of  it,  without  capacity  to 
manage  a  large  undertaking.  It  but  emphasized  Senator 
Chamberlain's  statement  that  the  Government  had  ceased 
to  function — an  outstanding  characteristic  of  the  Adminis- 
tration, though  as  many  as  3,000  clerks  in  Washington  were 
working  on  the  list  of  110,000  eligible  for  vocational  train- 
ing, at  the  beginning  working  under  a  code  of  rules  compris- 
ing 522  sections.  The  Federal  Board  of  Vocational  Educa- 
tion denied  with  vigor  the  charges  of  neglect  against  it,  ex- 
cept as  to  delays  due  to  the  War  Risk  Insurance  Division. 

This  was  the  one  bureau  of  the  Government  where, 
above  all  others,  once  the  nation  was  fully  in  the  war,  ex- 


Insurance  and  Compensation  427 

pedition  was  the  great  demand.  It  should  have  met  its 
obligations  to  the  splendid  fellows  who  went  to  the  front  at 
least  as  promptly  as  it  did  with  those  whose  profiteering 
was  reinforced  by  contracts  whose  preparation  required 
great  time  and  the  nicety  of  exactness,  or  the  officials  who 
remained  in  Washington  from  the  President  down. 

Overwhelmed  by  the  mass  of  business  for  which  it 
was  utterly  unprepared,  the  War  Risk  Bureau  became  a 
mass  of  inefficiency.  Under  these  circumstances,  Secretary 
McAdoo  asked  Colonel  Henry  D.  Lindsley  to  accept  the 
position  of  Director  of  the  Bureau,  in  the  hope  of  saving 
it  and  preventing  billions  of  dollars  of  insurance  lapsing. 
Colonel  Lindsley  accepted  upon  condition  that  he  be  given 
a  free  hand  to  effect  necessary  reforms  and  to  introduce 
business  methods.  When  he  found  the  indescribable  condi- 
tion of  affairs  in  the  Bureau,  he  asked  Secretary  Glass, 
who  in  the  meantime  had  succeeded  McAdoo,  to  aid  in  the 
removal  of  some  obstacles  that  existed  in  the  endless  red- 
tape,  so  that  he  might  meet  the  requirements  of  the  law 
looking  toward  the  real  aid  that  he  found  was  denied  the 
soldiers  and  sailors  of  recent  service.  In  reply,  Secretary 
Glass  asked  for  Colonel  Lindsley's  resignation.  He  and 
all  his  assistants  promptly  resigned,  leaving  this  most  im- 
portant bureau  practically  without  a  head — a  tragedy  in 
the  nation. 

This  new  and  great  bureau  had  fallen  into  disrepute. 
Demoralization,  utter  and  profound,  appears  to  have  set- 
tled down  upon  its  operations.  A  special  committee,  with 
Charles  E.  Hughes,  former  Republican  candidate  for  Presi- 
dent, at  its  head,  was  appointed  in  mid-summer,  1919,  to 
investigate  the  situation  and  devise  some  way  for  extricat- 
ing it  from  its  sad  state.  The  country  received  something 
of  a  shock  when  informed  by  this  committee  that  three- 
fourths  of  the  men  who  had  taken  out  insurance  had  failed 
to  keep  up  their  payments,  though  with  every  advantage 
of  governmental  organization,  authority  and  backing.  And 


428     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

the  Government  literally  placarded  the  entire  country  in  a 
campaign  urging  the  insured  o  keep  up  their  insurance. 
And  just  before  the  holidays,  end  of  1920,  large  display 
advertisements  appeared  in  the  newspapers  urging  friends 
to  present  the  insured  with  receipts  showing  premiums  paid 
up  to  that  time  as  a  Christmas  gift. 

So  disastrous  was  the  failure  of  the  bureau  to  func- 
tion, that  the  complaints  became  so  grievous  as  to  make  the 
whole  Country  feel  that  it  was  scarcely  less  than  an  outrage 
against  the  boys  who  suffered  at  the  front  and  who  were 
now  made  to  suffer  doubly.  And  at  a  conference  held  at 
Indianapolis,  Indiana,  early  in  November,  1920,  the  na- 
tional commander  of  the  American  Legion  declared  to 
the  department  adjutants  from  thirty  states  that  it  was 
necessary  for  the  Legion  to  place  itself  between  the  dis- 
abled service  men  and  government  incompetency.  Middle 
of  the  following  month,  a  Montana  delegation  went  to 
Washington  to  seek  relief  from  Congress,  and  in  that  state 
cases  of  neglected  disabled  men  became  so  glaring  as  to 
threaten  legal  steps  to  compel  action. 

The  enormous  load  placed  upon  this  newly  organized 
bureau  was  sufficient  to  swamp  any  organization  at  the  be- 
ginning, an  error  chargeable  to  the  Administration.  The 
new  bureau  failed  to  meet  the  requirements  of  the  situa- 
tion, when,  after  the  war  had  been  closed  for  more  than 
two  years,  it  was  still  floundering  while  the  disabled  men 
were  suffering  and  unprovided  for.  As  late  as  October, 

1921,  a  special  Senate  committee  reported  that  to  July  i, 
of  that  year,  there  had  been  388,000  applications  for  vo- 
cational training,  but  only  5,000  had  been  rehabilitated, 
and  added:     "It  is  with  deep  regret  that  we  report  this 
melancholy  fact." 

The  country  will  never  look  kindly  upon  any  organiza- 
tion or  institution  that  neglects  its  disabled  fighters.  For 

1922,  however,   the   expenditures   for  disabled  ex-service 
men  will  be  $510,000,000. 


CHAPTER   XXII 

THE  SPIRIT  OF  AMERICA 

There  is  an  abounding  literature  upon  the  Spirit  of  '76, 
some  of  it  boastful,  all  of  it  cheerful.  It  creates  an  ex- 
hilarating spirit  among  real  Americans.  There  is  ample, 
also,  upon  the  Spirit  of  '61,  which,  however,  partakes  of 
something  of  a  sectional  character,  though  it  relates  to  the 
preservation  of  the  Union.  There  is  a  lesser  literature 
upon  the  Spirit  of  '98,  when  America  as  one  man  flew  to 
arms  to  redress  the  outrage  of  Spanish  tyranny.  And  there 
are  other  Spirits  which  have  gained  a  place  in  American 
history,  even  if  they  do  not  grip  present-day  American 
thought. 

It  remained,  however,  for  the  conflagration  which  be- 
gan its  devastation  of  Europe  in  the  summer  of  1914,  to 
bring  forth  the  real  Spirit  of  America.  In  '76  there  was 
no  America;  in  '61  it  was  a  divided  America;  and  in  '98 
it  required  so  little  of  America.  But  in  1914-1918  there 
was  a  real  demand  for  the  genuine  American  Spirit  from 
the  very  moment  disaster  to  civilization  was  threatened  by 
the  destructive  forces  at  militarism's  command.  And  this 
spirit  promptly  began  to  take  shape,  once  the  purpose  of 
Prussianism  was  discerned.  True,  there  was  propaganda 
spread  insidiously  throughout  the  land  by  the  Prussian  forces 
at  work  and  by  the  destructive  forces  of  anarchism  in  our 
own  land,  most  of  which  were  operating  in  Germany's  be- 
half, and  the  no  less  insidious  forces  of  pacifism  among 
American  citizens  led  in  large  measure  by  those  in  high  places 
in  Administration  circles.  As  leaders  of  the  American 
thought  there  stood  forth  a  few  souls  preeminent  in  their 
Americanism,  who  grasped  the  situation  and  understood 

429 


43°     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

how  the  various  forces  in  operation  were  related  to  the 
preservation  or  destruction  of  American  institutions.  It 
was  an  extremely  unfortunate  moment  for  America  that 
none  of  these  outstanding  men  were  found  in  governmental 
positions.  It  is  no  less  unfortunate  that  those  in  the  Admin- 
istration who  did  undertake  to  represent  the  genuine  Amer- 
ican spirit  were  excluded  from  the  Administration  counsels. 
The  statements  put  forth  by  Administration  leaders  at 
first  confused,  then  baffled,  American  opinion.  When 
America  was  attacked,  deliberately  and  murderously,  by 
the  German  government  in  the  sinking  of  the  "Lusitania," 
sending  to  the  bottom  of  the  sea  innocent  men,  women,  and 
children,  there  was  such  an  outcry  at  the  outrage,  which 
was  known  clearly  to  be  an  outrage,  that  President  Wilson 
felt  called  upon  to  state  that  the  people  should  not  be  seized 
with  hysteria,  that  he  could  not  be  unbalanced  from  his  nor- 
mal course  of  thought,  and  that  some  people  were  too  proud 
to  fight.  This  the  Spirit  of  America  looked  upon  as  scarcely 
less  an  outrage  than  that  committed  upon  the  "Lusitania." 
The  American  Administration  had  been  looked  to  to  give 
guidance  to  American  thought  and  purpose  in  the  devastat- 
ing conflict  of  arms  in  Europe.  But  it  now  knew  that  it 
had  been  looking  to  the  wrong  source.  Even  Theodore 
Roosevelt,  sane  and  clear-eyed  citizen  that  he  was,  admitted 
that  he  had  been  misled  by  assuming  that  those  in  high  au- 
thority had  information  which  he  and  other  private  Ameri- 
can citizens  did  not  possess;  but  from  that  moment  he  be- 
came the  embodiment  of  the  American  spirit,  and  to  him 
the  American  people  turned  for  guidance  in  the  hour  of  dis- 
tress.1 

1  School  books  in  New  York  were  ordered  changed  because  they  con- 
veyed an  erroneous  idea  of  this  great  American,  then  still  living.  In 
December,  1918,  Superintendent  of  Schools  William  L.  Ettinger  notified  all 
high-school  principals  to  eliminate  all  reference  to  Theodore  Roosevelt's 
attitude  toward  the  Great  War  in  its  earlier  stages.  These  are  the  por- 
tions ordered  eliminated: 

The  Germans  invaded  Belgium  August  4,  1914.  The  same  day  our 
official  proclamation  of  neutrality  was  issued.  Two  weeks  later  Presi- 
dent Wilson  sent  an  appeal  to  the  American  people  in  which  he  said: 


The  Spirit  of  America  431 

So  pronounced  was  the  spirit  of  America  in  the  emer- 
gency that  tens  of  thousands,  not  relying  upon  the  Admin- 
istration's lead,  crossed  the  line  into  Canada  and  enlisted 
with  the  Canadian  forces  in  order  that  they  might  get  into 
the  fight  of  right  against  wrong;  while  yet  other  thousands 
crossed  the  seas  to  enlist  directly  with  the  British  or  French 
forces. 

But  America  became  fully  aroused  by  the  gravity  of 
the  situation.  Then  neither  the  President  nor  a  supine 
Congress  could  prevent  that  stirring  of  the  American  spirit 
which  has  always  been  profound  in  times  of  national  crisis, 
or  where  right  is  matched  against  wrong. 

And  there  was  probably  never  a  greater  manifestation 
of  eagerness  to  serve  than  was  found  in  America  in  the 
first  weeks  the  nation  was  in  the  war.  The  sum  of  the  effort 
that  grew  out  of  that  impulse  for  service  was  tremendous, 
incalculable. 

And  in  it  all,  there  was  found  nowhere  a  finer  mani- 
festation of  the  real  spirit  of  America,  the  spirit  to  serve, 
than  was  found  in  its  institutions  of  higher  learning,  where 
it  might  be  thought  to  be  most  apathetic.  For  there  was 
a  large  and  growing  class  in  all  of  America's  older  colleges, 
commonly  known  as  the  rich  or  well-to-do  class,  city  bred, 
who  accepted  college  life  largely  as  a  social  tradition,  that 

"Every  man  who  really  loves  America  will    act   and   speak  in  the  true 
spirit  of  neutrality,  which  is  the  spirit  of  impartiality  and  fairness  and 
friendliness  to  all  concerned."     The  following  month  ex-President  Roose- 
velt   in    a   magazine    article   wrote:     "It    is   certainly    desirable    that   we 
should    remain    entirely    neutral,    and    nothing    but    urgent    need    would 
warrant  breaking  our  neutrality  and  taking  sides  one  way  or  the  other." 
Replying  to  this  statement  in  the  New  York  text-books,  former  President 
Roosevelt   declared  that   he   had    assumed,    as   he    had    a    right  to    assume, 
that   the    national    Administration    was   dealing   fairly   with    the    American 
people,  knowing  the   inside  facts  of  the   diplomacy  in  connection  with  the 
Great  War,  instead  of  misleading  and  egregiously  deceiving  them  by   its 
conduct   of   foreign    affairs;    and   that   it   was    under   this   misapprehension 
that    he    had    written    the    words    quoted.      He    objected    strenuously    and 
righteously  to  school  books  quoting  him  when  he  was  laboring  under  a  mis- 
apprehension,   as  was   all   America,   because   of  the   deception   practiced   by 
the  Administration  upon  the  people ;  and  not  quoting  his  thorough  American 
spirit  after  he  was  put  into  possession  of  the  facts  as  to  neutrality  through 
channels  outside  of  the  Administration. 

In  this  connection  see  also  the  chapter  "Looking  Toward  Peace," 


43 2     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

was  moved  to  a  deeper  seriousness  by  the  events  of  war. 
A  large  proportion  of  them  entered  the  military  or  naval 
forces  as  soon  as  possible  after  our  declaration  of  war. 
They  met  danger,  endured  discipline,  and  suffered  privation 
in  the  finest  spirit.  Practically  all  of  the  leading  colleges 
of  the  nation  were  transformed  into  army  posts,  and  scarcely 
a  man  was  found  shirking  his  duty — colleges  that  were 
thought  to  be  beyond  the  reach  of  war,  whether  on  the 
plains  of  the  West  or  in  the  mountains  of  the  East  or  on 
the  seaboard.  The  men  in  the  colleges  possessed  of  this 
spirit  quickly  grasped  the  situation  and  were  ready  for  the 
utmost  trial  and  the  supreme  sacrifice. 

It  was  in  June  of  the  year  1917.  The  occasion  was  a 
college  commencement.  Many  of  the  young  men  of  the 
college  had  already  entered  the  fighting  ranks  of  the  nation, 
so  that  the  college  was  depleted  by  a  high  percentage  of  its 
student  body.  The  ample  rains  had  carpeted  the  expansive 
lawns  with  a  perfect  green.  The  sky  overhead  was  of  the 
deepest  blue.  The  air  was  balmy.  The  warmth  of  the 
sunshine  permitted  the  choice  of  summer  garments.  The 
mountains  round  about  were  as  great  fortresses,  and  at 
their  base  flowed  the  gentle  stream  through  the  undis- 
turbed quiet  of  the  valley.  Platoons  of  student  soldiers 
were  in  regular  formation  of  battle  or  of  maneuver.  The 
alumni  of  the  century-old  institution  had  gathered  from  every 
section  of  the  nation.  Young  ladies  in  their  gayest  summer 
costumes,  gazing  upon  the  scene,  wore  the  smile  becoming 
the  perfect  day  it  was.  The  procession  across  the  campus 
headed  by  the  institution's  president  was  a  thing  to  be  re- 
membered. The  oratory  of  the  day  was  different  from  the 
oratory  of  other  days.  The  whole  procedure  was  quiet  and 
without  ostentation.  Boys  from  the  institution,  boys  from 
the  homes  of  those  who  had  returned  for  the  events  of  this 
great  day,  were  in  the  ranks  in  other  sections  of  the  country 
or  were  crossing  the  seas  to  engage  in  the  death  struggle 
of  autocracy  against  democracy.  This  scene,  wonderful 


The  Spirit  of  America  433 

in  its  conception,  surpassing  in  its  impressiveness,  could 
be  repeated  whether  in  the  mountains  of  New  England  or 
in  the  plains  of  Kansas  or  Oklahoma.  It  was,  in  the  con- 
crete, the  American  spirit  as  manifested  in  the  outward 
form  among  the  most  intelligent. 

In  the  early  days  of  the  war,  they  were  joined  by  the 
tens  of  thousands  of  comrades  from  every  walk  of  life — a 
thing  to  remember  with  pride.  But  no  less  a  demonstra- 
tion of  magnificent  loyalty  was  the  spectacle  of  10,000,000 
young  Americans  quietly  assembling  at  their  polling  places; 
and  placing  their  lives  at  the  disposal  of  their  government, 
to  which,  at  a  later  date,  were  added  14,000,000.  As  finely 
phrased  by  President  Wilson:  "This  is  in  no  sense  a  con- 
scription of  the  unwilling;  it  is,  rather,  selection  from  a 
nation  that  has  volunteered  in  the  mass." 

And  all  these,  like  the  men  they  were,  stood  ready  to 
meet  the  shock  of  battle  in  the  manner  of  America's  best 
tradition.  Many  made  the  supreme  sacrifice ;  all  were  ready. 
America  never  exhibited  a  finer  spirit  on  the  battle-front, 
or  one  more  universal.  This  spirit  was  well  illustrated  in 
the  unequal  conflict  in  which  the  8,000  officers  and  men  com- 
posing the  Marine  Brigade  engaged  near  Chateau  Thierry 
on  June  5,  1918.  This  was  to  stop  the  German  thrust  at 
Paris,  and  was  thrown  into  the  breach  at  the  crucial  hour. 
The  marines,  in  the  fighting,  took  Lucy-le-Bocage,  cleared 
Belleau  Wood,  and  captured  Bouresches.  But  before  it 
could  be  relieved  at  the  end  of  the  month,  the  brigade  had 
lost  126  officers  and  5,073  men. 

This  was  not  exceptional,  save  for  the  opportunity  for 
sacrifice  which  it  offered.  A  writer  in  a  national  weekly, 
as  he  saw  it  on  the  American  battle-front  from  Vaux  to  Sois- 
sons,  gives  this  incident: 

All  our  boys  lay  stretched  exactly  in  the  same  direction,  as  if  by 
some  mysterious  magnetic  current  they  had  been  pointed  toward  some 
spiritual  pole — the  pole  of  their  avenging  purpose.  They  lay  stretched 
exactly  in  the  line  of  the  advance,  head  toward  the  foe,  and  bodies 


434    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

still  beautiful  and  lithe,  while  the  Germans  were  in  huddles  at  the 
bottom  of  shell  holes.2 

The  nation  is  very  proud  of  the  war  record  of  its  splen- 
did fellows  over  there.  At  Belleau  Wood;  at  Chateau 
Thierry;  in  the  dashing  sweep  by  which  the  St.  Mihiel 
salient  was  wrested  from  the  enemy  after  it  had  been  held 
with  a  grip  of  steel  for  four  years;  in  the  dogged,  terrible 
weeks  of  deadly  combat  in  the  Argonne  our  men  added 
laurels  to  the  American  arms  as  fine  as  any  in  our  history. 

It  is  the  same  story  by  all  of  them — the  very  old  story 
told  over  and  over.  It  is  the  same  story  which  had  been 
writ  large  across  the  pages  of  history  whenever  the  deeds 
of  American  soldiers  have  been  recorded.  Never  staling  in 
the  telling,  it  thrills  American  hearts  at  every  repetition,  and 
never  did  it  thrill  more  than  in  this,  the  latest  telling. 

The  only  thing  that  stopped  the  victorious  American 
soldiers  on  the  trail  of  the  German  armies  was  an  order 
issued  on  the  day  the  armistice  became  effective.  The  news 
that  the  German  command  had  thrown  into  the  lines  op- 
posite the  United  States  army  its  last  available  division 
came  simultaneously  with  the  order  to  American  divisions 
to  halt  in  their  tracks  at  n  a.  m.,  November  n,  1918. 
The  news  of  the  armistice  was  sent  by  telephone,  telegraph, 
radio,  and  runner  to  all  headquarters.  The  formal  field 
order,  timed  fifteen  minutes  after  the  armistice  was  in 
effect,  furnishing  written  confirmation  of  these,  runs  as 
follows,  and  is  the  last  field  order  of  the  Meuse-Argonne 
drive : 

I  Army,  Am.  E.  F. 

II  November,  1918,  11:15  H. 
SECRET. 

FIELD  ORDERS 

NO.  112  (MAPS:  No  change.) 

I.   (a)   Yesterday  the  enemy  threw  into  the  line  opposite  our  3rd 
Corps  his  last  available  division  on  the  western  front. 
2  James  Hopper  in  Colliers,  December  14,  1918. 


The  Spirit  of  America  435 

(b)  An  armistice  with  Germany  has  been  signed  and  all  hos- 
tilities cease  at  n  hours,  November  nth. 

(c)  The  Allied  Armies  hold  themselves  in  readiness  for  fur- 
ther advance. 

2.  The  I.  American  Army  while  holding  its  present  front  will 
prepare  for  further  advance. 

3.  (a)  ARMY  CORPS,  ARTILLERY  AND  SERF  ICES. 
The  present  line  attained  will  be  organized  in  depth.    Troops  will 

be  disposed  so  as  to  obtain  the  maximum  rest  and  comfort  consistent 
with  the  necessary  arrangements  or  security  and  with  preparations  for 
further  advance. 

(X)  No  troops  will  pass  the  line  reached  at  II  hours,  Novem- 
ber nth,  until  they  receive  further  orders. 

All  communication  with  the  enemy  is  forbidden  pending  further 
instructions.  The  cessation  of  hostilities  is  an  armistice  only,  and 
not  a  peace,  and  there  must  be  no  relaxation  of  vigilance.  The  troops 
must  be  prepared  at  any  time  for  a  rapid  forward  movement. 

Special  steps  will  be  taken  by  all  commanders  to  insure  the  strict- 
est discipline  and  to  be  prepared  for  any  eventuality.  Troops  must 
be  held  well  in  hand  and  higher  commanders  will  personally  inspect 
all  organizations  with  the  foregoing  in  view. 

4.  Administrative  details — No  change. 

5.  P.  C.'s.  and  exes  of  liaison — No  change. 
By  command  of  Lieut.  General  Liggett: 

H.  A.  DRUM, 

Chief  of  Staff. 
OFFICIAL: 

G.  C.  MARSHALL,  JR. 

Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-3. 

Preeminent  as  an  aid  to  the  fighting  spirit  is  the  con- 
sciousness of  a  worthy  cause.  Then  comes  the  maintenance 
of  morale,  a  mighty  factor  in  any  cause  in  which  co-opera- 
tion is  essential.  The  Administration  did  well  to  recog- 
nize the  value  of  the  manly  sports  in  developing  this  ele- 
ment. To  this  end,  it  made  liberal  allowance,  and  cannot 
be  given  too  high  credit  therefor. 

August  i,  1918,  The  War  Department  made  announce- 
ment that  for  use  in  training-camps,  the  Department,  with 


436     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

$250,000,  had  purchased  sufficient  material  to  equip  all 
the  training  camps  with  sporting  goods.  This  included 
17,500  sets  of  boxing-gloves,  7,000  baseball  bats,  21,100 
baseballs,  3,500  play-ground  baseball  bats,  10,500  play- 
ground balls,  3,000  Rugby  footballs,  7,000  soccer-balls, 
3,500  volley-balls. 

At  the  Great  Lakes  Naval  Training  Station  alone  were 
used  7,000  baseballs  for  the  season  of  1918.  At  the  same 
station,  footballs  were  ordered  by  the  gross,  and  sweaters, 
jerseys,  stockings  for  football,  and  the  like,  were  ordered  by 
the  car-lot. 

At  the  same  time  the  War  Department  made  public 
the  statement  that  the  amount  of  clothing  delivered  since 
April  i,  1918,  as  shown  by  the  latest  statistical  report  of 
the  Clothing  and  Equipage  Division  of  the  Quarter-master 
Corps,  was  as  follows:  4,373,000  pairs  of  spiral  puttees; 
55>958,ooo  pairs  of  woolen  stockings;  10,507,000  pairs  of 
woolen  breeches;  8,069,000  woolen  coats;  and  5,377,000 
overcoats. 

It  was  not  strange,  therefore,  when  the  American  sol- 
dier returned  from  his  service  overseas  that  he  was  found 
to  be  self-restrained,  self-contained,  and  at  the  same  time 
ready  to  be  helpful.  It  was  on  the  train  out  of  Rockford 
(Camp  Grant)  that  carloads  of  soldiers,  on  their  way 
home  from  discharge,  were  met  constantly.  One  could 
hardly  have  felt  that  he  was  among  those  who  had  gone 
through  trials  like  Chateau  Thierry  and  the  Argonne.  No 
loud  word  was  heard  in  a  two-hours'  ride  toward  Madison; 
no  discordant  note.  The  train  was  crowded.  There  was 
every  opportunity  to  become  noisy  and  more  or  less  fluent 
in  uncouth  language.  There  was  none  of  it.  Some  were 
studying  time-tables;  some  asked  questions  of  the  half-dozen 
civilian  passengers,  to  get  a  true  idea  of  home  conditions, 
or  told  how  New  York  was  closed  to  those  not  from  the 
metropolis  and  how  open-armed  was  Chicago  in  the  warmth 
of  its  welcome;  some  eagerly  devoured  the  news  of  the  lat- 


The  Spirit  of  America  437 

est  edition  of  the  city  papers,  while  others  were  deep  in  the 
magazine  short  story;  yet  others  were  reading  books  to 
which  they  had  fallen  heir,  or  trying  to  catch  up  in  the  mat- 
ter of  lost  sleep. 

One  thing  was  markedly  noticeable :  As  the  last  woman 
left  the  car  there  was  an  eager  scramble  to  light  pipes, 
cigars,  cigarettes.  Not  a  suggestion,  however,  of  smoking 
in  the  presence  of  a  woman  in  the  coach  was  to  be  seen  or 
heard  anywhere. 

It  is  none  too  strong  to  accord  with  the  facts  to  say  that 
the  world  had  never  possessed  such  an  army  as  that  which 
went  forth  from  field  and  factory,  from  rail  and  boat,  from 
office  and  street-cleaning  force,  from  college  professor's 
chair  and  scavenger's  dump,  known  as  the  Yankee  army. 
They  went  forth  to  fight  the  world's  battle  for  democracy 
with  those  other  nations  that  had  stood  the  shock  of  the 
mightiest  military  machine  the  world  had  ever  seen  until  it 
was  difficult  to  stand  longer  under  a  strain  such  as  history 
had  not,  till  then,  recorded.  If  the  Roman  legion  was  effi- 
cient, the  free  spirit  of  the  American  doughboy  was  more 
efficient.  If  the  Prussian  military  machine  was  mighty,  the 
free  fighting  spirit  of  the  American  doughboy  was  mightier. 
If  the  Spartan  was  taught  to  have  his  entrails  gnawed  out 
by  a  wild  beast  rather  than  complain,  the  American  dough- 
boy of  the  "lost  battalion,"  3  or  any  other,  would  gnaw  roots 
of  trees  and  plants  to  keep  himself  alive  in  order  to  send 
defiance  at  an  overwhelming  enemy  in  a  more  worthy  cause. 

That  President  Wilson  was  capable,  on  occasion,  of 
rising  to  the  highest  flights  in  real  appreciation  of  things 
accomplished  was  demonstrated  on  various  occasions.  Such 
an  occasion  was  his  tribute  to  the  American  army  and  navy, 
on  December  2,  1918,  when  he  said: 

Their  officers  understood  the  grim  and  exacting  task  they  had 

*  Under  command  of  Lieutenant  Colonel  Charles  W.  Whittlesey,  outnum- 
bered overwhelmingly  when  surrounded  and  commanded  by  the  enemy  to 
surrender,  defiantly  refused,  though  without  food,  sustained  life  by  eating 
the  bark  of  roots  until  relieved. 


43 8     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

undertaken  and  performed  it  with  an  audacity,  efficiency  and  unhesi- 
tating courage  that  touch  the  story  of  convoy  and  battle  with  im- 
perishable distinction  at  every  turn  whether  the  enterprise  were  great 
or  small.  .  .  .  Such  men  as  these  hardly  need  to  be  commanded  and 
go  to  their  terrible  adventure  blithely  and  with  the  quick  intelligence 
of  those  who  know  just  what  it  is  they  would  accomplish.  I  am  proud 
to  be  the  fellow  countryman  of  men  of  such  stuff  and  valor.  Those 
of  us  who  stayed  at  home  did  our  duty ;  the  war  could  not  have  been 
won  or  the  gallant  men  who  fought  it  given  their  opportunity  to 
win  it  otherwise;  but  for  many  a  long  day  we  shall  think  ourselves 
"accursed  we  were  not  there,  and  hold  our  manhood  cheap  while  any 
speaks  that  fought"  with  these  at  St.  Mihiel  or  Thierry.  The  mem- 
ory of  those  days  of  triumphant  battle  will  go  with  these  fortunate 
men  to  their  graves ;  and  each  will  have  his  favorite  memory. 

Nor  were  the  Allies  unappreciative  of  this  fighting  spirit. 
Expressing  what  was  the  general  sentiment  of  the  Allies 
toward  the  Yankee  soldier,  the  French  Government,  on 
January  i,  1919,  paid  this  tribute  to  America's  dead  in 
France : 

The  French  government  wishes  to  express  its  profound  sympathy 
and  gratitude  to  the  American  families  whose  sons  have  met  a  glorious 
death  on  French  soil  during  the  war.  It  wishes  to  share  in  their 
mourning.  The  graves  of  the  young  soldiers  of  America  are  as 
sacred  in  its  eyes  as  are  those  of  their  French  comrades  and  it  will 
take  the  necessary  measures  to  provide  that  they  shall  be  respected 
and  tended  with  a  reverent  and  patriotic  care. 

And  while  it  was  at  all  times  admitted  that  to  the  men 
who  went  through  the  trial  of  battle  America  gave  its 
thanks  and  admiration,  it  was  realized  that  the  men  who 
did  not  "get  across"  were  ready  and  eager  and  would  have 
given  of  themselves  to  the  glory  of  the  flag  and  the  suc- 
cess of  our  cause  as  freely  as  those  who  laid  down  their 
lives  in  battle. 

But  fighting  was  only  one  form  of  the  spirit  of  the 
American  soldier.  Dashing,  heedless,  dare-devil  in  their 
spirit  on  the  field  of  battle,  the  American  soldiers  won  other 


The  Spirit  of  America  439 

and  finer  tributes  than  these — tributes  calculated  to  stir  all 
as  profoundly  as  any  that  were  won  by  their  conduct  in 
the  smoke  and  uproar  and  fiery  hell  at  the  front.  The 
Marquise  de  Nosilles,  in  a  letter  to  a  New  York  friend, 
used  these  words: 

Bring  a  smile  on  somebody's  face!  That  seems  to  be  the  motto  of 
all  Americans  over  here.  Sugar  plums,  chocolate,  gasoline,  tires,  deli- 
cious white  bread,  all  luxuries  now  unknown,  are  given  to  the  French 
by  your  people.  One  of  the  things  that  touches  me  most  is  the  love 
of  the  Americans  for  little  children.  In  all  villages  you  can  see  little 
tots  shrieking  out  in  laughter  while  a  huge  boy  in  khaki  romps  about 
for  their  own  particular  amusement. 

As  if  this  were  not  enough  she  proceeds  to  give  an  in- 
stance of  a  poor,  shriveled  granny  seeking  to  cross  a  muddy 
street  along  which  the  motors  were  running  wildly,  and 
fearful  lest  she  be  caught  in  the  mud  and  between  the  ma- 
chines, when  a  big  burly  United  States  soldier  picked  her 
up  and  trotted  off  across  the  street  and  set  her  down  in 
safety.  And  she  refers,  in  her  letter  to  the  inborn  gentle- 
ness of  the  men,  who  did  not  forget  their  mothers  and 
sisters  at  home,  and  who  were  always  glad  to  extend  the 
friendly  hand  to  children.  Tributes  like  these  fell  as  thick 
as  showers  on  our  passing  regiments  by  the  hands  of  women 
and  children  once  left  in  the  brutal  wake  of  war. 

Every  American  that  is  100  per  cent  a  man  cannot  but 
tingle  with  pride  when  he  reads  of  deeds  like  these,  as 
much  as  he  does  when  he  reads  of  the  dare-devil  fighting 
fury  of  the  same  men  when  they  hurled  themselves  against 
the  brutal  Germans  who  wrought  all  the  wreck  and  ruin 
possible.  His  eyes,  blazing  with  pride  in  the  warrior,  may 
become  dimmed  as  emotion  unsteadies  his  frame  when  he 
sees  in  the  same  man  the  cheery,  light-hearted,  bright-faced 
soldier  in  khaki,  carrying  the  burdens  of  the  weak  and  help- 
less, romping  with  laughing  children,  sharing  his  food  and 
scanty  luxuries  with  the  hungry  and  heart-sick  victims  of  an 
inexpressible  wrong.  It  was  all  possible.  There  was  no 


44°     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

sentimentalizing.  It  was  all  in  the  routine  of  the  day's 
work — the  instinctive  matter-of-course  routine  of  the  gentle- 
man. 

When  the  first  of  the  American  forces  landed  in  France, 
France  was  almost  bled  white.  They  had  good  reason  to 
feel  downcast,  though  there  was  not  a  thought  of  surrender. 
And  when  the  French  people  saw  the  laughing,  singing, 
rollicking  youngsters  from  across  the  sea  marching  through 
Paris  as  if  it  were  a  mere  holiday  affair,  they  stood  aghast. 
Horrified  at  the  thought  that  these  men  could  ever  be  of 
service  in  battling  the  German  war  machine,  they  turned 
aside  with  drooping  spirit.  They  had  not  seen  anything 
like  it;  had  not  conceived  anything  so  incongruous.  It  was 
beyond  the  stretch  of  the  splendid  French  imagination.  But 
it  was  all  there,  and  was  all  true,  as  the  noble  French  dis- 
covered to  their  delight,  when  the  opportunity  came  to  face 
the  machine. 

But  the  Spirit  of  America  manifested  itself  not  alone 
in  the  fighting  man.  The  same  spirit  that  pushed  him  into 
the  hell  of  battle,  was  breathed  into  those  who  had  to  re- 
main at  home.  It  manifested  itself  in  many  and  diverse 
forms. 

The  housekeeper  accepted  the  suggestions  of  Herbert 
Hoover,  Food  Administrator,  as  a  religious  decalogue;  if 
the  householder  did  not  act  with  religious  care  upon  the  sug- 
gestions of  Fuel  Administrator  Garfield  as  to  how  to  run 
his  furnace  or  sift  his  ashes  or  the  many  details  as  to  the 
saving  of  fuel,  it  was  because  he  understood  it  less  readily. 
When  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  McAdoo  asked  the  peo- 
ple to  buy  bonds  to  help  the  nation,  they  bought,  often 
skimping  themselves  in  the  actual  necessaries  of  life  for  the 
purpose. 

But  nowhere  was  the  Spirit  of  America  more  freely  and 
openly  shown  than  in  compliance  with  the  simple  request  of 
the  American  Red  Cross  Society  that  everything  in  the  na- 
ture of  tin  and  tinfoil  be  saved  and  turned  into  its  hands. 


The  Spirit  of  America  441 

In  this  small  act  of  service,  dignified  elderly  gentlemen  vied 
with  young  men  and  maidens  in  gathering  from  the  side- 
walks, even  from  the  gutters  of  the  cities  and  towns  and 
the  country  villages,  all  scraps  from  cigarette  wrappings 
or  cigars  or  any  other  source  that  would  be  a  compliance 
with  the  Red  Cross  request — all  for  the  sake  of  the  spirit 
which  it  manifested  and  not  with  any  thought  or  suggestion 
of  money  remuneration. 

One  feature  of  the  developments  growing  out  of 
America's  relations  to  the  Great  War  that  accomplished 
much  for  the  better  community  spirit  throughout  the  land, 
was  the  helpfulness  rendered  by  neighbor  to  neighbor  and 
by  community  to  community.  It  is  to  the  credit  of  the 
Administration  that  it  gave  great  encouragement  to  this 
spirit;  and  it  should  be  recorded  as  one  of  the  ennobling 
features  of  the  Administration's  relation  to  the  Great  War. 
Mrs.  A.  would  take  care  of  the  children  of  her  next-door 
neighbor  Mrs.  B,  while  the  latter  visited  the  downtown  cash- 
and-carry  store  to  make  purchases  for  herself  or  for  both. 
Mrs.  C.  would  gather  all  the  neighbors  her  automobile 
would  carry  and  together  they  would  visit  the  store  where 
they  could  make  purchases  for  their  families  to  the  best 
advantage.  Mrs.  D.  made  her  home  the  center  for  collect- 
ing all  the  clothing  to  take  care  of  the  needy  children  in 
her  immediate  vicinity.  And  Mrs.  A.  and  Mrs.  B.  and 
Mrs.  C.  and  Mrs.  D.  with  all  their  neighbors  gathered  at 
the  home  of  some  one  of  them  for  the  forenoon  or  the 
afternoon  or  the  entire  day  to  knit  and  sew  and  do  any  other 
work  that  was  necessary  to  relieve  the  suffering  not  only  in 
their  immediate  vicinity  but  in  the  large  community,  per- 
haps to  clothe  some  Belgian  orphans  brought  to  America 
or  to  provide  clothing  for  suffering  humanity  across  the  sea. 
There  came  also  the  larger  service  when  the  neighbors  of 
a  whole  community  would  meet  at  the  public  library  or  in 
the  public-school  building  or  in  the  guild-hall  or  in  the 
church  to  carry  on  the  larger  and  broader  work  for  the  Red 


442    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

Cross.  Thus  there  developed  in  America  that  neighborly, 
home-like  spirit,  which  was  the  spirit  of  Jesus  when  he  was 
upon  earth,  that  became  so  helpful  in  administering  to  the 
acute  conditions  that  arose  after  the  war  due  to  the  unrest 
and  the  uncertainty  in  the  settlement  of  the  social  problem. 

Republics,  and  democratic  nations  generally,  have  been 
accused  of  being  slow  in  action,  and  probably  not  without 
reason.  But  once  America  took  a  decisive  stand,  there 
was  never  any  question  of  the  achievement.  With  2,000,- 
ooo  men  in  France,  and  with  the  assurance  of  5,000,000 
more  ready,  had  the  war  continued  until  the  middle  of  the 
next  year;  and  with  a  war  budget  of  more  than  $25,000,- 
000,000  for  the  year  1918,  the  conviction  that  the  demo- 
cratic system  was  necessarily  inefficient  was  dispelled.  The 
nation  was  turning  out  rifles  at  the  rate  of  more  than  3,000,- 
ooo  a  year — a  rate  that  was  constantly  increasing — ma- 
chine guns  at  the  rate  of  more  than  400,000  a  year,  with 
shells,  shrapnel,  and  small-arms  ammunition  in  correspond- 
ing quantities.  Whereas  in  1917  the  nation  was  turning  out 
13,000  rifles  monthly,  a  year  later  they  were  being  turned 
out  at  the  rate  of  264,000  every  month. 

With  every  man  from  18  to  45  years  of  age  registered 
for  military  service,  with  most  of  the  nation's  industrial 
plants  transformed  to  factories  of  war  materials,  with  clubs, 
schools  and  miscellaneous  buildings  every  day  converted  into 
hospitals,  with  all  the  agencies  of  transportation  becoming 
avenues  of  traffic  leading  directly  to  the  front  in  France, 
with  homes  half  deserted  because  the  members  were  en- 
gaged in  Red  Cross  work,  in  selling  bonds  to  carry  on  the 
war,  in  gathering  funds  for  the  Y.  M.  C.  A.  and  other  wel- 
fare agencies, — with  all  these  the  American  spirit  was  being 
manifested  in  its  real  form  in  the  American  nation. 

By  the  middle  of  October,  1919,  announcement  was 
made  that  8,000,000  American  women,  aided  by  many  boys 
and  girls,  produced  in  the  twenty  months  ending  February 
28,  1919,  more  than  371,500,000  relief  articles,  valued  at 


The  Spirit  of  America  443 

approximately  $94,000,000,  for  the  benefit  of  American 
and  Allied  soldiers  and  sailors  and  destitute  civilians.  Be- 
sides this,  the  report  of  the  American  Red  Cross,  covering  its 
activities  during  the  war,  showed  that  23,822  of  America's 
women  enrolled  themselves  as  Red  Cross  nurses;  while 
others  who  remained  at  home,  through  the  canteen  service 
of  the  Red  Cross  furnished  refreshments  such  as  sand- 
wiches, candy,  cigarettes,  ice-cream,  etc.,  to  soldiers  and 
sailors  39,948,733  times.  All  of  this  was  done  at  an  oper- 
ating cost  of  only  1.7  per  cent. 

Indeed,  the  ardor  and  unanimity  with  which  the  Ameri- 
can people  enlisted  in  the  cause  of  democracy  and  made  it 
virtually  a  national  religion  is  one  of  the  outstanding  phe- 
nomena of  history. 

The  artists  of  the  country'played  a  very  important  part 
in  the  manifestation  of  the  American  Spirit  during  the  war, 
through  posters,  large  and  small,  on  billboards  occupying 
as  many  feet  as  the  space  to  be  had  permitted.  Picture 
posters  of  rare  beauty  and  aptitude  were  placed  before  the 
people  showing  facts  that  were  essential  for  the  informing 
of  the  public  upon  the  great  needs  of  war.  Space  for  these 
posters  was  amply  and  generously  donated  by  individuals, 
organizations,  and  municipal  and  state  bodies — on  promi- 
nent vacant  lots,  in  front  of  courthouses,  on  church  lots,  on 
the  grounds  of  state  buildings — anywhere  and  everywhere 
that  they  would  serve  the  desired  end. 

They  were  among  the  many  influences  uniting  to  win 
the  war.  Not  much  was  written  about  them,  though  they 
weighed  heavily  for  victory.  It  was  the  National  Pictorial 
Publicists  Association,  of  which  Charles  Dana  Gibson  was 
the  head,  that  took  in  hand  the  chief  part  of  this  work.  It 
might  appear  a  little  out  of  order  to  consider  the  pencil 
and  brush  as  weapons  of  warfare;  but  these  are  the  facts 
that  the  story  of  the  war  brings  to  light.  To  win  the  war, 
the  boys  had  to  be  fed  and  armed;  to  buy  food  and  guns, 
money  was  needed;  to  raise  money,  an  appeal  had  to  be 


444    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

made.  The  poster,  the  painting,  the  cartoon  were  used 
with  telling  effect  to  drive  home  the  appeal. 

The  most  noted  and  highest  paid  artists  of  the  country 
banded  into  this  Association  to  give  their  service  freely  for 
the  maintenance  of  morale  and  cultivation  of  donations 
or  money.  Between  April  17,  1917,  and  November  15, 
1918,  fifty-eight  departments  worked  steadily  to  create  the 
national  spirit  through  posters  and  pictured  stories.  Seven 
hundred  poster  designs,  287  cartoons,  60  paintings  for  the 
Food  Administration,  and  1438  labor  drawings  were  turned 
over  to  the  Government  free  by  the  organized  artists.  The 
posters  are  to  perpetuate  the  art  of  the  decade  through  the 
centuries,  as  every  war  poster  has  been  preserved  by  the 
Government. 

In  the  conduct  of  the  great  mass  of  Americans  of  Ger- 
man blood  there  was  a  fine  and  enduring  testimonial  to  the 
power  of  America's  spirit.  It  stood  steadfast  and  with 
marvelous  patience  under  the  lash  of  humiliation.  But  these 
Germans  that  were  so  loyal  to  the  land  of  their  adoption 
were  an  offset  to  the  disloyalty  of  Germans  of  distinctly 
pro-German  sentiments  who  stood  for  the  Fatherland  rather 
than  for  the  land  to  which  they  had  come  to  secure  their 
education,  gain  a  livelihood  and  more,  but  of  which  they  did 
not  actually  become  a  component  part.  There  was  none 
among  all  the  races  of  earth  that  were  ready  to  endure 
more  than  the  distinctively  American  of  German  blood. 

As  the  reply  to  the  un-American  doctrine  of  these  pro- 
Germans,  backed  by  the  international  Socialists,  the  Ameri- 
can Legion  gave  expression  to  the  ringing  American  doc- 
trine in  the  preamble  to  its  constitution  as  follows : 

For  God  and  Country  we  associate  ourselves  together  for  the  fol- 
lowing purposes:  To  uphold  and  defend  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  to  maintain  law  and  order,  to  foster  and 
perpetuate  a  100  per  cent  Americanism,  to  preserve  the  memories  and 
incidents  of  our  association  in  the  Great  War,  to  inculcate  a  sense 
of  the  individual  obligation  to  the  community,  state  and  nation,  to 


The  Spirit  of  America  445 

make  righr  the  master  of  might,  to  promote  peace  and  good  will  on 
earth,  to  safeguard  and  transmit  to  posterity  the  principles  of  free- 
dom, justice  and  democracy,  to  sanctify  our  comradeship  by  our  devo- 
tion to  mutual  helpfulness. 

But  one  of  the  rich  fruits  of  the  war  was  the  arousing 
of  the  American  spirit  throughout  the  nation.  This  mani- 
fested itself  in  the  adoption  of  loyalty  pledges,  a  determina- 
tion to  serve  the  country  better,  to  stand  for  service  to  others 
rather  than  for  personal  selfishness  or  personal  glory. 

A  typical  stand  of  this  character  is  that  of  the  people  of 
Spokane,  Washington,  in  adopting  a  loyalty  pledge  in  April, 
1919.  Among  other  things  stated  are  these: 

I  am  proud  that  the  United  States  of  America  is  my  country,  the 
Stars  and  Stripes  my  flag.  No  matter  from  what  race  I  sprang,  or 
what  nation  may  claim  my  friendship,  my  watchword  shall  be, 
America  first.  A  citizen  by  birth  or  choice,  I  will  ever  strive  to 
make  my  government  revered  at  home  and  respected  abroad.  I 
believe  in  open,  just  and  honorable  covenants  with  other  nations  to 
establish,  in  keeping  with  the  laws  of  God,  a  world  of  justice  and 
peace.  .  .  . 

Therefore,  I  pledge  to  my  country  the  love  of  my  heart,  a  true, 
constant  and  absolute  loyalty;  I  pledge  respect  and  obedience  to  her 
laws.  I  pledge  my  property,  my  service,  my  honor,  and,  if  need  be, 
my  life,  to  defend  her.  I  pledge  allegiance  to  my  flag  and  to  the 
republic  for  which  it  stands,  one  nation,  indivisible,  with  liberty  and 
justice  for  all. 

And  the  Spirit  of  America  marches  on  and  in  many 
divisions.  When  the  national  assembly  of  the  American 
Legion  was  in  cession  at  Minneapolis  on  the  first  anni- 
versary of  the  signing  of  the  armistice,  the  chairman,  Colo- 
nel Henry  D.  Lindsley,  as  the  hour  of  n  o'clock  ap- 
proached, stated  to  the  assembly: 

We  are  approaching  the  moment  when  the  world  ceased  that  great 
struggle  which  resulted  in  victory  for  democratic  peoples  all  over  the 
world.  I  am  going  to  ask  every  delegate  here  to  rise  and  bow  his 
head  as  the  moment  arrives,  thinking  what  it  means,  particularly  to 


446    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

those  comrades  lying  on  the  other  side,  who  made  the  supreme  sacri- 
fice for  the  cause  of  free  people. 

Let  us  have  a  thought  in  our  hearts  and  our  prayers  because  these 
men,  our  comrades,  went  there  and  gave  their  lives  in  the  great  cause. 

Every  delegate  rose  and  stood  with  bowed  head  as 
faint  organ  notes  sounded  through  the  hall.  Eleven  strokes 
of  the  clock  marked  the  first  anniversary  of  Germany's  sur- 
render. 

As  the  last  echo  died  away,  the  organ  pealed  out  the 
"Star  Spangled  Banner."  The  massed  ranks  of  delegates 
standing,  furtively  wiped  away  tears. 

And  why  all  the  awful  sacrifice?  Why  were  Americans 
willing  to  enact  this  tragedy  in  a  million  homes? 

The  President  undertook  to  assure  the  American  peo- 
ple that  this  great  nation  had  put  itself  behind  some  abstract 
principles,  and  that  it  was  for  these  that  the  people  striving 
at  home  and  the  fighting  men  in  the  conflict  of  battle  were 
putting  forth  every  energy  they  possessed.  There  was  prob- 
ably not  one  soldier,  either  at  home  or  overseas,  who  ever 
thought  for  a  moment  that  he  or  the  country  was  carrying 
on  a  war  "against  the  attitude  of  the  balance  of  power" 
or  in  behalf  of  the  Fourteen  Points,  or  to  establish  a  League 
of  Nations. 

But  they  knew  what  they  went  out  to  fight  for:  they 
were  fighting  the  Germans,  because  the  Germans  were  bru- 
talizing mankind,  violating  international  law,  and  destroy- 
ing people's  homes  and  happiness  and  liberty.  Nor  was 
there  a  man  among  them  who  would  not  fight  again  for  the 
same  thing. 

The  story  is  related  of  a  young  American  soldier  found 
dead  on  the  battlefield  of  France  on  whose  body  was  found 
a  card  with  these  words :  "America  stands  for  freedom  and 
justice  and  is  always  ready  to  give  the  lives  of  her  citizens 
that  all  the  world  may  be  freed  from  tyranny  and  live  in 
peace  and  happiness."  It  is  not  known  who  wrote  these 


The  Spirit  of  America  447 

words.     Printed  by  hand,  they  were  unsigned  and  undated. 

And  where  was  this  mighty  power  lodged,  which  drove 
America  with  all  her  energy  into  this  war,  compelling  her 
Administration  to  accept  her  dictum  of  no  neutrality,  of 
not  too  proud  to  fight,  of  no  peace  without  victory? 

The  English  writers  took  the  view  that  in  any  democ- 
racy like  America  there  is  an  oligarchy,  whether  of  intellect, 
of  interest,  or  of  mere  popularity.  In  the  present  instance 
they  declared  it  was  the  sovereign  will  of  the  President  that 
carried  the  American  people  into  the  war.  A  writer  cited 
the  case  of  conscription,  which,  in  America,  became  a  law 
over  night,  though  3000  miles  separated  America  from  the 
scene  of  conflict,  while  it  took  England  two  years  because 
their  democracy  would  not  accept  an  oligarchy. 

As  was  well  pointed  out  by  a  noted  American  publicist, 
this  was  a  misapprehension  of  the  American  point  of  view, 
admitting  that  the  people  of  the  United  States  were  singu- 
larly united  and  obedient  to  leadership  but  stating  that  the 
English  comment  failed  to  find  a  true  interpretation  of  the 
fact.  This  American  writer  says : 

This  nation  has  never  bowed  to  "the  sovereign  will  of  the  Presi- 
dent." It  has  respected  the  voice  of  individual  conscience.  It  beheld 
in  the  conduct  of  Germany  an  inexpressable  wrong  of  gigantic  pro- 
portions. It  shuddered  but  it  did  not  hesitate  to  judge  or  condemn. 
Millions,  tens  of  millions,  of  men  in  America  wanted  to  fight  Ger- 
many when  the  will  of  the  President  was  not  yet  for  war,  and  chafed 
under  the  neutrality  of  their  Government.  Thousands  of  our  young 
ment  went  to  Canada  and  to  France,  in  order  to  help  in  defeating 
Germany  before  any  "sovereign  will"  had  expressed  itself  in  the 
United  States.  Here  was  a  peaceful  nation  that  did  not  want  peace, 
but  victory;  a  nation  that  would  have  accused  and  cursed  itself  if 
it  had  not  been  allowed  to  fight.  The  "oligarchy,"  if  there  be  one, 
responded  to  the  "sovereign  will"  of  an  aroused  people,  not  to  the 
leadership  of  a  President.  It  adhered  to  him  in  war,  not  because  he 
commanded  it,  but  because  it  had  commanded  him. 


448    The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

And  he  declared  that  the  principle  involved  was  not 
the  enunciation  of  the  Government;  "it  was  a  deep-seated 
and  almost  universal  declaration  of  the  national  mind."  4 

In  his  annual  report  in  1918  Secretary  Baker  showed 
that  in  the  nineteen  months  elapsing  from  the  declaration 
of  war  to  the  signing  of  the  armistice,  the  army  created  an 
embarkation  service  which  succeeded  in  shipping  overseas 
2,075,834  men  and  5,153,000  tons  of  cargo.  Even  these 
large  figures  do  not  tell  the  whole  story.  For  time  was 
required  in  drafting  and  training  the  men  and  for  organiz- 
ing the  production  of  supplies,  and  most  of  these  stupendous 
movements  occurred  in  the  last  half  of  our  active  partici- 
pation in  the  war.  From  January  i,  1918,  to  the  signing 
of  the  armistice,  a  period  of  ten  months,  the  army  embarked 
i>88o,339  men  and  shipped  4,660,000  tons  of  cargo.  Noth- 
ing to  compare  with  the  movement  of  these  numbers  of  men 
and  tons  of  supplies  across  the  Atlantic  is  known  to  the  mili- 
tary history  of  the  world. 

An  epochal  chapter  of  the  world's  history  has  been 
closed.  The  tragedy  has  been  enacted.  Those  who  initi- 
ated the  crime  against  civilization  that  personal  aggrand- 
izement might  result  have  been  overwhelmed.  The  curtain 
has  dropped  on  the  horrid  scene.  Autocracy  has  crumbled. 
Democracy  is  supreme.  Though  America  played  a  belated 
part,  its  spirit  was  ready  from  the  beginning.  The  be- 
numbed soul  of  America  has  re-awakened.  Other  demands 
upon  her  vital  energies  will  be  made  and  met.  Her  sons 
and  daughters  will  crush  any  autocracy  that  rears  its  head, 
however  insidious  in  method  or  comely  in  form.  They  will 
maintain  constitutional  government  that  liberty  and  justice 
may  live;  and  through  the  nation's  vitality,  happiness  may 
spread  to  all  mankind. 

Applying  the  challenge  of  Colonel  John  McCrae's  "In 
Flanders  Fields"  to  America's  own  brave  dead  in  France, 
the  answer,  to-day  as  then,  is : 

4 David  Jayne  Hill,  209  North  American  Review,  18-19. 


The  Spirit  of  America  449 

Rest  ye  in  peace,  ye  Flanders  dead. 
The  fight  that  ye  so  bravely  led 
We've  taken  up.    And  we  will  keep 
True  faith  with  you  who  lie  asleep, 
With  each  a  cross  to  mark  his  bed 
In  Flanders  fields. 

Fear  not  that  ye  have  died  for  naught. 
The  torch  ye  threw  to  us  we  caught. 
Ten  million  hands  will  hold  it  high, 
And  Freedom's  light  shall  never  die! 
We've  learned  the  lesson  that  ye  taught 
In  Flanders  fields. 

And  perhaps  nothing  that  came  from  lip  or  pen  dur- 
ing the  Great  War  surpassed  in  vivid  expression  of  Ameri- 
ca's passion,  now  as  on  the  yesterday,  those  thrilling  words. 
Yet  there  is  always  to  be  persistently  kept  in  mind  the  in- 
spirational words  of  such  men  as  Washington  when  he  de- 
clared : 

The  unity  of  government,  which  constitutes  you  one  people,  is 
also  now  dear  to  you.  It  is  justly  so;  for  it  is  the  main  pillar  in  the 
edifice  of  your  real  independence,  the  support  of  your  tranquillity  at 
home  and  your  peace  abroad ;  of  your  prosperity,  of  that  liberty  which 
you  so  highly  prize.5 

Until  America  loses  her  vital  spirit,  she  will  be  ever 
ready  to  rise  and  crush  any  attempt  from  within  or  without 
to  overthrow  constitutional  government,  civil  liberty,  and 
the  opportunity  for  the  legitimate  pursuit  of  individual  or 
community  happiness  through  orderly  and  well-established 
channels.  To  quote  the  heartening  words  of  President  Wil- 
son's successor,  a  contrast  with  the  "Covenant  greater  than 
Government :" 

To  make  the  real  America  to  which  we  all  aspire,  we  must  have 
distinctly  an  American  spirit,  and  must  become  a  race  born  of  a 
national  inspiration. 
'Farewell  Address, 


CONCLUSIONS 

From  the  foregoing  pages,  some  fair  conclusions  touch- 
ing the  relations  of  the  Wilson  Administration  to  the  Great 
War  would  seem  to  be: 

1.  In  the  first  place  it  should  be  remembered  that  at 
the  beginning  of  his  term  in  the  presidency,  Mr.  Wilson 
held  in  his  hands  the  high  hopes  of  the  nation;  and  for  two 
chief  reasons:     First,  as  Governor  of  New  Jersey  he  had 
gained  for  himself,  whether  rightly  or  otherwise  is  not 
here  discussed,  a  reputation  for  standing  by  the  people; 
and,  second,  he  made  large  promises,  as  shown  in  his  book, 
"The  New  Freedom,"  J  which  is  "the  result  of  the  editorial 
literary  skill  of  Mr.  William  Bayard  Hale,  who  has  put 
together  here,  in  their  right  sequences,  the  more  suggestive 
portions  of  my  campaign  speeches,"  as  stated  by  Mr.  Wil- 
son in  the  preface.    Relying  upon  these  two  facts,  a  reputa- 
tion and  promises,  one  following  directly  upon  the  other, 
the  people  placed  full  confidence  in  Mr.  Wilson's  disinter- 
ested purposes  and  his  capacity. 

2.  When  the  demands  of  the  Great  War  were  upon 
the  nation,  not  from  the  European  point  of  view,  but  from 
the  standpoint  of  Americanism  and  for  humanity's  sake,  the 
Administration  appeared  to  be  honeycombed  with  a  pacifism 
most  deadly  to  the  rousement  of  the  people  to  the  hour's 
great  needs  and  with  a  leadership  possessed  of  a  tendency 
to  lean  toward  Germany's  cause  rather  than  toward  that 
of  the  Allies,  notwithstanding  that  the  latter  were  hero- 
ically battling  with  inadequate  equipment  against  the  fright- 
ful barbarities  of  the  greatest  war  machine  known  to  all 

"The   New   Freedom,    a   Call    for   the   Emancipation   of   the    Generous 
Energies  of  a  People,"  Doubleday,  Page  &  Company,  New  York,  1913. 

450 


Conclusions  45 1 

human  records.  Witness  to  this  is  the  part  taken  by  the 
Secretary  of  State  in  pro-German  meetings  and  his  dallying 
with  pro-German  societies  and  individuals.  Treachery  and 
perfidy  were  permitted  full  sway  in  the  land,  as  witness  the 
hostile  acts  of  the  German  and  Austrian  ambassadors. 

As  if  this  were  not  sufficient,  when  it  was  found  that 
there  was  a  real  Secretary  of  War  in  the  cabinet,  he  was 
displaced  by  a  pacifist  of  so  pronounced  a  type  that  his  acts 
or  do-nothing  plans  sickened  his  own  people,  declaring  that 
no  preparation  for  the  inevitable  conflict  was  to  be  hurried, 
since  the  war  was  3,000  miles  away,  and  who  thanked  God 
that,  when  the  country  was  plunged  into  the  thick  of  battle, 
it  was  without  preparation.  And  as  a  result,  the  country 
was  stampeded  into  such  a  furor  of  haste,  disorder,  con- 
fusion, and  waste  as  to  result  in  great  unnecessary  sacrifice 
of  life,  the  development  of  profligacy,  and  all  the  kindred 
evils  of  the  unwarranted  situation,  following  the  clear  note 
of  warning  sounded  on  all  sides  except  the  German. 

3.  Once  the  country  was  in  the  mighty  conflict,  and  even 
before  that  event,  President  Wilson  would  take  a  stand  that 
met  the  demands  of  the  patriotic  mind  of  America;  and 
would  then  waver  in  his  purpose.  Thus  American  senti- 
ment was  divided,  when  unity  was  the  stern  demand  of  the 
hour. 

So  pronounced  became  this  vacillation  of  the  Adminis- 
tration as  to  lead  those  urged  to  stand  by  the  President  to 
inquire  where  he  stood.  Moreover,  he  had  placed  in  promi- 
nent places  for  influencing  the  public,  men  whose  American- 
mindedness  was  severely  open  to  question — men  like  George 
Creel,  William  Bayard  Hale,  Lincoln  Steffens,  and  numer- 
ous others,  to  all  of  whose  writings  attached  more  or  less 
of  official  flavor.  And  while  he  showed  his  zeal  for  the 
cause  of  preparedness  by  marching  at  the  head  of  a  parade 
in  its  interest  in  Washington,  he  could  as  insistently  and  per- 
sistently urge  leniency  toward  the  murderous  anarchist 
Mooney  who  set  a  bomb  that  killed  and  maimed  scores  in- 


452     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

terested  in  a  preparedness  parade  in  San  Francisco,  giving 
no  adequate  reason  therefor. 

Indeed,  there  was  such  a  leaning  toward  pacifism  at  the 
first,  and  latterly  toward  the  so-called  liberal  minds,  those 
willing  to  adopt  internationalism  even  to  the  undoing  of 
constitutional  government,  that  the  question  was  raised  as 
to  the  quality  of  the  Americanism  Mr.  Wilson  was  willing 
to  represent. 

4.  As  the  Great  War  approached  its  close,  Mr.  Wilson 
seemed  glad  to  accept  all  power  lawfully  conferred  upon 
him  and  to  usurp  other  powers  to  some  end  never  made 
clear  by  him  to  the  nation;  as  witness  the  taking  over  of 
wire  control  after  the  close  of  hostilities,  a  power  granted 
him  for  war  purposes  only.     The  people  gladly  confer  ex- 
tensive powers,  with  all  the  privileges  attaching  thereto, 
upon  an  Executive  who  is  with  the  people  and  who  pro- 
poses to  use  it  solely  for  the  people's  benefit.     They  de- 
terminedly resist  its  appropriation  for  some  remoter  pur- 
pose. 

5.  War  is  always  a  matter  for  most  serious  considera- 
tion before  undertaking  it.     So  many  possibilities  are  in- 
volved as  to  make  the  issue  uncertain.     The  Great  War 
was  no  exception,  with  this  consideration  noted:  That  with 
the  two  sides  so  nearly  balanced,  there  was  assured  in  ad- 
vance an  outcome  favorable  to  the  side  on  which  the  United 
States  would  throw  its  great  weight,  not  merely  because 
of  its  resources,  both  in  men  and  material,  but  because  of 
the  moral  influence  upon  other  neutrals.    And  it  is  a  mo- 
mentous responsibility  that  rests  upon  the  shoulders  of  any 
regime  that  carries  to  a  conclusion  a  war  of  unexampled 
proportions.    No  fair-minded  man  will  deny  to  the  Wilson 
Administration  due  credit  for  its  share  in  the  vast  undertak- 
ing.   And  once  it  threw  itself  into  war-making  as  a  business 
for  the  time  being,  it  made  prodigious  strides,  whatever  may 
have  been  its  previous  shortcomings.     For  this  the  people 
were  pleased  to  give,  and  to  this  day  do  give,  all  credit. 


Conclusions  453 

The  difficulties  were  legion,  and  far  beyond  the  vision  of 
ordinary  men   do   these   difficulties  project   themselves. 

6.  But  difficulties  piled  mountain  high  do  not  warrant 
shirking.     To  meet  them  as  the  occasion  requires  is  one 
of  the  glories  of  Americanism,  one  of  the  duties  and  one  of 
the  marked  privileges  that  belong  to  high  position  and  great 
power.     Besides,  the  people  cheerfully  placed  themselves 
at  the  ready  disposal  of  their  Chief  Executive  and  with  their 
might  support  his  worthy  efforts.    Yet,  they  want  to  know 
that  he  is  right — at  least  approximately  right;  and  they  like 
the  idea   of   reciprocal  confidence.     They   are  willing  to 
trust  him  even  after  he  has  made  many  mistakes  and  serious 
blunders.     But  there  may  come  a  time,  in  the  course  of 
events  of  his  own  shaping,  when  their  confidence  is  sapped, 
when  their  trust  is  gone  and  the  last  tie  of  moral  obliga- 
tion to  him  is  sundered.    This  was  never  more  true  in  the 
whole  history  of  the  presidency  than  during  President  Wil- 
son's Administration.    Buoyant  with  hope  at  the  beginning, 
the  people  wanted  to  trust  him  to  the  end,  but  felt  so  out- 
raged as  events  succeeded  one  another  in  swift  course  that 
the  cord  was  snapped. 

7.  True,  they  remembered  that  Mr.  Wilson  was  their 
President;  they  knew  him  as  the  legal  Chief  of  their  nation. 
They  further  knew  that  he  was  a  very  sick  man — so  ill 
and  so  secluded  that  a  committee  from  the  Senate  waited 
upon  him  to  ascertain  his  condition  and  whether  able  to 
carry  on  the  onerous  duties  of  his  office;  when  it  found  him 
sufficiently  alert  to  inform  them  that  Senator  Moses  could 
be  assured,  though  he  might  be  disappointed.    But  the  peo- 
ple felt  that  his  conduct  warranted  the  withdrawal  of  their 
confidence  from  his  measures  and  proposed  measures. 

8.  They  remembered  with  satisfaction  his  bold  declara- 
tions against  organized  and  established  wrongs;  they  dis- 
trusted his  favoring  classism.     At  first  divided  over  his 
vacillation  and  shirking  in  the  face  of  German  brutalities, 
they  finally  carried  him  in  their  sweep  against   Prussian 


454     The  Wilson  Administration  and  the  Great  War 

militarism  and  butchery.  They  were  stirred  when  pacifism 
was  found  rampant  in  official  circles  and  by  the  discovery  of 
public  enemies  at  the  nation's  capital  and  within  the  shadow 
of  the  White  House,  under  the  protection  of  the  Admin- 
istration, in  the  persons  of  the  Ambassadors  of  Germany 
and  Austria  threatening  to  destroy  the  integrity  of  the  na- 
tion. They  massed  almost  solidly  against  the  delays  and 
consequent  wastes  of  the  war  preparations,  and  yet  more 
against  the  carefully  planned  deceptions  to  cover  the  blun- 
derings  of  the  Administration.  They  resented  President 
Wilson's  telling  them  that  any  member  of  his  cabinet  was 
as  good  as  any  he  ever  knew,  when  they  knew  better.  They 
took  determined  position  against  the  alleged  liberalism, 
amounting  practically  to  Germanism  and  socialism,  found 
in  the  men  officially  seeking  to  create  an  artificial  public 
opinion  through  an  enforced  reptile  press.  They  stood 
by  him  when  the  war  was  forwarded  to  the  utmost  of  the 
nation's  capacity  and  resources,  they  gave  him  unstinted 
support  when  he  declared  there  was  to  be  no  peace  with 
an  unsubmitting  Germany.  They  resented  his  individual 
efforts  at  peace  when  other  nations  equally  to  be  considered 
and  having  suffered  vastly  more  should  have  been  consulted. 
They  applauded  his  swift  and  certain,  as  well  as  devastat- 
ing, reply  to  Germany's  peace  proposals  made  through  Aus- 
tria. They  took  him  severely  to  task  for  his  partisan  ap- 
peal in  the  congressional  elections,  fall  of  1918,  and  sharply 
turned  down  his  proposal  that  he  be  given  carte  blanche 
liberty  to  become  their  "unembarrassed  spokesman"  at  the 
peace  table;  and,  though  they  were  willing  to  hear  him  yet 
again,  he  from  that  time  completely  forfeited  their  confi- 
dence. They  defiantly  resented  his  taking  control  of  all 
of  the  nation's  wire  lines  as  a  war  measure  after  the  war 
was  ended,  and  no  less  his  secrecy  in  the  Peace  Congress 
after  proclaiming  zealously  open  counsels.  They  became 
deeply  concerned  over  his  undertaking  to  bind  the  Govern- 
ment to  unprecedented  obligations  at  a  time  when  the  coun- 


Conclusions  455 

try  had  had  no  opportunity  to  express  itself  upon  the  issue, 
closing  the  freedom  of  the  nation's  action,  and  his  failure 
to  explain  it  intelligently  after  declaring  that  he  could  make 
it  all  clear.  They  showed  their  sympathy  in  his  illness,  but 
little  with  the  cause  that  produced  it.  And  as  a  finale, 
they  concluded  that  the  best  way  to  be  rid  of  Wilsonism 
was  to  administer  the  most  crushing  rebuke  within  their 
power;  and  this  was  done  in  the  overwhelming  defeat  of 
his  party  in  the  presidential  election  of  1920,  which  he 
zealously  supported. 

9.  Beginning  with  his   act   forcing  the  Adamson  bill 
through  a  servile  Congress  immediately  prior  to  the  presi- 
dential election  at  which  he  was  a  candidate  for  re-election, 
a  piece  of  legislation  prepared  and  whipped  through  Con- 
gress by  a  class  for  its  own  benefit  as  against  the  people  by 
a  subterfuge,  President  Wilson  continued  his  favor  to  that 
class.     Against  this  classism  the  people  turned  in  its  wrath 
with  swift  and  unerring  precision,  once  they  grasped  the 
facts. 

10.  The  people  are  more  trustworthy  on  the  problems 
of  maintaining  national  integrity  and  freedom  of   action 
than  a  Chief  Executive  who  may  have  some  ulterior  pur- 
pose in  view,  once  they  are  permitted  to  view  the  situation 
as  it  is  and  not  have  it  discussed  only  in  a  closet. 


INDEX 


Act  of  October  6,  1917,  419 
Adamson    Law 

forced    through    Congress,    51,    59, 

.  4.55 
unionism    a   result,    58 

what  it  granted,   52 
Advance  veto  cancelled,  358 
Air-mail  service  inaugurated,   152 
Airplane    scandal,    113 
Allen,    Governor,    in,    134 
Allies  and  Bolshevism,  192 
Allotment    of   pay    to    fighters,    421, 

.423 

America   confused,   glad,    10 
America-First  Association,  232 
American  Legion,  223,  418,  428,  445 
American  Magazine,  228 
American    students   in   Germany,    n 
Amidon,   Judge   Charles   F.,    230 
Anderson,  Judge  George  W.,  63 
Ansell,    Samuel   T.,    134,    136 
Archibald,  James  F.,  21 
Armaments 

and  naval  power,  267 
President   Harding   on,   266 
Secretary  Hughes'  program,  266 
threat  by  President  Wilson,  266 
Armistice,  259 
Arnold,  Stanley,  203,  207 
Article   X   of   the    Covenant,    341 
Associated  Press,  in,  162 
Athletics  in  war,  435 

Babson,  Roger  W.,  408 
Baker,   Newton  D. 

controlling  the  press,   116,   163 

on  courtmartial  system,  135 

and  deceptions,   in 

described,    107 

evasions  of,   114 

large  army  asked,  324 

opposed  national  security,  113 

reply  to  criticism,  134 

and    slackers,    117,    231 

stand   against   Bolshevism,   219 
vice  and  liquor,   172,   175 

stated  war  3000  miles  away,   128 


Baker,  Ray  Stannard,  276 
Balfour,  Arthur,  243,  307 
Bannerman    guns,    414 
Bartholdt,  Congressman,  12 
Beck,   James  M.,    16,   246 
Beer   officially   medicine,    186 
Belgium's  claim,  288 
Berkman,  Alexander,  202,  206,  227 
Bernstein,   Herman,   191 
Bernstorff,  Count,  21,  223,  224,  231 
Blast,  The,  201,  205 
Bolshevism 

and  Allies,   192 
brought  to  America,  199 
Herman  Bernstein  on,   191 
and  Herron,  George  D.,  192 
Nicholas  Murray  Butler  on,   192 
President    Wilson's    message    on, 

201 

opposed,  191,  197 
supported,  191,  196 
Vladimir  Bourtzeff  on,  194 
Borah,   Senator,  reads  Treaty,  301 
Borglum,  Gutzon,  113 
Boy-Ed,    Captain,    23 
Bourtzeff,  Vladimir,   194 
Brandegee,   Senator,  308 
Brest-Litovsk,  189,  191,  235,  273 
Brieau,   M.,  quoted,  377 
Brumbaugh,  Governor,  13 
Bryan,    William   J. 

address  in  New  York,  19 

to      German-American      societies, 

22 

on  Treaty  adoption,  313,  315 
Buchanan,  Frank,  22 
Bullitt,  William  C.,  193,  287,  308 
Burian,  Baron,  240 
Burleson,   Albert   S. 

drives   employes   to   A.    F.    of  L., 
142. 

given  wire  control,  145 

later,  cable  control,   150 

mean    policy   of,    141 

news  control  by,  159 

reply  to  criticisms,  146,   152 

tergiversation  of,   348 


457 


458 


Index 


Burnquist,  Governor 
condemns  Creels  falsehoods,  228 
nominated  as  a  loyalist,  232 

Butler,  Nicholas  Murray,  192 

Cables  taken  by  Government,  150 

action  criticized,  132 

returned  to  owners,  151 
Calder,  Senator,  76 
Candy  supplied  the  army,  35 
Capper,  George  H.,  415 

Senator,    59 
Chamber  of  Commerce  of  the  U.  S. 

address  to  President  Wilson,   399 
Chamberlain,  Senator,  on 

courts-martial,    135 

failure   of  War   Department,    124, 
128,    130,    156,    390 

neglect  of  fighters,  133 
Christian  Science  Monitor,   160,  232 
Churches  and  the  Covenant,  338 
Civil   Service,   347,    348 
Clark,  Champ,  27,  355,  360 
Clemenceau,   Premier 

address  to  England  and  America, 
293 

announced     as    president    of    the 
Peace   Congress,   267 

on  Balance  of  Power,  268 

on  Bolshevism,    195 

in  conflict  with  President  Wilson, 
294 

reply  to  by  President  Wilson,  269 

on  Roosevelt  in  the  army,  363 
Cleveland,  President,  347 
Coal,  dirty,  48 

dumped  at  curb,  48 
Cochran,   W.   Bourke,   202,    203 
Colby,  Bainbridge 

for   liquid   efficiency,   179 

to  Russian  Bolshevists,   197 
Colleges  in  the  war,  431 
Collier's  Weekly 

Secretary  Wilson  in,  403 

on  wire  control,  151 
Commission    on    Camps,    170,    172, 

173 

Compensation  for  disability,  421 
erroneous  idea  on,  422 

Congressional  Record,  116,  305 

Connick,  Harris  D.  H.,  72 

"Conscientious    Objectors,"     26,    27, 
117,    231 

Constitution  week,  ignored  by  Presi- 
dent Wilson,  339 

"Constitutional  Government,"  380 

Co-ordination,   lack  of,   130 

Correspondents  of  newspapers,   160 


Cost-plus  system,  56 

Council    of    National    Defense,    29, 

170,   172,   399 

Court-martial   system,   135 
Covenant  of  League  of  Nations 
and  the  churches,  338 
Article  X  of,  337,  341 
propaganda  at  public  expense,  335 
Covenanters,  334 
Creel,  George 
book  excluded  library,  224 
chairman    committee   on   publicity, 

22,    109 

close  to  President  Wilson,  224 
failure   admitted,    155 
Minor  a  friend  of,  213 

a  representative  of,  211 
nd   propaganda   for  Administra- 
tion, 119 

for  Germany,  120 
quality  of  Americanism  of,  451 
resigned,  120 

Crime   during  Reconstruction,  418 
Crowder,  Enoch  H. 

on  meaning  of  draft,   57 
patriotic    record    tarnished    with- 
out cause,    137 
and  work-or-fight  order,  57 
Czernin,  Count,  237 

Daily  News,  Chicago,  283 
Daniels,  Secretary 

criticized,    171 

for  clean  men  in  navy,  172 

on  shipbuilding  records,  80 
Danzig,  286 

Day,  James  R.,  338,  344 
Daylight  saving,  45 
Debs,  Eugene,  62 
Deception,  official,  no 
Denman   and   Goethals,   68 
Densmore  report 

condemned  by  grand  jury,  207 

prepared  in  secret,  205 
Dent,  S.  Hubert,  in,  355,  360 
Department    of    Commerce,    401 
Dernberg,    Bernhard,    15,    223,    224, 

226 

Dillon,  E.  J.,  quoted,  379 
Dirty  coal,  48 
Draft,  the  service,  25 

meaning    of    second,    57 
Duluth  and  fuel  saving,  43 
Dumba,  Ambassador,  21,  22 
Du  Pont  Powder  Company,  406 

Ebert,   Herr,   quoted,  273 
Eddystone  plant,  406 


Index 


459 


Elections,  in  1916,  20 

President  Wilson's  appeal  in  1918, 

355 

reply  to  the  appeal,   356 

results  of  in  1918,  357 
Emergency  Fleet  Corporation,  69 
Employment  service 

aided   labor   policy,    56 

criticized,  409 

origin  of,   57,  408 

suspended,    408 
Edmonds,  Richard  H.,  405 
Educational  ideals,  416 
England,   at   beginning  of  the   war, 

9 

transported   American   troops,   82 
Enlisting   for   the    war,   25 
Espionage   Act,   229 
Evening    Mail,    New    York,    227 
"Evidence  in  the  Case,"  16 

Federal   Board  of  Training,  426 
Federal    judges    and    disloyalty,    229 
Federal   Trade   Commission's   report 

on    profiteering,    392 
Federal    trade    service,    40 
Field  order  ending  the  war,  434 
Fighters  and   labor,  61 
Flag-Day  address  of  President,  23 
Fleet  corporation,  67 
Food 

administrations  of  Allies,  37 

administration  of  after  war,  38 
charge  against,  39 

consumption  of  by  the  army,  34 

Control   Law,    29 

increase  of,  33 

law  for  control  proposed,  33 

prices,  36 

profiteering  in 
ancient,  39 
recent,  31,  392 

substitutes,   29,  36 

urgency  of,  28 
Ford,  Henry 

loses  Republican   primary,  354 

supported  pacifism,  18 
Fosdick,  Chairman,  173 
Fourteen  Points 

origin  of,   235 

in   peace  congress,   293 

in  peace  proposals,  237 

what  they  provide  for,  235 
France 

aided  America,  82 

and    war    loss,    322 

and  the  war's  start,  9 

militaristic,  said  Wilson,  322 


France,    thwarts   Bolshevism,    195 

treatment  of  after  war,  294 
Francis,  David  R.,  190 
Frankfurter,  Felix,  203 
Fuel 

price    of,    41,    47 

dirty  coal,  48 

saving  of,  42 
Fuel  Administration 

origin  of,  42 

outcry  against,  43 

Gardner,  Representative,  on  the  na- 
tional   security,    22 
Garfield,   Harry  A. 

appointed   Fuel    Administrator,  42 

criticism  of,  49 

fixed  fair  wages  for  miners,  63 

and  gasless  Sundays,  46 

not  responsible  for  fuel   shortage, 
49 

order   against  dirty  coal,  48 

order  to  deliver  at  curb,  48 

resigned  office,  63 

wisdom  of  course,  49 
Gasless  Sundays,  46 
Gas  failure   in  war,    127 
Garrison,    Secretary    of    War 

displaced,   18,   107 

energy  of  in  national  defense,  138 
Garretson,  A.  B.,  quoted,  412 
Geddes,  Sir  Eric,  71,  250 
Genoa  Conference,  220 
George,  Lloyd 

excused  peace  delays,  271,  285 

and  origin  of  the  Fourteen  Points, 

235 

on  ships'  importance,  66 

on  trying  the  kaiser,  277 

on    under-production,    62 
Gerhardt,  Mayer,  226 
German-American  Alliance,    12,    14, 

225 
Germanism    in    the    United    States, 

228 

Germans  loyal  to  United  States,  232 
German   societies  with  good  names, 

18 

German  universities,  teaching  of,  n 
Gilbert,  Joseph,  227 
Glasgow,  W.  A.,  33 
Goethals,  George  W.,  68 
Gompers,    Samuel 

labor  patriotic,  60 

and    Reconstruction,    410 

urged   support  of  Wilson,  410 
Grey,    Edward 

on  the  Covenant,  343,  367 


460 


Index 


Grey,  Edward,   a   storm  center,  9 
Governors   and   Mayors 

asked  to  give  employment,  415 

conference  of,  404,  408 
Gronna,  Senator,  226 
Grunau,  John,  59 

Habits  of  President  Wilson,  368 

Haldane,    Lord,    quoted,    170 

Hale,  William  B. 
American-mindedness       open       to 

question,    451 

among    President    Wilson's    eulo- 
gists,  193 

confidential   agent  of  Wilson,  230 
a   Hearst  writer,   228,   230 
publicity  writer  for  Germans,  228 
put  together  "New  Freedom,"  450 

Hanson,  Ole,  quoted,  219 

Hapgood,    Norman,    lauded   Wilson, 

i93 
Harding,  Warren  G. 

asks  as  to  shipbuilding,  73 
called      disarmament     conference, 

266 
called    unemployment    conference, 

415  t        u- 

on  appropriations  for  ships,  77 

inaugural  address  cited,  419 

Harvey,   George 

on    Secretary   Baker's   speech,    108 
on  Secretary  Baker's  delays,  115 

Harvey's    Weekly 
on    Herr    Ebert,    273 
misplaced  trust   in   Baker,   139 
on  Peace   Congress   delays,    271 
on    pro-Germanism,    229 
on  secrecy  in  Peace  Congress,  284 
on  sugar  profiteering,  396 

Hays,  Will  H.,  349 

Hearst   papers,    228,    231 

"He  kept  us  out  of  war,"  20 

Herron,  George  D. 
Quayle  on  appointment  of,  192 
Nicholas  M.  Butler  on,  192 
on  President  Wilson,  192 
on  the  social  revolution,  196 

Hertling,  Count,  237 

Hexamer,  J.  C.,  14 

Hill,  David  Jayne,  quoted,  340,  448 

Hillstrom  case,  210 

Hines,  Walker  D.,  Director-General 
and  Department  of  Commerce,  402 
explained  railroad  deficits,   104 
on   railroad   wage  increase,  95 
warned  railroad  strikers,  96 

Hodgson,  Captain  Samuel  H.,  135 

Hog  Island  shipyard,  70,  72,  75,  79 


Hoover,  Herbert  C. 
chairman   of  commission   on   food 

and   supply   and  prices,  28 
Food  Commissioner,  29 
workmanship  of  efficient,  29 

House,    Edward    M. 
confidential  clerk  of  Lloyd  George 
and    Mr.    Balfour    constantly 
with,  288 

diplomacy  of  extolled,  162 
on   peace  delegation,  262 
Secretary    Lansing    on,    316 

Hughes,   Charles  E. 

report  of,  on  War  Risk  Bureau,  427 
disarmament  proposals,  266 

Hunt,    Frazer,    301 

Hurley,  Edward  N. 
head  of  Shipping  Board,  69 
ignored  shipping  men,  70 
issued    erroneous   statements,   70 
neglected    existing   facilities,    69 
New    York    address,    70,    77 
no  defenders  of,  76 

Industrial   conference,   63 

Industrial      Relations      Commission 
aided   anarchy,   204 

Industry  on  unemployment,  409 

"Insurance,    Effects    of   War    upon," 
422 

Inner    Council,    277,    281 

Insurance  in  war 
amount  of,  421 

law  of  October  6,  1917,  on,  421 
President  Wilson  on  duty  to,  425 

International        Workers        Defense 
League,  202,  206,  208,  210 

Iron    Trade    Review    on    unemploy- 
ment, 409 

Jackson    Day   banquet,    312,    315 
Jefferson,    Thomas,    on   treaty   mak- 
ing,  302 
Johnson,  Hiram  W. 

followed     President     Wilson     on 

tour  for  Covenant,  340 
quizzed    the    President    on    secret 

treaties,    307 
Journal,  of  Providence,  16 

Kahn,    acted    chairman,    in 
Kaiser  to  President  Wilson,  12 

prosecution    of,    277,    280 
Kallen,    Horace  M.,   quoted,   388 
Kellogg,  Senator 

on  classifying  rail  workers,  54 

on    taking    over    wires,    149 

on   railroad   deficits,    104 


Index 


461 


Keynes,   John   M.,   quoted,    374,    380 
Kitchen,    Claude,    355,   360 

Labor,   decreased   production,  62,   78 
and    the    fighting   man,    60 
and    politics,    349 
was   it    loyal,    60 

Labor    policy    first    adopted,    56 

Labor  unions 

in  government  employment,   58 
sought  railroad  control,  92 

La  Follette,   Senator 

against  Lenroot's  nomination,   353 
answered  by  Roosevelt,  227 
St.    Paul    address    of,    227 

Land   for   fighters,  403 

Lane,    Franklin    K. 

in  Industrial  Conference,  63 
level-headed  in  work,  374 
planned    to    employ    fighters,    403 

Lane  Committee 

fixed    coal    prices,    41 
overturned  by  Secretary  Baker,  49 
report    of    Wage    Commission,    52 

Lansing,    Secretary 

as  peace  delegate,  262,  265 
contradicted  President  Wilson,  333 
harshness  of  Wilson   toward,    306 
on   kaiser's  culpability,  277 
saw   danger  of  peace   delays,   272 
witness    on    Covenant,    337 

Law,   Bonar,    251 

League   for    Preservation    of   Amer- 
ican   Independence,    36 

League  of  Nations 
constitution  read,  330 
fight   on   begins    in    America,    335 
at    Jackson    Day    dinner,    341 
in   the    past,    325 
in    the    Peace    Congress,    274 
people    question,    338 
people  stirred    against,   339 
propaganda  for,  335 
Roosevelt  on,  327 
to  be  entwined  in  Treaty,  330 
voted   on    in    Senate,    341,   342 
Wilson's  changing   views   on,   328 
Wilson  went  to  country  on,  337 

League  to  Enforce  Peace,  238 

Ledger,  Philadelphia,  193,  295 

Lee,  W.  G.,  59 

Lenroot,   Irvin   L. 

replies    to    disloyalty    charge,    351 
nominated,  353 

Letter  carriers,  140 

Lewis,  Senator 

campaign  aid  to  Wilson,  351 
on  peace  conversations,  247 


Lightless  Tuesdays,  45 
Lincoln    and    Wilson,    368-370 
Lindberg,    Charles   A.,   232 
Lindsley,   Henry  D. 

appointed,  War  Risk  Bureau,  427 

asked  to  resign,  427 

commander  American  Legion,  445 
Liquor 

"booze   versus   bread,"   179 

Congress  against,  177 

and    efficiency,    180 

execution  of  laws   against,   181 

favored  by  President  Wilson,   182 

and    German-American    Alliance, 
179,  225 

lawlessness  of,  176 

opponents  of,   180 

opposed  by  President  Wilson,  175 

prohibition  of  in  effect,  186 

Secretary  Baker's  appeal  to  elim- 
inate,   175 

Secretaries    Baker,    Daniels,     and 
McAdoo  on,  174-175 

supporters    of,    180 
Loans,    27 
Lodge,  Senator 

against    a    negotiated    peace,    253 

offered  resolution  on  powers  to  the 
President,    246 

on   suppression   of  news,   161,   163 

reply     to     Wilson     on     separate 

treaty,  305 
Lost  Battalion,   437 
Low,   A.  Maurice,   quoted,  375 
Lowell,  President 

on    the    Covenant,    331 

on  the  peace  drive,  238 
Loyalty    of    political    parties    com- 
pared,   357 
"Lusitania,"  the,    19,  22,   113,  430 

McAdoo,   William   G. 
accomplishments  of,  90 
appointed      Director-General      of 

Railroads,  84 
asked    five-year   Railroad   control, 

9i 
as    to    railroad    men    in    politics, 

.359 

devised  war  insurance  law,  420 
opposed  liquor  on  railroads,  175 
resigned  office,  91 

McLemore    resolution,    23 

McMaster,  John  B.,  quoted,   18,   24, 

Mail 

and  cost  of  periodicals 
curtailment  of  dispatches  of,  143 


462 


Index 


Mail,    delay    in    delivery,    143 

failure  of  investigated,   142 

force    in    defending,   418 

to  soldiers,  131 

zoning  of,  145 
Mail-planes,  152 
Makino,  Baron,  "not  too  proud  to 

fight,"  333 

Mann,  James  R.,   131 
Manufacturers'  Record,  405 
Marine  Brigade,  433 
Marshall,    Vice-President 

regretted  pacifist  measures,  244 

on     Bolshevism     in     the     United 

States,    220 

Martens,  Ludwig  C.  A.  K.,  214 
Mayors    and    Governors 

asked    to    employ    idle,    415 

conference  of,  404,   408 
Mediation  Commission,  report  of  on 

Mooney  case,  205 

"Men  everywhere"  and  Wilson,  369 
Merchants  Association  of  New  York, 

142 

Merchant   marine    low,    81 
Metropolitan  Opera   House   address, 

243 

Mexican  editors  at  White  House,  329 
Minor,  Robert  A.,   and  Administra- 
tion, 212 

Money-spending  riot,   411,   414 
Mooney,    Thomas   J.,    62,    201,    202, 

208,    212 

Morgan,    Postmaster,    348 
Morrow,  Harvey  W.,  229,  385 
Moses,    Senator 

gives   humorous  view   of   Treaty, 

302 

President  Wilson  to,  453 
questioned  President  Wilson,  308 
Municipal  inefficiency,  171 
Munitions,   failure,    122 

improvement  in  production  of,  126 
Mystery  of  Wilson,  366 

caused  by  "interpretations,"  366 

Nation,    The 

on    jazinary,    288 

suppressed,     159 

treats    on    suppression,    159 
National  Security  League  on  Creel's 

activities,  224 

Nebraska  pro-Germanism,  229 
Nelson,    Senator 

on   shipbuilding,   72 

veteran  loyalist,  227 
Neutrality  in  thought,  72 
"New  Freedom,"  the,  360,  450 


News  and  Mr.  Burleson,  159 
News,  The  Detroit,  160 
Newspapers 

arrogance  toward,   157,   158 

censored    news   of,   158 

humiliated,  164 

right  and  loyal,  168 

shackled,    156 

suppressed,    160 
New    Ulm,    228 
New  York  Merchants'  report  on  in- 

efficienct  mail   service,   143 
Non-Partisan  League 

defended  Berkman   and  Goldman, 
227 

disloyal,    232 

origin  of  in  North  Dakota,  226 

propaganda  of   in   North   Dakota, 
ii 

supported    by   Rumley   and   Creel, 

227 
North  American,  Philadelphia 

on    Belgium's   treatment    in   Peace 
Congress,  291 

on    government    railroading,    102, 


iroJit 


on  profiteering,  390,  394 

on  purposes  of   Samuel    Gompers, 

410 

on  suppression  of  news,  165 
on    Wilson's    nebulousness,    329 
sums   peace  conversations,   248 

North   American   Review 

on  "conscientious  objectors,"  118 
David    Jayne    Hill    in,     340,    448 
George   Rothwell    Brown    in,    156 
on  deficiency  in  production,  78 
quoted,     114 

Northcliffe,    Lord 
on  peace  conversations,  250 
on  Wilson's  going  to  Europe,  266 
thirteen   principles  of,    adopted   in 
Peace    Congress,   237 

North  Dakota,  propaganda  in,  n 

Official  Bulletin,  The,   154,   155,  203 

O'Hare,    Kate,    62,    227 

Official   denial,   the,    160 

Oklahoma,  draft  resistance  in,  27 

Olin,  John   M.,   Review  of  Mooney 
Case,  204 

O'Leary,  Jeremiah,  22 

Order  ending  fighting,  434 

Ordnance  collapse,    122 

Orlando,  Premier 

break  with  President  Wilson,  296 
on  the  inner  council,  271,  281 
and   Wilson's   Fiume   attitude,   294 


Index 


463 


Outcry   against  peace  conversations, 

246 

Overalls  crusade,  395,  414 
Owen,  Senator,   315 

Pacifism's  consequences,   24 
Pacifists    influenced    Administration, 

J9 
Palmer,    Attorney-General 

in   profiteer  prosecutions,   394 

prosecutions  of  violators  of  liquor 
laws,  186 

ruled  that  beer  was  medicine,  186 
Papen,    von,   23 
Paris  almost  taken,  22 
Peace  Congress 

announcement    of    President    Wil- 
son's intention  to  attend,  260 

commissioners  to,   262 

early  criticism  of,  274 

no  records  of,  299,  337 

opened,    267 

preliminary    meeting    for,    265 

preparation    for,    263 

propaganda  from,  295 

secrecy  of,  281,  283,  284 

threatened  break  in,  282,  297 

two    important    commissions-    ap- 
pointed by,  267 
Peace  conversations 

how  received,  250 

summarized,  248 
Peace  making 

false  propaganda  in,  295 

France    against    German    counter- 
proposals in,  273 

German     outcry     against     terms, 
272 

perils  of  delays  in,  272,  273 

public    opinion    affected    by    false 
propaganda  in,  295 

Senate    attacked   the   Covenant  in, 
275 

Wilson   against   France   in,   276 

Wilson  and  secrecy  in,  281 

Wilson's  delays  renewed  German 

hopes,  274 

Pennington,    Edmond,    90 
Pensions  paid  after  wars,  419 
Perils    in    peace    delays,    272 
Peterson,    James    A.,    227 
Phrasings  of  President  Wilson,   381 
Pittman,   Senator,  247 
Plattsburg  Camp,  21,   361 
Plumb    Plan,    94,    97 
Political  campaign  of  1916,  234,  347, 

349;   of  1918,  351 
Political  campaign  cards,  364 


Politics 

"is    adjourned,"    354 

camouflaged,  363 

in    price-fixing,   360 

interned,    356 
Preparation    for    war,    lack    of,    23, 

76 
Preparedness  day,  President  Wilson 

on,  23,  451 
Press   agent,   the,    160 
Post,  The,  Washington,  135 
Prices   in    reconstruction,   412 
Primary  elections,  Wilson  in,   350 
Prinkipo   Conference,    192,    193,    195, 

196,   198 
Profiteering 

among    laborers,    392 

ancient,    39 

due  to  preparation  failure,  389 

how  to  overcome  in  war,  391 

Federal    Trade    Commission's   Re- 
port on,  392 

in    government    contracts,    389 

in    rents,    390,    392 

in   sugar,    396 

outside  of  the  law,  389 

prosecutions    of    threatened,     392, 

394  . 

spasdomic  prosecutions,  395 
Prohibition 

execution  of  law,  181 

war-time  and  constitutional  in  op- 
eration, 1 86 

Wilson's  course  in,   181 
Propaganda 

extent   of,    1 1 

for    the    Covenant,    335 

for    Germany,    10 

for  Thomas  J.  Mooney,  204 

influence  of,   12,   13 

method  of,    15 

not   fully   known,    n 

purpose  of,  12 

revealed,   16 
Providence  Journal,  16 
Public    Health    Service,    174 
Public    information,    committee    on, 

109 
Public  Ledger,  Philadelphia,  295 

Quayle,  William  A. 
on  Bolshevism's  method,  193 
on    peace    conversations,    253 

Radical   publications   in   New   York, 

215 
Railroads 

employes  of,  in  politics,   359 


464 


Index 


Railroads,     government    control     of 

asked,  91 

aligning    of   forces  on,   92 
began,   84 
failure  of,  97 
regulative   process  under,  83 

restored    to    owners'    control,    103 
Railroad  Administration 

advanced   costs,    85 

conflicted      with      Department     of 
Commerce,    401 

courtesy   required  by,   88 

disillusionment    as   to    accomplish- 
ments, 90 

improved   service   of,    87 

McAdoo    director   of,    84 

methods  of,  87 

policy  of,  85 

and   railroad   officers,    85 

traffic  under,   89 

trained  women  agents,  88 
Railroad  Labor  Board,   105 
Railroad  Strike,  October,  1921,  65 
Rapallo   Treaty,    220 
Reconstruction 

aims  of  in  Great  Britain,  399 

and  the  banks,   415 

and  Bolshevism,  411 

and    business    men,    406 

Congress    at    Atlantic    City,    400, 

404 
Wilson's  address  to,  400 

and  Council  of  Defense,  399 

created    anxiety,    405 

and   crime,   418 

and  demands  of  social  justice,  416 

and  Department  of  Commerce,  401 

education  during,  416 

materialism  in,  417 

neglected,   400,   403 

prices    during,    412 

and  Secretary  Lane's  plan,  403 

spiritual  forces  during,  418 

unemployment   during,  406,  414 

wages  during,  409,  412 
Red  Cross  and   soldiers,   132,  443 
Redfield,    Secretary 

conflicted  with  Railroad  Adminis- 
tration,   401 

on    extending   trade,   402 
"Remember  Mooney,"  202 
Reparations,  German,  278 
Reptile   press,    163 
Responsibility,    evasions    of,    113 
"Review   of   Mooney   Case,"   204 
Rhinelander,  Bishop,  13,  14,  17 
Riot   of  spending,  411 
Robins,    Raymond,    189,    217 


Roosevelt,  Theodore 
combatted 

German-American  Alliance,  225 
Non-Partisan  League,  227 
pacifism,   156 

denied  army  service,   24,   360,  363 
desired  in  public  affairs,   19 
directed  American   thought,    17 
to    Felix    Frankfurter,    205 
missed   at  death,  270 
on  a  league  of  nations,  327 
on    loyalty,    quoted,    233 
statement  as  to  neutrality,  234,  430 
textbooks  misquoted,  234,  430 

Rumely,   Edward  A.,  227 

Russia,    greatest    loser    in    war,    190 

"Russian  Bolshevik  Revolution,"  236 

Scandals,   two    outstanding   of   war, 

121 

Schwab,  Charles  M.,  75 
S dent fie   American 

on    ignoring    General    Wood,    362 

on    mail    zoning,    145 
Secrecy  in  Peace  Congress,  281,  284 
Secret  Service,  224 
Secret  treaties,  307 
Self-determination,  291 
Senate  against  League  Covenant,  275 
Shantung,    286,    333 
Shipbuilders,    real,    69,    74 
Shipbuilding 

costs,    77 

Representative  Shirley  on,  78 

results  of  policy  of,  75,  77 

vast    plan    for,    79 

records  made  in,  80 
Shipping  Board 

accomplishments  of,  71 

created,  67 

deficit   of,    82 

headed  by  Hurley,  69 
Ships 

importance  of,  66 

loss    of,    68 

Shirley,    Representative,    78 
Sibert,  William  L.,  on  war  gas,  127 
Simmons,  Roger,  217 
Simonds,    G.    A.,    testimony    of,    216 
Sinking  of  vessels  by   Germany,   20 
Slackers  and  the  Administration,  230 
Smoot,  Senator,  353 
Smuts,  General,  drew  Covenant,  330 
Social  evil 

and  city  government,   171,   172 

and  the  public,  174 

and  training  camps,   173 

and  war,    172 


Index 


465 


Societies  during  the  war,  18 
Spirit    of    America 

artists  in,  443 

in    colleges,    431 

in  community  helpfulness,  441 

in  community   life,  447 

in  conduct  when  free,  440 

in  American  Legion,  445 

in  home   life,  442 

in  registration  for  service,  433 

in  relief  work,  442 

in  her  soldiers,  437,  439,  440,  442 

on    the   battlefield,    439 

President   Wilson    on,   437 

why   fighting  spirit,   447 
Spokane  loyalty  pledge,  445 
Sporting  goods  in  war,  435 
Spry,  Governor,  to  Wilson,  210 
Standing  by  the   President,    18 
Star,  The,  Kansas  City,  22,   316 

Montreal,  161 

Washington,    409 
State     Department     to     Austria     on 

peace  move,  241 

Steenerson,   Representative,    146,   147 
Steffens,   Lincoln 

American-mindedness  off  451 

commissioner  to  Bolshevists,  293 

with  Robert  A.  Minor,  212 
Stephens,  Governor,  to  Wilson,  209 
Stettinius,  Edward,  112 
Stevens,  Basil  M.,  118 
Stevenson,  Archibald,  112 
Strikes 

during  Reconstruction,   410 

on  wires,  148 

of  October,   1921,  65 
Sugar,  30,  36 
Sun,  New  York,  262 

Taft,  William  H. 

of  League  to  Enforce  Peace,  343 
on  stern  implacable  war,  238 
given  publicity   on   Covenant,    167 
with    Wilson    on    Covenant,    326, 

33i,  335 

Tank  failure,   127 
Teachers'  pay,  55 
Thirty-nine  senators,  331,  334 
Thomas,   Senator,   361 
Times,  New  York 

on  election  appeal,  357 

published    aircraft   report,    163 

punished,  161 
Tirpitz,  Admiral,  67 
Tonnage  of  the   world,  68 
"Too  proud  to  fight" 

Makino,  Baron,  333 


"Too  proud  to  fight,"  President  Wil- 
son,  20 

Tope,  Homer  W.,   178 
Tour  of  country  for  Covenant,  310, 

Townley,  Arthur  C.,  227 
Transcript,    Boston,    112 
Transportation  of  troops,  81,  134 
Treaty  of  Peace 

and  church  bodies,  312 

and    colleges,    312 

controversy    over    encouraged    by 

President  Wilson,   303-304 
execution  of,   321 
expounded    by    President    Wilson, 

308 

first  vote  on  by  Senate,  311 
Germany's  evasion  of,  322 
inconclusive,  321 
how   made   up,   302 
leaked    to    America,    301 
presented    to   the    Senate   by  Pre- 
sident Wilson,  303 
provisions  of,  319 
provoked  bitter  contest,  304 
read    to    the    Senate    by    Senator 

Borah,    301 
rejection 
first  time,   312 
responsibility  for,  313,  315 
second  time,  313,  315 
stages  of  antagonism  to,  304 
Treaty  with  France  withheld,  316 
Tribune,  The,   Chicago 
and    Ford's   suit,    352 
Frazer     Hunt,     correspondent    of, 

and  leaking  of  Treaty,  301 
Tribune,  The,  New  York 
poll    on   Italian   crisis,    297 
on  Wilson's  European  trip,  261 
on  Wilson's  publicity  abroad,  282 
Tumulty,  Private  Secretary,  212 

Unemployment,   406,  409,  414 
Unionizing  government  service,  58 
United    German-American    Societies, 


Van  Buren,   D.  C.,   218 

Van  Dyke.,  Henry,  16,  17,  239,  256 

Vanderlip,  Frank  A.,  272 

Venereal   disease,    170 

Venizelos,  Premier,  291,  292 

Veterans  Bureau,  423 

Veto,    advance,    358 

Vice  in   war,   170,   174 

Vienna   Congress,  271 


466 


Index 


Vocational  Training  Board 
denied  charge  of  neglect,  426 
eligibles  recognized  by,  426 
failure  to  aid  men  charged,  426 

Vollmer,  Henry,  22 

Wadsworth,   Senator,   116 

Wages  of  railroad  employes,   54 

Walsh,  Frank  P.,  204 

War  Department 

neglect  in  casualty  lists,  132 
failure  in  munitions  program,  122 
improvement  in  munitions,  127 

War  diet,  29 

War  Risk  Bureau 

administration  force '  resigned,  427 

complaints  against,  426 

failure  of,  427 

growth  of,  424 

Lindsley,   Henry  D.,   director,  427 

origin   of,  424 

War  Weekly 

on  Germanism  in  America,  229 
on  Secretary  Baker's  delays,  115 
on  Secretary  Baker's  speech,  108 
on    treatment    of    Leonard    Wood, 
361 

Watterson,  Henry,  151,  331 

White,  Henry  D.,  262 

White   House  conferences,   307,   311, 

337 

Whittlesey,  Charles  W.,  437 
Wilson,  Secretary  of  Labor 
and  Densmore  report,  207 
chairman     mediation     commission, 

203 
shielded  those  making  false  report 

in  Mooney  case,   207 
on  trade  extension,  402 
Wilson,  President 

address  of  at  Manchester,  269 
address  to  D.  A.  R.,  371 
appealed  to  class  spirit,  359 
cold   in   manner,   369 
and  "common  counsel,"  373,  378 
compared  with  Lincoln,  368-370 
created   divisions,   376 
demand    as    to    critical    publica- 
tions, 164 

destructive  in  type,  375 
disloyalty  struck  by,  23 
disregarded  people's  appeals,  53 
first  draftees  addressed  by,  26 
explained  Article  X  in  Treaty,  308 
flag-day  address,  23 
followed  by  Senator  Johnson,  340 
handiwork  of  in  Treaty,  286 
haughty,  375 


President    Wilson,    headed    flag-day 

parade,  23 

heeded  organized  labor,  51 
held  people's  confidence,  450 
ignorant  of  secret  treaties,  307 
incapable  of  team  work,  374 
and  internationalism,   382 
and    "interpreters,"    366,     371 
intervened  to  save  Mooney,  208 
influence  of  in  primaries,  350 
man  of  mystery,  366 
mental  perversity  of,  378 
method  of  work,  368 
and  nationalism,  380 
neutrality  address,  14 
and  personal  government,  375,  385 
personal   relations  of,    368 
phrasings  of,  described,  381 
place   of   in    history,    384 
political  appeal  of  in  1918,  355 
reply  of  to  Clemenceau,  269 
results  of  labor  policy  of,  59 
self-confidence  of,   373 
spoke  in  the  abstract,  368 
taken  ill  on  Covenant  tour,  340 
taking  wrong  side,  481 
urged  to  hear  General  Wood,  361 
unfair   to  the   nation,    16 
vacillating,  395 

Wilsonia,  291 

Wilsonism  defined,  385 

Wire    control 
chaos  in,  146 
criticized,  145,  146 
method  of  taking  over,  150 
news  wire,  159 
purpose  of  taking  over,   151 
rates  increased  under,  146 
returned  to  private  control,  151 
request  of  Burleson  in  taking  con  • 

trol,  145 
strikes  under,  148 

Wiseman,  Sir  William,  288 

Wood,  General  Leonard,  21,  361,  362 

World,  The,  New  York 
on  court-martial   system,  135 
on  Creel  and  the  Official  Bulletin, 

155 

on   President   Wilson's    1918    elec- 
tion appeal,  357 

on  prohibition  enforcement  at  in- 
ception, 1 86 
on  wire  control,   151 
Workingmen,  British,  on  war,  237 
Work-or-fight    policy,    57 

Zimmerman   notes,    21,   226 
Zone  system  of  mail,  144 


THE  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARY 
UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA,  SANTA  CRUZ 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  DATE  stamped  below. 


MAY  25  1968 


NOV  3    RECX 


MAY    5  1982  REC'D 

UUP  9  88 

....         f\ 

Jim  1  0  1988 


100m-8,'65(F6282s8)2373 


E766.Y5 


3  "YOG  00062  3402 


